




Selected Works of D. T. Suzuki

VOLUME IV: BUDDHIST STUDIES

MARK L. BLUM
VOLUME EDITOR

RICHARD M. JAFFE
GENERAL EDITOR



Published in association with the Buddhist Society Trust.



The publisher gratefully acknowledges the generous contribution
to this book provided by the Great Britain Sasakawa Foundation.

Selected Works of D. T. Suzuki,
Volume IV

大



Selected Works of D. T. Suzuki, Volume IV

Buddhist Studies

Volume Editor

Mark L. Blum

General Editor

Richard M. Jaffe

Published in association with The Buddhist Society Trust



UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS

University of California Press
Oakland, California

© 2021 by The Buddhist Society Trust as agent for the Matsugaoka Library
Foundation; and Mark L. Blum.

Frontispiece: *Kū* 空 (Emptiness). Calligraphy by Suzuki Daisetsu. Courtesy
of Matsugaoka Bunko.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Suzuki, Daisetz Teitaro, 1870–1966, author.

[Works. Selections. English. 2014]

Selected works of D. T. Suzuki / edited by Richard M. Jaffe.

volumes cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Contents: Volume 1. Zen.—Volume 2. Pure Land.—Volume 3.

Comparative Religion.—Volume 4. Buddhist Studies

ISBN 978-0-520-26918-7 (cloth : alk. paper)—

ISBN 978-0-520-97667-2 (ebook)

1. Suzuki, Daisetz Teitaro, 1870–1966—Translations into English.

2. Zen Buddhism. I. Jaffe, Richard M., 1954– editor of compilation.

II. Title.

BQ9266.S93 2014

294.3'927—dc23

2014012088

Manufactured in the United States of America

29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

*Dedicated to Luis Gómez,
friend, mentor, inspiration*

CONTENTS

<i>Acknowledgments</i>	ix
<i>Introduction by Mark L. Blum</i>	xi
<i>Editorial Note</i>	xxv

PART ONE. EARLY YEARS

1. The Mādhyamika School in China, 1898	3
2. The Breadth of Buddhism, 1900	11
3. Translator's Preface to the Awakening of Faith, 1900	14
4. Articles from Light of Dharma, 1902–1907	17
5. The First Convocation of Buddhism, 1904	27
6. Philosophy of the Yogācāra, 1904	44
7. <i>Excerpts from</i> Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism, 1907	58
8. The Development of Mahāyāna Buddhism, 1909	65

PART TWO. ŌTANI YEARS

9. The Buddha in Mahāyāna Buddhism, 1921	79
10. Notes on the Avataṃsaka Sutra, 1921	88
11. Enlightenment and Ignorance, 1924	92
12. Zen and the Assertion that Mahāyāna Was Not Preached by the Buddha, 1926	111

13. Passivity in the Buddhist Life, 1930	118
14. Mahayana and Hinayana Buddhism, or the Bodhisattva-Ideal and the Śrāvaka-Ideal as Distinguished in the Opening Chapter of the <i>Gaṇḍavyūha</i> , 1932	150
15. Impressions of Chinese Buddhism, 1935	165

PART THREE. MATURE YEARS

16. The Logic of Affirmation-in-Negation, 1940	181
17. The International Mission of Mahayana Buddhism, 1943	186
18. <i>Excerpts from</i> The Essence of Buddhism, 1946	198
19. The Buddhist Conception of Reality, 1974	219

<i>Notes</i>	237
<i>Glossary</i>	261
<i>Bibliography</i>	267
<i>Index</i>	271

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It was at a religion conference when Richard Jaffe approached both myself and Luis Gómez about working on this volume. Luis and I both immediately responded positively and then proceeded to sit down for a long conversation about what Suzuki meant to us when we were first studying Buddhism and that it would be an honor of sorts to repay this by putting together a volume of his writings that affected each of us then as well as those works that today remain noteworthy. At the same time, we were in agreement that much of his scholarship seems very dated today and therefore a retrospective of Suzuki's writings in the field of Buddhist Studies could also become to some degree a look at the history of our own field in the twentieth century. Our work together only reached the stage of drawing up a list of possible writings to include before we could even read them and report back to each other on our choices. Luis became overcome by his illness and our progress ground to a halt. In the end, the choice of writings, what part of those writings to include, and all editorial decisions about formatting, spelling corrections, added notes, and so forth were mine alone. Therefore, whatever problems or insufficiencies become evident in this book are my responsibility and mine alone.

I cannot speak for Luis, but my exposure to Suzuki began in the very first Buddhism course I took as an undergraduate with Miyuki Mokusen when I read *Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism*. Over time I devoured all three of his *Essays in Zen Buddhism* and was particularly impressed with *The Zen Doctrine of No Mind* and his *Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra*. By sheer accident, I was studying at Kyoto University where visiting professor Bandō Shōjun invited me to The Eastern Buddhist Society for their seminar on Suzuki's translation of the first four fascicles of Shinran's *Kyōgyōshinshō*. Thus began my own long relationship with that noble

institution, and today I sit on their editorial board. This is only one of the many things that Bandō-sensei gave to me for which I never had a chance to express my gratitude while he was with us. I am also grateful to Honda Hiroyuki and his team for critically examining Suzuki's manuscripts of that translation, producing a new critical edition, and for Cynthia Read and Oxford University Press for publishing that new edition, in the process making available that remarkable achievement that had been out of print for nearly forty years.

Suzuki was a complicated man, and I am deeply indebted to a number of people who have enlightened me by sharing their research into aspects of his writing I had not known about, as well as details of his personal life that help round out my own knowledge of someone who even among Japanese scholars remains enigmatic. I feel deeply grateful to Satō Taira and Mihoko Okamura for the stories they shared with me about their time with Suzuki in his final years, affording me a sense of personal connection, however secondhand it may actually be.

In addition to the critical discussions that I shared with Luis, I have learned a great deal from the many conversations about Suzuki I have had with Wayne Yokoyama, Richard Jaffe, James Dobbins, Sueki Fumihiko, Yoshinaga Shin'ichi, Moriya Tomoe, and Brian Victoria. Everyone, it seems, has a different perspective on who this man was and the nature of his contribution to the modern understanding of Buddhism. The staff associated with both the Matsugaoka Bunko in Kamakura and the D. T. Suzuki Museum in Kanazawa have been welcoming and generous. And I am particularly indebted to the Matsugaoka Bunko for their permission to use the calligraphy as the frontispiece to this volume. Wayne Yokoyama has also made innumerable editorial suggestions.

My wife Theresa Austin has been exceedingly patient and supportive of this project, and for this and so much more my gratitude will never end.

INTRODUCTION

Prosaic moderners, however, ask for something concise and directly to the point.

—DAISETZ SUZUKI

As the other volumes in this series have amply demonstrated, Suzuki Daisetsu Teitarō (1870–1966) was arguably the preeminent Asian spokesman for the Buddhist religion to the West in the twentieth century. Suzuki brought forth an impressive array of communicative talents in pursuing this role and was not shy about using his native Japanese heritage, education, and religious training to shore up his bona fides in this effort. An important part of Suzuki's legacy falls under the rubric of Buddhist Studies, the main focus of this volume. Unlike particular sectarian traditions like Zen or Pure Land, or the lively contemporary field of Comparative Religion where there is a broad sense of freedom as to what topics are deemed relevant, Buddhist Studies in Suzuki's time largely centered on the philology of canonical texts and their exegesis, with a heavy focus on doctrine. Suzuki's approach to Buddhist Studies followed this same path, at least before World War II. That is, he edited and translated classics and also presented summaries and studies of doctrines with examples of the influence of those doctrines in Chinese and Japanese tradition. What marks Suzuki as standing outside normative Buddhist Studies as a professional, academic discipline is the fact that he does not expand his text-critical apparatus after his *Laṅkāvatāra* and *Gaṇḍavyūha* studies published between 1930 and 1936. Note that the so-called Peking or "Suzuki" edition of the Tibetan canon published between 1955 and 1964 was a product of the Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute under the supervision of the Suzuki Foundation (Suzuki Gakujutsu Shinkōkai); there is nothing to suggest that it was edited by Suzuki himself, despite his name appearing as senior editor.¹ Although criticized for his idiosyncratic and somewhat shotgun approach in *Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism* (1907), after WWII he returned to similar textbook-like explanations of Buddhist systems of thought as

defined by a set of specific doctrines that he selected from among canonical texts long considered representative by Japanese tradition.

Suzuki Teitarō was born the youngest of five children into a samurai-class family in 1870 in Kanazawa, the capital of Ishikawa prefecture, located north of Kyoto on the Sea of Japan. His father's family had been physicians to the local rulers for generations and were associated with Rinzai Zen. When Suzuki Teitarō was six, however, his father died, plunging the family into poverty. The Shin sect of Pure Land Buddhism is pervasive in this area, and his mother at some point joined an underground branch of this tradition (*hiji bōmon*) considered heretical. Suzuki recalled her taking him as an eight-year-old boy to a secret, candlelit ceremony where rhythmic chanting of *nenbutsu* would lead to religious experiences among individuals in the room. At seventeen he dropped out of secondary school due to financial hardship, but because of his devoted study of English and the Chinese classics, he secured work as an English tutor. Suzuki also had a number of interactions as a teenager with Christian missionaries that seemed to leave him with some degree of antagonism toward an arrogance he saw embodied in that tradition.

When he was fifteen, he was inspired by the new mathematics teacher at his school who also happened to be a student of Imakita Kōsen (1816–1892), a famed teacher of Rinzai Zen at Engakuji in Kamakura. This led him to seek out Zen training at a temple in the area. At the age of twenty, his mother died, after which he moved in with his brother in Kobe. With his brother's support, the next year he moved to Tokyo to study at what would later become Waseda University. The following year he joined his childhood friend Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945) as *senkasei* at Tokyo Imperial University, both of them majoring in Philosophy. In those days, the imperial universities had a dual admissions system based on the ranking of one's secondary education, and Suzuki was in the lower of the two ranks, today akin to a nonmatriculating "special student," meaning no chance of graduation and limited access to classes and library facilities.² Probably not enjoying his second-class status at the university, he was not successful as a college student. Instead, Suzuki spent most of his time at college pursuing assiduous Zen practice at Engakuji under Imakita and then Shaku Sōen (1859–1919) after Imakita died in early 1892.

Sōen met Paul Carus (1852–1919) in Chicago at the World's Parliament of Religions in 1893. Carus asked Sōen to send someone to work at his publishing house and exchange ideas with Carus and others. Sōen initially had another student in mind, but ended up sending Suzuki. After a brief stay in San Francisco in 1897, Suzuki moved to LaSalle outside Chicago to work with Carus at Open Court Publishing Company, where he remained until 1906. That year he met up with Sōen in San Francisco and they traveled together to the East Coast, where Suzuki acted as interpreter for Sōen's talks in Boston, New York, and elsewhere. This is when he met his future wife, Beatrice Lane (1875–1939). During this period Suzuki published *Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism*, marking the end of his tenure with Carus

and life in the States. In 1908 at the age of thirty-eight, Suzuki traveled to Paris, where he made handwritten copies of Dunhuang materials in the Pelliot Collection. He then proceeded on to London, invited by the Swedenborg Society to begin a project translating their materials into Japanese.

In 1909 Suzuki returned to Tokyo and found work as a lecturer of English at Gakushūin, an elite private school with deep ties to the aristocracy and the imperial family. In 1911, Suzuki sent for Beatrice, and they were married at the U.S. consulate in Yokohama soon after her arrival in Japan. At this time, 1910, he met Sasaki Gesshō, a Yogācāra scholar who managed to create a position for him at Ōtani University after Suzuki lost his position at Gakushūin. In 1921, at the age of fifty-two, under the leadership of Nanjō Bun'yū (1849–1927) as university president, Suzuki moved to Kyoto and began a twenty-year period as professor of Buddhist Philosophy at Ōtani. Nishida had established himself at Kyoto University in 1910. As part of his contract Suzuki negotiated for the establishment of *The Eastern Buddhist*, the first English-language Buddhist journal dedicated to Mahāyāna Buddhism.³ The initial editorial committee included Sasaki, Yamabe Shūgaku, and Akanuma Chizen, but his wife Beatrice also played a major role.

During his time at Ōtani, Suzuki published a great deal in both Japanese and English. This included his English-language translation and study of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, which led to him being awarded a doctorate, his three-volume *Essays in Zen Buddhism* as well as *Manual of Zen Buddhism*, which sold widely. He was invited to speak at the World Congress of Faiths held in London in 1936; in attendance were Alan Watts and Christmas Humphreys, who would later devote considerable effort to spread the Suzuki view of Zen and Buddhism as a whole. Supported by the Foreign Ministry of Japan, this trip was extended so that Suzuki could also speak at a number of British and American universities. The notes from these talks were then collected and published as *Zen and Its Influence on Japanese Culture*, published by The Eastern Buddhist Society in 1938; the book was quickly translated into Japanese by Kitagawa Momoo for Iwanami and immediately sold out.

The tragedy of the war years, 1939–1945, was compounded by the death of his wife and the suspension of the university. In 1940 Suzuki returned to Kamakura and his residence in a corner of the Engakuji monastic compound, which remained his home until his death in 1966. There were no English-language publications from 1939 to 1945.

After the war, despite his age (he turned seventy-five in 1945) Suzuki returned to a remarkably robust career both in Japan and abroad, undoubtedly due to a combination of his widespread fame and an international hunger for a new paradigm of religious refuge, which many saw in Suzuki's often decontextualized approach to Buddhism. Within Japan, he somehow survived the war years with his reputation intact and achieved a position as the preeminent spokesman for Japanese Buddhism as a whole. Within a year of the war's end, the Court invited him

to deliver two lectures to the Emperor of Japan in April 1946. Already conscious of his international audience, Suzuki first published these in English; they are included here under the English title he gave them, *Essence of Buddhism*. Only afterward did he publish them in Japanese. In 1949 he was the first scholar working on religion to be awarded the National Medal of Culture (*bunka kunshō*), noteworthy in that the award was not for his work in comparative religion or Zen, but for his contribution to Buddhist Studies. That year he restarted *The Eastern Buddhist* and then in June went to Hawai‘i for a conference at the University of Hawai‘i that led to a lectureship there that fall semester. In 1950 he moved to California, teaching at the Claremont Graduate School for one year, and then moved to New York at the invitation of Columbia University, where he taught on and off between 1951 and 1957. Despite being in his eighties, in the 1950s Suzuki continued to travel extensively, giving lectures at various universities and conferences in Hawai‘i, the mainland United States, Mexico, and Europe, only returning to Kamakura in 1958 where he remained until his death in 1966 at the age of ninety-five. A great Suzuki archive is now kept at the Matsugaoka Bunko, the site of his residence.

SUZUKI’S EXPOSURE TO BUDDHIST STUDIES

It is this editor’s conclusion that the influence of Japanese traditional scholarship on Buddhism was heavily determinant of how Suzuki conceived his role as Buddhist scholar. Although the academic discipline of Buddhist Studies was originally conceived in the West as a methodology for studying the East, it dovetailed well with traditional exegetical scholarship of Buddhist doctrine across many Asian cultures whose origins date from Abhidharma studies in India. Known in the modern period as *shūgaku* or *kyōgaku*, this approach became highly critical in the Edo period when Buddhist seminaries sought to clarify the curriculum that was taught to their clergy in training, at times leading to heated debates over the authority of specific texts or interpretations, but this scholastic approach also went beyond narrow sectarian concerns to canonical materials as a whole. Such questioning led to the creation of critical editions of texts and treatises on what the authoritative readings of those texts should be, based on “higher criticism” of historical sources, and extended to systems of monastic training, meditative and liturgical practices, visual culture, and “services” performed for lay followers, including funerary rituals and institutional structures. This led to a great deal of published scholarship, at times producing polemic writings over the provenance of a text or the appropriateness of a particular hermeneutic that could even lead to physical violence between interpretive factions.

In the modern period, *kyōgaku* became the basis for *bukkyōgaku* (Buddhist Studies). Looking back at how both developed in the century between 1850 and 1950, we see that the parallels are striking, particularly the text-centered approach that almost entirely ignored material culture, social ethics, and almost anything of

a political nature such as institutional structure, positioning vis-à-vis government policies, financial accountability, and so forth. Starting in the late Meiji period, this background led to many Buddhist scholars in modern Japan doing text-critical work on texts at the core of the development of Buddhism in India *and* from their own sectarian traditions. For example, eminent scholars like Nanjō Bun'yū and Akanuma Chizen, known outside Japan primarily as Indologists/Sanskritists, also routinely published critical, influential works on texts representative of their own sectarian traditions.⁴ Works by Japanese scholars on representative Buddhist texts grew robustly in the early twentieth century, and most of these scholars were supported by some form of sectarian affiliation. Suzuki's dependence on the scholarship of his Japanese peers is all too frequently overlooked in appraisals of his English-language oeuvre, but without it, his enormous output in the realm of Buddhist Studies would have been impossible.

In this way, *kyōgaku* methodology was applied to a much wider range of textual materials than one would see in Edo-period scholarship, from “pre-Mahāyāna” Āgamas to mainstream Mahāyāna sutras used by all schools of Buddhism, such as *Prajñāpāramitā*, *Huayan/Avatamsaka*, *Suvarṇaprabhāṣa*, *Vajracchedika*, *Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa*, and so forth.

A good example of how this worked can be seen in what amounts to a monograph summarizing the contents of the sixty-volume *Huayan jing/Kegonkyō/Avatamsaka Sutra* that Suzuki published serially in the first four issues of the first volume of *The Eastern Buddhist*, beginning in May 1921. He called this, “The Avatamsaka Sutra (Epitomised).” In a footnote on the first page of the first installment he explains there are three Chinese translations identified as different forms of the so-called *Huayan jing*, adding that they are long and repetitive; he then concludes the footnote with the statement quoted in the epigraph about “prosaic moderners” seeking concise presentations of teachings. He adds, “A Japanese digest of the ‘Sixty Kegon’ has been prepared by two competent scholars, Professors Shugaku Yamabe and Chizen Akanuma”; he names the publisher, and then concludes: “The English is by D. T. Suzuki.” Looking into this matter, what Suzuki apparently meant by this statement was that he had access to a Japanese-language summary of the sixty-fascicle Chinese translation prepared by Yamabe and Akanuma that he would be using as a guide to his selection of what to translate, but his efforts have gone into English rather than into modern Japanese. Under the direction of Kizu Muan, these two younger scholars produced a number of summaries and selected “highlights” from famous scriptures in the Chinese-language Buddhist canon for a volume published four years later called *Shin'yaku Bukkyō seiten* (New Translation of Buddhist Scriptures).⁵ Suzuki followed their choices of which Chinese translation to use, and most of the material he translated can be found in the edited version of their material in that *seiten*.⁶

This fact is relevant to our understanding of Suzuki's oeuvre not only because it gives us insight into how the availability of detailed and historically nuanced

secondary scholarship on topics related to Mahāyāna doctrine made it possible for him to write so much on so many complex subjects, but also because it helps situate him within a certain tradition of scholarship motivated by decidedly religious, even missionary, zeal, and, just as importantly, it reflects his fondness for writing *digests*, summaries of “the main points” that define the philosophy and religious insight in the forms of Buddhism he chose to study. Some of these are far more erudite than others, and specialists in various subfields of Buddhist Studies often regard his repeated attempts to be comprehensive as problematic. Today, his writings on Indian Buddhism present a variety of problems for specialists, particularly his take on Yogācāra and his monistic assertions about “the will of the Dharmakāya,” which have been criticized as reductionist or Vedantic, yet his insight into the logic of *sokuhi* (“affirmation in negation”), a linguistic expression commonly found in Chinese translations of *prajñāpāramitā* materials, is undeniably brilliant and has proved deeply inspirational to scholars associated with the Kyoto School of philosophy.

Some of his notable responses to advances in Japanese scholarship never appeared in his English-language writing. Although this volume makes no attempt to represent his vast production in Japanese, three essays originally published only in Japanese have been selected for inclusion here because they stand out as noteworthy. First is a 1926 piece illustrating his reflective response to a prevailing theory among a number of high-profile Japanese scholars of Indian Buddhism in the early twentieth century that the Mahāyāna sutras were not *buddhavacana*, that is, they were not sermons actually given by the Śākyamuni. The second and third essays date from the 1940s—his theory of the logic of *sokuhi*, and his sense of mission in spreading Mahāyāna throughout the world.

Another way in which premodern *kyōgaku* permeates his approach can be seen in Suzuki’s choice of what to write about in explicating “Buddhism” itself. The near total absence of historical context in these writings is striking but again reflective of the traditional *kyōgaku* approach that limited its focus to texts and doctrines. Suzuki liked to say that Zen discourse represented Mahāyāna as a whole, which presumably explains the considerable time he devoted to Mahāyāna texts that played major roles in the formation of Zen doctrine, such as the *Awakening of Faith*, *Diamond Sutra*, *Laṅkāvatāra*, and the *Avataṃsaka*. His postwar work on texts in the Shin tradition also reflects similar statements about the centrality of Pure Land thought in the Japanese Buddhist tradition, a fact that becomes increasingly salient in the last twenty years of his life. In general, unless under a named topic that differs, Suzuki’s writings rarely venture outside the normative texts that Japanese traditions of Zen and Pure Land use, and his felt need to include Buddhist terms in Sanskrit (and at times Pāli) appears to suggest an agenda arguing that these particular traditions were representative of “mature” forms of Buddhism that somehow included India, despite the fact that historically Chan/Zen and Pure Land thinkers only used Chinese forms of Indic terminology.

Born in 1870, Suzuki came of age just when a whole host of changes were happening to the Japanese conception of Buddhism and how to study it that raised a great many questions but also provided unprecedented opportunities. From its inception as an academic discipline, Buddhist Studies has always oriented itself in a way that begins with the founding of the religion in India and its historical developments. Indeed, the founding of the discipline in mid-nineteenth-century Europe comes out of an engagement with Buddhist texts written in Sanskrit and Prakrit, or Middle Indo-Āryan. It is worth noting in this regard that prior to the Meiji period (1868–1912) Japan only had secondhand knowledge of India. Although there is mention of Indians reaching Japan in the Nara period, with the exception of Tenjiku Tokubē (1612?–1707?), there is no record of any Japanese person traveling to India, returning to Japan, and relating what he saw and experienced.⁷ The embedding of Buddhism in Japanese cultural history as an international religion was first and foremost through the medium of the Chinese language, a historical process that greatly enriched the Japanese language conceptually and terminologically, but as modernization quickened, the received wisdom about the authority of the Chinese-language Buddhist canon became problematized. The seeds of this critical outlook can be seen in the Edo period when, perhaps initially influenced by *rangaku* and the Tokubē legend, Japan welcomed a series of significant changes in the conception and reverence for Buddhist scriptures. The most salient are the attempts by Jiun (1718–1804) to reach India through scholarship by compiling with his students a one-thousand-fascicle collection of Indic-language materials in Japan called *Bongaku shinryō*, Japan creating its first fully *printed* Buddhist canon, critical editions of Chinese and Japanese texts for what would become sectarian canons, the methodology of Confucian “evidential learning” (*kōshōgaku*, Ch. *kaozheng xue*) deeply affecting Buddhist scholarship, and Jiun’s contemporary Tominaga Nakamoto (1715–1746) arguing persuasively that all forms of religious or philosophical “thought” were heavily shaped by social and cultural conditions.

Thus there was already a significant move toward modernization of Buddhist scholarship prior to the Meiji Restoration.⁸ It is also noteworthy that the first Japanese students to go abroad to learn how to read Buddhist texts in their Indic forms, namely, Nanjō Bun’yū (1849–1927) and Kasahara Kenju (1852–1883), went not to India but to England in 1876 to study with Max Müller at Oxford. Although there would be later Japanese individuals who did study in India, the examples of Nanjō and Kasahara suggest that the importance of the study of Buddhist texts in Indic languages was motivated just as much, if not more so, by the need to participate in the European discipline of “Buddhist Studies” as by the need to learn firsthand how Indians read Indian-language texts. In 1883, when Suzuki was just thirteen years old and avidly studying English, Nanjō published in English a breakthrough contribution to Buddhist Studies, *A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka*. Not only was this the first English-language catalog of the

scriptures in a version of the Chinese-language canon (*Dainihon kōtei daizōkyō*) in the process of being edited for publication some forty years before the Taisho Tripiṭaka, but also in it Nanjō supplies his reconstructions of Sanskrit titles of hundreds of Buddhist texts only known previously in East Asia by their Chinese translations. This was a bold first step in linking scholastic knowledge about Buddhist traditions in East Asia with Buddhist traditions in India, and the fact that it was done in English by a Japanese scholar at a time when very few, if any, Western scholars of Buddhism knew Japanese, marks this as a powerful entry of Japanese Buddhist scholarship onto the world stage. Until it was superseded by Lancaster's catalog of the Korean canon nearly a century later,⁹ Nanjō's catalog remained the standard, Western-language reference work for individual scriptures in Chinese-language Buddhist canons.

This history shows us the context of Suzuki's ambition to become a player in Buddhist Studies with facility in English. When his Zen teacher Shaku Sōen (1859–1919) was invited to the 1893 Chicago World's Parliament of Religions, he asked Suzuki to translate his talk on causality. At that event Sōen met Paul Carus, which inspired the latter to publish *The Gospel of Buddha* in 1894, which in turn led to a twenty-five-year-old Suzuki publishing a Japanese translation of *Gospel* only a year later.¹⁰

Suzuki was thus exposed to the newly emerging field of Buddhist Studies in a nonsectarian context at the university, for Nanjō was a part-time lecturer at the school and there was a flurry of Buddhist Studies going on while Suzuki was a student. One of the oddities of his career decisions was his choice neither to ordain as a Rinzai monk nor to pursue an academic career despite opportunities to do both. Not only did he not apply himself at university, but also when Carus arranged for him to study at the newly formed University of Chicago, he declined. Thus despite being deeply influenced by professional scholars working in both universities and seminaries, Suzuki's approach to Buddhist Studies is marked by a bold assertion of his own point of view, showing respect for but not adherence to any particular teacher or person of authority well-situated in a university program, monastic setting, institutional seminary, or even in the publishing world like Carus. At the same time he clearly saw the value and importance of the discipline of Buddhist Studies and did his best to absorb knowledge from people working in this field, for he was close to people who did Buddhist textual studies in Tokyo, Kamakura, LaSalle, and Kyoto.

TEXTS AND TEACHINGS

Let us begin this section with mention of what we do not find in his Buddhological writings: the political or economic aspects of the Buddhist tradition, concern for gender issues, visual culture, text-critical or linguistic problems, or even the materiality of the texts themselves. It is particularly noteworthy that Suzuki shows little concern for text-critical issues. Although he respects the fact that there were mul-

tiple Chinese translations of Indic texts, when he chose a text to work on, he seems to have accepted the received form in its canonical edition and does not ask where a text came from. In Suzuki's time this initially meant accepting the authority of the editions found in the *Dainihon kōtei daizōkyō* mentioned above; in the Shōwa period he shifted to using the *Taishō canon*.¹¹ Suzuki typically did not, for example, compare a text in its modern printed canonical form with the same work as preserved in the well-circulating popular editions known as *rufubon*, which might have shown him linguistic differences, even though we know he also used Edo- or Meiji-period xylograph printings. Either he did not notice discrepancies between these two forms or he simply did not care.

Given the enormity of the Buddhist canon, especially in Chinese, knowing which scriptures and which teachings in those scriptures Suzuki focused on tells us a great deal about his motivation for work in this area. Although today he is best known for his translations, studies, and editing of scriptures at the heart of the Zen tradition, looking through his diary one sees a wider range of interest. For example, on the fourth of October, 1927, in the morning he read the *Suvarṇaprabhāsōttama* with Izumi Hōkei (1884–1947) and in the afternoon he read the *Tannishō* with Imadate Tosui (1855–1931).

If we look at his publications, Suzuki's major textual work is found in three Mahāyāna scriptures. His English translations of the first two were the first published.

1. *Qixinlun*. A translation done during his time with Paul Carus in LaSalle: *Açvaghosha's Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna* (1900).¹²
2. *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*. Published in three book-length monographs: *Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* (1930), a translation from Sanskrit called *The Lankavatara Sutra* (1932), and an *Index to the Lankavatara* (1933). A revised version of the *Index* with Tibetan added was published in 1934.¹³
3. *Avatamsaka-sūtra* / *Gaṇḍavyūha*. In the very first volume of *The Eastern Buddhist* beginning in 1921, Suzuki serially published summaries of sections of this sutra, as well as an article he called "Notes on the Avatamsaka Sutra." At that time, he reconstructed the Sanskrit title of the Chinese *Huayan jing* (Jpn. *Kegon-kyō*) as *Avatamsaka Sutra*. Then, in the 1930s, after working with Izumi Hōkei on a copy of a Sanskrit manuscript from Paris, he published "Mahayana and Hinayana Buddhism or the Bodhisattva-Ideal and the Śrāvaka-Ideal as Distinguished in the Opening Chapter of the *Gaṇḍavyūha*" (*The Eastern Buddhist* 6, no. 1 [1932]). Finally, with Izumi as coeditor, he published a four-volume critical edition of the Sanskrit text of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* in Devanagari typeface.¹⁴

After the war Suzuki became internationally active as a spokesman for Buddhism and Zen Buddhism in particular. But this was also a period when he devoted

considerable time to Shin Buddhism, as seen in his work on the *myōkōnin* and his translation of the first half of Shinran's *Kyōgyōshinshō*. He also wrote a number of summaries or broad overview studies of Buddhism as a whole and Japanese Buddhism in particular, as seen in works like *Essence of Buddhism* (*Bukkyō no tai'i*) and *Japanese Spirituality* (*Nihonteki reisei*). In this postwar phase of his publishing career, among the three scriptures listed above, only the *Huayan* material reappears with any consistency; throughout the 1950s he had a number of publications in Japanese on it.

As the reader will see in the selections included in this study, in addition to the areas listed above, Suzuki wrote on all major strands of Mahāyāna doctrine except Vajrayāna, but he did so in the context of introductory essays, typically written on the level of a university textbook. Thus we find in his prewar writing boilerplate descriptions of Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha doctrines, and some expansive, often creative writing on the bodhisattva ideal and *prajñāpāramitā* logic of what he called affirmation in negation, alluded to above.

In this regard one of the most influential, and to some degree controversial, work is his 1907 book, *Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism*. At the time, no one had attempted a comprehensive treatment in English of the major teachings associated with Mahāyāna, and the book was not only widely read but it also has stayed in print consistently ever since. But the book is hampered by an odd perspective wherein Suzuki frequently uses Christian-like terms to frame his explications of doctrine, alienating some readers. The book also has a polemic tone to it, betraying an agenda to justify Mahāyāna Buddhism as equally authoritative and “genuine” in its Indian provenance as the Theravāda form being promoted so successfully by Dharmapala and Rhys Davids at that time. Louis de La Vallée-Poussin heavily criticized it in a review, and yet Suzuki never deemed to revise it, despite the book being reprinted repeatedly by The Buddhist Society of London (the copyright holder) over the course of his lifetime.

SANSKRIT PROBLEM

An unavoidable issue in considering Suzuki's contribution to Buddhist Studies is how to evaluate his access to Indic texts. Not only did his textual work involve translation from Sanskrit materials, Suzuki also had a penchant for dropping Sanskrit words into discussions of almost any topic in his English-language writing. His use of Sanskrit words and phrases is generally skillful and purposeful and shows an understanding of their role in traditional exegetical discourse, but misspellings are common. The orthographic mistakes by and large do not appear to have rattled him as they continued until his death.

It is rare to find an English-language essay of Suzuki's without some Sanskrit mentioned. But how and where he learned Sanskrit and other Indic languages used in Buddhist scriptures, and how much he could actually read of the highly

complicated linguistic forms of Buddhist writing in India remains a question. From *Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism* published in 1907 to selections from the two postwar essays included here—*Essence of Buddhism* reproduced from the 1946 edition and “The Buddhist Conception of Reality” taken from a speech given at the University of Hawai‘i in 1949—and in nearly everything in between with the exception of the work he did with Izumi Hōkei, there is a surprising carelessness about Indic Buddhist names and terms. To be fair, he also makes mistakes in his romanization of Chinese and even Japanese names, but the errors in rendering Sanskrit are more salient because they are more frequent and because at times they seem to be inserted somewhat gratuitously, by which I mean that his essays would read well without recourse to Sanskrit vocabulary. In other words, if he felt the need to justify a Buddhist teaching by anchoring it to an Indic form, why not take the time to ensure that that form is rendered accurately?

In the notes to his Japanese translation of *Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism*, Sasaki Shizuka estimates that as many as 80 percent of the Sanskrit words given in the book are misspelled. The writings presented in the present volume all contain an endnote listing corrections by the editor to the spelling of Sanskrit, Pāli, Chinese, and Japanese, but the overwhelming majority of problematic words are in Sanskrit.

So-called Buddhist Sanskrit is notoriously complicated in that it contains many Middle Indic forms not corresponding to classical grammar and spelling. Edgerton cites the *Gaṇḍavyūha* text edited by Suzuki and Izumi as part of the corpus of materials he used in his study of the Middle Indic forms he called Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit, but Suzuki never mentions anything about odd-looking word formations, issues of Prakrit to Sanskrit translation, Middle Indo-Aryan, and so forth.

Where and how did Suzuki study Sanskrit and how familiar was he with the use of it in Buddhist scriptures? He left no record of this, so we can only surmise that he picked up bits and pieces of Sanskrit and Pāli from people in his orbit. He apparently studied some Pāli with Shaku Kōzen (1849–1924), who had studied some Sanskrit under Nanjō Bun'yū, spent seven years in South Asia, and was ordained in the Theravāda tradition. Suzuki met Kōzen at Engakuji as both were students of Imakita, even though Kōzen came from a prominent Shingon family. Nanjō, as the doyen of Buddhist Sanskrit studies in Japan throughout the Meiji period, became a lecturer at Tokyo Imperial University in 1885 and in 1889 was given the first doctorate in the humanities awarded by the Japanese Ministry of Education. When Suzuki was hired at Ōtani University in 1921, Nanjō was president of the school, and indeed the creation of The Eastern Buddhist Society that Suzuki ran with his wife Beatrice was a dream shared by both Nanjō and Suzuki. Another source of Suzuki's knowledge of Indic languages was Albert J. Edmunds (1857–1941), a friend during his time at LaSalle, who fashioned himself a Pāli scholar and published a translation of the *Dhammapada*.¹⁵ Although there are reasons to doubt Edmunds's facility in Pāli, Kōzen was a serious Pāli scholar and devoted to spreading Theravāda ordinations

in Japan, but neither Kōzen nor Edmunds established themselves as scholars of the more complex linguistics of Buddhist Sanskrit.

The person more likely to have had the biggest impact on Suzuki's Sanskrit knowledge, such as it was, appears to have been Izumi Hōkei. Nanjō had many disciples, but it was Izumi whom Nanjō hired as professor of Sanskrit at Ōtani while he was its president. Suzuki's diaries show frequent mention of Izumi coming to read with him, specifically the *Gaṇḍavyūha* and the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa* sutras. Izumi somehow lost his job in 1928 in the wake of the Kaneko Daiei incident (Nanjō died a year earlier), and for at least the next eight years it appears that Suzuki paid out a significant amount of his personal research budget to Izumi to keep him afloat. It is worth noting that in 1927 Izumi and Nanjō jointly published a Japanese translation of the same *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, on which Suzuki published a volume of studies three years later, and his own translation into English just five years hence. The text that they both used was the one that Nanjō himself brought back from Nepal. The Buddhist Studies publications of Suzuki that involve Sanskrit texts all occur in the 1930s, and Izumi is deeply involved in all of them. Suzuki published three volumes on the *Laṅkāvatāra*—translation, studies, and an index—and although Izumi is not given credit in the first two volumes, he is acknowledged in the *Index* volume. At long last, Suzuki and Izumi appear as coeditors of the critical edition of the Sanskrit text of the *Gaṇḍavyūha*, printed in Devanagari, that was published in four volumes. Thus Izumi's proximity to the material, his superb command of Sanskrit, his acknowledgment by Suzuki in some of the publications, and the frequent mentions of him in Suzuki's diaries at the time of his work on both these multivolume studies suggest that Suzuki depended deeply on the help of Izumi throughout his research in and work on Indic texts.

CONCLUSION

Suzuki's work in Buddhist Studies, at times highly focused and narrow, at other times speculative and general, raises the question of what value this particular area of his writing represents for discerning his thought on Buddhism as a whole. While many of the writings in this volume do indeed speak to the question of "what is Buddhism," or more specifically, "what is Mahāyāna Buddhism," I would argue against a facile conclusion that it is in this area of his output that we can find out with the most certainty what Buddhism meant to him, although he does employ critical Buddhist thinking at times to define Buddhism or at least an idealized notion of what Buddhism means in the modern world. An example of this is his 1926 essay on the disruptive theory that the Mahāyāna sutras are not the words of the historical Buddha, translated here for the first time. The fact is, although Suzuki published on Buddhism up until the end of his life, he did not consistently pursue Buddhist Studies as a discipline. There is a significant amount of activity in

this area between 1900 and the early 1930s, much of it dedicated to important philological work, but his interest then wanes in competition with his devotion to writing about Zen, comparative religion, and Pure Land as defined by Shinran. After the war, he returned to a general theorizing on Mahāyāna doctrine that is reminiscent of his 1907 *Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism*, and we do see text-critical work in his partial translations of Shinran's *Kyōgyōshinshō* and the Chan classic *Biyan lu* (J. *Hekigan roku*), published posthumously.

Today the primary goal of Buddhist Studies is arguably the historical reconstruction of how a particular religious form came to be—whether it be an expression of doctrine, ritual, aesthetics, praxis, institutional structure, social consciousness, political power, economics, ethics, environmentalism, and so forth. We want to know when something started, what went into its creation, and how it changed in response to challenges and conflicts from external and internal forces. But despite an impressive publication record of studies on and translations of significant Buddhist texts, Buddhist Studies for Suzuki rarely exhibits any of these concerns. On the other hand, his work does show an appreciation of history, both in terms of diachronic developments in doctrine and circumstantial contexts framing those doctrines.

But ultimately Suzuki's motivation lies in explaining what Buddhism says about the nature of the human condition. In this, the publications of his that we can characterize as "Buddhist Studies" are limited to analyses of materials that either inspired him or echo his own understanding. Another way of putting this is found in the title of the last essay in this collection: "The Buddhist Conception of Reality," published posthumously in 1974 on the basis of a manuscript held by the Matsugaoka Bunko that was originally written for a public talk he gave at the University of Hawai'i in 1949. Analyzing and discerning how Buddhist discourse over time has attempted to define what "reality" is for us based on our subjective experiences and awakenings—this is what Buddhist Studies seems to have meant to him. It is analogous to an existential quest for meaning and parallels the enigma of theodicy for Abrahamic theologians, that is, why would the religious higher reality such as God, or Atman/Brahman in the Indic perspective, create a world so mired in anxiety, pain, and suffering? While this question is not reflective of concerns typically found in traditional Buddhist doctrine, this is how Suzuki processed the first Buddhist truth of suffering. But the theodicy question evaporates in the Suzuki-processed answer—namely, that we must recognize that reality as we know it is characterized by suffering only until we experience liberation, as liberation means we can "become Atman itself and to will with it in its creation of this world" because, "according to Buddhist philosophy, we can become God or Atman or Brahman. No, not become it, for we are it." Here we have what is hopefully a clear example of how Suzuki appropriates conceptual frames and questions from modern religious and philosophical discourse to advance what is, for him, essential features of Mahāyāna teachings.

As mentioned, when Suzuki was awarded the National Medal of Culture (*bunka kunshō*), it was for his work in Buddhist Studies. Thus what Buddhist Studies meant for Suzuki and arguably for Japan as a whole in 1949 is not quite how we think of this discipline in the academy today, and this may cause some consternation among scholars in the twenty-first century. When Suzuki writes that “Buddhism is neither pantheism nor mysticism” and argues this position by alluding to Buddhist universals like *dharmakāya*, *prajñā*, and *tathatā*, it is worth remembering that Edward Conze at times wrote explanatory descriptions in a similar manner. What may seem quaint or even somewhat orientalist today reflects a felt need by many mid-twentieth-century Buddhologists in *that* context to “clarify” what Buddhism was and was not in terms of European categories of religion. In fact, Conze was a strong supporter of Suzuki, writing an introduction to a collection of his essays published posthumously called *On Indian Mahayana Buddhism* (1968) as well as a strongly worded defense of Suzuki in *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies* (1967), concluding, “If Suzuki is to be blamed for anything, it is an insufficient awareness of the aridity of the desert into which he transplanted his lovely azalea tree.”

In the end, it is the very religious or “spiritual” purpose of Suzuki’s writings that infuse them with power but also irritate the serious student who easily finds fault with them. While there are many places where his approach or interpretation does seem a bit too creative, too personal, for general consumption, overall his contribution is significant and his approach continues to be appealing to many. Although born thirty-four years after Suzuki, Conze’s view of the purpose of his own career in Buddhist Studies reflects the fact that the two men were very much of the same generation. The following statement by Conze from the same 1967 memoir expresses this quite clearly:

The cornerstone of my interpretation of Buddhism is the conviction, shared by nearly everyone, that it is essentially a doctrine of salvation, and that all its philosophical statements are subordinate to its soteriological purpose. This implies, not only that many philosophical problems are dismissed as idle speculations, but that each and every proposition must be considered in reference to its spiritual intention and as a formulation of meditational experiences acquired in the course of the process of winning salvation. While I cannot imagine any scholar wishing to challenge this methodological postulate, I am aware that, next to D.T. Suzuki, I am almost alone in having applied it consistently. (213)

EDITORIAL NOTE

By and large, Suzuki's sentence structures and word choices have been left intact; only minor changes have been made in syntax. Though vastly different from current custom, capitalization has largely been left unchanged, as these choices in writings on Buddhism were often arbitrary in Suzuki's day, especially in the prewar period, and have been left unchanged to reflect Suzuki's notions of emphasis. Certain recurring terms that Suzuki writes in different formats, however, are standardized throughout the volume. Spellings of English words have been standardized to American English, and Chinese spellings have been corrected as needed and changed from Wade-Giles to Pinyin; as both of these are matters of orthographic custom they have not been noted. Orthographic changes reflecting the removing of hyphens, contemporary romanization of Indic names and words, such as changing *kshatriya* to *kṣatriya*, have also been made without notation. Spellings reflect U.S. usage. When corrections to the spelling of Indic, Chinese, and Japanese names and proper nouns were needed, a list of these word changes appears in an editorial endnote added to the end of each essay. In his early writings Suzuki included diacritics in certain Sanskrit Buddhist terms (not always correctly) that are dropped when he determined they had become part of the English lexicon—a noticeable change in the many Suzuki essays that appear with the founding of *The Eastern Buddhist* in 1921. Unless misspelled, the forms he used are retained. Words like Mahayana and Mahayanist are binaries coupled with Hinayana and Hinayanist in Suzuki's English-language writing, and are thus retained as English terms because they seem to reflect a Western idiom. The most common words in this category are Mahayana, Hinayana, Nirvana, and Tathagata, but this will not affect the orthography of technical jargon containing them. Thus the chapter 14 essay on the *Gaṇḍavyūha* has both Tathagata and *tathāgatagarbha*.

PART ONE

Early Years

The Mādhyamika School in China

1898

This is the first English-language publication by Suzuki under his own name. It exhibits a remarkable degree of detail about Indian thinkers associated with seventh-century Buddhist debates in India. Most of the Indic texts mentioned are reconstructed names based on Chinese translations that Suzuki is working from. I have corrected spelling when correct forms are known, but when not, I have left his Indic forms as is. Suzuki did not give sources for any of this material, and the reader might have had the impression that he had access to these texts in Sanskrit. In fact all of his materials are in Chinese, and the constructed Sanskrit clearly derive from Nanjō's catalog of 1883, but many are slightly different.

Originally published in Calcutta in the *Journal of the Buddhist Text Society of India* 6, part 4 (1898): 23–30.

• • •

HISTORY

The introduction of the Mādhyamika philosophy into China, according to an opinion prevalent among Japanese and Chinese Buddhists, was effected by Kumārajīva¹ (A.D. 344–413) and Divākara who came to China A.D. 676.² The so-called “second” introduction by Divākara, however, is no introduction at all in the proper sense of the word. He neither translated nor wrote any work on the Mādhyamika. What he did was simply the impartation to Fazang, a famous leader of the Avatamsaka³ sect, of some informations about the school, while he himself was most probably an advocate of the Vijñānavāda. The so-called second introduction therefore need not be considered.

Kumārajīva had four most eminent Chinese disciples who all helped him in his translation work as well as in the elucidation of the Mādhyamika philosophy. From Daosheng (died A.D. 434), one of the four, issues out the line of succeeding leaders of the Three Śāstra sect, which is the name given for the Chinese Mādhyamika school. In China, unlike in Tibet, the school suffered no doctrinal dissension whatever. But geographically one branch of the school was propagated in the South of the Yangtze River and the other in the North. It is the southern school which is the true representative of Nāgārjunean philosophy and which attained to its full development in the works of Jizang, generally known as Jiaxiang Dashi,⁴ that is properly called the Three Śāstra sect,⁵ for the northern school which scarcely made any growth, added the *Prajñāpāramitāśāstra* to the three canonical books.

One hundred and thirty-six years after Kumārajīva or one hundred and fifteen years after Daosheng, Jiaxiang Dashi was born in Jinling, and his active life continued up to the sixth year before Xuanzang made his pilgrimage to India. Besides his excellent commentaries on the three śāstras as well as some sūtras, he wrote the *Dasheng xuanlun* (Treatise on the Deepness of the Mahāyāna), the *Sanlun xuanyi* (Deep Significance of the Three Śāstras), and some other treatises, elucidating the principal doctrines of the Mādhyamika system, with occasional interpolations of his own original views. I have chiefly followed him in the succeeding brief exposition of the Chinese Śūnyatā philosophy.

The Three Śāstra sect did not flourish very long in China. Gradually declining after the death of Jiaxiang, it was completely excluded from the religious arena toward the end of the Tang dynasty (A.D. 618–907). The reason why it could not enjoy a further prosperity in China is due mainly to the peculiarity of the Chinese mind, which refuses to dwell on anything abstruse, and partly to the sweeping influence of the rival school, Dharmalakṣaṇa⁶ sect (Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda philosophy established by Asaṅga⁷), introduced and promulgated by Xuanzang. We cannot indeed expect such an abstract and highly speculative philosophy as propounded by Nāgārjuna to find any lasting support among the people who are the avowed advocate of Confucianism, a crystallization of practicality and conservatism. The work of Jiaxiang Dashi may be said accordingly to be the practical start as well as the terminus of the Mādhyamika movement in China.

OUTLINES OF THE DOCTRINE

The Mādhyamika philosophy has always emphasized its negative side both in India and China, and this has called forth the prejudiced and unfavorable comments of the critics of the West. But its position could be held only through the clear understanding of the negativistic view in question. One of the propositions stated by the Chinese Mādhyamika followers as the very kernel of the philosophy is the “Middle Path in the Eight negations or No’s” (*babu zhongdao*), that consti-

tutes the first aphorism of the *Mādhyaṃika-śāstra*. In the following pages I will try to explain the statement in connection with other essential theses according to the view held by Jiexiang Dashi.

(1) Two Forms of Truth

The discrimination of two forms of truth, Paramārtha- and Saṃvṛti-satya, has been prevalent among all Mahāyāna schools. Even the Yogācāra,⁸ the rival of the Mādhyaṃika, adopted the conception to some extent, but treating it in its own fashion. It seems that the antagonism between the two systems just mentioned reached its climax in India some three hundred years after Nāgārjuna. Bhāvaviveka, a powerful adherent of the Śūnyatā philosophy, wrote the *Mahāyānatālaratnaśāstra*⁹ against the Yogācārin Dharmapāla's commentary on the *Vijñānamātraśāstra*; the former insisting on the śūnya-ness of existence, while the latter, the validness of the Parinispāna-lakṣaṇa, which corresponds to the Paramārtha of Nāgārjuna.

According to the *Erdi yizhang* (Views on the Two Satyas) compiled by a royal prince of the Liang dynasty (A.D. 502–555),¹⁰ there were already twenty-three different views in China concerning the two forms of truth. It will be noticed that the problem how to deal with the Paramārtha and Saṃvṛti,¹¹ absolute and conditional, one and many, noumena and phenomena, universal and particular, was of a vital importance to all sects of the Mahāyāna as was to the philosophers of the West. How did the Three Śāstra sect solve the problem?

The advocate of the sect declares that the discrimination between the Paramārtha and Saṃvṛti, or in other words, between what appears to us, and what is in itself, is not absolute; thus they have only relative value, because it is the condition by which our imperfect understanding conceives existence. Noumena and phenomena have no objective reality as some suppose; for if they have, the truth becomes dualistic and therefore conditional, and that which is conditional cannot be the truth. Nor are they subjective forms inherent in our mind as others affirm; for if so, our reason becomes incapable of grasping the truth which must be absolute, transcending all modes of relativity.

The Paramārtha and Saṃvṛti are no more than the tools or passages which are necessary for us to reach the truth. Buddha distinguished them simply to dispel our intellectual prejudices which oscillate from one extreme to another, never keeping its equilibrium or Middle Path. When it is said that things are what they appear, that they are real as characterized with individuality, ignorant minds cling to the view and entirely forget the other side of the shield, namely, that they are not what they appear to us, that they are śūnya, conditional, relative, phenomenal. But when the śūnya-ness of existence is thus emphasized, they again cling to this view, utterly ignoring the truth contained in the naive realism. Clinging or one-sidedness is therefore the prejudice of our intellect, preventing us from obtaining an insight into the truth.

The truth transcends every form of separation and individuation, and therefore the attainment of the truth consists in shaking off all conceptions smutted with dualism. The distinction of the Paramārtha and Saṃvṛti holds good as long as they serve us as instruments for removing our mental biases, but as soon as we cling to either of them as the ultimate truth, we are doomed. "They are like the finger pointing out the moon, they are like the basket carrying the fish." As soon as the fish is caught in the hand and the moon is noticed, there is no need of bothering ourselves with the basket and the finger. Those who cling to the absolute validity of the two truths, forgetting what purpose they serve, are like an idiot who takes the basket for the fish and the finger for the moon.

Jiaxiang Dashi in this way refutes the views held by Indian as well as Chinese heretics (Daoists and Confucianists), by Hīnayānists, by the followers of the *Satyasiddhiśāstra* and of the Vaipulya-Mahāyānism.

From the religious point of view the Paramārtha corresponds to Prajñā, and the Saṃvṛti to Upāya. When Buddha proclaims that all beings in the universe have been saved by him, that they are eternally abiding in Nirvāṇa, that no one needs emancipation, he takes his standpoint on Prajñā, viewing things by the light of their Paramārtha-ness. But this being only one side of the truth, Buddha does not cling to it. He comes down from the eminence and mingles himself among the masses in order to lead them through every possible means to the final mokṣa. This is his Upāya, or to put it philosophically, the Saṃvṛti-side of things. Thus Buddha never deviates from the Middle Path.

(2) Middle Path

Jiaxiang Dashi distinguishes in the *Sanlun xuanyi* four aspects of Middle Path, which clearly show on what basis the Chinese Mādhyamika school stands.

They are: (1) Middle Path in contradistinction to one-sidedness; (2) Middle Path as the abnegation of one-sidedness; (3) Middle Path in the sense of Absolute Truth; (4) Middle Path as unity in plurality.

The philosophy of Being held by Hīnayānists and the philosophy of Non-being held by some Mahāyānists, both are one-sided and therefore imperfect, because the one cannot exist independently of the other. The philosophy which repudiates and avoids both extremes is to be called the doctrine of Middle Path.

A Middle Path therefore reveals itself when the two extremes are completely out of sight; in other words, the harmonization or unification of them leads to the perfect solution of existence. Neither the Āstika nor the Nāstika should be adhered to. They condition each other, and anything conditional means imperfection. So the transcending of one-sidedness constitutes the second aspect of the Middle Path.

But when we forget that the doctrine of Middle Path is intended for the removal of the intellectual prejudices and cling to or assert the view that there is something called Middle Path beyond or between the two extremes of Being and Non-being,

we commit the fault of one-sidedness over again, by creating a third statement in opposition to the two. As long as the truth is absolute and discards all limitation, clinging even to the Middle Path is against it. Thus we must avoid not only the two extremes but also the middle, and it should not be forgotten that the phrase “Middle Path” has from the deficiency of our language been provisionally adopted to express the human conception of the highest truth.

The final aspect of the Middle Path is that it does not lie beyond the plurality of existence, but that it is in it, underlying all. The antithesis of the Āstika and the Nāstika is made possible only through the conception of the Middle Path, which is the unifying principle of the universe. Remove this principle, the universe will fall into pieces and particulars will cease to be as such. The Chinese Mādhyamika school does not deny the existence of the universe as it appears to us; it condemns on the contrary the doctrine which unconditionally clings to the conception of śūnyata. What the school most emphatically maintains is that the universe must be conceived in its totality, in its oneness, that is, from the standpoint of Middle Path.

(3) *The Eight No's*

The Eight No's refers to the first aphorism of the *Mādhyamikaśāstra*, which according to the Three Śāstra sect sums up the essentials of Buddhism. The aphorism is:

I bow before the Bhagavat whose teaching crushes all sophism and stands foremost among all doctrines, declaring that there is *neither creation nor destruction, neither persistence nor discontinuance, neither unity nor plurality, neither appearance (lit. coming) nor disappearance (lit. going)*, that all things are conditional.

Creation and destruction, persistence and discontinuance, unity and plurality, appearance and disappearance—these eight conceptions are the fundamental faults of ignorant minds, from which all possible prejudices and wrong judgments do emanate. People think that the law of causation (coming and going) actually operates in the objective as well as the subjective world, that there is such a thing in reality as the persistence or discontinuance of existence, that things are in a state of transformation (creation and destruction), that substances are really capable of being counted as one or many; while they are wholly unconscious of the fact that all those ideas are limited, relative, conditional, and therefore not the truth, but merely the production of our imperfect subjective state. There nestles in those ideas the principle of misery, and as the people cling to them, their life is the everlasting prey for the pendulous feeling of exultation and mortification.

Where conditionality is, there is no truth; truth and conditionality are incompatible. Therefore to attain to the truth, conditionality must be completely cast aside. The eight mistaken notions must be annulled, and we must come to the conclusion that there is no real transformation, no real causation, no real persistence or discontinuance, no unity nor plurality. When our subjective mind is thus

purified from the smirch of ignorance the serene moonlight of Suchness or transcendental reality (Bhūtatathatā) will illuminate our whole life.

As ignorant minds are full of limited and illusive ideas, Jiaxiang says we have to emphasize the negative side of the doctrine by thus refuting every misconception they would cherish, but in the face of all this, we must not forget that the clinging of some Mahāyānists to the idea of absolute nothingness (śūnyatā), which is the other extreme, is equally wrong. It is like the case of a patient who having taken a medicine for the remedy, has thereby acquired a new disease. If every medicine produces a fresh suffering, what is the use of medicine at all? The philosophy of Non-being is therefore no better than the philosophy of Being, unless they are harmonized or unified through the truth of Middle Path.

(4) *How the Chinese Mādhyamika School Interpreted the
Teachings of the Buddha*

When various schools of Buddhism arose, each claiming to be the genuine and orthodox teaching of Buddha, it was more advisable for them to try some means of reconciliation than to denounce each other downright as false and heretical; so they tried to explain, each from its own dogmatical standpoint, why Buddha taught so many different doctrines, some of which standing in a direct antagonism to others. This tendency was conspicuous especially among the Mahāyāna Buddhists.

The first attempt known to us for a chronological explanation of the teachings of Buddha was made by Śīlabhadra and Jñānaprabha in India toward the end of the sixth century of the Christian era. Jñānaprabha was an adherent of the Mādhyamika school, while Śīlabhadra defended the philosophy of the Yogācāra. Both of them distinguished three stages of development in the teaching of Buddha, but each insisted that the doctrine he advocated was consummate and breathed the true spirit of Buddhism.

Since the transplantation of Buddhism into the Chinese soil, every Mahāyāna school attempted a chronological explanation concordant with its own doctrinal standpoint for the many-sided religious system of Śākyamuni. Jiaxiang Dashi representing the Chinese Mādhyamika philosophy had of course had his own explanation.

The object of this kind of interpretation given by the various Mahāyāna schools excluding the Three Śāstra sect was the exaltation of their own doctrines at the expense of others. Each therefore endeavored to degrade the other as “imperfect,” “provisional,” or “deficient.” But the Three Śāstra sect viewed the matter in quite a different light. It acknowledged that the teachings of Buddha were many-sided and broad enough to permit diverse explanations, but it did not make any further assertion, and it did not proclaim like others that one explanation was superior to or more perfect than the other. Jiaxiang says Buddha knew that there was a variety

of intellectual calibers, and that particular doctrines of his would more properly suit certain classes of people than to the rest. For instance, the Hīnayānist teaching perfectly met the needs of the Śrāvaka, but the spiritual thirst of the Bodhisattva could not be appeased by it, and he aspired to a different system of doctrine. On that account we must not however consider the latter as being superior to the former, because the Mahāyāna was as unsatisfactory and imperfect to the Śrāvaka as the Hīnayāna was to the Bodhisattva.

Jiexiang Dashi was not disposed to make any judgment of preference in the teachings of Buddha. Nevertheless, he could not help noticing a logical development in them. He classified the Dharma into three Dharmacakras: (1) Fundamental; (2) Peripheral; (3) Reductive.

The Fundamental Dharmacakra is the *Avatamsakasūtra*, which was delivered by Buddha soon after his attainment of the Bodhi and in which his fundamental thought was most elaborately and to the full extent disclosed. But the audience to whom this most important sutra was first revealed were not as strong in their mental capacity as Buddha himself and therefore were in a complete bewilderment to find out the real import of Buddha's preaching. When he realized the fact, he thought he should have first prepared their minds to be in such a condition as would be capable to comprehend the highest truth. The *Āgama*, *Viśeṣacintā*,¹² *Śrīmālā*, *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, and many other sutras all deal with this preparation stage. They are not fundamental; they do not represent the kernel of Buddhism; they belong to the periphery as it were. We must not linger long about the superficiality if we wish to dive deeply into the bottom of truth. Thereupon Buddha preached the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* as the teaching reductive leading to the Fundamental Dharmacakra. By this sutra the Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna are all reduced or led to the one Yāna of Middle Path.

THE THREE ŚĀSTRAS

Commentaries on the Zhōng Lùn (Mādhyamikaśāstra)

There are four commentaries on the Mādhyamikaśāstra by Indian authors still existent in Chinese translations. They are:

- (1) The *Madhyamakaśāstra*, by Piṅgala. Tr. by Kumārajīva, A.D. 409. Four fasciculi. Twenty-seven chapters.¹³
- (2) The *Madhyāntānugamaśāstra*, by Asaṅga. Tr. by Prajñāruci, A.D. 543. Two fasciculi. 13,727 Chinese characters.¹⁴
- (3) The *Prajñāpāramitāśāstravyākhyā*, by Fenbie Ming. Tr. by Prabhākaramitra, A.D. 630. Fifteen fasciculi. Twenty-seven chapters.¹⁵
- (4) The *Mahāyānamadhyamakaśāstravyākhyā*, by Sthiramati. Tr. by Weitsang, circa A.D. 980. Eight fasciculi. Seventeen chapters.¹⁶

THE DVĀDAŚANIKĀYASĀSTRA¹⁷

The book is ascribed to Nāgārjuna and translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva, A.D. 408. It consists of twelve nikāyas, each one of which proving the śūnyatā or conditionality of existence from several points of view. Its principal statements are:

All things are conditional. They have no noumena or "things in themselves."

There is no such thing as creation.

All things exist through the interrelation of the four conditions (as enumerated in the first chapter of the *Mādhyamikaśāstra*), but when they are taken by themselves have nothing to do with the existence.

We think things appear, persist, and disappear, but these conceptions are illusive.

Things are known by their attributes, but attributes themselves are śūnya.

Being is made possible by Non-being, and vice versa, but we cannot think of the coexistence of the two.

We observe transformation everywhere, since things are not self-existing.

The conception of causation has no absolute value.

There is no doer, no doing, no deed.

Anteriority, posteriority, simultaneity are unthinkable.

THE ŚATAŚĀSTRA¹⁸

By Deva, commented [on] by Vasubandhu, the Chinese translation is by Kumārajīva, A.D. 404. A disciple of the translator states in his preface to the book that the original text consisted of one hundred *gāthās*, the latter of which however not being considered to be useful to the Chinese reader, was left untranslated.¹⁹ The present work consists of two fasciculi and ten chapters. It is chiefly a refutation of Indian philosophical systems outside of Buddhism. The main points are:

Merit and demerit are relative. We have to transcend all modes of limitation. There is no creator. The law of identity as well as the law of nonidentity are untenable. The existence of the subject and of the object is not thinkable. To affirm that a combination of conditions produces a new substance is illogical. It is also not logical to affirm the contrary. It is wrong to assert the permanence or fixity of things, while the unconditional maintenance of the śūnyatā doctrine is equally faulty.

T. Suzuki
LaSalle, Ill., U.S.A.

The Breadth of Buddhism

1900

In this piece, one of his earliest publications working under Paul Carus, Suzuki lays out a characterization of Buddhism as “more intellectual . . . than any other religion” as well as unusually tolerant in its encounter with other religions, though admitting that it has been tainted by local superstition. At this time, there was a strong tendency in Japan for Buddhist apologists like Inoue Enryō (1858–1919) to argue that Buddhism was somehow more modern than other traditional religions because it was more empirical and therefore more compatible with science. Suzuki echoes that discourse here as well, asserting “the scientific spirit and ethical grandeur of pure Buddhism,” by which he means the Mahāyāna teachings described in scripture. However he processed the history of warfare between rival Buddhist temples and denominations in medieval Japan, the attitude Suzuki expressed here in which doctrine has primacy over actual historical events would continue throughout his life, shaken only during the war years.

“The Breadth of Buddhism” was originally published in *Open Court* 14, no. 1 (1900): 51–53.

. . .

Buddhism is more intellectual, though on this account by no means less religious, than any other religion, and faith and knowledge are intimately interrelated and equally emphasized. Observe how Buddha exercised the ten virtues (*pāramitās*) in his previous lives as well as in his last existence, to attain perfect enlightenment; observe how he discussed all those great philosophical problems with Brahman sages, which have been puzzling mankind ever since the dawn of intellectual thought. The intellectuality of Buddhism has contributed much to the peculiar fascination that it exercises on speculative minds.

One of the practical results of the philosophical tendency in Buddhism is the predominance of a spirit of tolerance toward its opponents. It is the pride and glory of the followers of Śākyamuni that its development and propagation among one-third of the world's population took place without bloodshed, burning at the stake, or any other of the cruel methods which were committed by other religions in the name of God and from the sheer love and zeal of saving souls. Whenever it was necessary to overcome opposition, Buddhism used the peaceful method of persuasion by argument. Tradition tells us how brilliantly Āryadeva, the eminent and talented disciple of Nāgārjuna, achieved a victory over thousands of *tīrthakas*,¹ simply by his superior dialectics and ingenious logic.

Buddhism thus calmly and patiently found its way from the East to the West, but never assumed a hostile attitude toward those religious and ethical systems that were already established. It adapted itself to new conditions and assimilated at the same time other views, so that the people could understand the new truths without experiencing any feeling of repugnance. Every nation has its peculiar needs, inclinations, and traditions, which, however superstitious they may appear at first glance, contain some germs of truth and should for that reason be respected. Buddhism always endeavors to point out those germs of truth, to nourish them, and to give them a new and better interpretation. Being more speculative than any other vehicle of salvation, Buddhism is less aggressive and less impassioned, and does not decry others as false, infidel, perfidious, and idol-worshipping, or apply other offensive epithets which are indifferently used by those pious propagandists who I fear love God too much and their fellow beings too little.

So when Buddhism was introduced into China officially (A.D. 67), it did not try either to suppress the mystic Daoism or the utilitarian Confucianism, although the transplantation of Buddhism into a climate profusely impregnated with practicality and optimistic thought must have at first excited a great commotion in the intellectual field. What a contrast between the highly abstract philosophy of the Mahayana and the positivistic ethical teaching of Confucius! Nevertheless, Buddhists worked on, steadily and peacefully, side by side with the followers of Kong Fuzi and Laozi, till Buddhism took root, and, starting a fresh development there, gave such a great impetus to Confucianism as to produce in it some deep thinkers, among whom the most noted were Lu Xiangsan,² Zhu Xi,³ and Wang Yangming.⁴

In Japan we have a singular instance that characteristically illustrates the rather over-tolerant spirit of Buddhism, if such a term be allowable. The Japanese are a people in whose minds the idea of ancestor worship is deeply imbued, partly I think because they were islanders secluded from intercourse with the world, and partly because there was not much intermixture of races in Japan. When a statue of Buddha and a few Sutras were first presented to the Japanese court by a Korean king A.D. 552, some of the ministers declared that they had no need of worshipping a foreign god as they had their own divine ancestors. Buddhists, however, did

not disparage the sacred traditions of the Japanese by proclaiming that they revered false gods, but at once made a practical application of one of their fundamental doctrines, to wit, the Jātaka theory. All Japanese ancestor-gods were then transformed into Bodhisattvas, or Avatāras (= incarnations) of the primordial Buddha, who, divining the natural inclinations of the nation, assumed the forms of their gods. And thus Buddhism and Shintoism, which strictly speaking is not a religion, were reconciled, and cherished no enmity toward each other. How ingeniously they interpreted Shinto doctrines! And in doing this they were perfectly consistent and sincere.

Enlightened Buddhists in Japan are still of the same opinion when they say that they feel friendly toward Christianity, for Christ, its founder, is an Avatāra (= incarnation) of the Dharmakāya, just as is Buddha himself. Independently of the religious significance of this attitude, it seems to me that in making such a statement they are uttering what is probably the truth; namely, that Christ himself, or at least early Christianity, was influenced [not] quite a little by Buddhism, whose missionary activities are to be found in the very cradle of Christianity and its vicinity, long before the establishment of the latter there. Granting that differentiation is a necessary product of different circumstances, we are confronted with many similarities, nay, I am tempted to say, we find almost the same things in Buddhism and Christianity regarding dogma and ritual, and considering that the Japanese Sukhāvati sects and Chinese Tiantai sect, Dhyāna sect, and others so very different from the Buddhist churches of Siam, Ceylon, and Burma, are all comprised under the general name of Buddhism; I then feel strongly inclined to assert that Christianity with all its Jewish, Greek, and Roman traditions may be a Buddhism so metamorphosed as to suit itself to the soil and climate of transplantation. The differences between the Sukhāvati (Jōdo) and the Dhyāna (Zen) sects are greater than between the Sukhāvati and the Protestant Christians or the Tiantai and the Roman Catholics. Whether or not a future discovery of some historical facts concerning this point confirms this view, it matters little; theoretically, it is absolutely true that Christianity and Buddhism, each in its own way, sprang out of the unfathomable depth of the human heart, which is everywhere the same. Take away their prejudices, intellectual as well as historical, and we have the essence of religion in all its purity and magnificence.

What makes a religion assume false appearances and exposes it to the gross miscomprehension of unsympathetic critics, is its local coloring and the popular superstitions that are so easily mixed with its purer doctrines. Buddhism as a faith for the masses has suffered this fate. While intellectual minds earnestly study it in all its essentials and find satisfaction therein, uneducated people and ignorant priests busily occupy themselves in heaping up superstitions. But outsiders should not judge Buddhism from these excrescences, and when they discover superstitious practices should not forget the scientific spirit and ethical grandeur of pure Buddhism.

Translator's Preface to the Awakening of Faith

1900

The *Dasheng qixin lun* (J. *Daijō kishinron*), more commonly known as simply the *Qixinlun*/*Kishinron*, is one of the most influential Buddhist texts in East Asia, particularly for the Chan, Huayan, and Tiantai traditions. Suzuki's translation into English in 1900 was the first, and as a result, the title he created, *Awakening of Faith*, remains the standard moniker used today. This piece is his translator's preface.

Written and published while he was living in LaSalle, this is an impressive achievement and one in which I think we can assume he must have had at least some proofreading help with his English. Although an Indic original was attributed to the poet Aśvaghōṣa in two Chinese translations made in the sixth century by Paramārtha (T#1666) and the seventh century by Śikṣānanda (T#1667), today the overwhelming consensus is that the text was composed in China. If Suzuki had such suspicions, he does not voice them here. Although the Paramārtha text has been more influential historically, Suzuki selected the Śikṣānanda text to render into English without explanation. Perhaps its language lent itself to English expression more easily.

The following preface was originally included in the monograph by Suzuki titled *Aṣvaghōṣa's Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna* 大乘起信論 *Translated for the First Time from the Chinese Version* (Chicago: Open Court Press, 1900).

. . .

The study of Buddhism has recently made gigantic strides, on this side of the Atlantic as well as on the other. Not only is the importance of the science of comparative religion making itself felt, but the advance of our Pali and Sanskrit knowledge has greatly contributed to a better understanding of things Oriental. Even Christians who were without sympathy for "heathen" religions have now taken up the study of Buddhism in earnest. Nevertheless, it appears to me that the teachings

of Śākyamuni are not yet known in their full significance and that they do not yet command just appreciation. Though intolerant critics lose no chance of vigorously and often wrongly attacking the weak points of Buddhism, which are naturally seen at the surface, clear-sighted people have been very slow to perceive its innermost truth. This is especially the case with the Mahayana school.

The main reasons for this are, in my opinion, evident. While the canonical books of the Hinayana Buddhism have been systematically preserved in the Pāli language, those of the Mahayana Buddhism are scattered promiscuously all over the fields and valleys of Asia and in half a dozen different languages. Further, while most of the Sanskrit originals have been destroyed, their translations in Tibetan, Mongolian, and Chinese have never been thoroughly studied. And, lastly, the Mahayana system is so intricate, so perplexingly abstruse, that scholars not accustomed to this form of thought and expression are entirely at a loss to find their way through it.

Among the false charges which have been constantly poured upon the Mahayana Buddhism, we find the following: Some say, "It is a nihilism, denying God, the soul, the world and all"; some say, "It is a polytheism: Avalokiteśvara, Tāra, Vajrapāṇi, Mañjuśrī, Amitābha, and what not, are worshipped by its followers"; still others declare, "It is nothing but sophistry, quibbling, hair-splitting subtlety, and a mocking of the innermost yearnings of humanity"; while those who attack it from the historical side proclaim, "It is not the genuine teaching of Buddha; it is on the contrary the pure invention of Nāgārjuna, who devised the system by ingeniously mixing up his negative philosophy with the non-ātman theory of his predecessor"; or, "The Mahayana is a queer mixture of the Indian mythology that grew most freely in the Tantric period, with a degenerated form of the noble ethical teachings of primitive Buddhism." Though no one who is familiar with Mahayanistic ideas will admit these one-sided and superficial judgments, the majority of people are so credulous as to lend their ear to these falsified reports and to believe them.

The present English translation of Aśvaghosha's principal work is therefore dedicated to the Western public by a Buddhist from Japan, with a view to dispelling the denunciations so ungraciously heaped upon the Mahayana Buddhism. The name of Aśvaghosha is not very well known to the readers of this country, but there is no doubt that he was the first champion, promulgator, and expounder of this doctrine, so far as we can judge from all our available historical records. Besides, in this book almost all the Mahayanistic thoughts, as distinguished from the other religious systems in India, are traceable, so that we can take it as the representative text of this school. If the reader will carefully and patiently go through the entire book, unmindful of its peculiar terminology and occasional obscurity, I believe he will be amply and satisfactorily repaid for his labor and will find that the underlying ideas are quite simple, showing occasionally a strong resemblance to the Upaniṣad philosophy as well as to the Sāṃkhya system, though of course retaining its own independent thought throughout.

In conclusion let me say a word about the difficulty of translating such an abstruse religio-philosophic discourse as the present text. It is comparatively easy to translate works of travels or of historical events or to make abstracts from philosophical works. But a translator of the Mahayanistic writings, which are full of specific phraseology and highly abstruse speculations, will find himself like a wanderer in some unknown region, not knowing how to obtain any communicable means to express what he perceives and feels. To reproduce the original as faithfully as possible and at the same time to make it intelligible enough to the outside reader, who has perhaps never come in contact with this form of thought, the translator must be perfectly acquainted with the Mahayanistic doctrine as it is understood in the East, while he must not be lacking in adequate knowledge of Western philosophy and mode of thinking. The present translator has done his best to make the Mahayanistic thoughts of Aśvaghoṣa as clear and intelligible as his limited knowledge and lack of philosophic training allow him. He is confident, however, that he has interpreted the Chinese text correctly. In spite of this, some errors may have crept into the present translation, and the translator will gladly avail himself of the criticisms of the Mahayana scholars to make corrections in case a second edition of the work is needed.

Articles from Light of Dharma

1902–1907

Here are four articles from *Light of Dharma*, a San Francisco-based publication that was in operation between 1901 and 1907 as part of the outreach efforts of the Nishi Honganji to communicate in English with its immigrant community membership and beyond.

In 1900, it is estimated that the total population of the Japanese immigrants in the United States was only about 25,000, based mainly in California and Hawai'i, but it was growing quickly, leading to discriminatory legislation in California to segregate them in public schools and prevent them from buying land. Unlike its Japanese-language journal called *Beikoku bukk'yō*, the *Light of Dharma* enjoyed a readership outside the Japanese community that included academics, and it included articles by figures of international stature who studied or promoted the Buddha's Dharma, such as T. W. Rhys Davids, C. A. F. Rhys Davids, Sir Edwin Arnold, Albert J. Edmunds, Henry Olcott, Paul Carus, Anagarika Dharmapala, and Suzuki's own teacher Shaku Sōen. No doubt Suzuki is cognizant of this wider, more critical, audience when he mentions the Scythians invading India or Kapila (founder of the Sāṃkhya school of Indian philosophy), for example, neither of whom he identifies, which must have been hopelessly obscure allusions to the mostly rural immigrant community. But he is also responding to the prejudicial discourse in Christian rationalizations for consistent discrimination against the Japanese and Chinese immigrants in California that he is highly cognizant of, and in some sense these essays should probably also be seen as not only a defense of the Mahāyāna but as English-language rhetorical tools for the immigrants to justify their own religious heritage in the face of such treatment.

Note that these are written while Suzuki is living in Illinois and, as seen in a more developed form in *Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism* published in 1907 (mentioned in his last note here), he adopts a somewhat theological approach at this time in which the concept of *dharmakāya* functions in a similar way to Yahweh in that it transcends the individual as a universal source of truth and liberation and has agency that we cannot fathom. Thus he

speaks of “the fountainhead of the Dharmakāya,” “the grand scheme of Dharmakāya,” “the will of Dharmakāya,” and so forth.

Concerning language, there are no diacritics in these essays—probably due to printing limitations—and, except for *kleśa* replacing *kleca*, I have left them as is to reflect the flavor of what was, essentially, a local, ethnic publication in San Francisco. Another quirk is that like nearly all his essays written prior to 1921 when he wrote on a much larger world stage that came with the founding of *The Eastern Buddhist*, in these *Light of Dharma* pieces Suzuki uses terms like “Hinayanism” and “Hinayanists” in the same way he uses “Buddhism” and “Buddhists.” Later he would drop these for the standard nomenclature of “Hinayāna Buddhism/Buddhists” and “Mahāyāna Buddhism/Buddhists.”

Originally published in *Light of Dharma* (San Francisco: Buddhist Mission). “What Is Buddhism?” in vol. 2, no. 1 (1902); “Mahayana Buddhism” in vol. 2, no. 3 (1902); “A Buddhist View of War” in vol. 4, no. 2 (1904); and “Is Buddhism Nihilistic?” in vol. 6, no. 1 (1907).

. . .

WHAT IS BUDDHISM?

If I am asked what constitutes the most characteristic and essential feature of Buddhism that distinguishes it at once from all the other religious systems, I would reply: It is, negatively stated, the doctrine of non-atman and, positively stated, the doctrine of Dharmakaya. And the realization of this conception of our every-day life is the aim of all sincere Buddhists.

What then is the doctrine of non-atman, and what is the doctrine of Dharmakaya? In my view these doctrines are the two sides of one and the same shield, negative and positive, or obverse and reverse; they are complementary and one without the other would make Buddhism a cripple.

Atman is a Sanskrit word and means the ego-entity, which is imagined by vulgar minds to be the transcendental agent of our spiritual activities. They think it is this that suffers pain when we cannot obtain what we desire; it is this that ascends to heaven or descends to hell after our corporal death; it is this that makes us think that we, individuals, are final realities. Now Buddhism outspokenly denies the truth of this conception: it teaches that this conception of the soul substratum is the source of egoism, and from egoism emanate all the evils in our life.

Let us ask: Why do we not have peace on earth? Why do we not establish the kingdom of righteousness here? Why do we not love our enemies as well as our friends? Christians might reply: “Because we do not believe in God and in his only son Christ as the Saviour, and practice his teachings.” Buddhists would say, however: “It is because we have not yet surrendered our egocentric conception while there is no such thing as the ego entity.” Get convinced of the truth that individual existences are only phenomenal and pass away as soon as the conditions disappear that have made their existence possible. Subjective ignorance blinds our vision and

makes us believe the reality of the *fata morgana*. But when our intellectual insight dispels the clouds of subjectivity we perceive without prejudice that there is no permanency, no immortality in individual existences. All that we imagine real in the phenomenal world are nothing but bubbles, shadows, dreams, dew, lightnings. This is in brief the doctrine of non-atman.

If individual beings are doomed to perish, if particularity is the product of subjective ignorance, if the vulgar conception of the ego-soul is no more than a belief in an *ignis fatuus* which vanishes when approached, is our life worth living at all? has it no better significance than a soap bubble? should it not be likened unto the flash of lightning scintillating from behind the clouds? To answer these questions, we have now to look at the positive side of the doctrine of non-atman.

As the doctrine of non-atman is a negative statement, it does not give us any definite view on life. True, it liberates us from clinging to the unfounded egoism, but the mere liberation may lead us only to asceticism or monachism. We want something positive, we want some work to apply the energy released from the bondage of selfishness. To meet this spiritual demand Buddhism has the doctrine of Dharmakaya.¹

The Dharmakaya is the reality that underlies all particular phenomena; it is that which makes the existence of individuals possible; it is the *raison d'être* of the universe. It may be compared in one sense to the Christian God and in another sense to the Vedantic Brahman or Paramatman. It is different, however, from the former in that it does not stand transcendently apart from the universe, which is on the contrary a self-manifestation of the Dharmakāya; it is also different from the latter in that it is not absolutely impersonal, but is capable of willing and reflecting, or, to use Buddhist phraseology, it is capable of Karuna (compassion) and Bodhi (intelligence).

The pantheistic Dharmakaya is working in every sentient being, for sentient beings are nothing but a self-realization of the Dharmakaya. Individuals are not after all isolated existences; subjective ignorance, i.e., the veil of Maya may temporarily throw an obstacle to our perceiving the light of the Dharmakaya in which we all are one. But when our Bodhi (intellect) is so enlightened, we no more build the artificial barrier of egoism; the distinction between *meum* and *teum* is obliterated; I recognize myself in you and you recognize yourself in me. The same sentiment is expressed in the Kathopanishad (IV. 10): "What is here, that is there; what is there, that is here. He who sees duality here goes from death to death." This state of enlightenment may be called the spiritual expansion of the ego, or, negatively, the ideal annihilation of the ego. The ever-flowing stream of sympathy and love which is the life of religion will now spontaneously gush forth from the fountainhead of the Dharmakaya.

The doctrine of non-ego teaches us that there is no reality in individual existences, that we do not have any transcendental entity called ego-soul. The doctrine of Dharmakaya, to supplement this, teaches us that we are all one in the Dharmakaya

and as such are immortal. The one shows us the folly of clinging to individual existences and of coveting the immortality of the ego-entity; the other convinces us of the truth that we can be saved by diving into the unity of the Dharmakaya. Therefore the questions: Why have we to love our neighbors as ourselves? Why have we to do to others all things whatsoever we would that they should do to us? are answered by Buddhists in this way. They say, it is not because the Golden rule was given by a sage or man-god, but because the we are all one in the Dharmakāya and because when the clouds of ignorant egoism are dispelled, the light of universal love and wisdom cannot help but shine in all its glory. And the reason why “not our will be done,” but “thy will be done,” is because “our will” is the product of subjective ignorance, which believes in egoism, while “thy will” is the will of the Dharmakaya in which we live and move and have our being.

The Apostle Paul says: “For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.” Why? Buddhists would answer because Adam asserted his egoism in giving himself up to ignorance (the tree of knowledge is in reality the tree of ignorance, for from it comes the duality of me and thee), while Christ on the contrary surrendered his egoistic assertion to the intelligence of the universal Dharmakaya. That is why we die in the former and are made alive in the latter.

But what is the will of the Dharmakaya as revealed in our consciousness? The question strikes at the very root of our religious life. For the sake of our Christian readers, let us quote from the Gospel those passages that are in perfect accord with this view of the life of Buddhists: “Behold the fowls of the air, for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; yet your Heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not much better than they? Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; not yet for your body, what ye shall put on **** Take no thought for the morrow: for the morrow shall take thought for the things for itself. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. **** For your Heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all things.” Buddhism expresses the same religious faith and sentiment somewhat in the style of Omar Khayyam: “Let us eat when we are hungry, let us drink when we are thirsty, and let us sleep when we are tired.” If our egoism did not prevent us from following these excellent advices, how simple our religious life would be!

But let us not be idlers. In order that it may be given to us, let us first ask; in order that we may find, let us first seek; in order that it may be opened unto us, let us first knock.

MAHAYANA BUDDHISM

Buddhism in its primitive form seems to have been simply a system of ethical teachings without any assumption of a superhuman or supernatural agent such as the God of Christianity. What was revealed to Shakyamuni after his six years [of]

profound meditation was not a mystic knowledge of something transcendental, but merely a psychological truth, that there was no atman or ego that is generally imagined to constitute the substratum of our soul-life. And the whole body of Buddhist ethics was no more than the practical application of this truth with all its corollaries. There was no need for Buddhism to create divine agents of any nature, whose existence might affect the human affairs in one way or another. Thus Buddhism was human and of human interests; even when devas came down from their celestial abodes, it was either to serve humanity or to listen to the sermons of the Enlightened One.

This strictly positivistic tendency of Buddhism, however, may be considered in a sense of a reactionary movement against the speculative philosophy of Kapila and the ritualistic tendency of Veda-worshippers, both of which exercised predominant influence at the time of Shakyamuni, and therefore primitive Buddhism was somehow one-sided and not entirely satisfactory to the Indian mind generally, which, by the way, has always taken delight in mysticism and metaphysics.

But if Buddha's religion were destined to conquer not only a limited number of intellectual people, but mankind as a whole, it had to grow and assimilate all the other religious systems with which it might come in contact, and which were worth assimilating because they answered more or less the needs of the human heart. Buddhism was not unequal to this task. It adapted itself not only to the Indian modes of feeling and thinking, which were not found in its original system, but also those of the other nations among whom it was introduced. It widened its original scope; it allowed itself to breathe in the idealistic and pantheistic air of the Vedanta; it assimilated the nature-worshipping faith of the Scythian race who invaded Northern India and established a powerful kingdom there two or three hundred years after Buddha. But in doing this, Buddhism ceased to be an ethical system pure and simple, it took in some religious and philosophical elements that were not entirely free from superstition and symbolism. This departure as it were from the traditional path marks the beginning of the so-called Mahayana Buddhism.

The most characteristic features of the Mahayana Buddhism in addition to its primitive ethical significance which has been also very carefully preserved by its followers, are, in brief, the conceptions of Dharmakāya, of Bodhi (Intelligence), and of salvation by faith. The first two conceptions, which were not very much emphasized in primitive Buddhism, gave a new impetus to the life of the renovated Buddhism. According to these theories, the universe is a manifestation of the Dharmakaya whose psychological expression is called Bodhi, and every creature existing in the three worlds is a partial and therefore imperfect realization of it; in other words, we are all Bodhi incarnates, Bodhisattvas, candidates for the Buddha. Every being is thus destined ultimately to become a Buddha, not by mortification or by leading an ascetic life, but through enlightening the Bodhi and annihilating egoism. Monachism is not essential to salvation, for we are not living for ourselves

only. A life of egoism is doomed to perish, but that in the Bodhi is immortal and the highest good we can perform on earth is to realize this life of Bodhi, which constitutes the essence of our being. Those who attain this goal are truly Bodhisattvas and even Buddhas. This enhancement of our intrinsic worth marks a new epoch in the history of Buddhism.

A BUDDHIST VIEW OF WAR

Every religion strives to bring about universal peace on earth; every prophet points out a way to paradise; every philosopher promises us the attainment of eternal happiness; every wise man tells us how to enjoy the bliss of life; and finally, every one of us wishes and endeavors to be delivered from all anxiety, worry, fear, grief, despair, etc. And in spite of all this, our world, our life, is anything but peaceful, blessed, and happy. How do we account for the paradox?

Is our idea of peace chimerical? Are we building an air castle to bring it about? Is our civilization founded on the sand? Are all the noble aspirations of our ancestors and our enthusiasm to follow in their wake like running after a mirage in a desert? Is our very existence an empty dream that is charming only as long as it lasts? Or perhaps are some mischievous spirits hovering over our heads and luring us to a land of eternal contradiction?

Whatever our objective experiences are, the final verdict comes from within, not from without. It is after all our will to believe, our subjectivism, that decides our destiny on earth and in heaven. In spite of its contradictions, its apparent disappointments, and its visionary promises, religious faith is our final bulwark, which is invincible even unto death. We know not the reason why; nay, it is idle to court the question. It is enough that it is so. Infinitely happy is he, indeed, who takes refuge in this sanctum of faith.

What then is the faith entertained by a Buddhist in the midst of this constant warfare between individuals, between classes, between nations, and between all things?

To express most outspokenly, Buddhist faith is essentially optimistic.

Whatever apparent and temporary evils, they are destined in their very constitution to come to a happy terminus. The cosmological development of Dharmakaya is so vast and comprehensive that all things are, at least temporarily, possible here—even such as appear irrational, inharmonious, or immoral in their partial realization. What we poor mortals experience here is only an infinitesimal portion of the grand scheme of Dharmakaya.

There was once an idiot who observed the heavens through a hollow tube of reed. He sincerely believed what he discovered with his instrument, for hence his heavens could not be made any vaster than the diameter of the tube. Perhaps we shall repeat this folly if we attempt to scale the infinitude of the Dharmadhatu with our limited intellect.

Such is the fundamental faith of Buddhism. And the faith is attainable only by pureness and simpleness of heart. The superficial, dissecting, murderous intellect is forever barred out in this holy realm.

How vague, how hazy, how mystical! But this vague mysticism is the very source from which religion drinks to her heart's content. It is the most wonderful fact in this world of prosaicism that every soul is capable of experiencing it sooner or later.

Enlightened Buddhists however do not hide themselves forever in the shrine of eternal subjectivism, as far as their every-day dealings are concerned. They have no spite for the realm of relativity because their temporal existence is possible only under this condition, and also because there is nothing dual in life which is the highest synthesis of all contradictions. They eat, they drink, they propagate, they collide, they struggle, they strike, and they succumb.

War is abominable, and there is no denying it. But it is only a phase of the universal struggle that is going on and will go on, as long as one breath of vitality is left to an animate being. It is absurdity itself to have perpetual peace and at the same time to be enjoying the full vigor of life. We do not mean to be cruel, neither do we wish to be self-destructive. When our ideals clash, let there be no flinching, no backsliding, no undecidedness, but for ever and ever pressing onward. In this kind of war there is nothing personal, egotistic, or individual. It is the holiest spiritual war.

One thing most detestable and un-Buddhistic in war is its personal element. Egotistic hatred for an enemy is what makes a war most deplorable. But every pious Buddhist knows that there is no such irreducible a thing as ego. Therefore, as he steadily moves onward and clears every obstacle in the way, he is doing what has been ordained by a power higher than himself; he is merely instrumental. In him there is no hatred, no anger, no ignorance, no prejudice. He has lost himself in fighting. Another thing that makes good Buddhists shrink, though not irrevocably, is the physical side of war. Brutality has never appealed to Buddhism. It is barbarism pure and simple. As a matter of fact, we cannot escape our material existence, but it is our solemn duty to make its significance as spiritual as possible, for herein lies divinity of our being. At the present stage of civilization in which we are living, great masses of people are still desperately groaning under the yoke of crass materialism, and war is still liable to rage in its most diabolical form. This is an evil Buddhists cannot take for a part of the grand scheme of Dharmakaya, comprehensive as it is. It must be crushed down at any cost with all the strenuousness Buddhists may possess.

As a physical being we are nothing. Even the strongest man cannot stand the explosion of a compound of nitroglycerin, an innocent-looking chemical in itself. Strange, indeed, that such a spiritual essence as ourselves should be encased in such a fragile vessel as flesh. Stranger still that this spiritual essence very frequently yields itself to the clamoring demands of the flesh. But in spite of the incongruity, the significance of our existence asserts itself in a most unmistakable way and

sometimes quite unexpectedly. History bears witness to all this. Let us then shuffle off this mortal coil whenever it becomes necessary, and not raise a grunting voice against the fates. From our mutilated, mangled, inert corpse will there be the glorious ascension of something immaterial, which leads forever progressing humanity to its final goal.

Resting in this conviction, Buddhists carry the banner of Dharma over the dead and dying until they gain final victory.

IS BUDDHISM NIHILISTIC?

Buddhism is commonly understood to be a nihilistic religion, which teaches the doctrines of non-atman and nirvana, meaning by nirvana the extinction of vitality, and non-atman the annihilation of individuality. Ever since this interpretation of Buddhism was adopted by the Christian missionaries of the East, many Western scholars have been so influenced by them as to refuse to listen to a modern Buddhist's own interpretation. They have gone even so far as to condemn it as a Christianized or degenerated view held by latter-day Buddhists, especially when the view so condemned upholds the natural development of our religious consciousness. They seem to have forgotten the well-known proverb that Rome was not built in one day, and there is no living religion on earth now that has not developed from some primitive faith, assimilating during its growth all the necessary nourishment from various sources.

The fact is that Buddhism is so many-sided and so comprehensive that we are sometimes induced to consider it a self-contradictory system, but by patient and careful investigation we finally come to understand its positive ground-principles, which are underlying and unifying in a higher form all its apparently irreconcilable teachings.

I have not space enough here to establish my points satisfactorily to the reader; let me only remark that, throughout all the Buddhist nations of the East, the most popular and the most fundamental saying of the Buddha is a verse in the *Dhammapada* (verse 183), which reads in Pali:

Sabba papassa akaranam,
Kusalassa upasampada,
Sacitta pariyodapanam,
Etam buddhanasasanam.

and in Chinese:

Zhu e mo zuo,
Zhu shan fengxing,
Zi jing qi yi,
Shi zhu fojiao.²

This forms the corner-stone of all the schools of Buddhism, Southern, Northern, and Eastern.

Toward the end of the Tang dynasty (A.D. 620–905) in China, a venerable Buddhist monk was approached by a famous poet, Bai Letian,³ who asked him what was the first fundamental doctrine of Buddhism. The monk instantly replied: “Refrain from doing all evil, and promote all that is good.” Then the poet said: “That is what is known by every child,” but the monk exclaimed: “Every child may know it, but even a gray-haired man is unable to practice it.”

In this simple significant and fundamental ethical injunction, do we find anything nihilistic and world-denying, so often considered characteristic of Buddhism? What is first taught to the novice in all Buddhist institutions is not the gospel of self-mortification or that of self-annihilation, but a course of plain moral instruction, which is contained in the *Book of Buddha's Last Sermon*.⁴ This book was one of the first Sanskrit books brought to China and translated into the language of that country by the first official Buddhist missionaries from India, who arrived in China A.D. 69. The book is essentially no more than an exposition of the moral precept just mentioned. In it we have practically the gist of Buddhism, which is to be faithful, righteous, kindhearted, and poor in spirit. The Buddha here admonishes his disciples in his dying moments to be diligent in their efforts to save themselves, not by mere meditation and asceticism, but by sincere moral endeavor to live in harmony with truth. He also warns them not to accept his teachings simply by strength of his authority, but on account of their intrinsic truth and worth. Thus reviewed, Buddhism can be said in a sense to be a purely ethical system, but by no means a gospel of annihilation.

I am not going to deal here with the mooted questions bearing on the rise of Mahayanism as distinguished from Hinayanism. I consider these two great divisions of Buddhism as equally representing the original spirit of the founder—the distinction between the two being merely incidental and not essential. Now, according to Mahayanism, all sentient beings in the triple world are Buddha's own beloved children and partake of something of his nature.⁵ This nature in us is called *Bodhicitta*, or more fully, *Anuttara Samyak Sambodhicitta*. This *citta* consists of *Mahakaruna* and *Mahaprajna*. *Mahakaruna* is no less than love and *Mahaprajna* is wisdom or intelligence. The Buddha was an incarnation of love and wisdom, and all sentient beings as his children are capable of love and faith. This conception of Buddha as love and wisdom finds a remarkable parallelism in Christian theology.

In Mahayanism, the conception of man becomes nobler and more sublime. He is not a mere existence of dust, but an embodiment of intelligence. He is not an isolated being who has no connection with the world-all, but he reflects in himself the essence that makes up this grand cosmos. Mahayanists call him, therefore, *Bodhisattva*, intelligence-being. A *Bodhisattva* refuses to be delivered for any

selfish consideration from the whirlpool of transmigration, as he wants to reappear on this earth again and again, until he has saved every one of his fellow-creatures from his sufferings caused by desire and sin (i.e., *Kleśa* or *Doṣa*). To accomplish this grand purpose he is considered to be able to assume any form of existence and to realize all possible means of salvation (*Kusala-upaya*) according to circumstances. For he is not a mere individual existence who is temporarily and spatially limited, but he is universal, and, in this phase of his being, he is sometimes known as Amitabha, or more widely, Dharmakaya.

In this connection I wish to state that the study of Mahayanism is still very much neglected. Most people do not know what it really is. Knowledge of Buddhism has made great strides within the last few decades, but its history of development is little known;—what is known to the West coming mostly from the Pali texts. To understand a living religion whose influence is felt by millions of souls to-day, one asserts itself throughout its successive stages of evolution. Those who are desirous of studying the unfoldment of the religious consciousness under various circumstances, that is, those who take interest in the science of comparative religion, cannot well afford to ignore the significance of Mahayana Buddhism.⁶

Let me add in conclusion that every stage of evolution, be it biological or social or spiritual, is influenced as much, if not more, by environment as by the original nature of a living system itself. All religious systems, whatever their original character, must adapt themselves to new surroundings in which they are going to develop, and to undergo such transformation as to suit best to the newly created needs. Religion may make a new type of character, but very frequently we find otherwise, i.e., religion remodeled by the needs of a new character. Any religion that is rigid as a corpse and not amenable to the laws of evolution, is surely doomed, and will die as soon as it finds itself in a totally different situation. The commonest mistake entertained by the masses is to take religious influence as well-nigh omnipotent. If Buddhism were first adopted by the Western people, who are more energetic and self-assertive, and who more strongly cling to individual existence than the Oriental people, Buddhism might have developed quite differently from what it appears now to the outsiders, that is, as nihilistic or quietistic or self-denying.

The First Convocation of Buddhism

1904

Published in 1904, this is undoubtedly the first detailed essay written on the descriptions in Chinese sources of the First Council, convened by the Saṃgha immediately following the Buddha's death. Indeed, it is all the more impressive given the fact that Suzuki draws from eleven different Chinese sources, only one of which has been translated into a European language even today. As most of the content is taken from Vinaya translations and we are still at the beginning stages of scholarship utilizing Chinese sources to aid in the reconstruction of Indian Vinaya discourse, it continues to be cited today.¹ Albert J. Edmunds (1857–1941) is given joint authorship for the paper, but the original publication is divided into a Prefatory Note by Edmunds and the essay itself by Suzuki, which has its own title, “The First Convocation of Buddhism.” Only Suzuki's essay is included here. Edmunds did not read Chinese and the entire paper is devoted to Chinese sources, so Edmunds's role was to frame the topic in terms of contemporary scholarship and provide assistance to Suzuki in the reconstruction of Sanskrit names and terms. Although Edmunds knew enough Pāli to publish a translation of the *Dhammapada*, many of the Sanskrit spellings here had to be corrected by the present editor. The Buddha's first sermon, for example, is written both as *Dharmaçakrapravartana* and *Dharma-cakra-pravartana Sūtra*, the word *nirvāṇa* written without the lingual ṇ, *piṭaka* without the lingual ṭ, and so forth. Given that *piṭaka* is spelled the same in Pāli and Sanskrit, Edmunds's editorial contribution appears minimal. Born in England, Edmunds worked at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania for many years but also had a short stint at Open Court. A devoted follower of Emanuel Swedenborg, Edmunds's diary mentions his discussions with Suzuki about Swedenborgianism, but there is anecdotal evidence that Suzuki knew of Swedenborg's thought even before journeying to America.²

Originally published in *The Monist* (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court for the Hegeler Institute), vol. 14, no. 2 (1904).

• • •

THE FIRST CONVOCATION OF BUDDHISM

The purpose of the present article is not to enter into an historical or critical examination of the First Convocation of the Buddhist Order, which is generally admitted by all the schools of Buddhism to have taken place immediately after the death of the Master. Though some critics, for instance, Oldenberg,³ doubt its historical reality, it is apparently natural that the pious disciples of Buddha wished to rescue all his teachings from oblivion as soon as an opportunity presented itself. It may not, of course, have taken place in all its details as told by different sects, but even then those records possess an important historical significance on account of the light which they throw on the later development of Buddhism. Having this in view, I have collected and compared as many materials as available from the Chinese sources, but have refrained from giving an entire translation of them, which, however interesting to the specialist, cannot be presented in a limited space. The following summarized notes may serve in giving some insight into the nature of the First Convocation as well as into the attitude assumed toward it by different schools of Buddhism.

SOURCES

The Chinese sources relating to the First Convocation of Buddhism are as follow:

1. The *Sudarśana-vinaya-vibhāṣā* (right-comprehension-vinaya-analysis): Case *Han*,⁴ fas. VIII., pp. 1–4. (Translated by Saṃghabhadra, A.D. 489. 18 fascicles.)⁵
2. The *Mahīśāsaka-nikāya-pañcavarga-vinaya* (the Vinaya-text of the Mahīśāsaka school in five divisions): Case *Zhang*, fas. II., pp. 68–69. (Translated by Buddhajīva with the assistance of some native Chinese Buddhists, A.D. 423–424. 30 fascicles.)⁶
3. The *Caturvarga-vinaya* (the Vinaya-text of the Dharmagupta school in four divisions): Case *Lie*, fas. VI., pp. 49–51. (Translated by Buddhayaśas and Zhu Fonian, A.D. 405. 60 fascicles.)⁷
4. The *Mahāsāṃghika-vinaya* (the Vinaya-text of the Mahāsāṃghika school): Case *Lie*, fas. X., 32–35. (Translated by Buddhahadbra and Faxian, A.D. 416. 46 fascicles.)⁸
5. The *Mūlasarvāstivāda-nikāya-vinaya-saṃyuktavastu* (the miscellaneous part of the Vinaya-text of the Sarvāstivāda school): Case *Han*, fas. II., pp. 87–93. (Translated by Yijing, A.D. 710. 40 fascicles.)⁹
6. The *Vinaya-mātrkā sūtra* (the Sūtra of the Vinaya-summaries): Case *Han*, fas. IX., pp. 15–16. (The translator's name is lost, but the work is considered to have been done under the Qin dynasty, A.D. 350–431. 8 fascicles.)¹⁰

7. The *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra* (a treatise on the great wisdom-perfection): Case Wang, fas. I., pp. 15–17. (The work is ascribed to Nāgārjuna. A commentary on the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra*. Translated by Kumārajīva, A.D. 402–405. 100 fascicles. The original is said to have been thrice as large as the present translation.)¹¹
8. The *Life of King Aśoka*: Case Tsang, fas. X., pp. 13–14. (Translated by An Faqin, between A.D. 281–306. 5 or 6 fascicles.)¹²
9. The *Record of the Compilation of the Three Piṭakas and the Miscellaneous Piṭaka*: Case Zang, fas. VIII., pp. 32–35. (The translator's name is lost, but the work is said to be a production of the Eastern Jin dynasty, A.D. 317–420.)¹³
10. The *Sūtra on Kāśyapa's Compilation*: Case Tsang, fas. VIII., pp. 35–37. (Translated by An Shigao, a monk from Parthia, A.D. 148–170. The above two works are very short and consist of a few pages only.)¹⁴
11. The *Accounts of the Transmission of the Dharmapiṭaka*: Case Zang, fas. IX, p. 92. (Translated by Kivkara 吉迦夜, A.D. 472. 6 fascicles.)¹⁵

Besides the above works we may consult Faxian and Xuanzang as well, but I have refrained from making extracts from these works, because good English and French translations are accessible to the students of Buddhism.

CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LED KĀŚAYAPA TO SUMMON THE FIRST CONVOCATION

That Mahākāśyapa, the first Buddhist patriarch, was the originator of the first assembly for compiling the Piṭakas, is a matter of general acceptance by all schools of Buddhism. His motive, according to the Ceylon tradition, is ascribed to the imprudent utterance of a certain Bhikṣu Subhadra¹⁶ who, hearing of Buddha's entrance into Nirvāṇa, unreservedly gave vent to his feeling of relief, for he thought the religious discipline demanded by his Master was too rigorous. This tradition agrees with the records in the Vinaya texts of the Mahīśāsaka, the Mahāsāṃghika, and the Dharmagupta schools, and also with those in the *Vinaya-māṭṛkā-sūtra* and the *Sudarśana-vinaya-vibhāṣā*,¹⁷ whereas in the Vinaya text of the Dharmagupta an additional reason why the Piṭaka should be rehearsed immediately after Buddha's death is given by Kāśyapa thus: "We should now compile¹⁸ the Dharma and the Vinaya, in order that heretics (*tīrthakas*) shall not make us [the subject of] superfluous comments and censures, saying that the discipline of the Śrāmaṇa Gautama is like smoke; that when the World-Honored One was living, all [his disciples] observed the precepts, but now, after his disappearance, there are none who observe them."

But the Vinaya text of the Sarvāstivāda, *Transmission of the Dharmapiṭaka*, and the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra* do not make any allusion to the unwise Bhikṣu. The *Sarvāstivāda-vinaya*, the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra*, and the *Life of Aśoka*, on the other hand, state that Mahākāśyapa was requested or instigated by devas who deeply lamented the possibility of the future loss of the Piṭakas, if not compiled in due time. The *Transmission of the Dharmapiṭaka*, however, says nothing about the superhuman suggestion. To quote the *Sarvāstivāda-vinaya*: “Those devas whose long life extends over many kalpas were greatly afflicted at witnessing the Nirvāṇa of Buddha. But when they came to observe that many a sage had also entered into Nirvāṇa, they at last began to blame [the disciples], saying: ‘The Sūtra, Vinaya, and Mātṛkā [which constitute] the genuine Dharmapiṭaka taught by the World-Honored One are left uncompiled, but surely [the disciples] are not going to have the right doctrine turned into ashes?’”

Surmising the wish of those devas, Mahākāśyapa said to all Bhikṣus: “You know that the venerable Śāriputra and the venerable Mahāmaudgalyāyana, each with a large number of great Bhikṣus who could not bear witnessing Buddha’s entrance into Mahānirvāṇa, had already reverted to a state of perfect tranquility, and now the World-Honored One himself, in turn with 18,000 Bhikṣus, has also entered into Parinirvāṇa. All those devas who are living in numerable kalpas, however, come forth to express their deep grief, and blame us, saying: ‘Why do you not have the holy teachings of the Tripiṭaka compiled? Are you going to have the deepest spiritual doctrine of the Tathāgata turned into ashes?’ So I declare to you all that the greatest thing we can do now is the compilation of the Pitaka. All then responded: ‘Well, let us do the work.’”

In the *Transmission of the Dharmapiṭaka*, Mahākāśyapa is stated to have told all Bhikṣus, as follows: “Buddha is now cremated, but we have no concern with the relics (*śārīra*) of the World-honored One, for kings, the rich, ministers of state, and lay-believers who desire the most excellent bliss will, of their own accord, make offerings [to them]. What we have to do is the collection of the Dharmacakṣu [literally, the eye of the law], whereby to prevent an untimely extinction of the torch of the law. In order that it may illuminate the future generation, let a prosperous perpetuation of the *triratna* be not interrupted.

The *Record of the Collection of the Tripiṭaka* and the *Samyuktapiṭaka*, which was translated during the Eastern Jin dynasty, A.D. 317–420, agrees with the above-mentioned work in referring neither to the imprudent Bhikṣu nor to the suggestion of devas.

THE EXCLUSION OF ĀNANDA

It is almost¹⁹ unanimously recorded in all the Chinese books that Ānanda was not admitted to membership in the Convocation until he attained to the state

of mastery, through the reprimand of Mahākāśyapa, which successfully awakened in his heart the feelings of deep remorse and shame. There is, however, no agreement of statements as to how Ānanda was instigated by him in obtaining final emancipation.

According to *The Sudarśana-vibhāṣā-vinaya*, Mahākāśyapa insisted on the exclusion of Ānanda from the Convocation in order to protect it against all the reprehension that might arise from admitting one who was still in the stage of training, but the rest of the congregation thought it impossible to compile the Sūtras without Ānanda, so they admonished him to exert all his spiritual powers for the attainment of Arhatship.

The Life of Aśoka, the *Caturvarga-vinaya* of the Dharmagupta school, and the *Pañcavarga-vinaya* of the Mahīśāsaka school, these three works generally agree in this connection. Ānanda was preaching the Law to a large crowd of people, not knowing anything about Mahākāśyapa's determination to exclude him from the meeting. A certain Bhikṣu named Boshe,²⁰ who perceived through his supernatural insight that Ānanda was not yet free from attachment, felt pity for him, and told him the following in verse:

Calmly sitting under a tree, contemplate Nirvāṇa.
Be not indolent, but exercise Dhyāna.
For what good would there be in chattering?

Thereupon Ānanda made up his mind to obtain final emancipation, etc., etc.

In the *Sarvāstivāda-vinaya*, a verse slightly different in meaning from the above is also mentioned, but it was given by a mysterious boy who served him as an attendant instead of by a Bhikṣu. This incident occurred after a severe censure by Mahākāśyapa of eight misdemeanors committed by Ānanda. The Vinaya text states that Mahākāśyapa at first considered what would be the proper way of treating Ānanda, whether with a severe reprehension or with a gentle encouragement. When he had determined to take the first course, Ānanda was brought before the congregation. Mahākāśyapa said: "You must leave this place. [It is not proper for] this congregation of worthy [Bhikṣus] to be associated with you in their work." Hearing this, Ānanda felt as if his heart were being pierced with arrows, and, trembling all over his body, he pleaded with Mahākāśyapa not to exclude him from the congregation, as he was not conscious of any faults [which would justify this severe punishment]. Mahākāśyapa now enumerated his eight misdemeanors, which caused Ānanda at last to retire from the assembly and to train himself for the attainment of Arhatship.

In the *Mahāsāṃghika-vinaya*, Ānanda is stated to have received a very humiliating treatment from Mahākāśyapa. When Mahākāśyapa was requested by Bhikṣus to admit the former to their assembly, he said: "No, if such a one [who is still in the stage] of training should be admitted into a congregation of those who are above

training and are perfect in their meritorious powers, he would appear like a leprous fox (?) in an assemblage of lions.” When this ignominious comparison was communicated by a deva to Ānanda, who was traveling toward Rājagṛha, it did not please him at all. But he thought that Mahākāśyapa, who well knew to what family he belonged, would not have referred to him in such a way if he were free from prejudice! But in the meantime having attained final deliverance, Ānanda hastened through the air to the Convocation. Mahākāśyapa, it is stated, then explained to him that he used such a vigorous expression, only as he wished to encourage him to reach the stage of Arhatship.

In the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra*, the episode is described somewhat in a similar way to that in the *Sarvāstivāda-vinaya*. Ānanda is brought before the congregation by Mahākāśyapa and is reproached first for his not being yet qualified to rejoin it, and then for his six (not eight) misdemeanors. When Ānanda is expelled from the assembly, Mahākāśyapa closes the gate behind him and begins to compile the Vinaya with the remaining Bhikṣus. Exceedingly mortified, Ānanda during the night exercised all his spiritual powers to reach the Path, and when at last he attained to the state of freedom from all prejudices, he rushed at midnight to Mahākāśyapa’s gates. Being told there to come inside through the keyhole, he did so by his supernatural power. Mahākāśyapa consoled him, saying that the severe reproach had been inflicted on him simply because he wished to see him enter into the state of Arhatship.

In the *Sutra on Kāśyapa’s Compilation [of the Tripiṭaka]*, Ānanda is said to have been expelled from the congregation after he was censured by Mahākāśyapa for his nine misdemeanors in the presence of the Saṃgha.

ĀNANDA’S MISDEMEANORS

When Ānanda said to Mahākāśyapa that he was not conscious of any faults, and that therefore there was no reason to exclude him from the assembly, Mahākāśyapa enumerated several of his (*duṣkṛta*), which were considered by him to be the proof that Ānanda was still in the stage of training. This incident is said to have occurred, according to some, before the compilation, but according to others, after it. To the former belong the *Sarvāstivāda-vinaya*, the *Sutra on Kāśyapa’s Compilation*, the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra*, and the *Caturvarga-vinaya* of the Dharmagupta school; to the latter belong the *Vinaya-māṭṛkā Sūtra*, the *Pañcavarga-vinaya* of the Mahīśāsaka, the *Life of Aśoka*, and the *Mahāsāṃghika-vinaya*. But in the *Caturvarga-vinaya*, the *Mahāsāṃghika-vinaya*,²¹ the *Life of Aśoka*, the *Pañcavarga-vinaya*, the faults of Ānanda are simply enumerated without any reference to his qualification as a member of the Convocation.

The number of his faults as censured by Mahākāśyapa or Upāli is variously estimated at six, seven, eight, and nine. The following sums up all that was charged against him:

1. Ānanda asked Buddha for the admittance of women into the Saṃgha, in spite of Buddha's prediction that if women were admitted, the Law of the Tathāgata would not long abide on earth.²²
2. Ānanda did not ask Buddha for the prolongation of his life, when the latter expressly suggested this to him, by saying that those who were trained in the four supernatural powers could either prolong or shorten their life for the period of one kalpa.
3. When Buddha preached in parables, Ānanda made, in spite of his presence, some superfluous remark on them.
4. Ānanda trod on Buddha's golden-colored robe while trying to wash it (a), or while trying to sew it (b).
5. Being asked by Buddha to give him some water when he was going to enter into Nirvāṇa, Ānanda gave him muddy water (a), or he did not give him any, even when thrice asked (b).
6. When Buddha told Ānanda that Bhikṣus might dispense with minor precepts, he did not make any inquiry as to what precepts should be regarded minor.²³
7. Ānanda exposed the secret parts of Buddha in the presence of women, thinking that the act would tend to the cessation of their passions, but how could he know this when he had not yet attained to the stage of Arhatship?
8. Ānanda showed the gold-colored body of Buddha to a multitude of women, allowing them to defile it with their tears.
9. Ānanda first allowed women to worship the remains of Buddha.
10. When Ānanda was one time reproached by Buddha, he secretly cherished ill-will, and was mischievous to others.
11. Ānanda was not yet free from the three evil passions: lust, malice, and ignorance, while all the other Bhikṣus assembled in the Convocation were free therefrom.
12. Buddha asked Ānanda three times to serve him as one who offers things (?) to Buddha, but he declined it.²⁴

The number and the order of these faults committed by Ānanda are different in different works.

In the *Sarvāstivāda-vinaya* eight faults are counted in the following order: 1, 2, 3, 4a, 5a, 6, 7, 8.

The *Pañcavarga-vinaya* counts six in this order: 6, 4b, 1, 2, 5b, 9.

The *Life of Aśoka*, six: 6, 5b, 4 (simply stepping on Buddha's robe), 2, 7 (the reason given by Ānanda is that he wished to awake in the minds of women the desire to be born as men in their future life), I.

The *Sūtra on Kāśyapa's Compilation* has nine: 1, 2, 10, 4 (simply stepping over the golden robe of Buddha), 5b, 6, 7, 8, II.

The *Caturvarga-vinaya* states seven: I, 12, 4b, 2, 5b, 6, 8.

The *Mahasamghika-vinaya* describes seven, thus: 1, 2, 4b, 5b, 6, 7, 8.

The *Mahāprajñāpāramitā Śāstra* has six: 1, 5b,²⁵ 2, 4 (when folding), 7.

The *Vinaya-māṭrkā Sūtra* merely states that Mahākāśyapa accused Ānanda for his seven faults but does not particularize any of them; on the other hand, it relates nine disadvantages arising from the admittance of women into the Saṃgha.

It is significant that the *Sudarśana-vinaya* does not make any reference to Ānanda's misdemeanors.

THE INCIDENT OF GAVĀMPATI

The incident of Gavāmpati in connection with the First Convocation is stated in all the Mahāyāna literature and also in some²⁶ of the Hinayāna. In the Mahāyāna literature we have the following works: *The Life of Aśoka*, the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā Śāstra*, the *Sutra concerning Kāśyapa's Compilation*, the *Record of the Transmission of the Dharmapiṭaka*, and the *Record of the Compilation of the Tripiṭaka and the Saṃyuktapiṭaka*. On the other hand, the *Vinaya-māṭrkā Sūtra*, the *Caturvarga-vinaya*, the *Pañcavarga-vinaya*, and the *Sudarśana-vinaya*, all of which belong to documents of the Hinayāna class, make no statement about the Gavāmpati incident.

The incident of Gavāmpati, though it is more or less differently recorded as to its details in different works, is briefly this. Hearing the great bell rung by Mahākāśyapa, the five hundred Bhikṣus²⁷ hastened to the place of meeting, but when Mahākāśyapa found that one of them²⁸ called Gavāmpati²⁹ had not yet joined them, he asked Anuruddha of the whereabouts of the missing Bhikṣu. Being told that he was enjoying a peaceful life in one of the Heavens,³⁰ he sent a message thither to invite him to the Convocation presided over by Mahākāśyapa. Gavāmpati, who knew nothing about the late events relating to Buddha and his disciples, scrutinizingly asked the messenger why Mahākāśyapa, instead of the Blessed One himself, stood at the head of the congregation: what was the object of such a grand religious convention, and some other questions.³¹ When he was informed of all that had been going on below, he was so greatly afflicted that he said he had now no inclination to descend to the earth, which was made entirely desolate by the eternal departure of Buddha. So saying, Gavāmpati entered into a state of deep meditation, suddenly rose in the air shining with supernatural brilliancy, and then consumed himself in a heavenly fire.³²

The *Mahāprajñāpāramitā Śāstra* says that Gavāmpati, having been fully familiar with the Vinaya and the Sutra, his presence was necessary to the assembly.

According to the *Mahāsāṃghika-vinaya*, Mahākāśyapa sent several messages to Heaven to summon those Bhikṣus who were abiding there, but all of them, having learned that Buddha had already entered into Parinirvāṇa, were so exceedingly mortified that they disappeared one after another in the same manner. Mahākāśyapa

then declared that no more messages would be dispatched to Heaven, nor should those Bhikṣus who were living on earth enter into Nirvāṇa until their work of great importance had been completed.

THE PROCEEDINGS

What was done by the Convocation? Were the Vinayapiṭaka and the Sūtrapiṭaka alone compiled? Did a compilation of the Abhidharmapiṭaka also take place? Did any dissension occur in the assembly? These questions constitute the most important part of the First Convocation, and the following abstracts from various Chinese translations are calculated to throw some light on them.

A. The Vinaya in Four Divisions (Caturvarga-vinaya). When the cremation ceremony of Buddha was over, all the five hundred Bhikṣus went from Vaiśālī to Rājagṛha, where Mahākāśyapa intended to summon the assembly. First, Ānanda was blamed for his seven faults, as already mentioned; then, Upālī was requested to recite the Vinaya, beginning with the first of the Principal Sins (Pārājika), as to the individual, the circumstance, and the nature of the crime. Rules concerning the Bhikṣu and the Bhikṣuṇī, the Prātimokṣa, the Poṣadha, the Residing Season, the Wandering Season, the use of leather, the robes, medicaments, the Kaṭhina ceremonies—all these regulations were incorporated in the Vinaya.

Ānanda was next asked to compile the Sūtrapiṭaka. Such Sūtras as the *Brahmajāla* (translated Brahma-moving), the *Ekottara* (increasing by one), the *Daśottara* (increasing by ten), the *Formation and Destruction of the World*, the *Samgīti* (chorus), the *Mahānidāna* (great cause), the *Questions of the Śakra* (Indra), were included in the Longer Āgama (Pāli, Dīgha Nikāya); those Sūtras of middle length were called the Middling Āgama (Pāli, Majjhima Nikāya); those in which the subjects were arranged numerically from one to eleven were called the Āgama Increasing by One (Aṅguttara Nikāya); those which were miscellaneously preached for (?) the Bhikṣus, Bhikṣuṇīs, Upāsakas, Upāsikās, Devas, Śakra, Marās, and Brāhmarājas, were called the Miscellaneous Āgama (Samyutta Nikāya); and lastly such Sūtras as the Jātaka, Itivṛttika,³³ Nidāna, Vaipulya, Adbhūta, Avadāna, Upadeśa, the Explanation of Aphorisms (Nirdeśa?), Dharmapada, Pārāyana,³⁴ Miscellaneous Discussions and several Gāthās, were comprised in the Miscellaneous Piṭaka (Pāli, Khuddaka Nikāya, with other matter). The Discursive [Book] (*Kathā Vatthu*)³⁵ the Non-discursive [Book] (*Vibhaṅga* or *Puggala paññati?*), the Yoking (*Dhammasaṅgaṇi?*), the Correlating (*Yamaka?*), and the Place of Birth (*Paṭṭhāna?*) made up the Abhidharmapiṭaka.³⁶

B. The Vinaya in Five Divisions (Pañcavarga-vinaya). When the five hundred Bhikṣus were assembled in Rājagṛha, Mahākāśyapa inquired of Upālī in due

formulary of the four Principal Precepts (Pārājika) as to the place where they were occasioned, as to the individual with whom they were concerned, and as to the matter with which they dealt. All the Vinaya, for the Bhikṣus as well as for the Bhikṣuṇīs was compiled in this way.

Mahākāśyapa then asked Ānanda where Buddha taught the *Ekottara Sūtra*, the *Daśōttara Sūtra*, the *Mahānidāna Sūtra*, the *Samgīti Sūtra*, the *Śrāmaṇyaphala Sūtra*, the *Brahmajāla* (translated Brahmā-moving), as well as those Sutras that were preached to Bhikṣus, Bhikṣuṇīs, Upāsakas, Upāsikās, Devapūtras, and Devīs. When all the Sutras were thus recited, Mahākāśyapa declared to the Saṃgha: “Those longer Sutras which are now compiled in one group shall be called the Longer Āgama; those Sutras which are neither long nor short, and are now compiled in one group, shall be called the Middling Āgama; those which are miscellaneous preached to Bhikṣus, Bhikṣuṇīs, Upāsakas, Upāsikās, Devapūtras, and Devīs, and are now compiled in one group, shall be called the Miscellaneous Āgama; those Sutras which start with one dharma and increase by one, up to eleven dharmas, and are now compiled in one group, shall be called the Āgama Increasing by One; while the remainder, all consisting of miscellaneous teaching, and now compiled in one group, shall be called the Miscellaneous Piṭaka. And to them all shall be given a collective name, Sūtrapiṭaka. We have now finished compiling the Law, and henceforth let us not put any unnecessary restraint on what was not restrained by Buddha; let us not violate what has already been restrained by Buddha; let us sincerely train ourselves according to the teachings of Buddha.”

C. The Vinaya-māṭrkā Sūtra. Ānanda being admitted to join the assembly, and the five hundred Arhats having taken their seats, they began to compile the Tripiṭaka out of the materials, which consisted of Sutras in five or five hundred³⁷ divisions. Rules for the Bhikṣu and Bhikṣuṇī, and the Skandhas (divisions) relating to the Kaṭhina and other things composed the Vinayapiṭaka. The four Āgamas, (1) Long, (2) Middling, (3) Increasing by One, and (4) Miscellaneous—the last one consisting of those Sutras which relate to Bhikṣus, Bhikṣuṇīs, the Śakrendra, devas, and Brahmarājas, as well as (5) the sundry collection which comprised the Dharmapada, the Exposition, the Pārāyana, the Upadeśa and others—these five groups of the Sutras were classified under the Sūtrapiṭaka. The Discursive (or Dialogical) Treatise (*Kathāvatthu?*), the Non-discursive (or Non-dialogical) Treatise (*Vibhaṅga?*), the Mutual Enclosing (*Dharmasaṅgaṇi?*), the Correlating (*Yamaka?*), and the Regions (*Dhātukathā* or *Paṭṭhāna?*)³⁸ made up the Abhidharmapiṭaka. And the general name Tripiṭaka was given to them all.

D. The Vinaya Text of the Sarvāstivāda School. Mahākāśyapa and the five hundred Bhikṣus kept the assembly in the Pippala Cave. He announced that as Bhikṣus in coming generations would be inferior in their natural endowment (literally, root, *mūla?*)

and lacking in the power of concentration, the assembly would first compile, for the sake of such, the Gāthās (verses)³⁹ in which the Sūtra, Vinaya and Abhidharma,⁴⁰ were treated in comprehensive brevity. This was done before the meal. They then proceeded to compile the Sūtras. Ānanda was requested by Mahākāśyapa as well as by the Saṃgha to select and compile them. Having gone through due formality and having reflected on the impermanence of things, he thought: "Among those Sūtras which I heard personally from Buddha, some are traditional,⁴¹ some are preachings in the Nāga (Serpent) Palace,⁴² others are preachings in the heavens. As I keep them all in memory and do not forget any of them, I shall now recite them." All Devas expressed their willingness to listen, and Mahākāśyapa praised the words of Buddha as the foremost of all doctrines.

Ānanda then recited the first Sūtra, the *Dharmacakrapravartana* (Revolution of the Law-wheel), which was taught in Benāres for the five Bhikṣus, one of whom, Ajñāta Kauṇḍinya, being present in the assembly, told Mahākāśyapa how at that time he gained the eye of the Law. Hearing this, devas as well as those Bhikṣus who were not yet freed from attachment,⁴³ uttered a pitiful cry as if their hearts were being pierced with thousands of arrows, and lamented that they could not hear those words of Buddha any more from his own mouth. In this lamentation the Bhikṣus of the assembly also joined. When they recovered from the shock of deep feeling, Mahākāśyapa declared that this first Sūtra, taught by the Blessed One, having been accepted by all, should be recognized as the genuine doctrine of Buddha.

The second Sūtra, Ānanda now went on, which was also preached in Benāres for the sake of the five Bhikṣus, consisted in the elucidation of the Four Noble Truths and the Eight Right Paths. Kauṇḍinya's confirmation and Mahākāśyapa's conclusion were declared as before.

The occasion that induced Buddha to preach the third Sūtra was also in Benāres for the sake of the five Bhikṣus. He taught that the five Skandhas (aggregates) have no Ātman, that they are subject to transformation, that they cause misery, that one can save oneself from misery through a right comprehension of the nature of things. The conclusion of Mahākāśyapa was the same as before.

In this way all the other Sūtras taught by Buddha in several places were recited by Ānanda and confirmed by the Arhats of the assembly. They were all classified in proper forms according to the subject: for example, Sūtras which treated the five Skandhas were grouped under the heading of Skandha, those which treated the six Āyatanas or the eighteen Dhātus were classified under the Āyatana or Dhātu, and so on with the (twelve) Chains of Causation, the (four) Noble Truths, the speeches of Śrāvakas, the speeches of Buddha, the (four) subjects of Recollection, the (four kinds of) Right Effort, the (four) Supernatural Powers, the (five) Indriyas, the (five) Balas, and the (eight) Bodhyaṅgas.⁴⁴

Those Sūtras which are in coincidence with the Gāthās (verse parts) were called the Coincidence⁴⁵ Āgama; those which consist of lengthy teachings, the Longer

Āgama; those which are of medium length, the Middling Āgama; those in which the subjects are numerically arranged, the Āgama Increasing by One. “There are,” says Mahākāśyapa, “no other Āgamas than these” now compiled.

Next, the Convocation proceeded to compile the Vinaya, led by Upāli, who was considered by Buddha to be the first of the Vinaya-dhara.⁴⁶ Being asked by Mahākāśyapa where, to whom, and on what the first rule of propriety (Śikṣā)⁴⁷ was announced by Buddha, Upāli said that it was in Vārāṇasi (Benāres) and for the five Bhikṣus, and that the matter related to the arrangement of the undergarment. The second Śikṣā was recited by him in the same way.

As for the third Śikṣā, the text continues as follows:⁴⁸ “Mahākāśyapa again said to Upāli: Where did the World-Honored One announce the Śikṣā? Upāli replied with a clear, penetrating voice: In Kalandaka Village—For whom?—For Bhikṣu Sudinna, son of Kalandaka—What was the matter? If a Bhikṣu training himself in the disciplinary rules commits an adulterous act with another Bhikṣu or with an animal, he performs a Pārājika fault; nor is he allowed to cohabit.”⁴⁹

In this way all the parts of the Vinaya were compiled; which consist of the Pārājika rules, Saṃghāvaśeṣa rules, two Aniyata rules, thirty Naiḥsargika rules, ninety Prāyaścittika rules, four Pratideśaniya rules, a number of Śikṣā rules, seven Adhikaraṇaśamatha, as well as the principal rules, obligatory rules, voluntary rules, rules for the Bhikṣu, rules for the Upāsaka, regulations of the Karmavācā, conditions for conversion, the Poṣadha, the season of residence, the wandering season, general and miscellaneous regulations, and the circumstances that brought forth all these rules and regulations.

The compilation of the Vinaya being thus finished, it now occurred to Mahākāśyapa that, as the people in coming generations would be so lacking in intelligence and so poor in natural endowment that they could not comprehend the deep significance of the Doctrine by studying the text only, he himself would recite the Mātṛkā,⁵⁰ that is, Abhidharma, whereby to prevent the spirit of the Sutra and the Vinaya from being obliterated by arbitrary interpretations. Having obtained the sanction of the Convocation, he comprised under the Mātṛkā the following subjects: the four Objects of Smṛti (recollections), the four Right Efforts, the four Supernatural Powers (Ṛddhi), the five Indriyas (lit. root), the five Powers (Bala), the seven Bodhyaṅgas (constituent parts of enlightenment), the Eightfold Noble Path, the four Abhayas (fearlessness), the four Pratisaṃvids (unimpeded knowledge), the four Śrāmaṇaphala (obtainment of Śrāmaṇaship), the four Dharma-padas, the Āraṇya (solitude), Wish, Knowledge, the Dhyāna of Boundary (the fourth Dhyāna?), Emptiness (Śūnyatā), Unconditionality (Animitta), Freedom from Desire (Apraṇihita), miscellaneous Disciplines, various Meditations, the Right Entering, Presentation (or perception), Knowledge of Phenomena, Śamatha (tranquilization), Vipāśyanā (insight), the Dharmasaṃgraha, and the Dharmaskandha.⁵¹

When the compilation of the Sutra, the Vinaya, and the Abhidharma was thus done, the heaven and the earth resounded with the praise of the devas.

E. The Vinaya text of the Mahāsāṃghika school. Having reached at last the state of Arhatship, Ānanda was permitted to join the assembly, which unanimously acknowledged him as the disciple of best memory. They requested him to compile the Dharmapiṭaka.⁵² When Ānanda began to recite, “Thus have I heard: ‘Buddha was at one time in the Bodhimaṇḍa by the river Nairāṇjanā,’” the five hundred Bhikṣus showed their deep feeling, which, however, soon passed to the calm reflection that all things which originate from a combination of causes are necessarily subject to ruin and transformation.

The Dharmapiṭaka thus compiled by Ānanda consisted of the Longer Āgama; the Middling Āgama; the Miscellaneous Āgama, which was so called because of its dealing with miscellaneous subjects concerning predisposition (lit. root, *mūla*), power (*bala*), enlightenment (*bodhi*), and the path (*mārga*); and the Āgama Increasing by one, which was so called because of a numerical arrangement of subjects from one up to one hundred;⁵³ while the Miscellaneous Piṭaka comprised the Udāna (narratives), Itivṛttaka (incidents), and Nidāna (circumstantial notes), relating to Pratyekabuddhas and Arhats, which are written in verses (Gāthā).⁵⁴

Upāli, who was announced by Buddha as well as by the Saṃgha as the first of the Vinaya-dhara, was asked next to compile the Vinaya text. He first told the Convocation that there were five sorts of purity, and then proceeded to censure Ānanda for having committed the seven faults as stated elsewhere, two of which, however, Ānanda refused to acknowledge.⁵⁵

Upāli is said to have then recited the nine divisions of the Vinaya, to wit, (1) Pārājika, (2) Saṃghāvaśeṣa, (3) two Aniyatas, (4) thirty Naihsargika, (5) ninety-two Prāyaścittika, (6) four Pratideśanīya, (7) Śikṣā, (8) seven Adhikaraṇaśamathas, and (9) rules conforming to the Doctrine. He also explained in addition various meanings of the Vinaya; for example, as to the distinction between the dreadful sins (pārājika) and serious offences (*sthūlātyaya*), or as to a different classification of the Vinaya-text. When thus they had finished compiling the Piṭaka, the ten hundred Bhikṣus staying outside⁵⁶ were called in and informed of the work of the Convocation.

A vehement discussion now arose in the assembly as to what was meant by Buddha when he said to Ānanda that the precepts of minor importance could be dispensed with. A certain group of six Bhikṣus went so far to the extreme as to say that “if the World-Honored One were still living, he would have everything at once abolished.” Mahākāśyapa, whose majestic dignity and authority were equal to those of Buddha, then sternly ordered them to keep silence and made a declaration that all which had ever been forbidden should be forbidden, and what had not been forbidden should not be forbidden, and that they should not give any chance to the heretics who were willing to blame the congregation at all costs.

The text concludes with a list of the venerable masters through whom this knowledge of the First Convocation was lineally transmitted down to the venerable Daoli (Bodhibala?).⁵⁷

F. The Sudarśana-vinaya. When the five hundred Bhikṣus were seated, Mahākāśyapa asked them what they would first compile, the Dharmapiṭaka or the Vinayapiṭaka, and to this they answered: “Venerable Sir, the Vinayapiṭaka is the life of Buddhism, and so long as the Vinayapiṭaka exists, Buddhism will also exist. Therefore, let us first produce the Vinayapiṭaka.”

The next question was who should be the principal compiler of it. Upāli suggested that Ānanda could be chosen for the position, but it was not accepted by the assembly. Being recognized by Buddha as the first of the Vinaya-dhara, Upāli himself was prevailed upon to recite the Vinaya by a general vote. After due formulary he produced all parts of the Vinaya, which consisted of the Prātimokṣa of Bhikṣu and Bhikṣuṇī, and Skandhaka, and the Parivāra.

Mahākāśyapa then nominated Ānanda, according to a general wish of the Saṃgha, to compile the Dharmapiṭaka. The *Brāhmajāla* and the *Śrāmañaphala* were first recited, and then all the five divisions of the Sūtra, which consist of the Longer Āgama Sūtra, the Middling Āgama Sūtra, the Saṃyukta Sūtra, the Anguttara Sūtra, and the Khuddaka Sūtra, the last one containing all the words of Buddha (*buddhavacana*) not included in the first four Āgamas.⁵⁸

The speeches of Buddha, the text goes on to say, are of one taste, have two functions, and are divisible into three periods; that is, they all teach the means of deliverance (moksha), which consist in morality, meditation, and understanding; they are composed of the Dharmapiṭaka and the Vinayapiṭaka; they are divisible into the first speech, the last speech, and those speeches which were delivered between them. The text then raises the question: What is the Tripiṭaka? to which is given the answer that it consists of Vinayapiṭaka, Sutrapiṭaka, and Abhidharmapiṭaka, together with their analytic explanation.⁵⁹ The contents of the Tripiṭaka given in this way agree with those of the Pāli collection.⁶⁰

*G. Mahāprajñāpāramitā Śāstra.*⁶¹ Mahākāśyapa in a friendly way requests Ānanda to compile the Dharmapiṭaka, saying: “Though there were many great disciples of the Buddha to whom the guarding of Dharmapiṭaka was entrusted, they are now all gone except you. Therefore, out of the compassion for all beings and in accordance with the spirit of Buddha, you shall compile the Buddhadharmapiṭaka.” Thus requested, Ānanda ascends the lion-seat, and reverentially turning toward the place where Buddha’s Nirvāṇa took place, says: “Though I did not personally hear the first preaching of Buddha, I have learned it by hearsay. When Buddha was in Vārāṇasī, he first opened the gate of nectar for the five Bhikṣus and preached the Four Noble Truths of Suffering, Amassing, Cessation, and the Path.

Ajñāta Kaundinya was the first to perceive the Path, and 80,000 devas also all entered upon the Path.”

When the one thousand Arhats assembled in the Convocation heard the words of Buddha as recited by Ānanda, they were greatly afflicted with the thought that they could no more hear Buddha's personal address. The Sthaviras Anuruddha and Mahākāśyapa expressed in verses their deep feelings about the impermanence of things.

Mahākāśyapa told Ānanda that all the teachings of Buddha, from the *Dharma-cakrapravartana Sūtra* down to the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*, should be classified in four divisions, each being called an Āgama, viz.: the Āgama Increasing by One, the Middling Āgama, the Longer Āgama, and the Coincidence Āgama.⁶² And to them all was given a general name: Sūtradharmapiṭaka.

Upāli, who was recognized by the Saṃgha to be the first of the Vinaya-dhara among the five hundred Arhats,⁶³ was then asked to recite the Vinaya consisting of eighty divisions.⁶⁴

Lastly, Ānanda was again requested to recite the first Abhidharma taught by Buddha, as he was acknowledged among the five hundred Arhats to be most conversant with the exposition of the Sutra. He addressed the Saṃgha: “Thus have I heard: Buddha was at one time in Śrāvastī, when he told the Bhikṣus that those who neither removed nor exterminated the five dreadful [sins], the five misdemeanors, and the five sorts of malice, would suffer in consequence innumerable misfortunes in this life, bodily as well as spiritual, and in the future would fall down into the evil paths; that those, however, who were free from these five dreadful [sins], five misdemeanors, and five sorts of malice, would enjoy in consequence various blessings in this life, bodily as well as spiritual, and in the future be born in a pleasant heavenly abode. What are those five dreadful [sins] which are to be kept away? They are: (1) killing, (2) stealing, (3) unlawful lust, (4) lying, and (5) drinking spirits.”

All such matters were comprised under the Abhidharmapiṭaka.

Thus ended the compilation of the three Dharmapiṭakas.

INCIDENT OF PURĀṆA

Three⁶⁵ out of the eleven Chinese translations that contain accounts of the First Convocation refer to the episode of Purāṇa, who was in the south⁶⁶ when Mahākāśyapa and five hundred Bhikṣus were working on the compilation of the Piṭaka. According to the *Caturvarga-vinaya*, the event occurred in the following manner:

Having heard that the Convocation was taking place in Rājagṛha, Sthavira Purāṇa hastened thither, accompanied by his party, which consisted of five hundred Bhikṣus. He went to Mahākāśyapa and asked if he also might be allowed to learn all that had happened. Mahākāśyapa thereupon again summoned the assembly, requested Upāli to rehearse what he had recited, and had other things repeated

as they had been done before. Purāṇa expressed his satisfaction with the general proceedings of the Convocation, except as to the insertion of the following eight indulgences, which had been plainly approved by Buddha, and unmistakably kept in memory by himself. The eight things were: (1) Keeping food indoors; (2) Cooking indoors; (3) Cooking of one's own accord; (4) Taking food of one's own accord; (5) Receiving food when rising early in the morning; (6) Carrying food home according to the wish of a giver; (7) Having miscellaneous fruits; (8) Eating things grown in (or by?) a pond.

These indulgences, said he, were not against the rule that forbids the taking of the remnant of food. Mahākāśyapa told him that he was correct in saying so, but that Buddha permitted them only on account of a scarcity of food, when the Bhikṣus could not get a sufficient supply of it by going their rounds, and that therefore when this circumstance was removed, Buddha again bade them to abstain from these eight indulgences. Purāṇa, however, protested, declaring that Buddha, who was all-wise, would not permit what otherwise was forbidden, nor would he forbid what otherwise was permitted. To this Mahākāśyapa replied: "The very reason of his being all-wise has enabled him to permit what otherwise was forbidden, and to forbid what otherwise was permitted. Purāṇa, we will now make this decision: That whatever Buddha did not forbid shall not be forbidden, and whatever Buddha forbade shall not be disregarded. Let us train ourselves in accordance with the disciplinary rules established by Buddha."

The *Pañcavarga-vinaya* mentions, instead of the eight above enumerated, seven indulgences which, however, may be taken for eight, according to how we punctuate the passage, though the text apparently states "these seven things." They are slightly different from those in the *Caturvarga-vinaya*, to wit: (1) Keeping food indoors; (2) Cooking indoors; (3) Cooking of one's own accord; (4) Receiving food in compliance with the wish of another; (5) Taking fruit of one's own accord; (6) Receiving things coming out of a pond; (7) Eating fruit with its seeds (or stone) removed, when received from one who is not a regular attendant in the Saṃgha.⁶⁷ According to the *Vinaya-māṭrkā Sūtra*, the first of the eight indulgences is the keeping of food indoors, and the last is the eating of sundry grasses and roots (or roots of grass) growing by a pond, but the six intermediate ones are not mentioned.

Mahākāśyapa is said to have told Purāṇa about the eight excellent qualities of Buddha, by virtue of which he could, when deemed fit, establish or abolish the rules for the benefit of the Saṃgha.

PLACE AND TIME

All the Chinese works, already referred to, agree in stating that the First Convocation took place in Rājagṛha, though they differ as to the special locality of the city.

The Saptaparṇa Cave, the Pippala Rock, the Kṣatrya Cave, and the Gṛdhrakūṭa are the places thus mentioned in them.

As to the time, they unanimously say that the event happened immediately after the demise of Buddha, though they in no wise agree regarding the exact date.⁶⁸

Philosophy of the Yogācāra

1904

“Philosophy of the Yogācāra” is an ambitious attempt to outline the basic texts and doctrines of Yogācāra based entirely on Chinese sources and likely the first essay in a European language to do so. Note that Suzuki is working before the Taishō canon has been created. He relies on the reconstructed Sanskrit titles found in Nanjō’s catalog and gives the text numbers found there. Another odd feature here is his reconstructed Sanskrit name for the storehouse or eighth consciousness as *āliya* rather than today’s expected form *ālaya*. This is based on the Chinese renderings 阿黎耶 and 阿梨耶, both pronounced *a-li-ya* today, that are commonly found in translations of Yogācāra texts translated before Xuanzang and also used in the *Dàshèng qǐxìn lùn* (Awakening of Faith), a text that Suzuki himself translated into English in 1900. Louis de La Vallée-Poussin, one of the editors, adds a note that he has never seen *ālaya* reconstructed as *āliya* as Suzuki is doing here, but he will wait to see his argument later in the article. Given that the Sanskrit root of *ālaya* is *ā + ī*, one can understand *āliya* as possible. In fact, Suzuki never explains his decision to render it this way, though he does mention *ālaya* as a “later translation” in the first paragraph of the section called The Ultimate Reality and in an addendum he explains that Xuanzang established a more accurate rendering of Indic words as a whole, and as a result, “Then *a-li-ya* came to be replaced by *a-lai-ya*.” Reconstructions of Six Dynasties pronunciation today renders both 黎 and 梨 as *lai* or *lei*, but Suzuki did not have access to such scholarship when he published this in 1904, and Sylvain Lévi’s translation of the *Mahāyāna Sūtrālaṃkāra* from Sanskrit came out between 1907 and 1911. Another irony is that we know that Nanjō Bun’yū brought back a Sanskrit-language copy of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* when he returned to Japan in 1885, and if Suzuki had been in Kyoto or Tokyo, he could have at least consulted with Nanjō about the pronunciation in what was then a rare Yogācāra text in Sanskrit, but he was in LaSalle at the time he composed this piece, and this error suggests that most of his knowledge of the subject was gained while he was in the United States. The first translations of a strictly Yogācāran text in a European language were French renderings of the

Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra, from Kumārajīva's Chinese translation by Édouard Huber in 1908 and from a Sanskrit text by Sylvain Lévi in 1911, based on his edited text published in 1907. These come after this piece by Suzuki, but Takakusu's translation of the Yijing travel record published in 1896 contains a list of texts by Asaṅga and some Yogācāra information. In fact this pronunciation error regarding the *ālaya* consciousness is good evidence for the fact that this essay may well have been the first article specifically on Yogācāra literature and thought in a European language. Note that in all subsequent publications Suzuki uses the form *ālaya*.

Note, too, that there is much in the way of "unusual" interpretations in this piece that will show up again in his 1907 *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, where he uses *ālaya*. He somehow believed that there is a translation by Kumārajīva that discusses *ālayavijñāna*, though we cannot find any such today. His glossing of *citta* as "soul" or "heart" and the strange assertion of "their conception of Ālaya-vijñāna as the ultimate reality" despite its tainted nature are arguably the strangest statements in this essay. Today we can only speculate on what Suzuki meant by *soul*, or why he felt this term helped clarify Yogācāra. But in that *manas* is glossed as "the deeply seated consciousness in the soul" and *manas* is "reflecting on *ālayavijñāna*," he seems to be asserting *ālayavijñāna* as a flawed source of human spirituality akin to a biblical notion of *soul*. In wanting the *ālayavijñāna* to represent a kind of ultimate principle, however, its problematic nature in the actual Yogācāra tradition disappears. We may infer from this view the deep influence of the *Qixinlun* (Awakening of Faith) on his understanding of Yogācāra, despite the fact it is not viewed today as a Yogācāra text per se. There are many enigmatic statements, such as, "the Hīnayānists did not have an insight penetrating enough to look into the bottom of the matter," or his understanding of *manas* as "the deeply seated consciousness in the soul" that he equates with "the Will of Schopenhauer." But in his final comment that the European student of Buddhism deserves a more complete telling of the history of Yogācāra but "the time seems not to have come yet for this kind of work" we see Suzuki's own admission that he was not well-versed in this area of Buddhist Studies.

Originally published in *Le Muséon: Études philologiques, historiques et religieuses* (Louvain/Leuven), new series, vol. 5, nos. 3–4 (1904).

• • •

THE MĀDHYAMIKA AND THE YOGĀCĀRA

The Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism, as far as it is known in China and Tibet, divides itself into two great schools, the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra. Though a close investigation of the Chinese Sanskrit literature reveals the existence of some other doctrines than the above two, they seem not to have been recognized in India as distinct schools. For we notice in Yijing's *A Record of Buddhism as Practiced in India Sent Home from the Southern Seas* that "Mahāyānism has no more than two kinds, one is the Mādhyamika and the other the Yogācāra. According to the Mādhyamika the *saṃvṛti* (phenomenal) exists [sensually], but the *paramārtha* (transcendental) is *śūnya* [that is, supersensual], and empty in its essence. According to the Yoga, the

external [*viṣaya*] does not exist, but the inner [*vijñāna*] does, things having existence only in our inner senses (*vijñānāni*).¹

The Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra are generally contrasted, one as a system of negation or emptiness and the other as that of affirmation. The ultimate object of the Mādhyamika school is *śūnyatā* and that of the Yogācāra is *dharmalakṣaṇa* or *āliyavijñāna*. Philosophically speaking, the former treats more of ontology and the latter chiefly of cosmogony or, better, psychology.

The founder of the Mādhyamika is commonly recognized to be Nāgārjuna, whose doctrine was ably supported and brilliantly expounded by Āryadeva. The *Mādhyamika-Śāstra* (Nanjio, 1179)² by Nāgārjuna, the *Śata-Śāstra* (N. 1188) and the *Dvādaśasnikāya-Śāstra* (N. 1186) by Āryadeva, are the principal works of this school. The scriptural foundation of the Mādhyamika system is, according to the Chinese Buddhist scholars, the sūtras of the Prajñāpāramitā class.

The most prominent expounders of the Yogācāra school in India were Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. The following is a list of canonical and expository works belonging to this school and translated into Chinese in various periods:

- (1) *Gaṇḍavyūha-Sūtra* (Nanjio, no. 87)³
- (2) *Samādhinirmocana-Sūtra* (Nanjio, no. 246)⁴
- (3) *Laṅkāvatāra-Sūtra* (Nanjio, no. 175)
- (4) *Yogācārabhūmi-Śāstra* (Nanjio, no. 1170)⁵
- (5) *Mahāyānasamgraha-Śāstra* (Nanjio, no. 1247)⁶
- (6) *Abhidharmasamyuktasaṅgīti-Śāstra* (Nanjio, no. 1178)⁷
- (7) **Ārya-deśanā-vikhyapāna* (Nanjio, no. 1177)⁸
- (8) *Madhyāntavibhāga-Śāstra* (Nanjio, no. 1248)⁹
- (9) *Vijñaptimātrasiddhi-Śāstra* (Nanjio, no. 1197)¹⁰

In China the Yogācāra is more generally known as the Dharmalakṣaṇa or Vijñānamātra sect.

THE TEN FEATURES OF EXCELLENCE

Before proceeding to explain the important tenets of the Yogācāra school, it may be found better to sketch first those points which the school has in common with Mahāyānism generally. For this purpose let me enumerate the ten essential characteristics of the Mahāyāna Buddhism as conceived by the leaders of this school,¹¹ as they at the same time substantially point out the peculiarities of Mahāyānism in general.

The ten "features of excellence" are: (1) Mahāyānism excels in its conception of a fundamental reality or principle, from which starts a universe. (This refers to the conception of *Āliyavijñāna*.)¹² (2) It excels in its interpretation of the object of knowledge, that is, of an external world which is dependent of the *Ālaya*. (3) It

excels in its idealistic world-conception. (4) It excels in its method of discipline, whereby the Mahāyānist attains a realization of the idealistic world-conception. (The discipline consists in the six pāramitās.) (5) It excels in its gradual ascension toward the summit of Bodhisattvahood. (The ascension is graded into ten stages, *bhūmis*.) (6) It excels in its moral precepts, for it teaches the three Mahāyānaśīlas. (7) It excels in its wonderful power of meditation (*samādhi*). (8) It excels in its attainment of transcendental knowledge (*prajñā*). (9) It excels in its perfection of Nirvana called *apraṭiṣṭhitanirvāṇa* (Nirvana that has no abode). (10) It excels in its realization of Dharmakāya, by which the Mahāyānist purifies the Ālaya of all its ignorance and destroys all its evil propensities.

Of these ten "excellent features" that preeminently distinguish the Māhāyana from the Hinayāna as well as from all the Tīrthaka systems, the following may fairly be considered the most essential teachings of the Yogācāra specifically: (1) The classification of knowledge into three forms instead of two as by the Mādhyamika. (2) The hypothesis of Āliya vijñāna. (3) A new conception of Nirvana.¹³ Beside these, what is most noticeable in the Yogācāra philosophy is its decided tendency toward a psychological investigation and its laborious systematization of the subject matter.

EPISTEMOLOGY

In Mahāyānism, knowledge or worldview is ordinarily classified into two. The one may be designated relative knowledge, or conditional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*), or commonsense worldview, and the other, absolute knowledge, or unconditional truth (*paramārthasatya*), or philosophical worldview. While acknowledging this classification, however, the Yogācāra proposes its own method of dealing with the human understanding. According to the *Samdhinirmocana-Sūtra*, the three knowledges or worldviews are *Parikalpita-lakṣana*, *Paratantra-lakṣana*, and *Pariniṣpanna-lakṣana*.

Parikalpita-lakṣana is a worldview based on a wrong assumption that takes falsehood for truth and superficiality for ultimate reality. This assumption does not penetrate into the essential nature of things, but erroneously recognizes them as they appear to our senses. As far as our deceptive sensual perception goes, the objective world looks like an ultimate fact, fully confirming our commonsense materialistic worldview. This view, however, is not supported by a sound reasoning, for things are not in reality and in truth what they appear. Asaṅga finds similarity between this kind of knowledge and the well-known parallelism of the vision of a man who erroneously takes a piece of rope for a snake. Both are merely an uncoordinated and unconfirmed perception and are doomed to lead us to a fatal end.

By *Paratantra-lakṣana* one recognizes the relativity of all existence, depending on a combination of causes and conditions. By this knowledge we come to perceive that the phenomenal world is devoid of finality, that it will disappear as soon as its

causes and conditions are dissociated, that there is nothing in this relative world which is not subject to ultimate dissolution, and that as things are thus transient and impermanent the belief in them is not conducive to the salvation of the soul. To refer to the rope-and-snake simile again, *Paratantra-lakṣana* is compared to the knowledge, of which the man comes in possession after a closer inspection of the dreaded object, that the object is really a piece of rope and not a snake. The rope is composed of fibers and as such is not an ultimate reality. To sum up, *Paratantra-lakṣana* recognizes the unreality of particulars as such and induces us to go further in order that we may finally come to something absolute and permanent.

Pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa is perfect knowledge. When we come to the perception of an ultimate reality that lurks behind the clouds of transient existences, our knowledge is said to have attained its perfection. For it is the comprehension of *Paramārthasatya* (supreme truth), or *Bhūtataṭhātā* (suchness);¹⁴ between these two the idealistic Buddhism makes no real distinction. Transcending all forms of reality and conditionality, the truth or Suchness pervades in the *Dharmadhātu*; it illuminates all sentient and nonsentient beings; it abides in the universality of things. To finish the analogy of rope and snake, the *Pariniṣpanna* is the knowledge by which we come to the final salvation as to the real nature of the rope. The rope is not by itself an ultimate reality, for it is made of flax or straw or cotton. There must be something besides, which makes up the *raison d'être* of the existence of the rope as well as its constituent, flax or straw, and the knowledge of which awakes us from the universal illusion veiling our light of intelligence. By the *Pariniṣpanna* we know that the world in which we live is not final, but it is a manifestation of a higher reality. To reach this final perfection of knowledge, says the Yogācāra, is the gist of all the teachings of Buddha.

ĀLIYA-VIJÑĀNA

What most distinguishes the Yogācāra from the other Mahāyāna schools is their conception of Āliya-vijñāna as the ultimate reality, from which originate our experiences of multitudinous particulars. This is a very complicated notion, showing what a deep psychological insight they had and also how far they have been influenced by the Sāṃkhya philosophy. In the following pages I shall present the Yogācāra's view in a condensed form from Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasamgraha-Śāstra*. Occasional references will be made to Vasubandhu's commentary on the same and also to his own work called *Vijñānamātra-Śāstra*.

THE ULTIMATE REALITY

The *Mahāyānasamgraha-Śāstra* opens with the proclamation that the text is based on the Mahāyāna sutras and proceeds to enumerate ten "points of excellency" they

have over the Hīnayāna. As seen above, the first point is the excellence of its conception of a fundamental reality. Now the Mahāyānists call this Āliyavijñāna (later Ālayavijñāna). It is declared by Buddha in the *Mahāyāna-Abhidharma*¹⁵ as “existing from eternity and forming the foundation of all dharmas, and without which neither the existence of all creations nor the attainment of Nirvāṇa is possible. This vijñāna supports and sustains everything, is a storage where all the germs of existence are stowed away; therefore, it is called Āliya. This I preach only to men of higher intellectual power.” Asaṅga comments on this and says: “It is called Āliya, because all living beings and all defiled [i.e., particular] objects are therein secretly stored in the form of a seed, and also because this vijñāna, being secretly stored within all objects, is the *raison d'être* of their existence, and again because all sentient beings taking-hold of this vijñāna imagine it to be their own ego.” He then quotes a stanza from the *Samdhinirmocana*, which reads:

The vijñāna that bears and sustains is deep and subtle:
The seeds of dharmas are eternally flowing [therein].
To the vulgar I preach [this] not,
[For] that thing is conceived by them as their ego.¹⁶

This Vijñāna is also called Ādhāna, because it carries and supports all physical organs [of our being], becoming their substratum when they come to existence. Why? If not carried and supported by this Vijñāna, all our physical organs would collapse, be lost and incapable of continuing activity. Again the birth of a sentient being would have been impossible if this Vijñāna did not gather around itself the skandhas and thus call into being the six forms of creation. The reunion and resuscitation of the skandhas is only possible by the presence and support of this Vijñāna. Therefore, it is called the Ādhāna.

CITTA AND MANAS

Āliyavijñāna is again called Citta or soul. Citta is to be distinguished from Manas, mind, as Buddha distinctly speaks of them as two. Manas is essentially intelligence-will, and wrongfully reflecting on Citta imagines it to be the substratum of the ego-consciousness. Manas itself has nothing in it that suggests the existence of an ego behind its activities, if not for the presence of Citta, that is, Āliyavijñāna. Manas performs a peculiar function in our intellectual field; it perceives an external world through the six vijñānas and at the same time reflects within itself. When it does the latter, it recognizes there the presence of a vijñāna that persistently makes itself manifest to the Manas. And this is the chamber where lurks “absolute ignorance.” This is the storage where all the seeds of former karma are securely preserved waiting for favorable conditions to germinate.

WHY NOT EXPLICITLY TAUGHT?

One may ask here: Why did not the Tathāgata teach the existence of the Āliya to Śrāvakas? Asaṅga says: Because it is too subtle to be comprehended by them. They have no intelligence that enables them to acquire Sarvajñatā (all-knowledge) as Bodhisattvas, and again, adds Vasubandhu, they show no aspiration for a universal salvation of all beings, being contented with their own self-deliverance only.

But Buddha did not leave the Hīnayānists altogether ignorant of the fact of Āliyavijñāna. For he gave them some hints on the subject in many places, not very clear for them possibly, but explicit enough for the Mahāyānists. For instance, we read, says Asaṅga, in the *Ekottara Āgama* to the effect that “to those people in the world who take delight in the Āliya, long for the Āliya, practice themselves in the Āliya, cling to the Āliya, the Tathāgata preaches the right Dharma to let them put an end to the Āliya.” Here Buddha only hinted at the name of Āliya, not revealing its true nature and significance.

In the Āgama of the Mahāsaṅghika, the Vijñāna is known by the name of fundamental (mūla?) Vijñāna, for it stands in relation to other vijñānas as the root does to the stem, branches, and leaves of a tree.

The Mahīśāsaka designated this by, “That which transcends the mortal skandhas.” All things that are physical or mental are necessarily subject to the cadence of birth and death. They never continue to exist eternally or act incessantly. But that which lies within these perishable phenomena and gathers in itself all the seeds, knows no interruption. It is thus straight and flat “as the royal road,” the way paved by Buddha toward the legitimate conception of the Āliya; only the Hīnayānists did not have an insight penetrating enough to look into the bottom of the matter.

MISREPRESENTED BY OTHER SCHOOLS

This Vijñāna was altogether wrongfully interpreted by other schools of Buddhism than those already mentioned. Some thought that between Citta (Ālaya) and Manas there was no distinction to be made; others, the Tathāgata meant by Ālaya, as when speaking of people taking delight in it, the clinging to worldliness; others, again, that the Ālaya was our body consisting of the five skandhas, to which we are liable to cling as a final reality; still others, that the Ālaya was the atman, or pudgala, or kāya. But, as we have seen above, all these views are altogether inadequate and do not tally with the true doctrine of Buddha.

WHAT IS THE ĀLIYA?

The Āliya is a magazine, the efficiency of which depends on the habit-energy (*xi qi* in Chinese¹⁷) of all defiled¹⁸ dharmas, and in which all the seeds are systematically

stowed away. In one respect this vijñāna of all seeds is the actual reason whereby the birth of all defiled dharmas becomes possible, but in another respect its own efficiency depends on the habit-energy that is discharged by multitudinous defiled dharmas since beginningless time. In other words, the Āliya is at once the cause and the effect of all possible phenomena in the universe.

The habit-energy might be said to be a sort of subtle substance that is left behind by every object, or a sort of force that emanates from an act and is left behind when the act is finished. As the odor emitted by a flower remains even after its destruction, so every deed and every existence leaves something in its trail even after its departure. All the mental activities, good or evil, may be destroyed with the destruction of the mind itself, but this habit-energy remains and is invisibly stored in the Āliya in the form of a seed.

The Āliya is not a mere aggregation of all these latent seeds, but it keeps them according to definite laws. In one respect the Āliya and the seeds are two separate things, but in another they are one. They act reciprocally. Their relation to each other is like that of the candle to the flame. It may also be likened to a bundle (*kalāpa*) of reeds or sticks, which stands together in a definite form.

TWO FORMS OF ACTIVITY

The activity¹⁹ of the Āliya may be said to exhibit two forms, philosophical and moral. The first is called by Asaṅga the activity that differentiates itself; the second, the activity that distinguishes between the desirable and the undesirable. By the philosophical activity, so called, heterogeneity of particular dharmas is unfolded out of the essentially one Āliya, where the multitudinous seeds are merged together. By the moral activity it is meant that from the Āliya there issue forth three dharmas: desire (*kleśa*), act (*karma*), and its effect. Original desire, which is harbored in the Āliya, is the impetus, by dint of which all deeds characterized sometimes as desirable, sometimes as undesirable, and sometimes as indifferent are produced.

The Sāṃkhya philosophy does not know the first activity of the Āliya as it considers Prakṛti the cause of birth and death. Nor does the Lokāyatika, as it does not adhere to the doctrine of former deeds. Nor does the Vaiśeṣika, as it does not adhere to the Ātman with eight virtues. Some adhere to the theory of manifestation of Īśvara. Some contend that there is no such thing as a first cause.

Those who fail to appreciate the second activity of Āliyavijñāna imagine that there is really a substance called ego; there is really a sufferer who suffers the result of his deeds. They thus fail to perceive the true significance of the Twelve Chains of Dependence proceeding from the Āliya.

The ignorant are like those blind men who fervently discuss what the real elephant looks like.²⁰

THE ĀLIYA AS THE STORAGE OF SEEDS

Now there are several reasons why the Āliya is to be called the storage of all seeds and why it is subject to the “infection” of all dharmas and karmas.

- (1) The Āliya is not a permanently fixed substance; it is not an absolutely rigid, inflexible reality, which is incapable of change and modification. On the contrary, it is nothing but a series or locus of constant transformations. It waxes and wanes, it comes and departs, it rises above the horizon and sinks in the abyss. It is an eternal moving, it is a succession of events. For otherwise the Āliya could not be more than a dead corpse.
- (2) It is thus subject to the law of causation. Here is a cause and there must be its effect. Now is a movement and there must be its result. Whatever is done by the Āliya, it is not outside of the pale of universal causation.
- (3) As there is a time for all seeds to stop germinating because of their old age or of their decay, so there is an occasion for the Āliya to perish and lose all its efficiency. This is the time when Vajracitta (Diamond-Heart) replaces Āliyavijñāna. Then the latter ceases to be a storage which furnishes an inexhaustible supply to the nourishment of our egoistic prejudices. Its original function of accumulation and transformation is still in full force, but it is no more the source of ignorance and egoism, and is now known as Ādhāna,²¹ which holds only the seeds of immaculate karma.
- (4) The Āliya does not fail to be the cause of reproduction after it has taken in a seed. That is, when it is infected with the result of a karma, it will definitely reproduce it, as soon as it comes under favorable circumstances.
- (5) The Āliya waits to be efficient till different causes are differently matured. One cause is not capable of becoming the cause of all different effects.
- (6) The Āliya reproduces the original dharmas whose seeds have been conceived by it. A cause bears its own fruit and no other's. The Āliya gives out only what was given to it.

For these reasons the Āliya is well qualified to be called the Vijñāna of Seeds.

THE INFECTION OF THE ĀLIYA

- (1) Only those things that are stationary or definite in their successive movements are liable to be infected, or “perfumed,” as expressed by the Yogācāra. Therefore, the wind cannot be made to remain perfumed; it is in too constant movement in all directions to be so affected.
- (2) Things are infected (or “perfumed”) only when they are neutral, that is, when they do not have an odor of their own. Therefore, highly scented

objects such as onions or musk or incense are not liable to be affected by other odors.

- (3) There are things whose very nature refuses to be perfumed, for instance, stones and metals.
- (4) To make the perfuming process effective, the perfuming and the perfumed must agree. By this it is meant that they must be identical in their nature and activity and substance.

From these considerations it becomes evident that: (1) the Āliya is definite and stationary as far as its formal aspect is concerned, (2) but it is indeterminate in its character, (3) there is a possibility in it which makes it susceptible to outer influences, (4) and finally it is liable to be affected by the karma of the same personality in whom it resides. (That is to say, an Āliya is infected only by its own karma.)

. . .

Asaṅga now proceeds to establish the reasons why the hypothesis of Āliyavijñāna is necessary, and points out that if we did not allow its existence, our impulses, passions, and deeds, whether moral or immoral or neutral, would be impossible, our reincarnation could not be affected, our world of particulars as they present themselves to our vijñānas would not exist, and finally, our attainment of Nirvāṇa and enlightenment would be an idle talk. He also insists that in the Samādhi, where all mental operation is said to vanish, the Āliya alone must be rationally considered to continue existing.

THE ĀLIYA'S RELATION TO MANAS

To thoroughly understand the significance of the Āliya, we must know its relation to Manas, by virtue of which alone it becomes efficient and productive. The Yogācāra admits the existence of three forces or factors or causes in our subjective realm, through their cooperation the universe being considered to make a start. The first is the Āliya or Citta or Hṛdaya; the second is Manas; and the last is the six vijñānas or senses. Manas is what we ordinarily understand by mind or consciousness, and the six senses are seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, and thinking (*manovijñāna*).

The difference between the sixth sense, Manovijñāna, and Manas (consciousness) is more fundamental, according to the Buddhists, than modern psychologists think. Manovijñāna, properly speaking, is the mind and does all kinds of mental operations such as memory, judgment, imagination, desire, decision, willing, etc. But all these functions performed by Manovijñāna are superficial when compared to the work of Manas, for the latter is the deeply seated consciousness in the soul, which ignorantly clings to the ego-conception and to the reality of an

external world. Manas in a sense is the Will of Schopenhauer, and constantly asserts itself influencing or infecting, as the Yogācāra says, the whole fabrication of mental activities.

Philosophically, therefore, Manas is to be distinguished sharply from Manovijñāna, the sense whose “base” is on Manas. If the work performed by Manovijñāna is not referred to Manas, that is, if all the mental activities are not attended by the unit of consciousness, they will certainly lack coordination and the entire individuality will collapse. The consciousness, “It is I that think or do this and that,” is ascribed by the Mahāyānists to the presence of Manas. Manas then is made the author of this self-consciousness as it ignorantly interprets the significance of the Āliya. Manas constantly reflecting on the Āliya thinks that the latter is the real self, simple, and absolute, and weaving the net of all mental operations.

The Āliya itself is wholly innocent of all this operative illusion on the part of Manas. It supplies, so to speak, the vital energy to our mental activities and makes the entire system go, and when this work leaves the “habit energy” behind and infects the seeds stowed away in the Āliya in its former lives, the latter mechanically reproduces according to its definite laws, all the while, however, being devoid of any consciousness. But there takes place the intrusion of Manas, and the consciousness looms up suddenly above the horizon with its assertion and clinging.

Manas, however, is not blind will. It is rather intelligent will, for it is capable of enlightenment. It is due to its ignorance only that it tenaciously clings to the conception of ego and contaminates the whole mentation with its onerous prejudices. As soon as it realizes the full import of the Āliya, it is denuded of its egoistic prejudices and opens the way to Nirvāṇa. Manas, therefore, is the pivot on which turn our spiritual deliverance and subjective ignorance. The six senses and the Āliya are Manas’s neutral or innocent fellow workers, or even its subordinate officers who become infected, sweetly or odiously, according to the attitude assumed by their ever-vigilant master. In passing we may remark here that the Sāṃkhya philosophy has played a strong influence on the development of the Yogācāra system.

AŚVAGHOṢA’S ĀLĪYAVIJÑĀNA

We can now see how different is Aśvaghōṣa’s conception of the Āliya as expounded in his *Awakening of Faith in The Mahāyāna*. His Āliya, which is more generally known among the Chinese Buddhist scholars as *Tathāgata-garbha*, is a sort of world-soul from which evolves this universe of particular objects, while that of the Yogācāra is an individual soul, so to speak, in which all the karma-seeds infected through the agency of that particular being are registered. The former is ontological and comparatively simple in its constitution, being a form of Suchness, though full of possibilities, while the latter is individual and psychological and is heavily laden as it were with all the seeds formerly sown, but in itself indifferent to their

development, somewhat like Sāṃkhya Prakṛti. The Tathāgata-garbha is a stage in the evolution of Bhūtatathatā. In its apparently simple organization there are all the possibilities of the most complex system known as a universe.

NIRVĀṆA

The Yogācāra conception of Nirvāṇa is not characteristically different from that of other Buddhist schools, but as it is not very well known among European scholars of Mahāyāna Buddhism and also as it is expounded generally in a special treatise belonging to the Yogācāra, it may not be altogether out of place to lightly touch upon the subject here.

Its Four Forms

According to Vasubandhu (*Commentary on Asaṅga's Mahāyānasamgraha-Śāstra*), there are four forms of Nirvāṇa: 1. Nirvāṇa in its purest original identical form; 2. Nirvāṇa that leaves something behind; 3. Nirvāṇa that leaves nothing behind; 4. Nirvāṇa that has no abode.

In this classification it is evident that the term Nirvāṇa is not used in the sense of final beatitude, merely a blissful state of mind after liberation from egoism. In Mahāyānism Nirvāṇa seems to have acquired quite a different significance at least from the commonly understood sense of Hīnayānism. The first Nirvāṇa, that is, Nirvāṇa in its purest original, self-identical form, is nothing but [a] synonym of Bhūtatathatā or Suchness, which is considered by all Mahāyānists to be inherent in all beings, though in most minds it is found eclipsed by their subjective ignorance. In this sense Nirvāṇa is not a state of mind but a quality inherent in it.

The second Nirvāṇa that leaves something behind is a state of Suchness which though liberated from the bondage of desire²² is still under the ban of karma. It is the Nirvāṇa attainable by the Śrāvakas in their lifetime. When they are Arhats they no more cherish any egoistic desires and impulses, but they are yet susceptible to the suffering of birth and death, for their mortal material existence is the result of their former karma, which cannot be extinguished until its due course has been run.

The third Nirvāṇa, in which nothing remains, is a state of Suchness released from the suffering of birth and death, that is, at the time of material extinction. With our egoistic desires and impulses exterminated and with our corporeal being brought to its natural end, we are said to be entering into eternal Nirvāṇa, in which nothing leaves its trace that is likely to entangle us again in the whirlpool of transmigration. According to the Mahāyānists, this is supposed to be the goal of the Hīnayānists.

The last Nirvāṇa that knows no dwelling is a state of Suchness obtained by the extermination of the bondage of intellect. And it is claimed by the Mahāyānists that this is the Nirvāṇa sought by all their pious followers. At this stage of enlightenment

there are awakened in the soul of a Mahāyānist infinite wisdom and infinite love. By the wisdom that transcends the limitations of birth and death, he does not cling to the vicissitudes of the world. By the love that is free from the dualism of love and hate, he does not “dwell” in the beatitude of Nirvāṇa. On the contrary, he mixes himself among the masses, lives the life of an average man, subjects himself to the law of a material world. But in his innermost he is rid of all egoistic impulses and desires, and his infinite love devises for his fellow creatures every means of salvation and enlightenment, for he is not content with his own spiritual bliss.

By the attainment of this final Nirvāṇa the Āliya is no more a storage of defiled seeds, for it has been deprived of all the causes and conditions that made this accumulation possible. Manas no more wrongfully reflects on the Āliya to take it for the ego. The six senses are no more contaminated with ignorance and egoism.

The Āliya at this stage is called Dharmakāya.²³

. . .

There are many other things in the Yogācāra, as well as in Mahāyānism in general, which ought to be made accessible to the occidental public or at least to the students of Buddhism. But the time seems not to have come yet for this kind of work, and I have to be contented with the above brief and therefore necessarily imperfect exposition of the Yogācāra system.

LaSalle, Ill., U.S.A.

D. Teitaro Suzuki

NOTE ADDITIONNELLE²⁴

The Chinese equivalent for *Āliya* is *a-li-ya*²⁵ and that for *Ālaya* is *a-lai-ya*.²⁶ The entire Chinese translation of the Buddhist documents beginning with the Sūtra of Forty-Two Sections by Moteng (A.D. 69) is commonly divided into two classes, old and new, and the dividing line is placed at the time of Xuanzang when he came back to China with many Sanskrit Sūtras and Śāstras (A.D. 649). In all the Chinese texts before him *a-li-ya*, was uniformly used by such translators as Kumārajīva, Paramārtha, etc. It was Xuanzang who reformed the old system of translation and tried to reproduce the original as accurately and as faithfully as the Chinese language permitted, though this considerably injured classical purity and made the translation read altogether like a foreign language unintelligible to the uninitiated. Then *a-li-ya* came to be replaced by *a-lai-ya*. According to Fazang, the most noted Chinese commentator of Aśvaghosa's *Awakening of Faith*, who was well versed in Sanskrit and helped the Hindu translators in their great work, which was done in the seventh and eighth century A.D., “*A-lai-ya* or *a-li-ya* vijñāna is a local dialect of Sanskrit. Paramārtha literally translated it by *wumo shi*”²⁷ (not-hidden vijñāna)

while Xuanzang according to the sense rendered it by *zang shi*²⁸ (storing vijñāna). *Zang shi* here means *she zang*²⁹ (that is, containing, embodying, comprehending, embracing, etc.), and *wumo* means *bushi*³⁰ (that is, not losing, not letting go, etc.). Though the characters are different, the sense is the same.”³¹

A commentator on the *Vairocana Sūtra* whose date I am unable, at present, to ascertain, understands *a-lai-ya* in the sense of a store containing things within. Literally, it is a chamber or room. All the skandhas are produced here and vanish here. It is the nestling place of all the skandhas. What we can conclude, from these various interpretations of the term, is that the original Sanskrit or Prakrit was either *ālīya* or *aliya* or *ālaya*.³²

Excerpts from Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism

1907

These are excerpts from the second chapter in *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, a landmark publication for Suzuki that appears at the end of his sojourn in LaSalle working under Paul Carus. Although numerous monographs had been published by that time on Theravāda- or Pāli-based Buddhism, Mahāyāna had not been treated in so comprehensive a manner, especially given the wealth of discoveries about its early history in India in the early twentieth century. Suzuki elects to wax *theological* in this work, however, explaining many Buddhist concepts in terms that sound somewhat off-putting, such as “the will of the dharmakāya.” The book is also striking in its description of Suzuki’s perceived intolerance toward Mahāyāna Buddhism among Christian writers and missionaries. Reviews were mixed, with Louis de La Vallée-Poussin upset about the anti-Christian polemics and what he deduced was a reduction of Mahāyāna to Vedantism. Nevertheless, Alan Watts added a preface to a 1963 reprint, and that edition is still in print today.

Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism was originally released in 1907 in London by Luzac and in the United States by Open Court Press (Chicago, Ill.) the following year.

• • •

CHAPTER II. HISTORICAL CHARACTERIZATION OF MAHĀYĀNISM

We are now in a position to enter into a specific exposition of the Mahāyāna doctrine. But, before doing so, it will be well for us first to consider the views that were held by the Hindu Buddhist thinkers concerning its characteristic features; in other words, to make a historical survey of its peculiarities.

As stated in the Introduction, the term Mahāyāna was invented in the times of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva (about the third or fourth century after Christ), when

doctrinal struggles between the Śrāvaka and the Bodhisattva classes reached a climax. The progressive Hindu Buddhists, desiring to announce the essential features of their doctrine, did so naturally at the expense of their rival and by pointing out why theirs was greater than, or superior to, Hīnayānism. Their views were thus necessarily vitiated by a partisan spirit, and instead of impartially and critically enumerating the principal characteristics of Mahāyānism, they placed rather too much stress upon those points that do not in these latter days appear to be very essential, but that were then considered by them to be of paramount importance. These points, nevertheless, throw some light on the nature of Mahāyāna Buddhism as historically distinguished from its consanguineous rival and fellow doctrine.

Sthiramati's Conception of Mahāyānism

Sthiramati¹ in his *Introduction to Mahāyānism* states that Mahāyānism is a special doctrine for the Bodhisattvas, who are to be distinguished from the other classes, viz., the Śrāvakas and the Pratyeka-buddhas. The essential difference of the doctrine consists in the belief that objects of the senses are merely phenomenal and have no absolute reality; that the indestructible Dharmakāya, which is all-pervading, constitutes the norm of existence; that all Bodhisattvas² are incarnations of the Dharmakāya, who not by their evil karma previously accumulated, but by their boundless love for all mankind, assume corporeal existences; and that persons who thus appear in the flesh, as avatars of the Buddha supreme, associate themselves with the masses in all possible social relations in order that they might thus lead them to a state of enlightenment.

While this is a very summary statement of the Mahāyāna doctrine, a more elaborate and extended enumeration of its peculiar features in contradistinction to those of Hīnayānism, is made in the *Miscellanea on Mahāyāna Metaphysics*,³ *The Spiritual Stages of Yogācāra*,⁴ *An Exposition of the Holy Doctrine*,⁵ *A Comprehensive Treatise on Mahāyānism*,⁶ and others. Let us first explain the "Seven General Characteristics" as described in the first three works here mentioned.

Seven Principal Features of Mahāyānism

According to Asaṅga, who lived a little later than Nāgārjuna, that is, at the time when Mahāyānism was further divided into the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika schools, the seven features peculiar to Mahāyānism as distinguished from Hīnayānism, are as follows:

1. *Its Comprehensiveness.* Mahāyānism does not confine itself to the teachings of one Buddha alone, but wherever and whenever truth is found, even under the disguise of most absurd superstitions, it makes no hesitation to winnow the grain from the husk and assimilate it in its own system.

Innumerable good laws taught by Buddhas⁷ of all ages and localities are all taken up in the coherent body of Mahāyānism.

2. *Universal Love for All Sentient Beings.* Hīnayānism confines itself to the salvation of individuals only; it does not extend its bliss universally, as each person must achieve his own deliverance. Mahāyānism, on the other hand, aims at general salvation; it endeavors to save us not only individually, but universally. All the motives, efforts, and actions of the Bodhisattvas pivot on the furtherance of universal welfare.
3. *Its Greatness in Intellectual Comprehension.* Mahāyānism maintains the theory of non-ātman not only in regard to sentient beings but in regard to things in general. While it denies the hypothesis of a metaphysical agent directing our mental operations, it also rejects the view that insists on the noumenal or thingish reality of existences as they appear to our sense.
4. *Its Marvelous Spiritual Energy.* The Bodhisattvas never become tired of working for universal salvation, nor do they despair because of the long time required to accomplish this momentous object. To try to attain enlightenment in the shortest possible period and to be self-sufficient without paying any attention to the welfare of the masses, is not the teaching of Mahāyānism.
5. *Its Greatness in the Exercise of the Upāya.* The term *upāya* literally means expediency. The great fatherly sympathetic heart of the Bodhisattva has inexhaustible resources at his command in order that he might lead the masses to final enlightenment, each according to his disposition and environment. Mahāyānism does not ask its followers to escape the metempsychosis of birth and death for the sake of entering into the lethargic tranquility of Nirvāṇa; for metempsychosis in itself is no evil, and Nirvāṇa in its coma is not productive of any good. And as long as there are souls groaning in pain, the Bodhisattva cannot rest in Nirvāṇa; there is no rest for his unselfish heart, so full of love and sympathy, until he leads all his fellow-beings to the eternal bliss of Buddhahood. To reach this end he employs innumerable means (*upāya*) suggested by his disinterested loving kindness.
6. *Its Higher Spiritual Attainment.* In Hīnayānism the highest bliss attainable does not go beyond Arhatship, which is ascetic saintliness. But followers of Mahāyānism attain even to Buddhahood with all its spiritual powers.
7. *Its Greater Activity.* When the Bodhisattva reaches the stage of Buddhahood, he is able to manifest himself everywhere in the ten quarters of the universe⁸ and to minister to the spiritual needs of all sentient beings.

These seven peculiarities are enumerated to be the reasons why the doctrine defended by the progressive Buddhists is to be called Mahāyānism, or the doctrine

of great vehicle, in contradistinction to Hīnayānism, the doctrine of small vehicle. In each case, therefore, Aśaṅga takes pains to draw the line of demarcation distinctly between the two schools of Buddhism and not between Buddhism and all other religious doctrines that existed at his time.

The Ten Essential Features of Buddhism

The following statement of the ten essential features of Mahāyānism as presented in the *Comprehensive Treatise on Mahāyānism* is made from a different standpoint from the preceding one, for it is the pronouncement of the Yogācāra school of Aśaṅga and Vasubandhu rather than that of Mahāyānism generally. This school together with the Mādhyamika school of Nāgārjuna constitute the two divisions of Hindu Mahāyānism.⁹

The points enumerated by Aśaṅga and Vasubandhu as the most essential in their system are ten.

(1) It teaches an immanent existence of all things in the *Ālayavijñāna* or All-Conserving Soul. The conception of an All-Conserving Soul, it is claimed, was suggested by Buddha in the so-called Hīnayāna sūtras, but on account of its deep meaning and of the liability of its being confounded with the ego-soul conception, he did not disclose its full significance in their sūtras but made it known only in the Mahāyāna sūtras.

According to the Yogācāra school, the *Ālaya* is not a universal but an individual mind or soul, whatever we may term it, in which the “germs” of all things exist in their ideality.¹⁰ The objective world in reality does not exist, but by dint of subjective illusion that is created by ignorance, we project all these “germs” in the *Ālayavijñāna* to the outside world and imagine that they are there really as they are; while the *Manovijñāna* (ego-consciousness), which is too a product of illusion, tenaciously clinging to the *Ālayavijñāna*, however, is indifferent to, and irresponsible for, all these errors on the part of the *Manovijñāna*.¹¹

(2) The Yogācāra school distinguishes three kinds of knowledge: 1. Illusion (*parikalpita*), 2. Discriminative or Relative Knowledge (*paratantra*), and 3. Perfect Knowledge (*pariṇiṣpanna*).

The distinction may best be illustrated by the well-known analogy of a rope and a snake. Deceived by a similarity in appearance, men frequently take a rope lying on the ground for a poisonous snake and are terribly shocked on that account. But when they approach and carefully examine it, they become at once convinced of the groundlessness of this apprehension, which was the natural sequence of illusion. This may be considered to correspond to what Kant calls *Schein*.

Most people, however, do not go any further in their inquiry. They are contented with the sensual, empirical knowledge of an object with which they come in contact. When they understand that the thing they mistook for a snake was really nothing but a yard of innocent rope, they think their knowledge of the object is

complete and do not trouble themselves with a philosophical investigation as to whether the rope, which to them is just what it appears to be, has any real existence in itself. They do not stop a moment to reflect that their knowledge is merely relative, for it does not go beyond the phenomenal significance of the things they perceive.

But is an object in reality such as it appears to be to our senses? Are particular phenomena as such really actual? What is the value of our knowledge concerning those so-called realities? When we make an investigation into such problems as these, the Yogācāra school says, we find that their existence is only relative and has no absolute value whatever independent of the perceiving subject. They are the “ejection” of our ideas into the outside world, which are centered and conserved in our Ālayavijñāna and which are awakened into activity by subjective ignorance. This clear insight into the nature of things, i.e., into their non-reality as ātman, constitutes perfect knowledge.

(3) When we attain to the perfect knowledge, we recognize the ideality of the universe. There is no such thing as an objective world, which is really an illusive manifestation of the mind called Ālayavijñāna. But even this supposedly real existence of the Ālayavijñāna is a product of particularization called forth by the ignorant Manovijñāna. The Manovijñāna, or empirical ego, as it might be called, having no adequate knowledge as to the true nature of the Ālaya, takes the latter for a metaphysical agent, that like the master of a puppet show manages all mental operations according to its humor. As the silkworm imprisons itself in the cocoon created by itself, the Manovijñāna, entangling itself in ignorance and confusion, takes its own illusory creations for real realities.

(4) For the regulation of moral life, the Yogācāra with the other Mahāyāna schools, proposes the practicing of the six Pāramitās (virtues of perfection), which are: 1. *Dāna* (giving), 2. *Śīla* (moral precept), 3. *Kṣānti* (meekness), 4. *Vīrya* (energy), 5. *Dhyāna* (meditation), 6. *Prajñā* (knowledge or wisdom). In way of explanation, says Asaṅga: “By not clinging to wealth or pleasures (1), by not cherishing any thoughts to violate the precepts (2), by not feeling dejected in the face of evils (3), by not awakening any thought of indolence while practicing goodness (4), by maintaining serenity of mind in the midst of disturbance and confusion of this world (5), and finally by always practicing *ekacitta*¹² and by truthfully comprehending the nature of things (6), the Bodhisattvas recognize the truth of *vijñānamātra*—the truth that there is nothing that is not of ideal or subjective creation.

(5) Mahāyānism teaches that there are ten spiritual stages of Bodhisattvahood, viz., 1. Pramuditā, 2. Vimalā, 3. Prabhākārī, 4. Arciṣmatī, 5. Sudurjayā, 6. Abhimukhī, 7. Dūramgamā, 8. Acalā, 9. Sādhumatī, 10. Dharmameghā.¹³ By passing through all these stages one after another, we are believed to reach the oneness of Dharmakāya.

(6) The Yogācārists claim that the precepts that are practiced by the followers of Mahāyānism are far superior to those Hīnayānists. The latter tend to externalism and formalism and do not go deep into our spiritual, subjective motives. Now, there are physical, verbal, and spiritual precepts observed by the Buddha. The Hīnayānists observe the first two neglecting the last, which is by far more important than the rest. For instance, the Śrāvaka's interpretation of the ten śikṣās¹⁴ is literal and not spiritual; further, they follow these precepts because they wish to attain Nirvāṇa for their own sake, and not for others'. The Bodhisattva, on the other hand, does not wish to be bound within the narrow circle of moral restriction. Aiming at a universal emancipation of mankind, he ventures even violating the ten śikṣās, if necessary. The first śikṣā, for instance, forbids the killing of any living being, but the Bodhisattva does not hesitate to go to war, in case the cause he espouses is right and beneficent to humanity at large.

(7) As Mahāyānism insists on the purification of the inner life, its teaching applies not to things outward, its principles are not of the ascetic and exclusive kind. The Mahāyānists do not shun to commingle themselves with the "dust of worldliness"; they aim at the realization of the Bodhi; they are not afraid of being thrown into the whirlpool of metempsychosis; they endeavor to impart spiritual benefits to all sentient beings without regard to their attitude, whether hostile or friendly, toward themselves; having immovable faith in the Mahāyāna, they never become contaminated by vanity and worldly pleasures with which they may constantly be in touch; they have a clear insight into the doctrine of non-ātman; being free from all spiritual faults, they live in perfect accord with the laws of Suchness and discharge their duties without the least conceit or self-assertion: in a word, their inner life is a realization of the Dharmakāya.

(8) The intellectual superiority of the Bodhisattva is shown by his possession of knowledge of non-particularization (*anānārtha*).¹⁵ This knowledge, philosophically considered, is the knowledge of the absolute, or the knowledge of the universal. The Bodhisattva's mind is free from the dualism of saṃsāra (birth and death) and nirvāṇa, of positivism and negativism, of being and non-being, of object and subject, of ego and non-ego. His knowledge, in short, transcends the limits of final realities, soaring high to the realm of the absolute and the abode of non-particularity.

(9) In consequence of this intellectual elevation, the Bodhisattva perceives the working of birth and death in nirvāṇa, and nirvāṇa in the transmigration of birth and death. He sees the "ever-changing many" in the "never-changing one," and the "never-changing one" in the "ever-changing many." His inward life is in accord at once with the laws of transitory phenomena and with those of transcendental Suchness. According to the former, he does not recoil as ascetics do when he comes in contact with the world of the senses; he is not afraid of suffering the ills that the flesh is heir to; but, according to the latter, he never clings to things evanescent, his inmost consciousness forever dwells in serenity of eternal Suchness.

(10) The final characteristic to be mentioned as distinctly Mahāyānist is the doctrine of Trikāya. There is, it is asserted, the highest being which is the ultimate cause of the universe and in which all existences find their essential origin and significance. This is called by the Mahāyānists Dharmakāya. The Dharmakāya, however, does not remain in its absoluteness, it reveals itself in the realm of cause and effect. It then takes a particular form. It becomes a devil, or a god, or a deva, or a human being, or an animal of lower grade, adapting itself to the degrees of the intellectual development of the people. For it is the people's inner needs that necessitate the special forms of manifestation. This is called Nirmāṇakāya, that is, the body of transformation. The Buddha who manifested himself in the person of Gautama, the son of King of Śuddhodāna about two thousand five hundred years ago on the Ganges, is a form of Nirmāṇakāya. The third one is called Saṃbhogakāya, or body of bliss. This is the spiritual body of a Buddha, invested with all possible grandeur in form and in possession of all imaginable psychic powers. The conception of Saṃbhogakāya is full of wild imaginations which are not easy of comprehension by modern minds.¹⁶

These characteristics enumerated at seven or ten as peculiarly Mahāyānist are what the Hindu Buddhist philosophers of the first century down to the fifth or sixth century of the Christian era thought to be the most essential points of their faith and what they thought entitled it to be called the "Great Vehicle" (*Mahāyāna*) of salvation, in contradistinction to the faith embraced by their conservative brethren. But, as we view them now, the points here specified are to a great extent saturated with a partisan spirit, and besides, they are more or less scattered and unconnected statements of the so-called salient features of Mahāyānism. Nor do they furnish much information concerning the nature of Mahāyānism as a coherent system of religious teachings. They give but a general and somewhat obscure delineation of it, and that in opposition to Hīnayānism. In point of fact, Mahāyānism is a school of Buddhism and has many characteristics in common with Hīnayānism. Indeed, the spirit of the former is also that of the latter, and as far as the general trend of Buddhism is concerned there is no need of emphasizing the significance of one school over the other. On the following pages I shall try to present a more comprehensive and impartial exposition of the Buddhism, which has been persistently designated by its followers as Mahāyānism.¹⁷

The Development of Mahāyāna Buddhism

1909

As seen in nearly all his publications before founding *The Eastern Buddhist* in 1921, this piece reflects Suzuki's strongly felt need to distinguish Mahāyāna from non-Mahāyāna Buddhism, which he always refers to with the pejorative label "Hīnayāna," advocating for the legitimacy of Mahāyāna in the process of comparing the two. Akin to his other publications in this period, Suzuki offers a reductionist view of Buddhist history in which non-Mahāyāna Indian Buddhism is reduced to Theravāda. Theravāda itself is reduced to an almost exclusive concern for ethics and, moreover, pursued over the centuries in a rigid manner, whereas Mahāyāna is dominated by "speculative philosophy," intellectually active, and therefore pluralistic with its attendant quarrels. In his view, therefore, "The problem that faces faithful Buddhists at present is how best to effect a complete reconciliation of the moral discipline of Hīnayānism with the speculations of Mahāyānism." One can infer a kind of unconscious projection of his own Japanese perspective on the historical developments of Buddhism in India, for upholding the precepts within the institutions of Japanese Buddhism in 1909 was largely viewed as hopelessly impossible.

In addition, there is also a clear polemic tone toward Christian theology and some odd renderings of Indic Buddhist notions that betray the influence of that theology. For example, *pariṇāmanā* is not merely the transfer of merit; here it becomes an all-inclusive religious concept that includes the "recognition of the oneness of all things" and vicarious sacrifice "in that a bodhisattva wishes to bear the burden of evil for real offenders." Echoing *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, qualities commonly associated with a personal deity are projected onto the concept of *dharmakāya*. To wit, *dharmakāya* is glossed as "love and wisdom" and "eternal motherhood"; it reacts with joy or disappointment to every karmic action of every sentient being. Yet there is nevertheless something appealing in the contrast he draws between karma and *pariṇāmanā*, the one masculine and judgmental, the other feminine and compassionate. It is also worth noting that the famous Suzuki theory/

doctrine of *sokuhi no ronri* appears here in its essence but without any attempt to develop a logic to explain it, which will not appear until 1940.

This article first appeared in 1909 in *Buddhist Review* (London: The Buddhist Society of Great Britain and Ireland), vol. 1, no. 2, and a revised version then appeared in 1914 with mostly stylistic modifications in *The Monist* (LaSalle: Open Court), vol. 14, no. 4. The second version was reprinted in *Middle Way*, vol. 41, no. 2 (1966). Below is the second version, selected under the presumption that Suzuki himself was involved in or at least approved the changes, for we do not know if he penned them himself. In addition to the apparent participation of a copyeditor (Beatrice?) in the second publication, the forms Mahāyānism and Mahāyānists are abandoned, Sanskrit jargon has been changed from proper nouns to italics (e.g., *Tattvā* > *tattvā*), and some descriptive passages have been moved into footnotes.

. . .

European Buddhist scholars are wont to divide Buddhism into two schools, Northern and Southern. By Southern Buddhism they understand that form which prevails mostly in Ceylon, Burma, and Siam; while Tibetan Lamaism and Chinese, Korean, and Japanese Buddhism they consider as belonging to the Northern school. This geographical division, however, does not seem to be quite correct and justifiable; for we know that the Buddhism of Tibet is as different from the Buddhism of Japan as the latter is from that of Ceylon or Burma, not only in some of its teachings but principally in its practical aspects. Take, for instance, the Chinese or Japanese Zen sect or the sect of the Pure Land, and compare it to Tibetan Buddhism as it is known to us today, and we shall find that the difference between the two is wider perhaps than that between the so-called Southern Buddhism and the Japanese Buddhist sect called *Risshū* or *Vinaya* sect.

A better way of classifying the different schools of Buddhism is to divide them into the Buddhism of Arhats and the Buddhism of Bodhisattvas; understanding by the former that Buddhism whose ideal attainment is Arhatship, and by the Buddhism of Bodhisattvas that system of Buddhist teachings which makes the conception of Bodhisattvahood its most salient feature. Or we may retain the old way of classifying the followers of the Buddha into two groups: the *Mahasanghika* and the *Sthavira*. Or, further, we can even invent a new method of division, and call one the progressives and the other the conservatives.

Taking all in all, however, it seems to me that the division of Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna Buddhism is preferable to all the rest from the point of view of our knowledge of Buddhism. Of course, this way of dividing Buddhism has its historical odium, which is most desirable for modern scholars of Buddhism to avoid. Except for this latter objection, the term “Mahāyāna” is comprehensive and definite enough to include all those schools of Buddhism in which the ideal of Bodhisattvahood is upheld in preference to the attainment of Arhatship, and whose geographical distribution covers not only the northern parts of India but

east of them as well. Let us here, therefore, use the term “Mahāyāna” more for the sake of convenience than anything else, until we shall have studied Buddhism in all its diverse aspects, historic, dogmatic, and ritualistic, when we shall be able to understand Buddhism far better than we do now.

The object of the present article is to expound briefly, what in my view constitutes the essential characteristics of the Mahāyāna Buddhism, in contradistinction to the Hīnayāna Buddhism.

The character of Mahāyāna Buddhism can be expressed in the one word, speculative. Buddhism generally teaches three forms of discipline: moral (*śīla*), contemplative (*dhyāna*), and intellectual (*prajñā*), and of these the last seems to have been particularly emphasized by the Mahāyāna Buddhists, while the moral discipline has become the chief feature of Southern Buddhism, so called—in fact, to such an extent that most Western scholars of Buddhism, whose principal source of information is the Pāli *Tipiṭaka*, are apt to take Buddhism for no more nor less than a system of ethical culture, which, therefore, cannot be called a religion in the same sense as is Christianity. While the Buddha apparently taught a well-balanced practice of *śīla*, *dhyāna*, and *prajñā*, his followers became one-sided as has been also generally the case with other religious systems, and emphasized one aspect at the expense of others. The Mahāyāna in one sense can be said to have gone too far in its speculative flight, almost to the point of forgetting its ethical side, while the Hīnayāna adherents have been so extremely conservative as to refuse to adapt themselves to their ever-changing environment. However this may be, a practical reformer of Buddhism today would do well if he endeavored to restore the three forms of discipline, each in its proper bearings and therefore to manifest more perfectly the original spirit of the founder of Buddhism.

This one-sided tendency and the development of the two schools of Buddhism can also be seen in their respective history. In Ceylon, there has been practically but one school ever since the introduction of Buddhism there. The Singhalese Buddhists have had one code of morality, the Vinaya, which is recorded in detail in their scriptures, and which, being so very explicit in its enunciation that even the uncultured could comprehend it readily, does not allow of very widely divergent interpretations. Accordingly there were few chances for dissension. The Vinaya as it is practiced today in Ceylon has not changed even in its details since the day of its first promulgation there. In this respect we can say that Hīnayāna Buddhism faithfully preserves the practical form of Buddhist moral culture as it developed during the time that elapsed after the decease of the Buddha down to the dispatch of the Asoka missionaries to this district. I emphasize this latter point, for it is quite reasonable to suppose, and the supposition is justified by the records in our possession, that Buddhism began to grow in its diverse aspects soon after the death of the Buddha.

History, however, shows us a very different state of affairs among the Mahāyāna followers. Into how many schools did it divide itself! And how vehemently did each school defend its own doctrine against the others! While the Hīnayāna Buddhists evidently kept quiet, the Mahāyāna spoke disparagingly of their rival believers, and this was altogether unworthy of their professed liberalism. In fact, it was through their self-conceit that they came to designate themselves as Mahāyāna Buddhists, followers of the Great Vehicle of Salvation, which had in view the discrediting of their conservative brethren in the faith. This spirit of self-exaltation was exhibited not only against the more orthodox ethical adherents of Buddhism, but also among themselves, as witness the famous founder of the Nichiren or the Puṇḍarika sect of Buddhism in Japan. His denunciation of the other Buddhist sects then existent in Japan was so strong and abusive that the authorities of the time thought it politic to get rid of him quietly, though I must add that his prosecution was not solely due to religious reasons.

This struggle and fighting, however, was quite in accord with the somewhat one-sided development of the Mahāyāna in the direction of speculative philosophy. Intellect is always inclined to dissent, to quarrel, to become self-conceited. The existence of ten or twelve sects of Japanese Buddhism was the inevitable result of the general movement of speculative Mahāyāna. Of course, the other phases of Buddhism were not altogether forgotten, for the practice of *dhyāna* (meditation) is still in evidence—indeed, there is one sect in Japan and China bearing its very name and exercising much influence, especially among the educated classes. However this may be, the fact remains that the Mahāyāna is a development of one side—the intellectual, speculative, philosophical side—of Buddhism, while Hīnayānism preserves the ethical side of Buddhism comparatively in its pure form. To realize the perfect type of Buddhism, the threefold treasure, *triratna*, must be equally developed; the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṃgha must stand side by side, imbued with the same spirit as when they were first established, whatever outward transformation they may have undergone according to varying circumstances. If the Hīnayāna is said to have the Saṃgha in its model form, Mahāyāna may be considered to have fully developed the Dharma, that is, the religio-philosophical signification of Buddhism, while both schools claim the Buddha as their common founder. The problem that faces faithful Buddhists at present is how best to effect a complete reconciliation of the moral discipline of Hīnayāna with the speculations of Mahāyāna.

Now let us see how Mahāyāna Buddhism has developed its speculative course as compared to the Hīnayāna, and I will first discuss the doctrine of *anātman*, or non-ego. This is considered one of the most important and characteristic features of Buddhism, and justly so, because both the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna uphold this as essential to their *raison d'être*. However, the Hīnayāna school seems to have remained almost too faithful, as it were, to the doctrine; it has not gone beyond its negative statement; it has not carried out its logical consequence to the utmost

limits. On the other hand the Mahāyānism has not only extended the theory from its subjective significance to the objective world, but has also boldly developed the positive conclusion implied in it. I do not mean that the Hīnayāna has none of the tendencies shown by Mahāyāna; in fact, it seems to contain everything Mahāyānistic in germinal form. What most eminently distinguishes the Mahāyāna school in this connection is that it makes the most explicit, manifest unequivocal, and fearless assertions on these religio-philosophical questions that deeply concern the human heart.

With regard to the non-ego theory, the Mahāyāna followers assert that there is no *ātman* or ego-soul not only in its psychological signification, but in its objective sense. That is to say, they deny with the Hīnayāna followers that there is any such thing as an ego-entity, a concrete, simple, ultimate, and independent unit, behind our consciousness, but they go still further and declare that this objective world too has no *ātman*, no ego, no personal creator, no Īśvara, who works and enjoys his absolute transcendence behind the eternal concatenation of cause and effect. This is technically known as a double negation of the subjective and the objective world, and it is on this account that the Mahāyāna school has often been called, though unjustifiably and quite incorrectly, nihilism or *śūnyavādin*.

In this connection, it may be of interest to quote a Western Buddhist scholar's opinion of Buddhism as typical of a prejudiced and uncritical judge. Eitel, a noted student of Chinese Buddhism, thus speaks of the Buddhist doctrine of Nirvāṇa in his *Three Lectures on Buddhism*, which were delivered in Union Church, Hong Kong, 1870–1871.

Nirvāṇa is to them [the Buddhists] a state of which nothing can be said, to which no attributes can be given; it is altogether and abstract, devoid alike of all positive and all negative qualities. What shall we say of such empty useless speculations, such sickly, dead words, whose fruitless sophistry offers to that natural yearning of the human heart after an eternal rest, nothing better than a philosophical myth? It is but natural that a religion which started with moral and intellectual bankruptcy should end in moral and intellectual suicide. (p. 21, column 2.)

As a matter of fact, the Mahāyānists do not regard negation as the ultimate goal of their speculations. With them negation is but a road to reach a higher form of affirmation; for they are aware of the fact that the human mind lives in affirmation and not in negation. Any critic of Mahāyāna philosophy, who with sympathetic insight deep enough it penetrates into its heart, would readily find that behind a series of negations offered by the Mahāyāna thinkers there is really the assertion of a higher truth, which, owing to the limitations of the human intellect, cannot be represented by any other means than negation. It is not due to sophistry or mere abstraction that the Buddhists sometimes appear to delight in a negative statement of truth. They are most earnestly religious; they know that the deepest religious

truth cannot be presented in a stereotyped philosophical formula. Only those who are short-sighted timidly stop at the negation and refuse to go beyond. If they thus misjudge the significance of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the fault is on their own side.

What, then, is that positive something offered by Mahāyāna scholars as the logical conclusion of the theory of non-ātman? It is generally designated as *tattva* or suchness. This is a philosophical term, and when its religious import is emphasized, it is called *dharmakāya*.¹ In this conception of suchness, or *dharmakāya*, they find the highest possible affirmation, which is reached after a series of negations and which unifies all forms of contradiction, psychological, ethical, and ontological. Aśvaghōṣa, one of the greatest early Buddhist philosophers in India, says in his *Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna*,²

Suchness is neither that which is existent, nor that which is non-existent; it is neither that which is at once existent and non-existent; nor that which is not at once existent and non-existent; it is neither that which is one, nor that which is many; neither that which is at once one and many, nor that which is not at once one and many. . . . It is altogether beyond the conception of a finite mind, and the best way of designating it seems to be to call it "suchness."

Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism in India, who was as great as Aśvaghōṣa, declares in his *Book of the Mean*,³ "No birth, no death, no persistence, no oneness, no manyness, no coming, no going: this is the doctrine of the mean." Again, "To think, 'it is,' is eternalism: to think, 'it is not,' is nihilism. To be and not to be, the wise cling to neither."

All these statements have been construed as nihilistic and leading the mind nowhere but to absolute emptiness. But, as I have said before, such critics entirely ignore the fact that the human understanding, owing to its constitutional limitations, often finds it most expedient and indeed most logical to state a truth negatively, since a negation is really a higher form of affirmation, to be comprehended only through a process of intuition. The Mahāyāna thinkers have denied with their conservative fellow believers the existence of a concrete ego-soul; they have refused to accept the doctrine of a personal God; they are further reluctant to assert anything dogmatically; and the ultimate logical consequence of all these necessarily negative statements could not be anything else but the conception of suchness. Beyond this, one enters into mysticism; philosophy must bow her head modestly to religion at this gate of suchness, and religion must proceed by herself into an unknown wilderness, or to Eckhart's *stille Düsterniss* or *Wüste*, or to Boehme's *Abgrund*; this is the realm of "Eternal Yea," or, which is the same thing, the realm of "Eternal Nay." The Mahāyāna philosophy at this point becomes mysticism. Intellectually, it has gone as far as it can. *Vidya* must now give way to *dhyāna* or *prajñā*; that is, intellection must become intuition, which is after all the ultimate goal of all religious discipline. Mysticism is the life of religion. Without it religion

loses her reason of existence; all her warm vitality departs, all her inexpressible charm vanishes, and there remains nothing but the crumbling bones and the cold ashes of death. I have said before that Mahāyāna is highly speculative, but I must now add that it is most deeply and thoroughly religious.

It is apparent that with the conception of suchness, Mahāyāna speculations have reached the highest peak, and on this summit stands the grand religious edifice of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Superficially, Mahāyāna seems widely different from Hīnayāna, but when its development is traced along the lines indicated above, one will readily comprehend the fact that in spite of the disparity existing between the two *yānas* of Buddhism, the Mahāyāna, which started intellectually and culminated in mysticism, as every religion should, is really no more than a continuity of the Hīnayāna.

When the conception of suchness is established, the *raison d'être* of Mahāyāna becomes manifest. Buddhism is not an agnostic system of philosophy, nor is it an atheistic ethics. For in suchness, or Dharmakāya, it finds the reason of existence, the real reality, the norm of morality, the source of love and goodness, the fountain head of righteousness, absolute intelligence, and the starting point of karma, the law of deeds. For suchness, according to the Mahāyāna thinkers, is not a mere state of being, but it is energy, intelligence, and love. But as suchness begins to assume these attributes, it ceases to be transcendental suchness, it is now conditioned suchness. So long as it remained absolutely transcendental, in which neither negation nor affirmation is possible, it is beyond the comprehension of the human understanding; suchness cannot very well become the object of our religious consciousness. But there is the awakening of the will in suchness, and with this awakening we have conditional and self-limiting suchness in place of the absolutely unknowable. As to the reason and manner of this process, the human mind has to confess a profound and eternal ignorance. It is in this transformation of suchness that the Mahāyāna system perceives the religious significance of *dharmakāya*.

The *dharmakāya* is now conceived by the human heart as love and wisdom, and its eternal prayer is heard to be the deliverance of the ignorant from their self-created evil karma, which haunts them as an eternal curse. The process of deliverance is to awaken in the mind of the ignorant the *samyaksambodhi*, the most perfect wisdom, which is a reflection in sentient beings of the *dharmakāya*. This wisdom, this *bodhi*, is generally found asleep in the benighted, because a sort of spiritual slumber results from the narcotic influence of evil karma, which has been and is being committed through the non-realization of the presence of the *dharmakāya*. Deliverance or enlightenment consists, therefore, in making every sentient being open his spiritual eye to this fact. It is not his ego-soul that makes him think, feel, desire, or aspire, but the *dharmakāya* itself in the form of the *bodhicitta* or wisdom-heart which constitutes his ethical and religious being. If we abandon the thought of egoism and return to the universal source of love and

wisdom, we are released from the bond of evil karma, and we are enlightened as to the reason of existence; in short, we are Buddhas.

In trying to make a sentient being realize the presence in himself of the *bodhicitta*, the *dharmakāya* can be said to be working for its own sake, that is, to awake from the spell of ignorance. Here is involved a great philosophical and religious problem. In the beginning, the *dharmakāya* negated itself by its own affirmation, and it is now working to release itself from the negation through which this world of particulars was created. This is, as it seems to our limited intellect, an eternal process of suchness: from affirmation to negation and from negation to affirmation. To this mystery of mysteries, however, we fail to apply our rules of syllogism; we have simply to state the fact that, though it seems apparently contradictory, our religious consciousness finds in this mystery something unspeakably fascinating and indeed the justification of its own eternal yearnings.

As a consequence of the conception of *dharmakāya* as eternal motherhood and as the source of infinite love, the doctrine of karma had somehow to modify its irrefragable severity. And here we observe another phase of differentiation as effected by the Mahāyāna Buddhists from the doctrine commonly held by their ethical, monastic Hīnayāna brethren. I do not maintain that the doctrine of karma is denied by Mahāyāna thinkers. Far from it. They adhere to the doctrine as firmly as the Hīnayāna philosophers; they have taken away only its crushing effects on the sinful, who are always too weak and too timid to bear the curse of all their former evil deeds. Or, in other words, the Mahāyāna Buddhists offer a doctrine complementary to that of karma in order to give a more satisfying and more human solution to our inmost religious needs. The Mahāyāna doctrine of *pariṇāmanā*, therefore, must go side by side with that of karma; for through this harmonious co-working of the two, the true spirit of Buddhism will be more effectively realized.

The doctrine of *pariṇāmanā* is essentially that of vicarious sacrifice. Apparently, it contradicts the continuity of the action of karma, but in Mahāyāna Buddhism, karma is conceived in its cosmic rather than in its individualistic aspect, which makes it possible to reconcile the two notions, *karma* and *pariṇāmanā*. I will try to make this clear.

First, what does *pariṇāmanā* mean? It means “to bend,” “to turn about,” or “to deliver,” or “to transfer,” or “to renounce,” for which the early Chinese Buddhists have *hui xiang*, which means “to revolve and be directed towards,” that is to say, “to turn a thing about and hand it over to another.” The doctrine of *pariṇāmanā*, then, is to turn one’s merits over to another, to renounce oneself for others, to sacrifice oneself for the sake of others, to atone for others’ evil karma by one’s own good deeds, to substitute oneself for another who, according to the law of karma, ought to suffer himself. Or, to use Christian terminology, the doctrine of *pariṇāmanā* is in its principle that of vicarious sacrifice; with this difference, however, that while in Christianity vicarious sacrifice means the death of Christ on the cross for the

sins of all mankind, the Mahāyāna philosophy does not confine the principle of vicarious sacrifice to a solitary historical incident. Christianity is built on the history of a person, whatever its intrinsic authenticity may be, and not directly on the fact of religious consciousness and intellectual necessity. Therefore, it is unable to uphold the universal application of the principle of vicarious sacrifice, not to say its inability to appreciate the importance of the principle of karma. This is where Christianity derives its strength, the strength of concreteness and objectivity, as compared with Mahāyāna Buddhism, but here lies also its weakness, at least so it would seem to Buddhist thinkers.

The notion of *pariṇāmanā* is based on the following truths: The universe, according to the Mahāyāna, is a grand spiritual system composed of moral beings, who are so many fragmentary reflexes of the *dharmakāya*. The system is so closely knitted together that when any part of it or any unit composing it is affected in one way or another, good or bad, all the other parts or units are drawn into the general commotion that would follow, and will share the common fate. This subtle spiritual system, of which all sentient beings are its parts or units, is like a vast ocean in which the eternal moonlight of *dharmakāya* is reflected. Even a faint wavelet that is noticed in one part of the water is sure to spread all over its surface sooner or later according to the resistance of the molecules, and thus finally to disturb the serenity of the lunar image in it. Likewise, with every deed, good or bad, committed by any sentient unit of this spiritual organization, the *dharmakāya* rejoices or is grieved. When it is grieved, it wills to counteract the evil with goodness; when it rejoices, it knows that so far the cause of goodness has been advanced. Individual karma, therefore, is not after all individual, it is most intimately connected with the whole. It is not an isolated phenomenon originating from the individual and returning to the same agent. It is no mere abstraction when I say that the lifting of my arm or the moving of my leg is not an accidental, indifferent act, but directly related to the ultimate cause of the universe.

This assertion applies with an immeasurably greater emphasis with reference to an act that has a moral bearing. "If," we may ask, "in our spiritual plane of existence things are so intimately related to one another, why could we not make the merit of our own deeds compensate or destroy the effect of an evil karma created by an ignorant mind? Why could we suffer ourselves for the sake of others and lighten even to a small degree the burden of evil karma under which weak, ignorant ones are groaning, though they have nobody else to blame but themselves for their own wretchedness?" These questions are answered affirmatively by the Mahāyāna Buddhists. For they say, "It is possible for us to dedicate our own good karma to the cause of universal goodness, and to suppress or crush or to make quite inefficacious the evil karma perpetrated by the ignorant. It is possible for us to substitute ourselves for others and to bear their burden upon our own shoulders in order to save them from their self-created curse." The result of this conviction is the doctrine of *pariṇāmanā*.

In this, however, it is seen that quite in accordance with the cosmic conception of *dharmakāya*, the Mahāyāna philosophers emphasize the universal or supra-individual significance of karma more than its solitary, individual character. In the Hīnayāna system, the conception of karma is individualistic, pure and simple, there is no escape whatever from the consequence of one's evil or good deeds, for it follows one even after death, which is merely another form of birth. The Mahāyāna Buddhists believe in this as far as the law of causation is concerned, but they go a step further and assert that karma also has its cosmic or supra-individual aspect that must be taken into consideration when we want to realize fully the meaning of our spiritual existence. Though a man has to reap what he had sown and there is no escape possible from the consequence of his evil deeds, the Mahāyāna thinkers would say: A Bodhisattva wishes from [the] fullness of his heart to turn over whatever merit he can have from his acts of goodness to the general welfare of his spiritual kingdom, and to bear upon himself whatever burden of evil is going to befall his ignorant, self-destroying fellow beings. The good he does is not necessarily for his own benefit. In whatever deed he performs, he does not forget its universal character; above all, he desires to be of service in any capacity whatever to the whole spiritual organization, of which he is a unit.

Therefore, the doctrine of *pariṇāmanā* is no more than that of vicarious sacrifice. It is in point of fact vicarious sacrifice in that a Bodhisattva wishes to bear the burden of evil for the real offenders and to save them from suffering. But when he works to add to the general "stock of goodness," and to nourish the "root of merit" in this world, he is doing more than merely substituting, he is doing something positive. *Pariṇāmanā* is vicarious sacrifice, self-renunciation, the transference of merit, the promotion of universal goodness, the annihilation of me and thee, the recognition of the oneness of all things, and the complete satisfaction of our inmost religious yearnings.

The doctrine of karma is terrible; the doctrine of *pariṇāmanā* is humane: karma is the law of nature, inflexible and irreconcilable; *pariṇāmanā* is the heart of a religious being, filled with tears: the one is rigidly masculine and knows no mercy whatever; the other is most tenderly feminine, always ready to weep and help: the one is justice incarnate; the other is absolute compassion: the one is the god of thunder and lightning, who crushes everything that dares resist him; the other is a gentle spring shower, warm, soft, and relaxing, and helping all life to grow: we bow before the one in awe and reverence; we embrace the other as if finding again our lost mother: we need the one, for we must be responsible to the *dharmakāya* for our thoughts, feelings, and deeds; but we cannot let the other go, as we need compassion, tolerance, humaneness, and loving kindness. Mahāyāna Buddhism can thus be said to have a singularly softening effect on the conception of karma. Karma cannot be denied, it is the law; but the human heart is tender and loving, it cannot remain calm and unconcerned at the sight of suffering, however this might

have been brought about. It knows that all things ultimately come from the one source; when others suffer I suffer too; why then should not self-renunciation somehow moderate the austerity of karma? This is the position taken by Mahāyāna Buddhists in regard to the doctrine of karma.

With the moderation of the principle of karma, there took place another change in the Mahāyāna concerning the ideal man, that is, as to what constitutes the true ideal Buddhist, or what kind of being he must be, who really embodies all the noble thoughts and enlightened sentiments of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Arhatship was not satisfactory in this respect and ceased to be the goal of religious discipline for the followers of the Mahāyāna. They considered the Arhat as not fully realizing all the inmost aspirations of religious consciousness, for is he not a Buddhist who seeks only his own deliverance from the whirlpool of birth and death, in which all beings are struggling and being drowned? So long as karma was understood in its individualistic aspect, Arhatship was quite the right thing for the Buddhists to aspire after, but karma could be interpreted in another and wider sense, which made the doctrine of *pariṇāmanā* possible, and Mahāyāna Buddhists thought that this was more in accord with the deepest yearnings of a religious being who wants to save not only himself but the entire world as well. Therefore, the speculative Buddhists came to establish the ideal of Bodhisattvahood in place of Arhatship, and for this reason the Mahāyāna is often designated as Bodhisattvayāna, in contradistinction to Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna. (*Yāna* means a vehicle on which sentient beings are carried from this shore of ignorance to the other shore of enlightenment and eternal happiness.)

The development of this ideal Bodhisattvahood was quite natural with the Mahāyāna Buddhists. Grant that the Hīnayāna followers more faithfully adhered to the moral, monastic, and disciplinary life of primitive Buddhism, while the Mahāyānists in the meantime were bent on the unfolding of the religio-philosophical significance of the teachings of Buddha, and it will be seen that the further they advanced the wider grew their separation from each other. To the moralists, such a bold flight of imagination as that conceived by the Mahāyānists was a very difficult thing to realize. Moral responsibility implies a strict observance of the law of karma; what is done cannot be undone. Good or bad, one has to suffer the consequence; for nobody can interfere with it. Arhatship alone, therefore, could be made the goal of those self-disciplining moralists. With the Mahāyāna Buddhists, however, it was different. They came to look at the import of our moral action more from the point of view of its cosmic relations, or from that of the most intimate interdependence that obtains among all sentient beings in their moral, intellectual, and spiritual activities. With this change of the point of view, they could not but come to the conception of a Bodhisattva whose religion was the realization of the doctrine of *pariṇāmanā*.

In point of fact, there are not two Buddhisms. The Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna are one; the same spirit of the founder of Buddhism breathes through both. Only

each has developed in its own way, according to the different surroundings in which it has thrived and grown—understanding by surroundings all those various factors of life that make up the peculiarities of an individual or a nation. Lack of communication has hitherto prevented the bringing together of Buddhists and the effecting of a complete understanding of each other. But the time is coming nearer when each will fully realize and candidly admit its own shortcomings, though not oblivious of its advantages, and earnestly desire to cooperate with the other in order to bring about a perfect assimilation into one uniform system of Buddhist thought and Buddhist practice, and to contribute to the promotion of peace and goodwill toward all beings, regardless of racial or national differences.⁴

Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki
University of Tokyo

PART TWO

Ōtani Years

The Buddha in Mahāyāna Buddhism

1921

In this essay from the first year of publication of *The Eastern Buddhist*, Suzuki defines the appeal of Mahāyāna as lying within a focus on the personality of the Buddha himself. He advances this theory by setting up a dichotomy between “Hīnayānists,” who insist on the Dharma as having more significance than the person who extolled it, which he characterizes as a “cold logic” in their appreciation of the Buddha’s achievement, and the “Mahāyānists,” who can only appreciate the Dharma through their focus on the personality of the preacher who bestowed this on the world. It is a rather surprising valorization of the affective dimension of Buddhism, almost evangelical; to wit, “However deep and blissful the Buddha’s teachings were, what most profoundly affected his disciples was his own personality.”

This essay first appeared in *The Eastern Buddhist* (Kyoto: The Eastern Buddhist Society), vol. 1, no. 2 (1921).

• • •

The whole system of Mahāyāna Buddhism may be said to depend on its conception of the Buddha. With it the Buddha ceased to be merely historical; he grew to be the object of the religious consciousness that came to assert itself more and more strongly as the Mahāyāna conception of Buddhism gained its force in India. The Buddha for the Hīnayāna followers so called was a great teacher who revealed the Law to dispel their ignorance. Whatever reverence they showed him was that for an extraordinary human being, who, while far surpassing them in intellect, morality, and spiritual insight, was still human, subject to the law of karma or birth and death. The Dharma was not his creation, it existed before him, and disclosed itself to his superior spirituality. The Buddha was to the Hīnayānists, therefore, a sort of medium through whom the truth became accessible and intelligible to them. They were grateful to him and paid him all the deference due to a rare

spiritual seer. To them thus the Dharma and the Buddha were two distinct items of conception; in fact, together with their own congregation (*Samgha*) they forced the Triple Treasure (*triratna* 三寶) of Buddhism. The Buddha (佛), the Dharma (法), and the Samgha (僧), as the three essential constituents of Buddhism stood on equal footing. Of course the Buddha was the center of the congregation, without whom the latter could not have any reason of existence, but since the congregation was the only ethical school where human character could be perfected, its importance in the body of Buddhism could never be ignored. Especially, when its component members began to go out and missionarize the entire earth, they were representatives of the Buddha and transmitters and propagators of the Dharma. They and their devotees bowed to the Dharma and honored it as the agent of enlightenment. While the Buddha was by no means and under no circumstances neglected, he could not surpass the Dharma, that is, he was not regarded by the Hīnayānists as a supernatural being from whom the Dharma itself issued. This Hīnayāna conception of the Buddha was in perfect accord with his own declaration that he was the revealer of the truth and not its inventor or creator. It is not incorrect to say of the Hīnayānists that “the Buddhist saint stands in no relation of dependence to any being above himself. There is no Creator, no Savior, no Helper in his purview. Religious duties, properly so called, he has none. He has been his own light, his own refuge. He is what he is by grace of himself alone” (Coplestone, p. 63).¹

This the Buddha himself has in an unmistakable manner preached to his disciples: “Therefore, O Ānanda, be ye lamps unto yourselves. Be ye a refuge to yourselves. Betake yourselves to no external refuge. Hold fast to the Truth as a lamp. Hold fast as a refuge to the Truth. Look not for refuge to anyone besides yourselves. . . . And whosoever, Ānanda, either now or after I am dead, shall be a lamp unto themselves, shall betake themselves to no external refuge, but holding fast to the Truth as their lamp, and holding fast as their refuge to the Truth, shall look not for refuge to anyone besides themselves. It is they, Ānanda, among my Bhikkhus who shall reach the very topmost height! But they must be anxious to learn” (Coomaraswamy, p. 77, quoting Rhys Davids).²

Hīnayāna Buddhism was a religion of self-discipline and self-enlightenment. When the Buddha finally passed away, his disciples, gods and men, were assembled about him, their grief was extreme, their hair was disheveled, they wept bitterly, stretching forth their arms, or falling prostrate on the ground, or rolling to and fro in anguish, they cried: “Too soon hath the Buddha passed away! Too soon hath the Buddha died! Too soon hath the light of the World passed away.” The loss of a teacher, a guide, or a master was indeed an event of the greatest possible sorrow, but “impermanent are all component things,” “even the Buddha cannot escape the karma of birth and death,” for it is in the very nature of all things most near and dear unto us that we must divide ourselves from them, leave them, sever ourselves

from them.” The Dharma, however, will remain forever, it is only its revealer that has succumbed to the law inherent in all things; as long as the transmission of the Dharma continues in the Saṃgha, our earthly human sorrow must be quieted by the exercise of logic. Thus reasoning and thus consoled, the Hīnayānists kept up their spirits and went on propagating the Dharma revealed to the superior spirituality of the Master.

Even when we read in the *Last Sermon of the Buddha* (佛遺教經)³ that, “After this let all my disciples follow them [that is, his teachings] in succession, and then the Tathāgata’s Dharma-body (法身) will abide forever and not pass away.” This does not necessarily refer to the Dharmakāya as conceived later by the Mahāyāna followers as one of the *trikāya* (三身), but merely to the systematized collection of the Dharma, which, being the Truth revealed to the Buddha and not merely formulated by him, will remain forever even after his passing; and it was this that was so strongly urged by the Buddha to be kept holy and unbecloaked. The Dharma, was, therefore, later symbolized by the Wheel (*Dharmacakra* 法輪), the revolution of which was first started by the Muni of the Śākyas. His followers of course lamented deeply the passing of their Great Master, but as long as the Dharma was preserved from decay, his Nirvāṇa was to be accepted as one of the practical examples of the doctrine of impermanence. For there was yet no connection spiritually established between the Dharma itself and its revealer in the minds of his immediate followers.

This was not however the case with the Mahāyānists; it was not in their character to remain so impersonal, so logical, so scientific, and so calmly rational. Their intensely human interest centered in the personality of their Master. Whatever his teachings, they were vital only so far as they were considered in connection with the Master himself. There was something in him besides his mere teachings which deeply touched their hearts, and it was in fact this deep feeling that gave such animation and power to the teachings of the Buddha. The teachings, when taken by themselves and independent of their author, were cold and too logical to satisfy the Mahāyāna disciples, or rather they were ever desirous to understand his teachings as vitally connected with his personality. They wished to warm up the Buddhist teachings with the fire of his personality. This does not mean that they rejected the logic of the Fourfold Noble Truth (四聖諦) and the thought of the impermanence of all things, but that the objective truth as it were of the Dharma had to be interpreted according to the subjective truth which now imperatively demanded recognition in the hearts of the Buddhists who were now with no living, energy-imparting guide. And then there were not lacking in the many and varied discourses of the Master statements that would justify the Mahāyāna interpretation as to the personality of their author. There was no thought in them of orthodoxy or heterodoxy, of conservatism or liberalism. They were simply impelled to go their way, which was illumined by their inner spiritual light only.

What was this light?

The light in which the Mahāyānists took refuge, the spiritual command which they had no choice but to obey, told them that the Buddha and the Dharma were one and the same thing, that the Dharma could not be comprehended apart from the Buddha, and that the Dharma in fact was the Buddha himself. When they took refuge in this light, everything became perfectly intelligible, the Buddha ceased to be an enigma, and the Dharma grew full of force and energizing and spiritually. Not only that, their religious aspirations found full justification in the Master's teachings themselves. The growth of Mahāyāna Buddhism was thus an inevitable event. If the Buddhism of the Hīnayānists is the literal transmission of the Buddha's teachings in their logical and objective form, the Buddhism of the Mahāyānists must be said to be the spiritual interpretation of the same in vital relation to the Buddhahood of the Master himself. With the Hīnayānists the Master remained a master who discoursed on the Dharma, while with the Mahāyānists the Master's personality was so intimately connected with and interwoven into his teachings that it could never be overlooked in their acceptance. The signification of Mahāyāna Buddhism lies in its conception of the Buddha. Those who charge the Mahāyānists as non-Buddhists or even un-Buddhists are entirely forgetful of the fact [that], strictly speaking, the Mahāyāna alone can justify the claim to be Buddhism.

A parallelism may be found in Christianity. There are two main currents of thought in Christianity, one is Johannism and the other is Paulinism, and we can say that most of the Christians these days are followers of Paulinism. For it was Paul that succeeded in deifying Christ, in religiously interpreting the crucifixion, and in promulgating the theory of salvation by faith. Paul concentrated his attention on Christ himself rather than on his teachings independently, he made use of the latter to consolidate his theory as to the personality of Christ, which so vitally concerned us rather than the teachings themselves. The Mahāyāna advocates have done almost, if not quite, the same thing to their own spiritual leader. This will grow much clearer as we proceed.

However deep and blissful the Buddha's teachings were, what most profoundly affected his disciples was his own personality. While he was yet alive, they were not quite conscious of all its wonderful attractions. As they listened to his discourses, they felt them so satisfying and thought that this feeling of sufficiency came from the truth of the discourses themselves, which was not in any inseparable manner connected with the personality of the preacher. Indeed, he frequently declared himself a Buddha, but they felt this referred more to his intellectual insight than to his superhuman personality. He was great in the latter quality no doubt, but his general emphasis on the Dharma itself turned the hearers' attention more or less away from the person. This unconscious diversion was quite natural as we can see exemplified in our daily intercourse with others. But the disciples had to pay more than double for this when their Master was carried away from their midst. The

absence was felt by them with vehemence, and all the memory was vividly awakened. The mysterious and indescribable power which had hitherto unconsciously been exercising itself over the minds of the disciples raised its head now and most emphatically asserted itself in them. As the natural consequence, such questions as the following agitated them:

Who was he really that called himself the Enlightened? Who was he that was the owner of such superhuman qualities? He was so good, so lovingly kind, so highly endowed with intellectual powers, so fully morally trained as to break the bonds of ignorance and karma, and so spiritually elevated as not to allow our approach to him. Who could such a being be? What constitutes Buddhahood? He could not be an ordinary mortal, though apparently he was subject to all the ills that flesh was heir to. He said that he would not come back on earth again as he had cut successfully asunder all the bonds of karma, but could *we* think of him as gone forever as abiding eternally in the serenity of Parinirvāṇa? Could *we* conceive of that wonderful, inexpressively impressive personality as carried away forever from among us?

Not only the Buddha's personality but his superior intellectual insight was also the subject of inquiry among his disciples. If his moral purity so strongly appealed to the imagination of his followers who were like the rest of us ever prone to hero worship, his analytical intellect, which most deeply penetrated into the nature of things and laid bare all the mysteries of life, could not but excite the wonder of his disciples. How could such a mind be merely human? It must have come directly from the source of all things if there is any such. Or there must be something more than human in this world, for if otherwise such a soul as the Buddha could not come among us. His passing must be only apparent, he must be living somewhere yet, his disappearance must be one of his innumerable contrivances of love just to show us that the sorrow of separation and dissolution is inherent in the nature of things, while in fact he is above all changes. Freedom from evil desires, which set the wheel of karma going, cannot mean mere extinction, absence of all things, which is negative, but there must be something in it to be positively affirmed, though our language may not be adequate enough to point it out affirmatively. As we read in the *Nirvana Sutra* the moon behind a cloud does not mean that she is gone forever, her temporal disappearance has in fact nothing to do with her real existence that is above our visual conditions. So with the Buddha, his passing away from us must be only an event of the phenomenal world, in the spiritual realm, which is also the realm of truth and reason, the Buddha divested from all his physical encumbrances, must be eternally living. He was a unique figure while with us, and this uniqueness cannot be in vain.

That the Buddha was designated with so many titles while yet walking among us, the number of which ever increased after his Nirvāṇa, proves sufficiently the naturalness of the questions cited just above. The ten appellations most commonly given to

him are: (1) The Enlightened One (*Buddha* 佛), (2) One who hath thus gone (*Tathāgata* 如來), (3) One who is worthy of offerings (*Arhat* 羅漢), (4) One who is perfect in enlightenment (*Samyaksaṃbuddha* 正偏智), (5) One who is perfect in deeds and knowledge (*Vidyācaraṇasaṃpanna* 明行足), (6) The Well-Gone One (*Sugata* 善逝), (7) The Peerless One in the knowledge of the world (*Lokavidanuttara* 世間解無上士), (8) The Controller of Man (*Puruṣadāmyasārathi* 調御大夫), (9) The Teacher of Gods and Men (*Śāstādevamanuṣyānām* 人天師), and (10) The World-Honored One (*Lokajyeṣṭha* 世尊).⁴ The *Mahāvīyutpatti*, which is a kind of Buddhist dictionary in Sanskrit, mentions eighty-one titles of the Buddha including the ten already referred to. Among the rest I may mention a few here: The Ocean of Merits (*Guṇasāgara* 功德海), The Savior (*Tāyin* 救世主), The Leader (*Nāyaka* 導師), The Lord of the Law (*Dharmasvāmin* 法王), The Omniscient One (*Sarvajña* 一切智), The Serene One (*Samita* 寂靜者), The Immaculate One (*Nirmala* 無垢), and so on.

So long as we are mortal, finite creatures, we are ever prone to worship great men, to worship divinity enshrined in them and operating through them. They have of course their weaknesses or peculiarities, but when their fleshy structures are finally blown away, the life, the power that used to shine out of them is now revealed in its full glory and strength. All that belonged to their flesh is forgotten, singularly forgotten. It may be due to the innate goodness of human nature, but the fact stands out most prominently that we are generally oblivious of our friends' shortcomings and prejudices when they are dead, and that we easily forgive them for whatever faults they have committed while alive. In the case of a master or hero whose personality has already deeply impressed us, his good qualities are immeasurably enhanced; in other words his divine virtues shine forth and overwhelm us with their irresistible superhuman power. We bow to them without questioning origin. Indeed, we contrive to give some intellectually and spiritually satisfactory interpretation to the source of this mysterious power which so compellingly demands our submission to it. The result is the deification of the master or hero. He grows differentiated from us ordinary mortals, not only in his mental qualities but in his bodily form. Hence the Buddha's thirty-two major (三十二相) and eighty minor (八十種好) extraordinary marks of personal appearance.

When we know that this sort of superhumanization or deification was already going on in Hināyāna Buddhism, we can realize that the process will not stop until it has reached its climax, that is, where our human hearts find a complete satisfaction of their religious yearnings. Siddhartha could not remain even as the Muni of the Śākyas, nor as a historical Buddha who preached the Fourfold Noble Truth (四聖諦) and Eight Ways of Righteousness (八正道). He was to be made into an ideal Buddha transcending history or mere facts. It may be better to say that Siddhartha formed a point of crystallization around which our spiritual yearnings coagulated and solidified, just as Christ formed such a point for his followers.

The physical uniqueness of the Buddha as I referred to before naturally presupposed his superhuman spiritual qualities. He is generally described as the owner of the following powers: the *Daśabala* (ten powers 十力), four sorts of *Vaiśāradyam* (usually translated "fearlessness" 四無畏), and eighteen uncommon virtues (十八不共法). As all these faculties were ascribed to the Buddha by followers of the Hīnayāna, we may infer how far the process of deification had been going on before the Mahāyāna conception of the Buddha was fully established by Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga.

Miracles are inevitable to religion. Human nature longs for them. A world so rigidly bound up in the law of causation that no miracles are possible, no supernaturalism is allowed, will be an extremely uninteresting place for us mortals to live in. When everything is prearranged, when one thing determines another, and all surprise, all unexpectedness is excluded, our sense of logic may be gratified, but our religious nature will revolt. Whether scientific or not, we are so constituted as to demand something supernatural, that is, something directly coming from the source of all things and not determined by a chain of causes and conditions. Miracles are essential. If the Buddha is endowed with so many superhuman qualities, mentally and physically, how can his life itself be devoid of miraculous deeds?

For these it is not necessary to come to Mahāyāna Buddhism, for the Hīnayāna is already full of them, showing that the process of deification began soon after the death of the Buddha, as well as that the so-called Hīnayāna Buddhism is by no means primitive or original Buddhism. To cite a few examples. When the Buddha was about to pass away, transfiguration took place, and the color of his body grew exceedingly bright. When asked by Ānanda how this was so, the Buddha replied that transfiguration took place twice in the life of the Tathāgata, when he attained Enlightenment and when he entered Parinirvāṇa (般涅槃). As he was lying on the couch between twin sal trees, suddenly they all burst forth into bloom though it was not the flowering season, and the blossoms scattered themselves over the body of the Tathāgata. Then the earth shook in six different ways; men and gods from the ten quarters of the universe filled the space about the departing Master, so that one could not find room to stick even the point of a hair. What a miracle this!

The deification of the Muni of the Śākyas has thus been going on in various ways after his death, perhaps even while he was still alive. It was in vain for the Buddha even if he had any desire to avoid this form of supernaturalization, as far as he himself was concerned, to check the inevitable course of human psychology which ever wants to take hold of something for its support, for its own unification, or for its transcendentalism. What Buddhists, Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna, conceived of the personality of their Master in regard to his physical, intellectual, and spiritual qualifications, was no extravagant outburst of the Indian imagination. To save the truth of the Dharma preached by the Buddha, as well as to fulfill the religious requirements of the human heart, the Buddha had to perform miracles and to be endowed with superhuman qualities both in his personality and spirituality.

All the stage-settings being now thus complete for the Buddha to pass from human to superhuman, it needed the Mahāyānists to give them the final touch. The Buddha was now Vairocana (盧舍那) or Amitābha (阿彌陀), or Dharmakāya (法身) as the case may be. His sermons were then attended with wonderful phenomena. A mysterious light shone forth from his crown, and his voice resounded through the ten quarters of the world, awakening all sentient beings from ignorance and folly. The gods, demigods, Bodhisattvas, Arhats, spiritual beings and the rest of the creation hastened to manifest themselves before the Buddha, praising, honoring, and worshipping him in the grandest possible style. The dramatic scene thus projected beggars description, and those who have ever read such Mahāyāna sutras as the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka* or *Gaṇḍavyūha* will at once see that the Buddha manifested here is no ordinary mortal subject to the laws of the world, but that he is really the Lord of all the universes. Miracle is no word to describe the phenomenon thus produced by the spirituality of the Master. The superficial critics who try to find in Buddhism an empty, dreamy, abstracted theory of life called a philosophy of nothingness will be completely taken aback by the tropical richness and extravagant luxury of the Mahāyāna imagination.

Here we have the Mahāyāna Buddha in full development. How grand, how poetic, how mystical he is! Compared with the prosaic and altogether too logical concept of the Hīnayāna Buddha, how deep in thought and how rich in imagination and yet how intimately in contact with the religious cravings of human nature is the Buddha in the minds of Mahāyāna followers of Buddhism.

As to the idea that the Buddha is the Dharma incarnate, that is, Dharmakāya, it was not probably consciously entertained by Śākyamuni himself, but that he was a Buddha, an enlightened one who was not conditioned by the law of birth and death, he cut completely asunder the bondage of karma, that he was the only honored one above and below the heavens, and that he could by his will either prolong or shorten his earthly life, which means he was absolute master of his fate, points directly to his superhuman character. If this did not do so to the mind of the Buddha, they certainly did to his disciples, especially after his death. The ultimate problem of Buddhahood could be solved only when the Buddha was regarded as a superhuman being or a personal manifestation of the highest principle. In some respects we are also manifestations of the ultimate reason, for we are all in possession of the Buddha-nature as is taught in the Mahāyāna text of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* (涅槃經).

In the Pāli text of the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, according to Warren, the Buddha gave his final instruction to Ānanda in the following words:

It may be, Ānanda, that some of you will think, "The word of the Teacher is a thing of the past, we have now no Teacher." But that, Ānanda, is not the correct view. The Doctrine and Discipline, Ānanda, which I have taught and enjoined upon you is to be your teacher when I am gone.⁵

In the Chinese translation of the Hinayāna text, we have that “even the diamond body of the Buddha passes away.” The idea that the Buddha passes but the Dharma or Doctrine or Law remains goes well with the ordinary human point of view, but in the case of a supernaturally endowed personage, this idea is sure to be transformed, and the identification of the Buddha and the Dharma takes place. The result is what the *Śrīmālā Sūtra* endeavors to establish: that is, not only the Buddha is the Dharma itself but the Saṃgha also has its reason of existence in the Buddha, indeed the Buddha means the unity of the Threefold Treasure; when you take refuge in the Buddha, you take refuge in all of the *triratna* (or Threefold Treasure), Buddha, Dharma, and Saṃgha; whereas taking refuge in the other two of the Treasure is incomplete and leaves one still unsatisfied in one’s inmost religious yearnings. When the Buddha was thus interpreted it was quite natural that the Threefold Treasure was considered to be united in one Buddha, and that where he was worshipped all the rest were included in him, that he was the main and sole stay of Buddhism as a system. Therefore Mahākāśyapa exclaims in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa*, “O ye my fellow-disciples, you need not lament and cry so, this is not an empty world, and the Tathāgata lives forever, he suffers no change; so does the Dharma and the Saṃgha.” The Buddha chimes in, “The Tathāgata indeed abideth forever, no change takes place on him, and he never entereth into Parinirvāṇa.”

This is the Mahāyāna idea intellectually developed, but the foreshadowings of it we find already in the Buddhology of the Mahāsāṅghika school, which was one of the two main divisions of Buddhism rising soon after the death of the Buddha. According to Vasumitra’s *Samayabhedōparacana-cakra* (異部宗輪論),⁶

The human Buddha who appeared in India was a temporal body and not a real one. The real body of the Buddha was obtained by him as the result of innumerable meritorious deeds he had practiced through a long series of kalpas, and therefore it is infinite in duration and spiritual power. When others look at him, they are blessed, their evil passions are subdued, and they are saved from transmigration. Whatever he utters never fails to be in perfect accord with truth. This body of the Buddha will appear on earth whenever conditions are ready for him.

The logical development of these ideas is Nāgārjuna’s Double Body theory of the Buddha, which is discussed at length and in several places in his treatise on *Prajñāpāramitā*. Before the *trikāya* theory of Buddhahood came to be fully established, Nāgārjuna’s served as a sort of passage through which the primitive conception of the Buddha had to walk. Its culmination later in the triplicity of Dharmakāya (法身), Nirmāṇakāya (應身), and Saṃbhogakāya (報身), as an established doctrine of Mahāyāna Buddhism, will be treated in another article in one of the coming issues of this magazine.⁷

Notes on the Avataṃsaka Sutra

1921

Spread out over four issues of *The Eastern Buddhist* during its first year of publication, Suzuki put out an English translation that incorporated parts of a modern Japanese translation of selected verses from the sixty-volume *Huayan jing* prepared by Akanuma Chizen and Yamabe Shūgaku. His translation was called “*The Avataṃsaka Sutra* (Epitomised).” Accompanying the third installment was this introductory essay that reflects Suzuki’s own guide to the study of that scripture. The nature of the writing shows the middle ground occupied by *The Eastern Buddhist* between professional scholars and interested nonprofessionals who are presumed to have heard of the sutra in question but have minimal or no familiarity with its contents. Given the unusual structure of the text—it is preached by bodhisattvas, and the buddha’s role is merely to shine radiantly—and its abstruse teaching of interpenetration, the essay reflects Suzuki’s felt need to provide an introductory frame for the translated bits of the sutra in the journal, no doubt the first appearance of the sutra in a Western language, and affords an insight into Suzuki’s own views on what the sutra’s message contained.

This was first printed in *The Eastern Buddhist* 1, no. 3 (1921).

• • •

To understand the Avataṃsaka Sutra, the following remarks will be found useful.

Besides the general Mahāyāna notions, the Avataṃsaka has its own philosophy or world conception constituting the fundamental tenets of the Kegon School of Buddhism, which is regarded by some to be the culmination of the Buddhist experience of life.

First, the Buddha as the central figure naturally occupies the most important position throughout the discourse. Unlike in the other sutras, the Buddha himself does not deliver a sermon, or a series of sermons; all the lecturing whatever there is, is done by the attending Bodhisattvas—not only the lecturing but the praising

of the Buddha's holy merits, of which there is a great deal in this sutra, in fact more than in other sutras—all this is the doing of the Bodhisattvas. The part played by the Buddha is just to show himself in radiance, and this is the important point in the understanding of the Avataṃsaka. The Buddha here is not the historical Buddha, but one in the Sāgara-mudrā Samādhi, which means "Ocean-Seal Samādhi." According to Kegon scholars, the Buddha in this Samādhi keeps his mind serene and transparent as the ocean in which all things are sealed or impressed, that is, reflected as they are in themselves; the world thus appearing to him is not a world of the senses, but one of light and spirit. This world is called the Dharmadhātu, that is, a world of pure beings, or simply a spiritual world, and is technically known as the "World of the Lotus Treasure."

When the world is contemplated by the Buddha in this Samādhi, it is radiant with light; for the light issues from his body, from every part of his body, in fact from every pore in his skin, illuminating the ten quarters of the universe and revealing the past, the present, and the future. The Buddha himself is reflected in every object on which his light falls. His gaze turns toward the east, and all the holy lands of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas with their innumerable attendants in that quarter are manifested; when it is directed to the west, or south, or north, the same miracle takes place. This applies not only to space but to time as well.

In the heaven of Śakrendra it is said that there hangs a network of pearls which is so arranged as to make each one of them reflect the light of another, so that when one of the pearls is picked, everyone else is seen mirrored in it. In a similar manner, the Dharmadhātu of the Avataṃsaka Sutra is a network of lights, where when you take up any one of them, in it you will see the whole world reflected. In other words,

In every particle of dust there are present Buddhas innumerable,
Revealing innumerable worlds of indescribably sublimity;
And they are perceived in one thought,
And all the kalpas past, present, and future are also manifested in one thought.¹

or,

All the Buddha-lands and all the Buddhas themselves,
Are manifested in my own being, freely and without hindrance,
And even at the point of a single hair a Buddha-land is perceivable.²

When Genju Daishi (賢首大師, 643–712)³ of the Tang dynasty discoursed on the philosophy of Kegon, his disciples found it difficult to follow up this theory of interpenetration. Thereupon, the Buddhist scholar had a number of mirrors stand all around a light so that the latter would be reflected in them all and each of them in turn would reflect all the others. This apt practical demonstration greatly helped to enlighten his disciples on the subject.

Interpenetration or intermutuality sums up the doctrine of Kegon. This may be hard to comprehend when this world is observed in its gross sense-provoking aspect as we do in our ordinary life, but let us once be introduced into the spiritual light of Vairocana Buddha (盧舍那佛), and everything in the world will assume a totally different aspect, full of radiance, not only in itself but reflecting in it the whole world with all its multitudinous objects. The Sutra depicts this world of pure light, which is the world as it appears to those who have attained to the Perfect Wisdom (*prajñā*).

This Kegon conception of the world is not pantheism; for what it teaches is that each object is not only itself but every other object, and that all things are mutually conditioning to such an extent as the withdrawal of one of them means the disturbance of the whole system, which is to say, the world grows imperfect to that extent. When this theory is pushed to its logical conclusion, the complete network of interrelationships of all things rests on the point of a single hair. As this pen moves along the lines of this ruled paper, the triple chiliocosm moves with it, and as I think out my thought, in it are reflected all the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas of the past, present, and future, even as the moon and stars and all other heavenly bodies are mirrored in the ocean, eternally serene and undisturbed. This is what is known as the spiritual freedom, thoroughly unfettered, of an enlightened being.

The world of Kegon is thus known as the world of interpenetration, which is regarded as one step gone further than the idea of the oneness of the phenomenal and the noumenal world—this latter being the doctrine of “imperfect” Mahāyāna Buddhism.

So long as this insight is not attained, our world remains sense-bound, and untold misery dogs our steps wherever they are directed. This the Buddha pities, and with his overflowing love he embraces the world and all creatures in it; his activity, which is called the “Deeds of Samantabhadra” (普賢行), never ceases until every being is delivered; he will go to Hell, even, to the lowest one, Avīci (阿鼻地獄), in order to get the suffering souls out of it. The Bodhisattva follows the example of the Buddha, for he strictly observes the Six Virtues of Perfection (*pāramitā*). Indeed these Virtues are what constitutes the essence of Bodhisattvahood. By strength of the merits a Bodhisattva accumulates through countless ages by the practice of these Six Virtues, he finally attains to Buddhahood.

The Six Virtues called the “Bodhisattvacaryā” (菩薩行) are: 1. Almsgiving (*dāna*, 布施) which is not only giving away material things but preaching the truth and sacrificing one’s life for the cause; 2. Observance of the precepts (*śīla*, 持戒); 3. Untiring in work (*vīrya*, 精進); 4. Long-suffering (*kṣānti*, 忍辱); 5. Wisdom (*prajñā*, 智慧), which is not mere accumulation of knowledge but a penetrating insight into the very nature of things; and 6. Meditation (*dhyāna*, 禪定). As to this last subject, Meditation, a special treatment will be required, as this, together with

Wisdom (*prajñā*) and Precepts (*śīla*), constitutes the three branches (三學) of Buddhist discipline.

There are many other points in the Kegon Sutra requiring enlightenment, but this short introduction I hope will be of some help to those who are not quite familiar with the Mahāyāna in its various aspects of development.⁴

Enlightenment and Ignorance

1924

In this piece from 1924 Suzuki asserts his views on the process by which awakening takes place, perhaps most prominent among them is his stress on the “the struggle of the will,” a point that he sees as having been overlooked in Western scholars’ emphasis on dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) and his discussion of the spiritual significance of Ignorance as the first *nidāna* in that formula. He is arguing that the Buddha’s Enlightenment stems from a strong assertion of will power rather than insightful speculation or analytical reasoning. In Suzuki’s usage, will is not mere effort but a form of consciousness that itself must be liberated, and this process is key to the Buddhist path. In his words, “The Buddha thus wants an illumined will and not the negation of it.” In Japanese hermeneutic terms, this suggests a valorization of “self-power” (*jiriki*) over “other-power” (*tariki*). Yet only six years hence he would publish an even longer piece on the significance of passivity in Buddhism (see chapter 13 below). Note that the normative Indic language of reference here is not Sanskrit but Pāli, something he would later move away from in his study of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* and thereafter. This essay freely quotes Pāli, Sanskrit, and German, translated without attribution or presented entirely without translation, which suggests a different conception in Suzuki’s mind of his intended audience than in previous *Eastern Buddhist* pieces. Although corrected here, his misspellings of Indic words remain numerous, though somewhat fewer than in his previous writing.

Originally published in *The Eastern Buddhist* 3, no. 1 (1924).

. . .

Strange though it may seem, the fact is that Buddhist scholars are engrossed too much in the study of what they regard as the Buddha’s teaching and his disciples’ exposition of the Dharma, so called, while they neglect altogether the study of the Buddha’s spiritual experience itself. According to my view, however, the first thing

we have to do in the elucidation of Buddhist thought is to inquire into the nature of this personal experience of the Buddha, which is recorded to have presented itself to his inmost consciousness at the time of Enlightenment (*Samboḍhi*). What the Buddha taught his disciples was the conscious outcome of his intellectual elaboration to make them see and realize what he himself had seen and realized. This intellectual outcome, however philosophically presented, does not necessarily enter into the inner essence of Enlightenment experienced by the Buddha. When we want, therefore, to grasp the spirit of Buddhism, which essentially develops from the content of Enlightenment, we have to get acquainted with the significance of the experience of the founder—experience by virtue of which he is indeed the Buddha and the founder of the religious system which goes under his name. Let us see what record we have of this experience, and what were its antecedents and consequences.¹

I

There is a sutra in the Dīgha-Nikāya known as the *Mahāpadāna Suttanta*, in which the Buddha is represented as enlightening his disciples concerning the past six Buddhas prior to him. The facts relating to their lives as Bodhisattvas and Buddhas are almost identical in each case except [for] some incidental details; for the Buddhas are all supposed to have one and the same career. When therefore Gautama, the Buddha of the present Kalpa, talks about his predecessors in this wise, he is simply recapitulating his own earthly life. Incidentally, the idea that there were some more Buddhas² in the past seems to have originated very early in the history of Buddhism as we may notice here, and its further development, combined with the idea of the Jātaka, finally culminated in the conception of a Bodhisattva, which is one of the characteristic features of Mahayana Buddhism.

When the Bodhisattva, as the Buddha is so designated prior to his attainment of Buddhahood, was meditating in seclusion, the following consideration came upon him: "Verily this world has fallen upon trouble (*kiccha*), one is born, and grows old, and dies, and falls from one state, and springs up in another. And from this suffering, moreover, no one knows of any way of escape, even from decay and death. O when shall a way of escape from this suffering be made known, from decay and death?"³ Thus thinking, the Bodhisattva reasoned out that decay and death arose from birth, birth from becoming, becoming from grasping, grasping from craving, until he came to the mutual conditioning of name-and-form (*nāmarūpa*) and cognition (*viññāṇa*).⁴ Then he reasoned back and forth from the coming-to-be of this entire body of evil to its final ceasing-to-be—and at this thought there arose to the Bodhisattva an insight (*cakkhu*)⁵ into things not heard of before, and knowledge arose, and reason arose, wisdom arose, light arose.

(*Bodhisattassa pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhum udapādi, ñāṇaṃ udapādi, paññā udapādi, vijjā udapādi, āloka udapādi.*)⁶

He then exclaimed: “I have penetrated this Dharma, deep, hard to perceive, hard to understand, calm, sublime, no mere dialectic, subtle, intelligible only to the wise (*Dhammo gambhīro duddaso duranubodho santo paṇīto atakkāvacaro nipuṇo paṇḍita vedanīyo.*)”⁷ “But this is a race devoting itself to the things to which it clings, devoted thereto, delighting therein. And for a race devoting itself to the things to which it clings, devoted thereto, delighting therein, this were a matter hard to perceive, to wit, that this is conditioned by that, and all that happens is by way of cause. This too were a matter hard to discern—the tranquilization of all the activities of life, the renunciation of all substrata of rebirth, the destruction of craving, the death of passion, quietude of heart, Nirvana.”

The Buddha then uttered the following verse in which he expresses his reluctance to teach the Dharma to the world at large—the Dharma which he realized in himself by ñāṇa—Dharma which he saw visibly, face to face, without any traditional instruction (*anītiha*):

This that through many toils I’ve won—
Enough! why should I make it known?
By folk with lust and hate consumed
Not this the Truth⁸ that can be grasped!
Against the stream of common thought,
Deep, subtle, difficult, delicate,
Unseen ’twill be by passion’s slaves
Cloaked in the murk of Ignorance.⁹

According to this report transmitted by the compilers of the Nikayas, which is also confirmed by the other literature we have of the Buddha’s Enlightenment, what flashed through his mind must have been an experience most unusual and not taking place in our everyday consciousness, even in the consciousness of a wise, learned, and thoughtful man. Thus, he naturally wished to pass away into Nirvana without attempting to propagate the Dharma, but this idea was abandoned when Great Brahma spoke to the Buddha in the following verse:

As on a crag, on crest of mountain standing.
A man might watch the people far below,
E’en so do thou, O Wisdom fair, ascending,
O Seer of all, the terraced heights of Truth,
Look down, from grief released, upon the nations
Sunken in grief, oppressed with birth and age.
Arise, thou Hero! Conqueror in the battle!
Thou freed from debt! Lord of the pilgrim band!
Walk the world o’er, and sublime and blessed Teacher!
Teach us the Truth; there are who’ll understand.¹⁰

There is no doubt that it was this spiritual experience that converted the Bodhisattva into the Buddha, the Perfectly Wise, the Bhagavat, the Arhat, the King of the Dharma, the Tathagata, the All-Knowing One, and the Conqueror. In this, all the records we have, Hinayana and Mahayana, agree. Here then arises the most significant question in the history of Buddhism. What was it in this experience that made the Buddha conquer Ignorance (*avijjā*) and freed him from the Defilements (*āsava*)? What was his insight or vision he had into things, which had never before been presented to his mind? Was it his doctrine of universal suffering due to Thirst (*taṇhā*) and Grasping (*upādāna*)? Was it his causation theory by which he traced the source of pain and suffering to Ignorance? It is quite evident that his intellectual activity was not the efficient cause of Enlightenment. "Not to be grasped by mere logic" (*atakkāvacara*) is the phrase we constantly encounter in Buddhist literature, Pāli and Sanskrit. The satisfaction the Buddha experienced in this case was altogether too deep, too penetrating, and too far-reaching in result to be a mere matter of logic. The intellectual solution of a problem is satisfying enough as far as the blockage has been removed, but it is not sufficiently fundamental to enter into the depths of our soul-life. All scholars are not saints and all saints are by no means scholarly. The Buddha's intellectual survey of the Law of Origination (*paṭicca-samuppāda*), however perfect and thoroughgoing, could not make him so completely sure of his conquest over Ignorance, Pain, Birth, and Defilements. Tracing things to their origin or subjecting them to a scheme of concatenation is one thing, but to subdue them, to bring them to subjection in the actuality of life, is quite another thing. In the one, the intellect alone is active, but in the other there is the operation of the will—and the will is the man. The Buddha was not the mere discoverer of the Twelvefold Chain of Causation, he took hold of the chain itself in his hands and broke it into pieces so that it would never again bind him to slavery.

The question then is, what is this act of breaking? And where does the feeling of release and freedom come from?

The Buddha's psychological experience of life as pain and suffering must have been quite intense and moved him to the very depths of his being, and naturally the emotional reaction he experienced at the time of Enlightenment was in proportion to this intensity. It is therefore all the more evident that he could not rest satisfied with an intellectual glancing or surveying of the facts of life. In order to bring a perfect state of tranquility over the waves of turmoil surging in his heart, he had to have recourse to something more deeply and vitally concerned with his inmost being. For all we can say of it, the intellect is after all a spectator, and when it does some work it is as a hireling for better or for worse. Alone it cannot bring about the state of mind designated as enlightenment. The feeling of perfect freedom, the feeling that "*ahaṃ hi arahā loke, ahaṃ satthā anuttaro*,"¹¹ could not issue from the consciousness of an intellectual superiority alone. There must have been

in the mind of the Buddha a consciousness far more fundamental which could only accompany one's deepest spiritual experience.

To describe this spiritual experience the Buddhist writers exhaust their knowledge of words relating to the understanding, logical or otherwise. "Knowledge" (*vijjā*), "understanding" (*pajānanā*), "reason" (*ñāṇa*), "wisdom" (*paññā*), "penetration" (*abhisameta*), "realization" (*abhisambuddha*), "perception" (*sañjānana*), "insight" (*dassana*), and what not,¹² are the terms they use in describing the Buddha's consciousness at the time of Enlightenment. In truth as long as we confine ourselves to intellection, however deep, subtle, sublime, and enlightening, we fail to see into the gist of the matter. Therefore, even the so-called primitive Buddhists who are by some considered positivists, rationalists, and agnostics, though in fact I do not think they are, are obliged to assume something more than relative knowledge that deals only in knowledge of things as they appeal to our psychological ego, such as external objects, concepts, images, and so on. If not indeed for the assumption of something far deeper than mere knowledge, enlightenment would not be satisfactorily accounted for.

The Mahayana account of Enlightenment as is found in the *Lalitavistara* (chapter on "Abhisambodhana") is more explicit as to the kind of intellect or wisdom which converted the Bodhisattva into the Buddha. For it was through "*ekacittekṣana-saṃyukta-prajñā*" that supreme perfect knowledge was realized (*abhisambodha*) by the Buddha. What is this *Prajñā*? It is the understanding of a higher order than that which is habitually exercised in acquiring relative knowledge. It is a faculty both intellectual and spiritual, through the operation of which the soul is enabled to break the fetters of consciousness. The latter is always dualistic inasmuch as it is cognizant of subject and object, but in the *Prajñā*, which is exercised "in unison with one-thought-viewing" there is no separation of knower and known and knowledge, these are all viewed (*īkṣaṇa*) in one thought (*ekacitta*). Enlightenment is the outcome of this. It is therefore an absolute state of mind in which no "discrimination" (*parikalpana* or *vikalpa*) takes place. It requires a great mental effort to realize this state of viewing all things in one thought; our logical as well as practical consciousness is too given up to analysis and ideation; that is to say, we cut up realities into elements in order to understand them, but when they are put together to make the original whole, its elements stand out too conspicuously defined and we do not view the whole "in one thought." And as it is only when "one thought" is reached that we have enlightenment, an effort is to be made to go beyond our relative empirical consciousness. We read in the *Kaṭha-Upaniṣad*: "As rain water that has fallen on a mountain ridge runs down on all sides, thus does he who sees a difference between qualities run after them on all sides. As pure water poured into pure water remains the same, thus, O Gautama, is the self of a thinker who knows." This pouring of pure water into pure water is, as we have it here, the "viewing all qualities in one thought," which finally cuts off the hopeless tangle of logical mess by merging all differences and likenesses into the absolute

oneness of the knower (*jñānin*) and the known (*jñeya*). Eckhart, the great German mystic, is singularly one with the Buddhist view of enlightenment when he expresses his thus: “Das Auge, darin ich Gott sehe, ist dasselbe Auge, darin Gott mich sieht. Mein Auge und Gottes Auge ist ein Auge und ein Gesicht und ein Erkennen und eine Liebe” (Martensen, p. 29).

Enlightenment therefore must involve the will as well as the intellect. It is an act of intuition born of the will. The will wants to know itself as it is in itself, *yathābhūtam dassana*, free from all its cognitive conditions. The Buddha attained this end when a new insight came upon him at the end of his ever-circulatory reasoning from decay and death to Ignorance and from Ignorance to decay and death, through the twelve links of the Paṭicca-samuppāda. The Buddha had to go over the same ground again and again, because he was in an intellectual impasse through which he could not move further on. He did not repeat the process, as is originally imagined, for his own philosophical edification. The fact was that he did not know how to escape this endless rotation of ideas; at this end there was birth, there was decay and death, and at the other end there was Ignorance. The objective facts could not be denied, they boldly and uncomfortably confronted him, while Ignorance balked the progress of his cognitive faculty moving further onward or rather inward. He was hemmed in on both sides, he did not know how to find his way out, he went first this way and then that way, forever with the same result—the utter inutility of all his mental labor. But he had an indomitable will, he wanted, with the utmost efforts of his will, to get into the very truth of the matter, he knocked and knocked until the doors of Ignorance gave away, and they burst open to a new vista never before presented to his intellectual vision. Thus he was able to exclaim to Upaka, the naked ascetic, who he happened to meet on his way to Benares after Enlightenment (Majjhima-Nikāya, XXVI):

All-conqueror I, knower of all,
From every soil and stain released,
Renouncing all, from craving ceased,
Self-taught; whom should I Master call?
That which I know I learned of none,
My fellow is not on the earth.
Of human or of heavenly birth
To equal me there is not one.
I truly have attained release,
The world's unequalled teacher I,
Alone, enlightened perfectly,
I dwell in everlasting peace.¹³

When we speak of enlightenment or illumination we are apt to think of its epistemological aspect to forget the presence of a tremendous will power behind it—the power in fact making up the entire being of an individual. Especially as in

Buddhism the intellect stands forth prominently, perhaps more than it ought to, in the realization of the ideal Buddhist life, the scholars are tempted to ignore the significance of the will as the essentially determinate factor in the solution of the ultimate problem. Their attention has thus been directed too much toward the doctrine of the *Paṭicca-samuppāda* or the *Ariya-sacca*, which they considered constituting the ultimate fact of Buddhism. But in this they have been sadly at fault, nor have they been right in taking Buddhism for a sort of ethical culture, declaring that it is no more than a system of moral precepts (*sīla*), without a soul, without a God, and consequently without a promise of immortality. But the true Buddhist ideas of Ignorance, Causation, and Moral Conduct had a far deeper foundation in the soul-life of man. Ignorance was not a cognitive ignorance, but meant the darkness of spiritual outlook. If Ignorance were no more than cognitive, the clearing-up of it did not and could not result in enlightenment, in freedom from the Fetters and Defilements, or Intoxicants as some Pāli scholars have them. The Buddha's insight penetrated the depths of his being as the will, and he knew what this was, *yathābhūtam*, or in its *tathābhāva* (thatness or suchness), he rose above himself as a Buddha supreme and peerless. The expression "Anuttara-samyak-saṃbodhi," was thus used to designate this preeminently spiritual knowledge awakened in his inmost consciousness.

Ignorance which is the antithesis of Enlightenment, therefore, acquires a much deeper sense here than that which has hitherto been ascribed to it. Ignorance is not merely not-knowing or not being acquainted with a theory, system, or law; it is not directly grasping the ultimate facts of life as expressive of the will. In Ignorance knowing is separated from acting, and the knower from that which is to be known; in Ignorance the world is asserted as distinct from the self, that is, there are always two elements standing in opposition. This is, however, the fundamental condition of cognition, which means that as soon as cognition takes place there is Ignorance clinging to its every act. When we think we know something, there is something we do not know. The unknown is always behind the known, and we fail to get at this unknown knower, who is indeed the inevitable and necessary companion to every act of cognition. We want however to know this unknown knower, we cannot let this go unknown, ungrasped, without actually seeing what it is, that is, Ignorance is to be enlightened. This involves a great contradiction, at least epistemologically. But until we transcend this condition, there is no peace of mind, life grows unbearable. In his search for the "builder" (*gahakāraka*), the Buddha was always accosted by Ignorance, unknown knower behind knowing. He could not for a long time lay his hands on this one in a black mask until he transcended the dualism of knower and known. This transcending was not an act of cognition, it was self-realization, it was spiritual realization, and outside the ken of logical reasoning, and therefore not accompanied by Ignorance. The knowledge the knower has of himself, in himself, that is, as he is to himself, is unattainable by any proceeding of the intellect which is

not permitted to transcend its own conditions. Ignorance is brought to subjection only by going beyond its own principle. This is an act of the will. Ignorance in itself is no evil, nor is it the source of evil, but when we are ignorant of Ignorance, of what it means in our life, then there takes place an unending concatenation of evils. *Taṇhā* (craving) regarded as the root of evil can be overcome only when Ignorance is understood in its deeper and proper signification.

II

Therefore, it betrays an utter ignorance on the part of Buddhist scholars when they relegate Ignorance to the past in trying to explain the rationale of the Twelffold Chain of Causation from the temporal point of view. According to them, the first two factors (*angāni*) of the Paṭicca-samuppāda belong to the past while the following eight belong to the present and the last two to the future. Ignorance from which starts the series of the Nidānas has no time limits, for it is not of time, but of the will as is enlightenment. When time-conception enters, enlightenment, which is negatively the dispelling of Ignorance, loses all its character of finality, and we begin to look around for something going beyond it. The Fetters would ever be tightening around us, and the Defilements would be our eternal condition. No gods would sing of the Awakened One as “a lotus unsoiled by the dust of passion, sprung from the lake of knowledge; a sun that destroys the darkness of delusion; a moon that takes away the scorching heat of the inherent sins of existence.”¹⁴ If Enlightenment made the whole universe tremble in six different ways as is recorded in the Sūtras, Ignorance over which it finally prevailed must have as much power, though diametrically opposed to it in value and virtue, as Enlightenment. To take Ignorance for an intellectual term and then to interpret it in terms of time-relation altogether destroys its fundamental character as the first in the series of the Twelve Nidānas. The extraordinary power wielded by the Buddha over his contemporaries as well as posterity was not entirely due to his wonderful analytical acumen, though we have to admit this in him; it was essentially due to his spiritual greatness and profound personality, which came from him as will power penetrating down into the very basis of creation. The vanquishing of Ignorance was an exhibition of this power, which therefore was invincible and against which Māra with all his hosts was utterly powerless either to overwhelm or to entice. The failure to see into the true meaning of Ignorance in the system of the Paṭicca-samuppāda or in the Ariya-sacca will end unavoidably in misconstruing the essential nature of Enlightenment and consequently of Buddhism.

In the beginning, which is really no beginning and which has no spiritual meaning except in our finite life, the will wants to know itself, and consciousness is awakened, and with the awakening of consciousness the will is split into two. The one will, whole and complete in itself, is now at once actor and observer.

Conflict is inevitable; for the actor now wants to be free from the limitations under which he has been obliged to put himself in his desire for consciousness. He has in one sense been enabled to see, but at the same time there is something that he as observer cannot see. In the trail of knowledge, Ignorance follows with the inevitability of fate, the one accompanies the other as shadow accompanies object, no separation can be effected between the two companions. But the will as actor is bent on going back to his own original abode where there was yet no dualism, and therefore peace prevailed. This longing for the home, however, cannot be satisfied without a long hard trying experience. For once divided into two the thing cannot be restored to its former unity until some struggle is gone through with. And the restoration is more than a mere going back, the original content is enriched by the division, struggle, and resettlement.

When first the division takes place in the will, consciousness is so enamored of its novelty and its apparent efficiency in solving the practical problems of life that it forgets its own mission, which is to enlighten the will. Instead of turning its illuminating rays within itself, that is, toward the will from which it has its principle of existence, consciousness is kept busy with the objective world of realities and ideas, and when it tries to look into itself, there is a world of absolute unity where the object of which it wishes to know is the subject itself. The sword cannot cut itself. The darkness of Ignorance cannot be dispelled because it is its own self. At this point the will has to make a heroic effort to enlighten itself, to redeem itself, without destroying the once-awakened consciousness. This was accomplished as we see in the case of the Buddha, and he became more than mere Gautama, he was the Awakened One and the Exalted and Supremely Enlightened. Willing is thinking and seeing. By thus seeing itself, the will is made really free and its own master; for it recognizes itself through its own act. To know itself thus in the most fundamental sense of the term—here is the Buddhist redemption.

Ignorance prevails as long as the will remains cheated by its own offspring or its own image, consciousness in which the knower always stands distinguished from the known. The cheating however, cannot last, the will wishes to be enlightened, to be free, to be by itself. Ignorance always presupposes the existence of something outside and unknown. This unknown outsider is generally termed ego or soul, which is in reality the will itself in the state of Ignorance. Therefore, when the Buddha experienced Enlightenment, he at once realized that there was no Atman, no soul-entity as an unknown and unknowable quantity. Enlightenment dispelled Ignorance and with it all the bogies conjured up from the dark cave of ego disappeared. Ignorance in its general use is opposed to knowledge, but from the Buddhist point of view in which it stands contrasted to Enlightenment, it means the ego (*ātman*), which is so emphatically denied by the Buddha. This is not to be wondered at, seeing that the Buddha's teaching centered in the doctrine of Enlightenment, the dispelling of Ignorance.

Those who only see the doctrine of non-ātman in Buddhism and fail to inquire into the meaning of Enlightenment, are incapable of appreciating the full significance of the Buddha's message to the world. If he simply denied the existence of an ego-entity from the psychological point of view after reducing it into its component factors, scientifically he may be called great as his analytical faculties stood far above those of his contemporaries in this respect, but his influence as a spiritual leader would not have reached so far and endured so long. His theory of non-ātman was not only established by a modern scientific method, but essentially was the outcome of his inner experience. When Ignorance is understood in the deeper sense, its dispelling unavoidably results in the negation of an ego-entity as the basis of all our life activities. Enlightenment is a positive conception, and for ordinary minds it is quite hard to comprehend it in its true bearings. But when we know what it means in the general system of Buddhism, and concentrate our efforts in the realization of it, all the rest will take care of themselves, such as the notion of ego, attachment to it, Ignorance, Fetters, Defilements, etc. Moral Conduct, Contemplation, and Higher Understanding—all these are meant to bring about the desired end of Buddhism, that is, enlightenment. The Buddha's constant reiteration of the theory of causation, telling his disciples how when this is cause that is effect and how when cause disappears, effect also disappears, is not primarily to get them acquainted with a kind of formal logic, but to let them see how enlightenment is causally related to all human happiness and spiritual freedom and tranquility.

As long as Ignorance is understood as logical inability to know, its disappearance can never bring out the spiritual freedom to which even the earliest known literature of Buddhism makes so frequent and so emphatic allusions. See how the Arhat's declaration of spiritual independence reads in the Agamas: "There arose in me insight, the emancipation of my heart became unshakeable, this is my last birth, there is now no rebirth for me."¹⁵ This is quite a strong statement showing how intensely and convincingly one has seized the central facts of life. The passage is indeed one of the characterizations of Arhatship, and when a fuller delineation of it is made, we have something like the following: "To him, thus knowing, thus seeing,¹⁶ the heart is set free from the deadly taint of lust, is set free from the deadly taint of Ignorance. In him, thus set free, there arises the knowledge of his emancipation, and he knows that rebirth has been destroyed, that the Higher Life has been fulfilled, that what had to be done has been accomplished, and after this present life there will be no beyond."¹⁷

In essence the Arhat is the Buddha and even the Tathagata, and in the beginning of the history of Buddhism the distinction between these terms did not seem quite sharply marked. Thus to a great extent they may be qualified in the same terms. When the Buddha was talking with his disciples concerning various speculations prevalent in his days, he made the following remarks about the knowledge of things in command by the Tathagata:

That does he know, and he knows also other things far beyond, far better than those speculations; and having that knowledge he is not puffed up; and thus untarnished he has, in his own heart, realized the way of escape from them, has understood as really they are, the rising up and passing away of sensations, their sweet taste, their danger, how they cannot be relied on, and not grasping after any of those things men are eager for, he the Tathagata is quite set free. These are those other things, profound, difficult to realize, and hard to understand, tranquilizing, sweet, not to be grasped by logic, subtle, comprehensible only by the wise, which the Tathagata, having himself realized and seen face to face, hath set forth; and it is concerning these that they who would rightly praise the Tathagata in accordance with the truth, should speak.¹⁸

These virtues for which the Tathagata was to be praised were manifestly not derived from speculation and analytical reasoning. His intellectual sight was just as keen and far-reaching as any of his contemporaries, but he was endowed with a higher faculty, will power, which was exercised to its fullest capacity in order to bring about all these virtues which belonged to the entire being of Tathagatahood. And naturally there was no need for him to face these metaphysical problems that agitated the philosophers of his days; they were solved in him, when he attained his spiritual freedom and serenity, in their entirety, in their synthetic aspect, and not partially or fragmentarily—which should be the case if they were presented to the Buddha's cognition as philosophical problems. In this light is to be read the *Mahāli Sutta*. Some scholars wonder why two entirely disconnected ideas are treated together in one body of the Sutra, which, however, shows scholarly ignorance in regard to matters spiritual, as they fail to notice the true import of enlightenment in the system of Buddhist faith. To understand this, we need imaginative intuition directly penetrating the center of life, and not always do mere literary and philological talents succeed in unraveling its secrets.

The *Mahāli Sutta* is a Pali Sutra in the Dīgha-Nikāya, in which Mahāli asks the Buddha as to the object of the religious life practiced by his disciples, and the following is the gist of his answer: The Buddhists do not practice self-concentration in order to acquire any miraculous power such as hearing heavenly sounds or seeing heavenly sights.¹⁹ There are things higher and sweeter than that, one of which is the complete destruction of the Three Bonds (delusion of self, doubts, and trust in the efficacy of good works and ceremonies) and the attainment of such a state of mind as to lead to the insight of the higher things in one's spiritual life. When this insight is gained, the heart grows serene, is released from the taint of Ignorance, and there arises the knowledge of emancipation. Such questions as are asked by you, O Mahāli, regarding the identity of body and soul, are idle ones; for when you attain to the supreme insight and see things as they really are in themselves, that is, emancipated from the Bonds, Taints, and Deadly Flows, those questions that are bothering you at the moment will completely lose their value and no more be asked in the way you do. Hence no need of my answering your questions.

This dialogue between the Buddha and Mahāli well illustrates the relation between enlightenment and the problem of the soul. There is no need of wondering why the Buddha did not definitely solve the ever-recurring question instead of ignoring it in the manner as he did and talking about something apparently in no connection with the point at issue. This is one of instances by which we must try to see into the meaning of Ignorance.

III

One of the reasons, however, why the Buddha left some metaphysical questions unanswered or indeterminate (*avayākata*) was due to the fact that Buddhism is a practical system of spiritual discipline and not a metaphysical discourse. The Buddha naturally had his theory of cognition, but this was secondary inasmuch as the chief aim of Buddhist life was to attain enlightenment from which spiritual freedom ensues. Enlightenment vanquishes Ignorance lying at the root of birth-and-death and laying fetters of every description, intellectual as well as affective. And this vanquishing of Ignorance cannot be achieved except by the exercise of one's will power; all the other attempts, especially merely intellectual, are utterly futile. Hence the Buddha's conclusion:

These questions²⁰ are not calculated to profit, they are concerned with the Dharma, they do not redound to the elements of right conduct, nor to detachment, nor to purification from lusts, nor to quietude, nor to tranquilization of heart, nor to real knowledge, nor to the insight of the higher stages of the Path, nor to Nirvana. Therefore is it that I express no opinion upon them.²¹

What the Buddha, on the other hand, expounded was: "What pain is, what the origin of pain is, what the cessation of pain is, and the method by which one may reach the cessation of pain." For these are all practical matters to be not only fully understood and realized but actively mastered by anyone who really desires to accomplish the great deed of emancipation.

That the Buddha was very much against mere knowledge and most emphatically insisted on actually seeing and personally experiencing the Dharma, face to face, is in evidence everywhere in the Agamas as well as the Mahayana texts. This has been indeed the strongest point in the teaching of Buddhism. When a Brahman philosopher was referring to his knowledge of the Three Vedas and a union with that which he has not seen, the Buddha ridiculed him in one of his strong phrases:

So you say that the Brahmins are not able to point the way to union with that which they have seen, and you further say that neither any one of them, nor of their pupils, nor of their predecessors even to the seventh generation has ever seen Brahma. And you further say that even the Rishis of old, whose words they hold in such deep

respect, did not pretend to know, or to have seen where, or whence, or whither Brahma is. Yet these Brahmins versed in the Three Vedas say, forsooth, that they can point out the way to union with that which they know not, neither have seen. . . . They are like a string of blind men clinging one to the other, neither can the foremost see, nor can the middle one see, nor can the hindmost see. The talk of those Brahmins versed in the Three Vedas is but blind talk: the first sees not, the middle one sees not, nor can the last see.

Enlightenment, or the dispelling of Ignorance, which is the ideal of the Buddhist life, we can see now most clearly is not an act of the intellect but the transforming or remodeling of one's whole being through the exercise of the most fundamental faculty innate in every one of us. Mere understanding has something foreign in it and does not seem to come so intimately into life. If enlightenment had really such a tremendous effect on our spiritual outlook as we read in the Sutras, it could not be the outcome of just getting acquainted with the doctrine of Causation. Enlightenment is the work of Paññā which is born of the will when it wants to see itself and to be in itself. Hence the Buddha's emphasis on the importance of personal experience; hence his insistence on meditation in solitude as the means of leading to the experience. Meditation, through which the will endeavors to transcend the condition it has put on itself in the awakening of consciousness, is therefore by no means the simple act of cogitating on the theory of Origination or Causation, which forever moves in a circle starting from Ignorance and ending in Ignorance. This is the one thing that is most needed in Buddhism. All the other metaphysical problems involve us in a tangled skein, in a matted mass of thread.

Ignorance is thus not to be got rid of by metaphysical means but by the struggle of the will. When this is done, we are also freed from the notion of an ego-entity, which is the product or rather the basis of Ignorance, on which it depends and thrives. The ego is the dark spot where the rays of the intellect fail to penetrate, it is the last hiding lair of Ignorance, where the latter serenely keeps itself from the light. When this lair is laid bare and turned inside out, Ignorance vanishes like frost in the sun. In fact, these two are one and the same thing, Ignorance and the idea of ego. We are apt to think that when Ignorance is driven out and the ego loses its hold on us we have nothing to lean against and are left to the fate of a dead leaf blown away hither and thither as the wind listeth. But this is not so; for enlightenment is not a negative idea meaning simply the absence of Ignorance. Indeed, Ignorance is the negation of enlightenment and not the reverse. Enlightenment is affirmation in the truest sense of the word, and therefore it was stated by the Buddha that he who sees the Dharma sees the Buddha and he who sees the Buddha sees the Dharma, and again that he who wants to see the Buddha ought not to seek him in form, nor in voice, etc. When Ignorance ruled supreme, the ego was conceived to be a positive idea, and its denial was nihilistic. It was quite natural for Ignorance to uphold the ego where it found its original home. But with the realiza-

tion of Enlightenment, the whole affair changes its aspect, and the order instituted by Ignorance is reversed from top to bottom. What was negative is now positive, and what was positive now negative. Buddhist scholars ought not to forget this revaluation of ideas that comes along with enlightenment. Since Buddhism asserts enlightenment to be the ultimate fact of Buddhist life, there is in it nothing negativistic, nothing pessimistic.

IV

Ignorance is departure from home and enlightenment is returning. While wandering we lead a life full of pain and suffering, and the world wherein we find ourselves is not a very desirable habitat. This is, however, put a stop to by enlightenment as thus we are enabled once more to get settled at home where reign freedom and peace. The will negates itself in its attempt to get an insight into its own life and dualism follows. Consciousness cannot transcend its own principle. The will struggles and grows despondent over its work. Why? This is a mystery deeply inherent in the will. Why did the Heavenly Father have to send his only child to redeem the creation which was his own handwork and yet went further astray from its home? Why had Christ to be so dejected over the destiny of the erring children of God? This is an eternal mystery, and no relative understanding is made to grapple with these questions. But the very fact that such questions are raised and constantly threaten one's spiritual peace shows that they are not idle metaphysical problems to be solved by professional philosophers, but that they are addressed directly to one's inmost soul who must struggle and make effort to subdue them by a higher and deeper power native to itself—far higher and deeper than [the] mere dialectic of cognition.

The story of the prodigal son²² is such a favorite theme both for Buddhists and Christians, and in this do we not discover something eternally true, though tragic and unfathomable, which lies so deep in every human heart? Whatever this may be, the will finally succeeds in recognizing itself, in getting back in its own original abode. The sense of peace one finds in enlightenment is indeed that of a wanderer getting safely home. The wandering seems to have altogether been unnecessary from the logical point of view. What is the use of losing oneself if one has to find oneself again? What boosts it after all—this going over from one to ten and from ten to one? Mathematically, all this is nonsensical. But the spiritual mystery is that returning is not merely counting backward so many figures that were counted before in a reverse way. There is an immense difference here between physics and psychology. After returning one is no longer the same person as before. The will, back from his excursion through time-consciousness is God himself.

In the *Vajrasamādhi Sūtra*, the Bodhisattva Apratiṣṭhita (無住菩薩) asks the Buddha why the father was so unkind as not to recall his wandering son before

fifty years expired, to which the Buddha answers, “Fifty years is not to be understood as indicating time-relations here; it means the awakening of a thought.” As I would interpret, this means the awakening of consciousness—a split in the will, which now, besides being actor, is knower. The knower, however, gradually grows to be the spectator and critic, and even aspires to be the director and ruler. With this arises the tragedy of life, which the Buddha makes the basis of the Fourfold Noble Truth. That pain (*duḥkha*) is life itself as it is lived by most of us, is the plain undisguised statement of facts. This all comes from Ignorance, from our consciousness not being fully enlightened as to its nature, mission, and function in relation to the will. Consciousness must first be reduced to the will when it begins to work out its “original vows” (*pūrvapraṇidhāna*) in obedience to its true master. “The awakening of a thought” marks the beginning of Ignorance and its condition. When this is vanquished, “a thought” is reduced to the will, which is enlightenment. Enlightenment is therefore returning.

In this respect Christianity is more symbolic than Buddhism. The story of Creation, the Fall from the Garden of Eden, God’s sending Christ to compensate for the ancestral sins, his Crucifixion, and Resurrection—they are all symbolic. To be more explicit, Creation is the awakening of consciousness, or the “awakening of a thought”; the Fall is consciousness going astray from the original path; God’s idea of sending his own son among us is the desire of the will to see itself through its own offspring, consciousness; Crucifixion is transcending the dualism of acting and knowing, which comes from the awakening of the intellect; and finally Resurrection means the will’s triumph over the intellect, in other words, the will seeing itself in and through consciousness. After Resurrection the will is no more blind striving, nor is the intellect mere observing the dancer dance. In real Buddhist life these two are not separated, seeing and acting, they are synthesized in one whole spiritual life, and this synthesis is called by Buddhists “Enlightenment,” the dispelling of Ignorance, the loosening of the Fetters, the wiping-off of the Defilements, etc. Buddhism is thus free from the historical symbolism of Christianity; transcending the category of time, Buddhism attempts to achieve salvation in one act of the will; for returning effaces all the traces of time.

The Buddha himself gave utterance to the feeling of return when his eye first opened to the Dharma unheard of before at the realization of Enlightenment. He said: “I am like a wanderer who, after going astray in a desolate wilderness, finally discovers an old highway, an old track beaten by his predecessors, and who finds, as he goes along the road, the villages, palaces, gardens, woods, lotus-ponds, walls, and many other things where his predecessors used to have their dwellings.”²³ Superficially, this feeling of returning to an old familiar abode seems to contradict the statement made concerning “an insight to things never before presented to one’s mind,” but the contradiction is logical and not spiritual. As long as the Buddha was going over the Chain of Origination from the epistemological point of

view, that is, as long as he attempted to get back to his native will through the channel of empirical consciousness, he could not accomplish his end. It was only when he broke through the wall of Ignorance by the sheer force of his will that he could tread the ancient path. The path was altogether unrecognizable by his intelligent eye, which was one of the best of the kind; even the Buddha could not ignore the law governing its usage; the Chain was not to be cut asunder by merely reckoning its links of cause and effect backward and forward. Knowledge, that is, Ignorance drove Adam from the Garden of Eden to the world of pain and patience (*sahāloka*), but it was not knowledge that would reconcile him to his Father, it was the Will dispelling Ignorance and ushering Enlightenment.

The sense of return or that of recognizing old acquaintances one experiences at the time of enlightenment is a familiar fact to the students of Zen Buddhism. To cite one instance, Zhiyi (智顗, 530–597) generally known by his honorary title Zhizhe Dashi (智者大師), is the founder of the Tiantai school of Buddhist philosophy in China. He was also trained in meditation by his teacher Huisi (慧思, 513–577), and though not belonging to the orthodox lineage of the Zen masters, he is reckoned as one. When he came to the master, he was set to exercise himself in a Samadhi known as “Fahua Sanmei” (法華三昧, *saddharma-puṇḍarīka-samādhi*). While exercising himself in it, he came across a certain passage in the Sutra, and his mind was opened, and at once realized the statement referred to by his master. It was this, that he with the master personally attended the Buddha’s congregation at the Vulture Peak where the Buddha discoursed on the Sutra. Then said the master, “If not for you no one could see the truth; and if not for me no one could testify it.” It is often remarked by Zen masters that the holy congregation at the Vulture Peak is still in session. This however ought not to be confounded with the remembering of the past, which is one of the miraculous gifts of the Buddhist saints. It has nothing to do with such memory, for in enlightenment there are more things than are implied in mere time relations. The sense of return to something thoroughly familiar, really means the Will getting settled once more in its old abode, after many a venturesome wandering, with an immense treasure of experience, and full of wisdom that will light up its unending career.

V

It may not be altogether out of place here to make a few remarks concerning the popular view that identifies the philosophy of Schopenhauer with Buddhism. According to this view, the Buddha is supposed to have taught the negation of the will to live, which was insisted on by the German pessimist, but nothing is further from the correct understand of Buddhism than this negativism. The Buddha does not consider the will blind, irrational, and therefore to be denied; what he really denies is the notion of ego-entirety due to Ignorance, from which notion comes

craving, attachment to things impermanent, and giving away to the egotistic impulses. The object the Buddha always has in view and never forgets to set forth whenever he thinks opportune, is the enlightenment of the will and not its negation. His teaching is based on affirmative propositions. The reason why he does not countenance life as it is lived by most of us is because it is the product of Ignorance and egoism, which never fail to throw us into the abyss of pain and misery. The Buddha pointed the way to escape this by enlightenment and not by annihilation.

The will as it is in itself is pure act, and no taint of egotism is there; this is awakened only when the intellect through its own error grows blind as to the true working of the will and falsely recognizes here the principle of individuation. The Buddha thus wants an illumined will and not the negation of it. When the will is illumined, and thereby when the intellect is properly directed to follow its original course, we are liberated from the fetters which are put on us by a wrong understanding and purified of the defilements that ooze from the will not being correctly interpreted. Enlightenment and emancipation are the two central ideas of Buddhism.

The argument Āśvaghoṣa puts into the mouth of the Buddha against Ārāda (or Ālāra Kālāma), the Sāṃkhya philosopher, is illuminating in this respect. When Ārāda told the Buddha to liberate the soul from the body as when the bird flies from the cage or the reed's stalk is loosened from its sheath, which will result in the abandonment of egoism, the Buddha reasons in the following way:

As long as the soul continues there is no abandonment of egoism. The soul does not become free from qualities as long as it is not released from number and the rest; therefore, as long as there is no freedom from qualities, there is no liberation declared for it. There is no real separation of the qualities and their subject; for fire cannot be conceived apart from its form and heat. Before the body there will be no subject; how if it was originally free, could the soul ever become bound? The body-knower (the soul) which is unembodied, must be either knowing or unknowing; it is knowing, there must be some object to be known, and if there is this object, it is not liberated. Or if the soul be declared to be unknowing, then what use to you is this imagined soul? Even without such a soul, the existence of the absence of knowledge is notorious as, for instance, in a log of wood or a wall. And since each successive abandonment is held to be still accompanied by qualities, I maintain that the absolute attainment of our end can only be found in the abandonment of everything.²⁴

As long as the dualistic conception is maintained in regard to the liberation of the soul, there will be no real freedom as is truly declared by the Buddha. "The abandonment of everything" means the transcending of dualism of soul and body, of subject and object, of that which knows and that which is known, of "it is" and "it is not," of soul and soul-lessness; and this transcending is not attained by merely negating the soul or the will, but by throwing light on its nature, by releasing it as it is in itself. This is the act of the will. An intellectual contemplation that is advocated by the Sāṃkhya philosophers does not lead one to spiritual freedom, but to

the realm of passivity, which is their “realm of nothingness.” Buddhism teaches freedom and not annihilation, it advocates spiritual discipline and not mental torpor or emptiness. There must be a certain turning away in one’s ordinary course of life, there must be a certain opening up of a new vista in one’s spiritual outlook if one wants to be the true follower of the Buddha. His aversion to asceticism and nihilism as well as to hedonism becomes intelligible when seen in this light.

The Majjhima-Nikāya’s account of the Buddha’s interview with the Sāṃkhya thinkers somewhat differs from the Mahayana poet’s, but in a way gives a better support to my argument as regards the Buddha’s Enlightenment. The reason why he was not satisfied with the teaching and discipline of Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka is stated to be this: “This doctrine does not lead to turning away, to dispassion, to cessation, to quietude, to perfect penetration, to supreme awakening, to Nirvana, but only to attainment to the Realm of Nothingness.” What did then the Buddha understand by Nirvana, which literally means annihilation or cessation, but which is grouped here with such terms as awakening, turning away (that is, revaluation), and penetration, and contrasted to nothingness? There is no doubt, as far as we can judge from these qualifications, that Nirvana is a positive conception pointing to a certain determinable experience. When he came up to the bank of the Nairāṇjāna and took his seat of soft grass on a shady, peaceful spot, he made up his mind not to leave the place until he realized in himself what he had been after ever since his wandering away from home. According to the *Lalitavistara*,²⁵ he at that moment made this vow (*praṇidhāna*):

Let my body be dried up on this seat,
Let my skin and bones and flesh be destroyed:
So long as Bodhi is not attained, so hard to attain for many a kalpa,
My body and thought will not be removed from this seat.

Thus resolved, the Buddha finally came to realize Supreme Enlightenment for which he had labored for ever so many lives. How does this vary from his former attainments under Uddaka and Ālāra Kālāma? Let him express himself:

Then, disciples, myself subject to birth, but perceiving the wretchedness of things subject to birth and seeking after the incomparable security of Nirvana, which is birthless, to that incomparable security I attained, even to Nirvana, which is birthless.

Myself subject to growth and decay, but perceiving the wretchedness of things subject to growth and decay and seeking after the incomparable security of Nirvana, which is free from growth and decay, to that incomparable security I attained, even to Nirvana which is free from growth and decay.

Myself subject to disease, but perceiving the wretchedness of things subject to disease and seeking after the incomparable security of Nirvana, which is free from disease, to that incomparable security I attained, even to Nirvana, which is free from disease.

Myself subject to death, but perceiving the wretchedness of things subject to death and seeking after the incomparable security of Nirvana, which is deathless, to that incomparable security I attained, even to Nirvana, which is deathless.

Myself subject to sorrow, but perceiving the wretchedness of things subject to sorrow and seeking after the incomparable security of Nirvana, which is sorrowless, to that incomparable security I attained, even to Nirvana, which is sorrowless.

Myself subject to stain, but perceiving the wretchedness of things subject to stain and seeking after the incomparable security of Nirvana, which is stainless, to that incomparable security I attained, even to Nirvana, which is stainless.

Then I saw and knew: "Assured am I of deliverance; this is my final birth; never more shall I return to this Life!"²⁶

When Nirvana is qualified as birthless, deathless, stainless, sorrowless, and free from growth and decay and disease, it looks negativistic enough. But if there was nothing affirmed even in these negations, the Buddha could not rest in "the incomparable security" (*anuttaraṃ yogakkhemaṃ*) of Nirvana and been assured of final emancipation. What thus the Buddha denied, we can see, was Ignorance as to the true cause of birth and death, and this Ignorance was dispelled by the supreme effort of the will and not by mere dialectic reasoning and contemplation. The will was asserted and the intellect was awakened to its true significance. All the desires, feelings, thoughts, and strivings thus illuminated cease to be egotistic and are no more the cause of defilements and fetters and many other hindrances, of which so many are referred to in all Buddhist literature, Mahayana and Hinayana. In this sense the Buddha is Conqueror, not an empty conqueror over nothingness, but the conqueror of confusion, darkness, and Ignorance.²⁷

Zen and the Assertion that Mahāyāna Was Not Preached by the Buddha

1926

Translation by Mark L. Blum

This is the first translation of Suzuki's only known published response to the controversy swirling among professional Buddhists and scholars who questioned the provenance of the Mahāyāna sutras for about a decade before he left Japan for his tenure with Paul Carus. At this time—between 1895 and 1920—the Theravāda canon was largely accepted rather uncritically as preserving the actual sermons of Śākyamuni, but serious debate had ensued among Japanese scholars about the “authenticity” of the entire Mahāyāna canon. It is noteworthy that Suzuki questions the acceptance of both what he termed “Hīnayāna” and Mahāyāna canons, a perspective that mirrors scholarly opinion today. On the other hand, given Suzuki's stress at this time on the degree to which the personality of Śākyamuni Buddha deeply imprinted how Buddhism developed in India and beyond (see chapter 9), the specter of scriptural creation as a product of the Sangha rather than the actual words of the founder raises disturbing questions.

Although debate in Japan about the provenance of the Mahāyāna sutras heats up only after Buddhist scholars—nearly all of them ordained clergy—begin to study the canon in Indic languages, the subject was actually broached 150 years earlier by the critical scholar Tominaga Nakamoto (1715–1746) who, working only with Chinese-language materials, came to a similar conclusion. Tominaga argued that normative Buddhist historical thinking was not to be trusted as an accurate representation of how the religion developed in India, including how the scriptures were formulated. In the process, Tominaga averred that the canon could not be accepted as the actual words of the Buddha (*buddhavacana*), especially the Mahāyāna material. Although initially rejected by Buddhist scholars, after the importation of the Indic-based Buddhist Studies discipline from Europe, a version of the Tominaga rejection was advocated again by Anesaki Masaharu and Murakami Senshō in publications that came out around 1900, setting off much more widespread debate.

Anesaki and Murakami were scholars at the University of Tokyo where Suzuki himself had studied, but this article is not published until 1926. Why Suzuki waited so long to

address this issue is unclear, but relevant to the timing of this piece were two other major controversies in the mid-1920s: the publication of Nonomura Naotarō's *Jōdokyō no hihan* (Critique of the Pure Land Teaching) in 1923, which led to Nonomura's subsequent dismissal from Ryūkoku University in 1924, and the publication of Kaneko Daiei's *Jōdo no kannen* (The Concept of the Pure Land) in 1925, which similarly cost Kaneko his position at Ōtani University in 1928. Suzuki's stance here reflects his attempt to offer a solution to what he was clearly seeing as an inevitable conflict between historical scholarship and living, functioning religion.

That he adds the word "Zen" to the title of the essay, *Daijō hibussetsu to Zen*, may simply reflect his consciousness of the intended readership where the article appeared—a journal devoted to Zen studies. The "person of Zen" as he uses it here, is an ideal practitioner focused on the pragmatic, but there is an undeniable convenience in asserting a certain kind of religious ideal when he states that "Zen is indifferent to history and scholarship." Apart from this somewhat facile conclusion, Suzuki does lay out many of the core arguments about the enigmatic provenance of the Mahāyāna teachings, expressing the tension felt by many professional religious scholars in Japan at that time.

Another salient fact about this essay is that he never presented this material or even alluded to this topic in his English-language writings. We thus have an informative clue in this piece about the fundamental difference in how Suzuki viewed the audiences for his writings in Japanese and in English.

This essay was first published in 1926 under the title "Daijō hibussetsu to Zen" 大乘非仏説と禪 (Zen and the Assertion that Mahāyāna Was Not Preached by the Buddha) in Japanese in a journal called *Daijō Zen* ("Mahāyāna Zen") and then reprinted in 1927 in a collection of his writings under the title *Zuihitsu Zen* 随筆 禪 ("Zen Essays") and again in 1941 in *Zen no mikata to okonaikata*; see SDZ 19: 511–516. This is its first appearance in English.

. . .

PART ONE

The controversy over whether or not the Mahāyāna was preached by the Buddha was quite vigorous at one point. These days this has quieted down even though the issue has not been resolved one way or the other. In the end, however, it does appear that the debate has shifted even more in favor of those who assert that Mahāyāna was not expounded by the Buddha. That is, what is being asserted is that the Buddhist teachings/Buddhism (佛教) that we call Mahāyāna was not preached by the Buddha in the same way we have it now, but slowly developed a number of centuries after the Buddha had died. However, it is not the case that therefore we should immediately conclude that the Buddhist teachings (佛教) known as Hinayāna must be what was taught by the Buddha. It is commonly thought that in the theory that Mahāyāna was not taught by the Buddha is an affirmation of the idea that the Hinayāna was taught by the Buddha and thus the Mahāyāna people, although we do not really know, out of sheer will power could

not help but verify that the Buddhism (Buddhist teachings) they had created themselves was genuine. But logic does not necessarily confirm Hīnayāna as what was taught by the Buddha; I will deal with this particular issue separately. If one takes what is written in the Pāli texts to be the teachings of Hīnayāna Buddhism, then it is quite clear that Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna were equally not being preached by the Buddha. People speak as if the Pāli scriptures are the “original Buddhism” because they contain the sermons of the Buddha just as he preached them, but the reality is that we cannot know what original Buddhism truly was until significantly more research is done. It cannot be said that the Buddhist teachings are only what is in the Pāli canon, nor can we say that it cannot be found without looking into the Mahāyāna teachings. From the standpoint of the words, from the standpoint of history, detailed investigation into this will continue for decades, and we have no choice but to wait for the painstaking research of scholars. In other words, what was the “original” form? What was the dharma that the Buddha actually preached? These things simply cannot be determined.

PART TWO

Looking at this issue from the standpoint of Zen, one should not forget the following considerations. First is the definition of Buddhism itself. Second is the experience of how one lives as a Buddhist. If one cannot arrive at a correct opinion on these two questions, it will not be possible to address the core points raised by the theory that Mahāyāna was not expounded by the Buddha. The arguments raised by the linguists and Buddhist historians always remain on a superficial level when it comes to these things. To speak frankly, in dealing with this we always see two different attitudes. One attempts to make sense of this from the outside. But the other considers how to understand how the problem itself functions. These two attitudes lead to two completely different approaches such that their arguments go in completely different directions. It goes without saying that the standpoint of a person of Zen is to return to the issue itself.

So let us look at the definition of Buddhism itself. Normally when people speak of what Buddhism is, they think there is no need for debate or discretion. But to my way of looking at it, the question cannot be taken care of so easily. First of all, when we say “Buddhism” are we talking about the teachings of the Buddha himself, or does this include what was said by his disciples? And in what was said by his disciples is found the dissemination of what the Buddha said, and in that dissemination there will naturally be a significant amount of participants with their own subjectivity. And those disciples, whether they be direct or indirect disciples, will naturally have their own ideas in response to both what they hear from their teachers and in regard to those teachers themselves. This pertains even more so when you have someone like the Buddha himself, who had such an unusual

personality, because even more than what he said, the emotional feelings of adoration and reverence he inspired will have a powerful influence on the understanding of the disciples. In explaining just what Buddhism is, our deliberations must include this affective aspect arising out of the adoration of the Buddha himself in addition to the Dharma that the Buddha taught directly.

Yet there is more. In addition to consideration of how the Buddha's personality as a whole was viewed, we also need to consider the events of his life. His experience of religious awakening under the bodhi tree was the causal event that led to him saying whatever came into his head thereafter. What was this experience that became the fountain of life for the Buddha? It was no different from the disruption that arose in the spiritual life of his disciples. Their understanding of the Buddha's teaching is expressed in various forms in their writing, depending on the degree and depth of their own disruption. If that is indeed how things went, then the teachings of the Buddha are not simply a direct record of his sermons but inevitably also reflect the Buddha's personality and experience as understood and explained by his followers. And these two issues did not exist independent of each other. Thus, (1) the Buddha's sermons themselves; (2) the Buddha's personality and personal experience; and (3) there is no limit to the complexity found in the comprehension and explanations by the Buddha's followers toward all of this. So trying to define what Buddhism was or is will never be easy.

PART THREE

While the Buddha was in the world there was no such thing as "Buddhism," there was only "the Buddha" and "the Buddha's words." "Buddhism" as such could only have come about after the Buddha's death. Whether it be Hinayāna or Mahāyāna, anything called "Buddhism" is not what the Buddha preached. Buddhism is not only "the teachings of the buddha" but also includes "teachings about the buddha." While the Buddha was alive there would have been "teachings of the buddha" but not "teachings about the buddha." In our concept of Buddhism today there is much more about the Buddha than the teachings of the Buddha. Or, one could make this statement: it is the "teachings of the buddha" as understood in the "teachings about the buddha" that is what we understand the Buddhist teachings to be. And it goes without saying that the central point of the "teaching about the buddha" is his experience of awakening. This is the aim of the Zen practitioner. The historian, the linguist, the textual critic, etc., will take no notice of this, but there is nothing wrong with that for them. But for a Zen person, it is unacceptable.

A Zen person is always looking to find out more about the question of what the Buddha's awakening was. This is the key that opens the door to the storehouse containing the Buddha's teaching. The words of the Buddha (佛説), the teaching of the Buddha (佛の教え), the teachings about the Buddha, these are all fingers

pointing at the moon. One should not be swayed by a finger. If you can clarify what it is you are fixated on, whatever problems crop up later will be easily resolved.

Even if we had a direct copy of the Buddha's sermons, though they may be of some help, they do not present us with an absolute authority. The reason for this is that even the Buddha's sermons cannot help but be influenced by the philosophy and ethos of the time they were uttered. And within the "Buddha's sermons" there are two forms: "the Buddha's words (佛言)" and "the Buddha's sermon (佛說)." The "Buddha's sermons" refers to how the Buddha explained his experience in terms of principles already operating in the world, whereas "the Buddha's words" denotes the same experience but expressed in descriptive and emphatic ways. One is logical and the other is psychological. What has most value for the person of Zen is, of course, the psychologically rich "Buddha's words." This is because verbal descriptions of one's own circumstances do not change with time. The other changes as contemporary trends develop over time; they cannot be fixed. Take for example the doctrine of the twelve *nidānas* of dependent arising. Even if this reflects something directly preached by the Buddha, it would be difficult for modern people to accept this in exactly that form. But when the circumstances were such that he asserted, "I alone am the honored one in the heavens and on earth," even today this can be affirmed [by many]. If we do not appreciate this difference, we will not be able to grasp the spirit of Buddhism.

PART FOUR

It would take a much longer essay to discuss this in detail, but one thing I can mention here is this. We blithely speak of Buddhism or the teachings of the Buddha without thinking about it too much, but when the problem of the Mahāyāna sutras not being the teachings of the Buddha comes up, it forces us to look into what our own conceptions of Buddhism are. In this we naturally include what was preached by the Buddha himself, the understanding of that preaching by his disciples as well as the entire range of what the character of a *buddha* is and the opinions and explanations of Buddhists about everything that occurred during his lifetime. But there is one more thing we much consider: the experience of living as a Buddhist.

The Buddhist lifestyle flows from the fountainhead of his awakening under the bodhi tree. But that flow does not grow only by means of the water flowing from that source—it has expanded into something that is unceasingly abiding by the experiences of those who have leaped into that flow as well.¹ That is why the flow gets larger and larger as it follows the passage of time, manifesting a force that will not end until it fills the heavens and covers the earth. If the water were limited to what came from the source of the stream, with the passage of time it would probably dry up. But if that source were alive in any way, shape, or form, the flow that ran from it would absorb smaller streams on either side of it as it followed its

course. In other words, the contents of Buddhism would grow richer by means of the experiences of its believers. Therefore within the concept of “Buddhism” there is more than simply the sermons of the Buddha; it also contains a significant amount that has been added by centuries and centuries of its followers. To see religion in a mechanical or a fossilized way does not reflect the circumstances of how things operate. This is precisely why, over and over, linguists or historians conclude their treatment of religion by burying it alive.

PART FIVE

I will stop this rather thin argument here but I believe that what I have stated above clarifies the standpoint of a “Zen person” regarding the theory that Mahāyāna is not the word of the Buddha. That is, in the eye of a person of Zen, whatever becomes of the theory that Mahāyāna is not the word of the Buddha is utterly unrelated to himself. In some quarters of religious focus, it must be said that the theory that Mahāyāna is not the word of the Buddha is heard loud and clear, but speaking from the belly where he uttered nary a word in forty-nine years of preaching, neither Hīnayāna nor Mahāyāna—indeed none of the sutras—are the word of the Buddha. But if the awakening under the bodhi tree is a fact, then the establishment of Buddhism is genuine.

The first point of consideration is the fact of the Buddha’s awakening. Then one dedicates oneself to the meaning of the Buddha’s psychological declaration about it. Each Buddhist then verifies this fact and its meaning within their own spiritual life. This critique, regardless of how sophisticated it may or may not be, simply has no place in the life of a person of Zen.

PART SIX

Tradition tells us that at an assembly on Vulture Peak the Buddha Śākyamuni twirled a flower and the monk Kāśyapa smiled, showing his understanding, but this is probably not a true story. The Buddha Prabhūtaratna sharing his seat with the Buddha Śākyamuni in the stūpa in the sky was also probably fabricated. The dialogue between Bodhidharma and the Liang Emperor (Liang Wudi) was also probably made up in someone’s head. These things do not matter. The reality that is Zen does not come from historical inquiry. Its origins spring directly from the true awakening of the Buddha, and that spring is still gushing forth. Anywhere this is clear is a place where Zen can be. What people call “original” Buddhism must be seen to reflect this same stance. The Āgamas say this, the Nikāyas say that, what something is in Sanskrit or in Pāli—inquiries like this from the viewpoint of a person of Zen are not a core issue. Clarifying “original” Buddhism by focusing on explanations of such things as the four noble truths or the twelvefold chain of

dependent origination is trivial. Instead, a person who cultivates the practice of the eightfold path and the six perfections will gradually come to understand the meaning of “original.”

On the whole, Zen is indifferent to history and scholarship. This is not wrong or unacceptable. The fact that from the beginning it has not been restricted by such things is marvelous. However, in a worldly context, logical explanations are a form of expedient means. For this reason, persons of Zen these days are listening to some degree to what worldly scholars have to say, and in regard to this I think they should clarify their own positions. This is why I wrote this segment.

Passivity in the Buddhist Life

1930

Although passivity is not a traditional topic in Buddhist Studies, in this long essay Suzuki argues in a variety of ways that it is a *sine qua non* for success in religious practice and religious life in general. In addition to extolling the value of passivity in the Pure Land tradition where it is more commonly referred to as *other-power* (*tariki* in Japanese), Suzuki also makes a forceful argument about passivity being at the core of successful *kōan* practice, when one realizes a kind of spiritual breakthrough that is itself marked by passivity. Most of the examples from Christian mysticism have been removed from the truncated sampling of the essay here (the original is more than sixty pages), but we can see his borrowing in his unusual assertion of passivity as a holy state of mind in Buddhism. Borrowing from the notion of being “possessed by God,” Suzuki instead asserts that passivity in Buddhist designates a psychological state wherein the individual is “wholly possessed by Prajñā.” On the other hand, Suzuki’s conception of passivity includes an analysis of the traditional Buddhist attainment of the realization of *anūpattikadharmakṣānti*, or “what the spirituality of the Bodhisattva is like when he realizes a life of effortless activities,” the latter outlined here in a summary of the description of an eighth-stage bodhisattva in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*. In this way, “passivity” for Suzuki includes activity that is effortless and/or not self-oriented.

This essay first appeared in *The Eastern Buddhist* 5, nos. 2–3 (1930) and was then reprinted in 1933 in a revised version in *Essays in Zen Buddhism (Second Series)*. After the war, the latter volume was reprinted many times but always without the Chinese characters that appeared in the 1930 and 1933 versions. Below is the 1933 revised version with most of the Chinese words moved to the notes.

• • •

PRELIMINARY NOTE

Thy way, not mine, O Lord,
 However dark it be;
 Lead me by Thine own hand,
 Choose out the path for me,
 Smooth let it be or rough,
 It will be still the best;
 Winding or straight, it leads
 Right onward to Thy rest.
 Choose Thou for me my friends,
 My sickness or my health;
 Choose Thou my cares for me,
 My poverty or wealth.
 Not mine, not mine the choice
 In things or great or small;
 Be Thou my guide, my strength,
 My wisdom, and my all.¹

The feeling of passivity in religious experience, so typically given expression here, is universal and natural, seeing that the religious consciousness consists in realizing, on the one hand, the helplessness of a finite being, and, on the other, the dependability of an infinite being, in whatever way this may be conceived. The finite side of our being may protest, saying, "Why hast thou forsaken me?" but while this protest possesses us there is no religious experience, we are not yet quite saved. For salvation comes only when we can say, "Father, unto thy hands I entrust my spirit," or "Lord, though thou slay me, yet will I trust thee." This is resignation or self-surrender, which is a state of passivity, ready to have "thy will" prevail upon a world of finite beings. This is the characteristic attitude of a religious mind toward life and the world, and we know that all religious experience is psychologically closely connected with the feeling of passivity. The object of the present essay is to see how this feeling rules and in what forms it expresses itself in the Buddhist life, including that of Zen.

I. THE DOCTRINE OF KARMA

Superficially, passivity does not seem to be compatible with the intellectual tendency of Buddhism, especially of Zen, which strongly emphasizes the spirit of self-reliance as is seen in such passages as "The Bodhisattva-mahāsattva retiring into a solitude all by himself, should reflect within himself, by means of his own inner intelligence, and not depend upon anybody else";² or as we read in the *Dhammapada*:

By self alone is evil done,
 By self is one disgraced;
 By self is evil undone,
 By self alone is he purified
 Purity and impurity belong to one;
 No one can purify another.³

Besides, the Four Noble Truths, the Twelfefold Chain of Origination, the Eightfold Path of Righteousness, etc., all tend toward enlightenment and emancipation, and not toward absolute dependence or receptivity. "To see with one's own eyes and be liberated" is the Buddhist motto, and there is apparently no room for passivity. For the latter can take place only when one makes oneself a receptacle for an outside power.

The attainment of passivity in Buddhism is especially obstructed by the doctrine of Karma. The doctrine of Karma runs like warp and weft through all the Indian fabrics of thought, and Buddhism as a product of the Indian imagination could not escape taking it into its own texture. The Jātaka Tales, making up the history of the Buddha while he was yet at the stage of Bodhisattvahood and training himself for final supreme enlightenment, are no more than the idea of Karma concretely applied and illustrated in the career of a morally perfected personage. Sakyamuni could not become a Buddha unless he had accumulated his stock of merit (*kuśalamūla*) throughout his varied lives in the past.

The principle of Karma is, "Whatever a man sows that will he also reap," and this governs the whole life of the Buddhist; for in fact what makes up one's individuality is nothing else than his own Karma. So we read in the *Milindapañha*: "All beings have their Karma as their portion; they are heirs of their Karma; they are sprung from their Karma; their Karma is their refuge; Karma allots beings to meanness or greatness."⁴ This is confirmed in the *Samyutta-nikāya*:

His good deeds and his wickedness
 Whate'er a mortal does while here;
 'Tis this that he can call his own,
 This with him take as he goes hence,
 This is what follows after him,
 And like a shadow ne'er departs.⁵

According to the *Visuddhimagga*, chapter XIX, Karma is divisible into several groups as regards the time and order of fruition and its quality: (1) that which bears fruit in the present existence, that which bears fruit in rebirth, that which bears fruit at no fixed time, and bygone Karma; (2) the weighty Karma, the abundant, the close-at-hand, and the habitual; (3) the productive Karma, the supportive, the counteractive, and the destructive.⁶ There is thus a round of Karma and a round of fruit going on all the time. And who is the bearer of Karma and its fruit?

No doer is there does the deed,
 Nor is there one who feels the fruit;
 Constituent parts alone roll on;
 This view alone is orthodox.

And thus the deed, and thus the fruit
 Roll on and on, each from its cause;
 As of the round of tree and seed,
 No one can tell when they began.

Not in its fruit is found the deed,
 Nor in the deed finds one the fruit;
 Of each the other is devoid,
 Yet there's no fruit without the deed.

Just as no store of fire is found
 In jewel, cow dung, or the sun,
 Nor separate from these exists,
 Yet short of fuel no fire is known;

Even so we ne'er within the deed
 Can retribution's fruit descry.
 Not yet in any place without;
 Nor can in fruit the deed be found

Deeds separate from their fruits exist,
 And fruits are separate from the deeds;
 But consequent upon the deed,
 Fruit doth into being come.

No god of heaven or Brahma-world
 Doth cause the endless round of birth;
 Constituent parts alone roll on,
 From cause and from material sprung.⁷

The working of Karma is apparently quite impersonal as is explained in these quotations, and it may seem altogether indifferent for anybody whether he did something good or bad. There is no doer of deeds, nor is there any sufferer of their fruit. The five Aggregates or constituent parts (*skandhas*) are combined and dissolved in accordance with the inevitable law of Karma, but as long as there is no personal agent at the back of all this, who really feels the value of Karma, it does not seem to matter what kind of deed is committed and what kind of fruit is brought forth. Still the Buddhists are advised not to practice wickedness:

If a man do wrong,
 Let him do it repeatedly,
 Let him not take pleasure therein;
 Painful is wrong's accumulation.⁸

Why painful? Why pleasurable? The Hinayanist reasoning is logically thoroughgoing, but when it comes to the question of practical psychology, mere reasoning does not avail. Is the feeling no more real than the mere bundling together of the five Aggregates? The combination, that is, unity seems to be more than the fact of combination. Whatever this is, as I am not going to discuss the doctrine of Karma here in detail, let it suffice to give another quotation from Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*, chapter XVII, where the doctrine of Karma appears in a new garment.⁹

All sentient beings are born according to their Karma: good people are born in the heavens, the wicked in the hells, and those who practice the paths of righteousness realize Nirvana. By disciplining himself in the six virtues of perfection a man is able to benefit his fellow beings in various ways, and this is sure in turn to bring blessings on him, not only in this but also in the next life. Karma may be of two sorts: inner or mental, which is called *cetanā*,¹⁰ and physical, expressing itself in speech and bodily movement. This is technically known as Karma "after having intended."¹¹ Karma may also be regarded as with or without "intimation."¹² An act with intimation is one the purpose of which is perceptible by others, while an act without intimation is not at all expressed in physical movements; it follows that when a strong act with intimation is performed it awakens the tendency in the mind of the actor to perform again deeds, either good or bad, of a similar nature.

It is like a seed from which a young plant shoots out and bears fruit by the principle of continuity; apart from the seed there is no continuity, and because of this continuity there is fruition. The seed comes first and then the fruit, between them there is neither discontinuity nor constancy. Since the awakening of a first motive, there follows an uninterrupted series of mental activities, and from this there is fruition. Apart from the first stirring of the mind, there will be no stream of thoughts expressing themselves in action. Thus there is a continuity of Karma and its fruit. Therefore, when the ten deeds of goodness and purity are performed, the agent is sure to enjoy happiness in this life and be born after death among celestial beings.

There is something in Karma that is never lost even after its performance; this something called *avipraṇāśa*,¹³ it is like a deed of contract, and Karma, an act, is comparable to debt. A man may use up what he has borrowed, but owing to the document he has some day to pay the debt back to the creditor. This "unlosable" is always left behind even after Karma and is not destroyed by philosophical intuition.¹⁴ If it is thus destructible, Karma will never come to fruition. The only power that counteracts this "unlosable" is moral discipline.¹⁵ Every Karma once committed continues to work out its consequence by means of the "unlosable" until its course is thwarted by the attainment of Arhatship or by death, or when it has finally borne its fruit. This law of Karma applies equally to good and bad deeds.

While Nāgārjuna's idea is to wipe out all such notions as doer, deed, and sufferer, in other words, the entire structure of Karma theory, this introduction of the

idea of “unlosable” is instructive and full of suggestions. Taken all in all, however, there is much obscurity in the doctrine of Karmaic continuity, especially when its practical working is to be precisely described; and, theoretically too, we are not quite sure of its absolute tenability. But this we can state of it in a most general way, that Karma tends to emphasize individual freedom, moral responsibility, and feeling of independence, and further, from the religious point of view, it does not necessitate the postulate of a God, or a creator, or a moral judge, who passes judgments on human behavior, good or bad.

This being the case, the Buddhist conviction that life is pain will inevitably lead to a systematic teaching of self-discipline, self-purification, and self-enlightenment, the moral center of gravity being always placed on the self, and not on any outside agent. This is the principle of Karma applied to the realization of Nirvana. But we may ask, “What is this “self”? And again, What is that something that is never “lost” in a Karma committed either mentally or physically? What is the connection between “self” and the “unlosable”? Where does this “unlosable” lodge itself? Between the Buddhist doctrine of no-ego-substance and the postulate that there should be something “not to be lost” in the continuation of Karma-force, which makes the latter safely bear fruit, there is a gap that must be bridged somehow if Buddhist philosophy is to make further development. To my mind, the conception of the *Ālayavijñāna* (“all-conserving soul”), where all the Karma-seeds are deposited, was an inevitable consequence. But in the meantime let us see what “self” really stands for.

The Conception of Self

“Self” is a very complex and elusive idea, and when we say that one is to be responsible for what one does by oneself, we do not exactly know how far this “self” goes and how much it includes in itself. For individuals are so intimately related to one another not only in one communal life but in the totality of existence—so intimately indeed that there are really no individuals, so to speak, in the absolute sense of the word. Individuality is merely an aspect of existence; in thought we separate one individual from another and in reality too we all seem to be distinct and separable. But when we reflect on the question more closely we find that individuality is a fiction, for we cannot fix its limits, we cannot ascertain its extents and boundaries, they become mutually merged without leaving any indelible marks between the so-called individuals. A most penetrating state of interrelationship prevails here, and it seems to be more exact to say that individuals do not exist, they are merely so many points of reference, the meaning of which is not at all realizable when each of them is considered by itself and in itself apart from the rest. Individuals are recognizable only when they are thought of in relation to something not individual; though paradoxical, they are individuals so long as they are not individuals. For when an individual being is singled out as such, it at once ceases to be an individual. The “individual self” is an illusion.

Thus, the self has no absolute, independent existence. Moral responsibility seems to be a kind of intellectual makeshift. Can the robber be really considered responsible for his deeds? Can this individual be really singled out as the one who has to suffer all the consequences of his antisocial habits? Can he be held really responsible for all that made him such as he is? Is his *svabhāva* all his own make? This is where lies the main crux of the question: "How far is an individual to be answerable for his action?" In other words, "How far is this 'he' separable from the community of which he is a component part?" Is not society reflected in him? Is he not one of the products created by society? There are no criminals, no sinful souls in the Pure Land, not necessarily because no such are born there but mainly because all that are born there become pure by virtue of the general atmosphere into which they are brought up. Although environment is not everything, it, especially social environment, has a great deal to do with the shaping of individual characters. If this is the case, where shall we look for the real signification of the doctrine of Karma?

The intellect wants to have a clear-cut, well-delineated figure to which a deed or its "unlosable" something has to be attached, and Karma becomes mathematically describable as having its originator, perpetrator, sufferer, etc. But when there are really no individuals and Karma is to be conceived as nowhere originated by any specifically definable agent, what would become of the doctrine of Karma as advocated by Buddhists? Evidently, there is an act, either good or bad or indifferent; there is one who actually thrusts a dagger, and there is one who actually lies dead thus stabbed; and yet shall we have to declare that there is no killer, no killing, and none killed? What will then become of moral responsibility? How can there be such a thing as accumulation of merit or attainment of enlightenment? Who is after all a Buddha, and who is an ignorant, confused mortal?

Can we say that society, nay, the whole universe is responsible for the act of killing if this fact is once established? And that all the causes and conditions leading to it and all the results that are to be connected with it are to be traced to the universe itself? Or is it that the individual is an ultimate absolute fact and what goes out from him comes back to him without any relation to his fellow beings and to his environment, social and physical? In the first case, moral responsibility evaporates into an intangible universality; in the second case, the intangible whole gets crystallized in one individual, and there is indeed moral responsibility, but one stands altogether in isolation as if each of us were like a grain of sand in no relation to its neighbors. Which of these positions is more exactly in conformity with facts of human experience? When this is applied to the Buddhist doctrine of Karma, the question comes to this: Is Buddhist Karma to be understood individualistically or cosmologically?

Mahayana Buddhism on the Theory of Karma

As far as history goes, Buddhism started with the individualistic interpretation of Karma, and when it reached its culminating point of development in the rise of

Mahayana, the doctrine came to be cosmologically understood. But not in the vague, abstract, philosophical way as was referred to before but concretely and spiritually in this wise: the net of the universe spreads out both in time and space from the center known as “myself,” where it is felt that all the sins of the world are resting on his own shoulders. To atone for them he is determined to subject himself to a system of moral and spiritual training which he considers would cleanse him of all impurities and by cleansing him cleanse also the whole world of its demerits. This is the Mahayana position. Indeed, the distinction between the Mahayana and Hinayana form of Buddhism may be said to be due to this difference in the treatment of Karma-conception. The Mahayana thus came to emphasize the “other” or “whole” aspect of Karma, and, therefore of universal salvation, while the Hinayana adhered to the “self” aspect. As Karma worked, according to the Hinayanists, apparently impersonally but in point of fact individualistically, this life of pain and suffering was to be got rid of by self-discipline, by moral asceticism, and self-knowledge; nobody outside could help the sufferer out of his afflictions; all that the Buddha could do for him was to teach him the way to escape, but if he did not walk this way by himself, he could not be made to go straight ahead even by the power and virtue of the Buddha. “Be ye a lamp and a refuge to yourselves” (*attadīpa-attasaraṇa*), was the injunction left by the Buddha to his Hinayana followers; for the Buddha could not extend his spiritual virtue and attainment over to his devotees or to his fellow beings. From the general position of the Hinayanists, this was inevitable:

Not in the sky,
Not in the midst of the sea,
Nor entering a cleft of the mountains,
Is found that realm on earth
Where one may stand and be
From an evil deed absolved.¹⁶

But the Mahayana was not satisfied with this narrowness of spiritual outlook; the Mahayana wanted to extend the function of Karuṇā (love) to the furthest end it could reach. If one’s Prajñā (wisdom) could include in itself the widest possible system of universes, why could not Karuṇā, too, take them all under its protective wings? Why could not the Buddha’s wish (*praṇidhāna*) for the spiritual welfare of all beings also efficiently work toward its realization? The Buddha attained his enlightenment after accumulating so much stock of merit for ever so many countless kalpas (eons). Should we conceive this stock of merit to be available only for his own benefit? Karma must have its cosmological meaning. In fact, individuals are such insofar as they are thought of in connection with one another and also with the whole system that they compose. One wave, good or bad once stirred, could not help affecting the entire body of water. So with the moral discipline and the spiritual

attainment of the Buddha, they could not remain with him as an isolated event in the communal life to which he belonged. Therefore, it is said that when he was enlightened the whole universe shared in his wisdom and virtue. The Mahayana stands on this fundamental idea of enlightenment, and its doctrine of the Tathāgatagarbha or Ālayavijñāna reflects the cosmological interpretation of Karma.

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF SIN IN BUDDHISM

In Buddhism sin means ignorance, that is, ignorance to the meaning of the individual or the ultimate destiny of the self. Positively, sin is the affirmation of the self as a final *svabhāva* in deed, thought, and speech. When a man is above these two hindrances, ignorance and self-assertion, he is said to be sinless. How to rise above them, therefore, is the question with the Mahayanists.

Calderon, a noted Spanish dramatist, writes: "For the greatest crime of man is that he ever was born." This statement is quite true since sin consists in our ever coming into existence as individuals severed from the wholeness of things. But as long as this fact cannot be denied from one point of view, we must try to nullify its evil effects by veering our course in another direction. And this veering can take place only by identifying ourselves with the cosmos itself, with the totality of existence, with Buddhātā in which we have our being. The inevitability of sin thus becomes the chance of devoting ourselves to a higher plane of existence where a principle other than Karmaic individualism and self-responsibility reigns.

When Karma was conceived to be controllable by the self, the task of releasing oneself from its evil effects was comparatively an easy one, for it concerned after all the self alone, but if it is sin to believe in the ultimate reality of an individual soul and to act accordingly, as if salvation depended only on self-disciplining or on self-enlightenment, the Mahayanist's work is far greater than the Hinayanist's. As this goes beyond the individual, something more than individual must operate in the Mahayanist heart to make its work effective. The so-called self must be aided by a power transcending the limitations of the self, which, however, must be immanently related to it; for otherwise there cannot be a very harmonious and really mutually helping activity between the self and the not-self. In fact, the idea of sin, and hence the feeling of pain and suffering, is produced from the lack of a harmonious relationship between what is thought to be "myself" and what is not. The religious experience with the Mahayanists is to be described in more comprehensive terms than with the Hinayanists.

A Reality beyond Self

Buddhātā or Dharmatā is the name given by the Mahayanists to that which is not the self and yet which is in the self. By virtue of this, the Mahayanists came to the

consciousness of sin and at the same time to the possibility of enlightenment. Buddhata is the essence of Buddhahood, without which this is never attained in the world. When the Buddha is conceived impersonally or objectively, it is the Dharma, law, truth, or reality; and Dharmata is what constitutes Dharma. Dharmata and Buddhata are interchangeable, but the experience of the Mahayanists is described more in terms of Buddhata.

With the conception of Buddhata, the historical Buddha turns into a transcendental Buddha; he ceases to be merely the Muni of the Śākyas, he now is a manifestation of the eternal Buddha, an incarnation of Buddhata, and as such he is no more an individual limited in space and time, his spirituality goes out from him and whatever power it has will influence his fellow beings in their advance or development toward Buddhahood. This will take place in proportion to the intensity of desire and the sincerity of effort they put forward for the attainment of the goal. The goal contends in getting cleansed of sin, and sin consists in believing in the reality of self-substance (*svabhāva*), in asserting its claims as final, and in not growing conscious of the immanency of Buddhata in oneself. The cleansing of sin is, therefore, intellectually seeing into the truth that there is something more in what is taken for the self, and conatively in willing and doing the will of that something that transcends the self and yet that works through the self.

This is where lies the difficulty of the Mahayanist position—to be encased in what we, relative-minded beings, consider the self and yet to go beyond it and to know and will what apparently does not belong to the self. This is almost trying to achieve an impossibility, and yet, if do we not achieve this, there will be no peace of mind, no quieting of soul. We have to do it somehow when we once tumble over the question in the course of our religious experience. How is this to be accomplished?

That we are sinful does not mean in Buddhism that we have so many evil impulses, desires, or proclivities, which, when released, are apt to cause the ruination of oneself as well as others; the idea goes deeper and is rooted in our being itself, for it is sin to imagine and act as if individuality were a final fact. As long as we are what we are, we have no way to escape from sin, and this is at the root of all our spiritual tribulations. This is what the followers of Shin Buddhism mean when they say that all works, even when they are generally considered morally good, are contaminated as long as they are the efforts of “self-power” and do not lift us from the bondage of Karma. The power of Buddhata must be added over to the self or must replace it altogether if we desire emancipation. Buddhata, if it is immanent—and we cannot think it otherwise, must be awakened so that it will do its work for us, who are so oppressed under the limitations of individualism.

The awakening and working of Buddhata in mortal sinful beings is not accomplished by logic and discursive argument as is attested by the history of religion. In spite of the predominantly intellectual tendency of Buddhism, it teaches us to appeal to something else. The deep consciousness of sin, the intensity of desire to

be released from the finality of individual existence, and the earnestness of effort put forward to awaken Buddhata—these are the chief conditions. The psychological experience resulting therefrom will naturally be connected with the feeling of passivity.

A New Phase of Buddhism

Buddhism, whose intellectual tendency interpreted the doctrine of Karma individualistically in spite of its teaching of non-ego (*anatta*), has at last come to release us all from the iron fetters of Karma by appealing to the conception of Buddhata. Finite beings become thus relieved of the logical chain of causation in a world of spirits, but at the same time the notion of sin, which is essentially attached to them as limited in time and space, has taken possession of their religious consciousness. For sin means finite beings' helplessness of transcending themselves. And if this be the case, to get rid of sin will be to abandon themselves to the care of an infinite being, that is to say, to desist from attempting to save themselves, but to bring about a spiritual state of passiveness whereby to prepare the ground for the entrance of a reality greater than themselves.

We can thus say that Karma is understood by the Mahayanists rather cosmologically, or that the superindividualistic aspect of Karma came to assert its importance more than its individualistic aspect. Nāgārjuna's attempt to nullify Karma is the negative side of this evolution which has taken place in the history of Buddhism. As long as Karma was conceived individualistically by Hinayanists, there was no room for them to entertain a feeling of passivity. But with the Mahayanist interpretation of Karma a sense of overwhelming oppression came to possess the minds of the Buddhists, because Karma was now understood to have a far deeper, stronger, and wider foundation than hitherto thought of. It grew out of the cosmos itself, against which finite individuals were altogether powerless. This feeling of helplessness naturally turned the Mahayanists toward a being who could overcome the enormity of Karma-force.

There was another factor in the religious consciousness of the Mahayanists that made them ever persistent in applying to the superindividualistic powers of Buddhata. By this I mean the feeling of compassion (*karuṇā*) going beyond individualism. This is an annoying feeling, to say the least; it goes directly against the instinct of self-preservation. But there is no doubt that its roots are deeply laid, and in fact it makes up the very foundation of human nature. Compassion then walks hand in hand with sorrow, for a compassionate soul is always sorrowful when he observes how ignorant and confused the world is and grows conscious of something in himself that makes him feel his own participation in universal confusion and iniquity. The sense of sin is the outcome of all this. Perhaps here lies one of the reasons why the practice of asceticism has a strong appeal to the religiously minded who feel a shadow of penitence, not always realizing exactly why they do. When the

overwhelming force of Karma is thus combined with compassion, sorrow, and even sin, the attitude of the Buddhist toward himself assumes an altogether different aspect, he is no more a self-reliant individualist, he now wants to identify himself with a power that holds in itself the whole universe with all its multitudinousness.

III. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PASSIVITY

Passivity is essentially psychological, and to interpret it metaphysically or theologically is another question. The feeling that one has been cleansed of sin is passive as far as the sinner's consciousness is concerned. This subjectivism may be objectively verified or may not. But to say that in this consciousness there is absolutely no other feeling than passivity is not correct. This feeling, which came upon us indeed quite abruptly or without our being conscious of every step of its progress, is no doubt predominant especially when we know that with the utmost voluntary efforts we could not induce a state of liberation. But when the feeling is analyzed and its component factors are determined, we realize that this passivity is made possible only when there is something intensely active within ourselves. Let this active background be all blank, absolutely colorless, and there is not even a shadow of passivity felt there. The very fact that it is felt to be passive proves that there is a power on our side that prepares itself to be in a state of receptiveness. The exclusive "other-power" theory, which is sometimes maintained by advocates of the Shin school of Buddhism as well as by the Christian quietists, is not tenable.

While a man is attached to individualism, asserting it consciously or unconsciously, he always has a feeling of oppression, which he may interpret as sin, and while the mind is possessed by it, there is no room for the "other-power" to enter and work, the way is effectively barred. It is quite natural, therefore, for him to imagine that with the removal of the bar he became altogether empty. But the removal of the bar does not mean utter emptiness, absolute nothingness. If this is the case, there will be nothing for the "other-power" to work on. The abandoning of the "self-power" is the occasion for the "other-power" to appear at the scene, the abandoning and the appearance take place simultaneously; it is not that the abandoning comes first, and the ground remaining empty there is a vacancy, and finally the "other-power" comes in to claim this vacuity. The facts of experience do not justify this supposition, for nothing can work in a vacuity. On the contrary, there must be a point to which the "other-power" can fix itself, or a form into which it can, as it were, squeeze itself; this self-determination of the "other-power" is impossible if there is nothing but an absolute emptiness of passivity. The suppression of the self does not mean its utter annihilation but its perfect readiness to receive a higher power into it. In this receptivity we must not forget that there is a power which receives, which has been made passive. The absolute "other-power" doctrine is not psychologically valid nor metaphysically tenable.

*Absolute Passivism and Libertinism*¹⁷

The doctrine of absolute passivity is frequently productive of disastrous consequences in two ways. The one may be called negative as it tends to quietism, laziness, contemplative absorption, or all-annihilating Dhyāna or Nirodha; while the other is decidedly positive, being quite aggressive and self-assertive in its practical functioning as is shown, for instance, by the doctrine and the life of the advocates of the Free Spirit in the fourteenth century.

That when the mystic has the feeling that he is entirely possessed of God, or something greater than himself, he is apt to give himself up to a life of sensuousness, is psychologically explainable, for there is a tendency in all religion to assert instincts or native impulses not controlled by reasoned morality. When existence is accepted as it is as part of the inconceivable wisdom of the Buddha or God, the acceptance often involves acquiescence in all ills the flesh is heir to. This is why orthodoxy is always reluctant to lend its ear unconditionally to the gospel of passivism. Grave dangers are always lurking there. The Shin teacher's announcement that "you are saved just as you are," or the doctrine that Amida's all-embracing love takes in all sinful mortals with their sins and defilements even unwashed, is full of pitfalls unless it is tempered by sound reasoning and strong moral feeling. The injunctions such as "Take no thought of your life," or "Take no thought for the morrow, for the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself," are fine, and Buddhists too will wholeheartedly uphold the truth contained in them, but at the same time we must realize that this kind of momentarism is a life essentially at one with that of the fowls of the air and the lilies of the field, and harbors the possibility of sliding headlong into the abyss of libertinism or antinomianism. True religion, therefore, always shuns absolute subjectivism, and rightly so. Still we can ill afford to ignore the claims of the mystic so simply and innocently expressed in the following life of a pious Buddhist, where there is nothing of the aggressive assertions of Brothers of the Free Spirit.

*The Passive Life Described*¹⁸

"Passively active," or "actively passive," either will describe the mentality of the quietest type of the mystic. He is not generally conscious of his own active part in his religious experience and may wish to ignore this part altogether on the ground of his religious philosophy. But, as I said before, there is no absolutely passive state of mind, for this would mean perfect emptiness, and to be passive means that there is something ready to receive. Even God cannot work where there is nothing to work on or with. Passivity is a relative term indicating a not fully analyzed state of consciousness. In our religious life, passivity comes as the culmination of strenuous activity; passivity without this preliminary condition is sheer inanity in which there will be no consciousness, from the very first, even of any form of passivity. "I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." This is passivism as far as somebody else,

and not the self has taken possession of that which liveth, but that which liveth stays there all the time. "Ye are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God" (Colos. III, 3). Something in you is dead, which is to die sooner or later, but that which is to live keeps on living. This does not mean that you are altogether annihilated, but that you are living in the most lively sense of the word. Living is an activity, in fact, the highest form of activity. Absolute passivity is death itself.¹⁹

Passivity and Pure Land Buddhism

It is in the Pure Land school that the idea of passivity is most clearly traceable in Buddhism, though even in the Holy Path school it is not quite absent. Shinran, a great advocate of the *Tariki* (other-power) doctrine, naturally upholds passivity in the religious life of his followers. His idea is manifest in such passages as this, in which he repudiates "self-power" or "self-will" (*hakarai*). "By 'self-power' is meant," says he, "the self-will of the [Holy Path] devotees, relying on which each of them, as he finds himself variously situated in the circumstances of life, invokes the Buddha-names other [than Amida], disciplines himself in good works other [than invoking the name of Amida]; he upholds his own will, by which he attempts to remedy all the disturbances arising from the body, speech, and thought, and, thus making himself wholesome, he wishes to be reborn in the Land of Purity. The 'other-power' devotees, on the other hand, put their wholehearted faith in the original vow of Amida, as is expressed in the Eighteenth Vow in which he vows to receive all beings to his Land of Purity if they only recite his name and desire to be saved by him. In this, says the Holy One, there is no human scheme because 'human scheme' is here only the scheme of the Tathagata's vow. By 'human scheme' is meant 'self-will,' and 'self-will' is self-power which is a human scheme. As to 'other power,' it is a wholehearted belief in the original vow, and as the devotee is thus assured of his rebirth in Amida's land, there is no human scheme in the whole procedure. And therefore, again he need not feel any anxiety in his mind as to whether he will be welcomed by the Tathagata because of his sinfulness. Let him remain undisturbed, even with all his passions, because they belong by nature to him as an ignorant and sinful mortal, nor let him imagine himself that he shall be reborn in Amida's land because of his good will and good conduct. For as long as he has the mind of relying on his 'self-will' he has no chance for rebirth in the Pure Land."²⁰

Shinran's vocabulary is rich in such phrases as "artless art" or "meaningless meaning,"²¹ "no scheming whatever,"²² "naturalness," or "suchness," or "the natural course of things,"²³ "the passage of absolute freedom" or "unobstructed path,"²⁴ "beyond the intelligence of contrivance of the ignorant" as it is the will of the Buddha, "an absolute trust in the Tathagata's vow which is not tinged with human contrivance," "the great believing heart is Buddhata and Buddhata is the Tathagata," etc.

The ultimate meaning of all these phrases, so common in the lexicon of Shin Buddhism, is the upholding of passivity in the psychology of its followers. Let

Amida work out his original vow as he made it in the beginning of his religious career, which means, “Let us believe in it wholeheartedly and it will find its way inevitably, naturally, spontaneously, and without any contrivance on our part, into our sinful hearts and take us up into his Land of Bliss and Purity, after our death.” While we are living here on earth as the result of our past Karma, bound by the laws of the flesh and driven by the instinctive and uncontrollable urge of life, we cannot escape its course, but so long as there is the original vow of Amida, which has proved efficient in his own attainment of supreme enlightenment, we need not worry about the sinful urge of our earthly life. Absolute faith puts an end to our spiritual tribulations, which annoy us on account of our sins. Sins themselves as they are committed by us mortals may not be eradicated, for as long as we are relative existences, limited and governed by forces beyond our “self-power” to control, we cannot rid ourselves completely of defiled passions and desires and impulses. In spite of this fact, we are not troubled about sin, because our sin no more affects our life after death: have we not already been saved by the original vow of Amida, which we have unconditionally accepted? Was it not our worry about our after-death life, or immortality as the Christians would put it, that made us feel concerned about this sinful state of affairs on earth? It is not that we keep on sinning, or that we take delight in sinning, as some antinomians do, indeed we feel seriously concerned about sinning, but this sinning no longer shakes our faith in Amida and our final enlightenment and emancipation. The soul is no more disturbed, and with all its sins and regrets and lamentations it retains its sincerity, its hope, and its transcendental joy.

Ichiren'in (1788–1860) was a modern follower of the “other-power” school; he used to teach in the following manner:²⁵

If you have yet something worrying you, however trivial it may be, your faith in Amida is not absolute, When you have a feeling of unrest, this is of course far from believing in Amida; but even when you are rejoicing as having at last found rest, this is not real rest either. To make strenuous effort because you have not yet gained a restful heart, is also not quite right. To put your belief to a test wishing to know if it is firmly resting on Amida, is again wrong. Why? Because all these are attempts to look into your own mind, you are turned away from Amida, you are wrongly oriented. Indeed it is easy to say, “Abandon your self-power,” but after all how difficult it is! I, therefore, repeat over and over again and say, “Don't look at your own mind, but look straight up to Amida himself.” To rely on Amida means to turn towards the mirror of the original vow and see Amida face to face.

Passivity Is Accepting Life as It Is

Passivity is not self-reflection or self-examination. It is an unqualified acceptance of Amida. So long as there is a trace of conscious contrivance (*hakarai*), you are not wholly possessed of Amida. You and the original vow are two separate items of

thought, there is no unity, and this unity is to be attained by accepting and not by striving. In this case passivity is identifiable with accepting existence as it is. To believe then is to be and not to become. Becoming implies a dissatisfaction with existence, a wishing to change, that is, to work out “my will” as against “thy will,” and whatever we may say about moral ideals of perfection, religion is after all the acceptance of things as they are, things evil together with things good. Religion wants first of all “to be.” To believe, therefore, is to exist—this is the fundamental of all religions. When this is translated into terms of psychology, the religious mind turns on the axle of passivity. “You are all right as you are,” or “to be well with God and the world,” or “don’t think of the morrow”—this is the final word of all religion.

It was in this spirit that Rinzai (Linji, d. 867), the founder of the Rinzai branch of Zen Buddhism, said: “The truly religious man has nothing to do but go on with his life as he finds it in the various circumstances of this worldly existence. He rises quietly in the morning, puts on his dress and goes out to his work. When he wants to walk, he walks; when he wants to sit, he sits. He has no hankering after Buddhahood, not the remotest thought of it. How is this possible? A wise man of old says, If you strive after Buddhahood by any conscious contrivances, your Buddha is indeed the source of eternal transmigration.”²⁶ To doubt is to commit suicide; to strive, which means “to negate,” is, according to Buddhist phraseology, eternally to transmigrate in the ocean of birth and death.

A man called Jōemon, of Mino province, was much troubled about his soul. He had studied Buddhism but so far to no purpose. Finally, he went up to Kyoto where Ichiren’in, who was a great teacher of Shin Buddhism at the time, resided, and opened his heart to him, begging to be instructed in the teaching of Shinran Shōnin. Said Ichiren’in, “You are saved as you are.” (Amida’s salvation consists in accepting yourself as you are.) Jōemon was not satisfied and made further remonstrance, to which Ichiren’in repeated, “you are saved as you are.”²⁷ The seeker after truth was not yet in a state of mind to accept the word of the teacher right off, he was not yet free from dependence on contrivances and strivings. He still pursued the teacher with some more postulations. The teacher, however, was not to be induced to deviate from his first course, for he repeated, “You are saved as you are,” and quietly withdrew. It was fortunate that he was a “tariki” teacher, for if he had been a Zen master, I feel sure that Jōemon would have been handled in an altogether different manner.²⁸

John Woolman (1720–1772), a Quaker, died of smallpox, and toward the end his throat was much affected and he could not speak. He asked for pen and ink and wrote with difficulty: “I believe my being here is in the wisdom of Christ; I know not as to life or death.”²⁹ This confession exactly tallies with that of Shinran when he says in *The Tannisho*, “I say my Nenbutsu as taught by my good teacher. As to my being reborn after death in the Land of Purity or in hell, I have no idea of it.” Shinran quite frequently makes reference to the inconceivability of Buddha-

wisdom. Our being here is entirely due to it, and it is not in our limited knowledge to probe into its mystery nor is it necessary to exercise our finite will about it; we just accept existence as it is, our trust is wholly placed in the infinite wisdom of Amida, and what we have to do is to get this ignorance. And the wonderful thing is that this ignorance has such a wisdom in it as to give us entire satisfaction with this life and after.³⁰

The mystic knowledge or mystic ignorance and the satisfaction derived from it are also illustrated by the poem of thirty-one syllables composed by Ippen Shōnin (1239–1289). When he was studying Zen under Hottō (1203–1298), the latter wanted to know how Ippen understood the meaning of the statement that, “As a thought is stirred there is an awakening.” Ippen’s answer was in verse:

When the Name is invoked,
Neither the Buddha nor the Self
There is:
Na-mu-a-mi-da-bu-tsu—
The voice alone is heard.

The Zen master, however, did not think Ippen rightly understood the point, whereby the latter uttered another verse:

When the Name is invoked,
Neither the Buddha nor the Self
There is:
Na-mu-a-mi-da-bu-tsu,
Na-mu-a-mi-da-bu-tsu!³¹

This met the master’s approval. In Ippen’s religion we find Zen and Shin harmonized in a most practical way. When this *sonomama* (*yathābhūtam*) idea is translated into human relations, we have the following in which self-will is denounced as hindering the work of the All-One, that is, Amida.

When the rebellious will of your self-power is given up, you realize what is meant by putting trust in Amida. You desire to be saved and the Buddha is ever ready to save, and yet the fact of your rebirth in the Land of Purity does not seem to be so easily established. Why? Because your rebellious will still asserts itself. It is like contracting a marriage between a young man and a young woman. The parents on both sides want to see them united in marriage. The one party says, “There is no need of the bride’s being provided with any sort of trousseau.” But the other thinks it necessary seeing that the bridegroom belongs to a far richer family, and it would not do for the bride not to be supplied even with one wardrobe. Both are ready and yet the sense of pride is their barrier. If the bride’s family took the proposal made by the other party in the same spirit as is made by the latter, the desired end would be accomplished without further fussing. Quite similar to this is the relationship between the Buddha and sentient beings. The Buddha says: “Come”; why not then go to him even as you

are? But here the rebellious will shakes its head and says, "With all his good will, I cannot go to him just as I am; I ought to do something deserve the call." This is self-pride. This is more than what the Buddha requires of you, and anything extraneous coming out of your self-conceit, and limited philosophy obstructs the passage of the Buddha's mercy into your hearts. For all that is asked of you is to put your hand forward, into which the Buddha is ready to drop the coin of salvation. The Buddha is beckoning to you, the boat is waiting to take you to the other shore of the stream, no fares are wanted, the only movement you are to make is to step right into the ferry. You cannot protest and say, "This is a difficult task." Why don't you then give yourself up entirely to the Buddha's vow of salvation and let his will prevail over yours?³²

Molinos writes to Petrucci: "One of the fundamental rules which serve to keep my soul in constant inner peace is this: I may cherish no desire³³ for this or that separate good, but only for that good which is the highest of all, and I must be prepared for all which this highest good gives me and requires of me. These are few words but they contain much."³⁴ If one asks a Shin teacher what are few words containing so much as productive of the highest good, he will at once say, "Na-mu-a-mi-da-bu-tsu, Na-mu-a-mi-da-bu-tsu!" For this is indeed the magic sesame that carries you right to the other side of birth and death.

Ignorance and Passivity³⁵

The significant fact about religious experience, which is to be noticed in this connection, is that it always insists on abandoning all knowledge and learnedness acquired by the seeker of God or truth. Whether it is Christian or Buddhist, whether it is the Pure Land or the Holy Path, the insistence is equally emphatic. It is evident that religious experience stands diametrically opposed to intellectual knowledge, for learnedness and scholarship do not guarantee one to be a member of the kingdom of God, but "being like a child" not only in humbleness of heart but in simpleness of thought. The stains of vanity, conceit, and self-love, which are so-called human righteousnesses, are indeed "as a polluted garment," which is to be cast off by every one of us, but why is the use of the intellect too to be avoided? The soul may long for solitude and silence, but why does the constant reading of religious books grow wearisome? Why was Jesus thankful for his Father's hiding "these things" from the wise and prudent and revealing them unto babes, who are incapable of "careful meditations and subtle reasoning"?

Buddhism, however, is fundamentally a religion against and not for ignorance (*avidyā*) and not for it as in the foregoing quotations. The ignorant (*bāla*) and confused (*bhrānti*) and simple-minded (*prthagjana*) are very much condemned in all Buddhist sutras as not being able to grasp the deepest truths of enlightenment. It is true that Buddhism is more intellectual than Christianity and that the whole drift of Buddhist thought tends to encourage an intuitive grasp of the emptiness of existence instead of being embraced in the love of the highest being. But in spite of

this fact there is a strong undercurrent in the Buddhist teaching to uphold the futility of all intellectual attempts in the experience of the Buddhist life, which consists really in abandoning every self-centered striving and preconceived metaphysical standpoint. This is to keep the consciousness in utter purity or in a state of absolute neutrality or blankness, in other words, to make the mind as simple as that of the child, which I not at all stuffed with learning and pride.

Hōnen Shōnin's (1133–1212) “One-Sheet Document” illustrates the Pure Land attitude toward ignorance and simple-heartedness:

By Nenbutsu I do not mean such practice of meditation on the Buddha as is referred to by the wise men of China and Japan, nor is it the recitation of the Buddha's name, which is practiced as the result of study and understanding as to the meaning of Nenbutsu. It is just to invoke the name of Amida, without doubting that this will issue in the rebirth of the believer in the Pure Land. Just this, and no other considerations are needed. Mention is often made of the threefold heart and the four manners of exercise, but these are all included in the belief that a rebirth in the Pure Land is most conclusively assured by the “Namu Amida Butsu.” If one imagines something more than this, one will be excluded from the blessings of the two holy ones, Amida and Śākyamuni, and left out of the original vow. Those who believe in the Nenbutsu, however, learned they may be in all the teachings of Śākyamuni, should behave themselves like an ignoramus who knows nothing, or like a simple-hearted woman-devotee;³⁶ avoid pedantry, and invoke the Buddha's name with singleness of heart.

Shinran Shōnin (1173–1262), as disciple of Hōnen, voices the same sentiment in his *Tannishō*:

[Some say that] the salvation of those who do not read and study the sutras and commentaries is doubtful. Such a view as this is to be regarded as very far from the truth. All the sacred books devoted to the explanation of the truth of the Other-power, show that everyone who believing in the original vow recites the Nenbutsu will become a Buddha. Excepting this, what learning is needed to be reborn in the Pure Land? Let those who have any doubt on this point, learn hard and study in order to understand the meaning of the original vow. It is a great pity that there are some who in spite of a hard study of the sacred books are unable to understand the true meaning of the sacred doctrine. Since the Name is so formed as to be recited by any simple-hearted person who may have no understanding of even a single phrase in the sacred books, the practice is called easy.

That Zen representing the Holy Path wing of Buddhism too avoids learning and sutra-reading can be seen from the way the historians of Zen treat Huineng, the sixth patriarch of Zen; for he is made an ignorant peddler of kindling as compared with his rival Shenxiu, whose scholarship was the object of envy among the five hundred disciples of Hongren; and also from one of the chief mottoes adopted by Zen followers, “Depend not on letter[s]!” for it was indeed on this that the Tiantai

advocates of the Song concentrated their assaults on Zen. Those who have at all studied Zen know well what attitude is assumed by Zen toward scholarship and intellection. Its literature is filled with such passages as these: "I have not a word to give to you as the teaching of Zen"; "I have not uttered even a syllable these forty-nine years of my preaching"; "That is your learning, let me have what you have discovered within yourself"; "What are you going to do with your sutra-reading, which does not at all belong to your inner self?"; "With all your erudition, do you think you can cope with Death?"; "All the sutras and commentaries so reverently studied by you, are they not after all mere rubbish to wipe dirt?"; and so on.

Of the reasons why ignorance or simple-mindedness is so exalted in religious experience, the most weighty one is perhaps to be found in the nature of the intellect itself. Being essentially dualistic, it requires a point of reference from which it starts to make a statement, or to advance an argument, or to give a judgment. This mental habit of having a proposition definitely ascertained and holding fast to it goes against the religious frame of mind which principally consists in accepting existence as it is without asking questions, without entertaining doubts. Religious experience depicts in plain, unqualified, and straightforward statements, refusing to do anything with quibblings and dialectics. Whether of the Zen or of the Shin kind of Buddhism, mystic intuition thrives best in a mind which has no predilection, especially nursed by learning. When the mirror of consciousness is thoroughly cleansed of intellectual muddle, it reflects the glory and love of God, as the Christians would say. Hence ignorance and naivety go hand in hand with passivity.

*Selflessness and Emptiness*³⁷

When this doctrine of passivity is rendered into philosophical phraseology, it is the doctrine of Anātman or non-ego, which, when further developed, turns into that of Śūnyatā, or emptiness. As I explained elsewhere, the doctrine of no-self-substance is not so nihilistic as non-Buddhist scholars may imagine, for this denial of the ego is also constantly on the lips of the Christian mystics. Or, according to the *Visuddhimagga* (chap. XVI):

Misery only doth exist, none miserable,
No doer is there; naught save the deed is found.
Nirvana is, but not the man who seeks it.
The Path exists, but not the traveller on it.

We must remember that the Buddha's teaching of Anātman or Anatta is not the outcome of psychological analysis but is a statement of religious intuition in which no discursive reasoning whatever is employed. The Buddhist experience found out by immediate knowledge that when one's heart was cleansed of the defilements of the ordinary ego-centered impulses and desires, nothing was left there to claim itself as the ego-residium. It was Buddhist philosophy that formed the theory, but

that which supplied it with facts to substantiate it was Buddhist experience. We ought always to remember this truth, that religion first starts with experience and [only] later philosophizes, and, therefore, the criticism of the philosophy must be based on facts and not on the philosophy as such.

The doctrine of Śūnyatā too is a statement of religious intuition, and not an abstract formulation of empty ideas. If this were not so, it could never be the fundamental concept of all the schools of Mahayana Buddhism and have such an inspiring influence upon the religious consciousness of its followers. The subject was treated somewhat fully in my *Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*, and I would not repeat it here except that Śūnyatā, which is generally translated emptiness or vacuity, which is its literal meaning, is not to be interpreted in terms of relative knowledge and logical analysis, but it is the utterance of direct insight into the nature of existence. Whatever philosophy it has gathered about it is a later addition and the work of Buddhist scholarship.

IV. PASSIVITY AND PATIENCE OR HUMILITY

While the life of passivity on the one hand tends to libertinism, it shows on the other hand much aloofness from human concerns. There are however some practical moral virtues arising from the experience of passivity, or, stated conversely, where there are these virtues they issue from the experience. They are highly characteristic of the religious life irrespective of its theology, be it Buddhist or Christian. In Buddhism the virtues thus realized are generally estimated at six, called *Pāramitā*: *Dāna*, *Śīla*, *Kṣānti*, *Vīrya*, *Dhyāna*, and *Prajñā*. The latter two, meditation (*dhyāna*) and intuitive knowledge (*prajñā*), may not be in any direct relationship to passivity, and here we will not touch upon them. The first four are important and we may say that the Mahayanist life is summed up in them. Still, of these four, the first, the practice of charity, which in Buddhism also involves the giving up of one's life to the cause, and the second, the observance of the moral precepts, may not engage our attention here. For I wish to give especial consideration to one or two classical instances of *Kṣānti* and *Vīrya*, both of which I take to be closely connected with the life of passivity and the philosophy of Śūnyatā. We may think that *Kṣānti* (patience) may have something to do with passivity, but how about *Vīrya* (energy), which is apparently an opposite quality of meek suffering? How could energy be thought of issuing from religious passivity and emptiness? This is a significant point in the life of the Mahayana Buddhist and in the teaching of the *Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*. For according to the latter, which is lived by the Bodhisattva, an inexhaustible mine of energy obtains just because of the emptiness of things; if there were something determinable at the back of our existence, we could not put forward such an energy exhibited by the Bodhisattva Sadāprarudita. And, owing to this energy, patience or humility is again made possible. To be patient

or to practice *Kṣānti* does not mean merely to submit oneself to sufferings of all sorts which are brought on him from external sources, but it means to exert the virtue of energy (*vīrya*) in the life of emptiness, which is no less than what is known in all the Mahayana sutras as the life of a Bodhisattva (*bodhisattvacaryā*). So we read in the *Diamond Sutra*:

O Subhūti, at the time when Kalirāja cut my flesh from every limb, I had no idea of a self, of a person, of a being, or of a living being; I had neither an idea nor no-idea. And why? Because, O Subhūti, if I at that time had had an idea of a self, of a person, or a being, or of a living being, I should also have had an idea of malevolence. And why? Because, O Subhūti, I remember the past five hundred births when I was a Rṣi Kṣāntivādin. At that time also I had no idea of a self, or a person, of a being, or of a living being.³⁸

We can thus see that without a philosophical comprehension of emptiness there will be no real patience or passivity in the life of the Mahayana Buddhist, which, supported by energy, never grows weary of seeking for the highest good, *Śūnyatā*, *Kṣānti*, and *Vīrya* are inseparable. The story of the Bodhisattva Sadāprarudita is in this respect quite illuminating.³⁹

V. PRAYER AND NENBUTSU⁴⁰

In Buddhism, the Shin, like Protestantism, emphasizes faith, and as a result its followers have no special psychological method with which they attempt to strengthen the subjective force of faith, except attending religious discourses given by the preacher and being interviewed by him on doubtful points. It is true, however, that it is in Shin more than in any other school of Buddhism that the *tariki* (other-power), or passivity, side of experience is most persistently insisted on. As far as their teaching goes, Shin tells us not to put forward anything savoring of “self” but just to listen to the teacher and accept him, that is, his message as transmitted from Śākyamuni onward, who was the first historically to get us acquainted with the original vow of Amida. The Shin is really a consistent passivity-religion.

The Jōdo, however, from which the Shin branched off as a special sect of the Pure Land school of Buddhism, has a way to prepare the mind for the final experience of what is known in Buddhism as *anjin* 安心 (*an* = peace, *jin* or *shin* = mind), that is, a restful state of mind, or “interior quiet.” This is saying the Nenbutsu, that is, invoking the name of Amida; *Namu Amida Butsu* (in Sanskrit, *namo ’mitābhāya*), “Adoration to the Buddha of Infinite Light.” The formula or phrase is to be repeated in its Chinese form (*na-mo-o-mi-to-fo*) or in the Japanese (*na-mu-a-mi-da-bu-tsu*), and not in the original Sanskrit nor in any other translation. Some earnest devotees are reported to have repeated the phrase ten hundred thousand times a day, for instance, Tanluan⁴¹ (476–542), Hōnen⁴² (1133–1212), etc. The conscious object of course is to be

embraced in the grace of Amida by repeatedly pronouncing his name, but psychologically it is to prepare the mind in such a way as to suspend all the surface activities of consciousness and to wake from its unconscious sources a power greater than the empirical ego. Theologically or metaphysically, it may mean many things, but from the psychological point of view the Nenbutsu is like a certain kind of prayer,⁴³ an attempt to tap new life for the mind that has reached as it were the end of its rope. The Nenbutsu is thus meant to exhaust the power of a finite mind, which when it comes to this pass or *impasse*, throws itself down at the feet of something it knows not exactly what, except that the something is an infinite reality.

The Practice of Zazen and Passivity

In Zen there is apparently no passivity traceable. As it claims, it is the strong “self-power” wing of Eastern Mahayana Buddhism, and besides it is intellectual in the sense that it puts its whole stress on the intuitive apprehension of the truth. It is almost a kind of philosophy. But as far as psychology is concerned, things cannot be any different with Zen than with other religious consciousnesses; the way it works in our empirical mind is the same as in other religious experiences. Whatever metaphysical interpretations and contents we may give to its experience, there is a certain feeling of passivity in it. To go beyond the realm of limited intellection is not to use the strength of the intellect itself; it comes from something more than that, and as long as there is something transcending the mind, and yet its working is manifested in and through the mind, the latter must play the role of passivism, there is no other choice for it. The consciousness of “self-power” (*jiriki*) may be too prominent in the Zen mind, but this cannot overrule the principle of the experience by which alone the mind is made to realize what is beyond itself. “Passively active” or “actively passive”—the choice of one term or the other depends upon the individual psychology more than upon the fact itself, for the fact always lends itself to alternative interpretations. To understand the position of Zen in this matter we must have the knowledge of its practice of dhyāna⁴⁴ or zazen,⁴⁵ as it is called in China and Japan. Zen does not exactly coincide with Indian Dhyāna, though *zen* is an abbreviation of *zenna*,⁴⁶ which is in turn the transliteration of Sanskrit *dhyāna*; in practice, however, the same bodily posture is assumed. The following directions⁴⁷ given by a Zen master may throw light on what Zen proposes to do.

The Bodhisattva who disciplines himself in Prajñā should first of all awaken a great compassionate heart, make great universal vows, and thoroughly be versed in all Samādhis, in order to deliver all beings; for the Bodhisattva does not seek emancipation for his own benefit. Let him renounce all external relations and put a stop to all worldly doings, so that his mind and body becoming one can be kept in perfect harmony whether moving or sitting quiet. His food should be regulated, neither too much nor too little; and his sleep also should be moderate, neither too long nor too short.⁴⁸

[In the study of Buddhism], the practice of meditation comes foremost. When the mind is not being sufficiently brought under control no tranquility obtains in it, the practitioner will entirely be at a loss with the arrival of the critical moment. When looking for a gem, the water must not be stirred up; the waves make it difficult to get hold of a gem. Let the waters of meditation be clear and undisturbed, and the spiritual gem will all by itself shine forth. Therefore, we read in the *Sūtra of Perfect Enlightenment*⁴⁹ that “Prajñā pure and flawless is produced by means of meditation”; in the *Sūtra of the Lotus of the Good Law*⁵⁰ that “Retire into a solitary place and have your mind under full discipline, and let it be as steady and immovable as Mount Sumeru.” We thus know that the sure way to realize saintliness which goes beyond worldly trivialities is attained by means of a quiet life. It is all through the power of concentration, indeed, that some of the old masters have passed away into eternity even while sitting cross-legged or standing upright. There are many chances of interruption and failure even when one is devoting one’s life [to the realization of the truth]; how much more if illness gains the hold of you! How can you cope with the assault of Karma? So says an ancient teacher, “If you have not acquired the power of concentration strong enough to destroy the camp of death, you will have to come back with your eyes blindfolded and with nothing achieved. Your life will thus be utterly wasted.”⁵¹

The Function of Kōan in Zen

When it is said that Buddhism, Mahayana as well as Hinayana, is rich in the intellectual element, it does not mean that Buddhism lays its principal stress on logic or philosophy in the unfoldment of religious consciousness, but that it upholds an intuitive understanding of ultimate religious truth rather than a merely faithful acceptance of the teaching of its founder. And as the most efficient means to come to this intuitive understanding it teaches the practice of meditation known as Dhyāna or Zazen. The direction given above is thus followed by all Buddhists—Indian, Tibetan, Chinese, and Japanese—except the adherents of the Pure Land school of Buddhism. For they believe that the understanding grows by itself from within when the practice of Zazen is brought to perfection. As is stated, Prajñā reflects itself on the serene undisturbed water of Dhyāna. When, however, in the history of Zen the system of Kōan came to be in vogue, meditation so called was pushed behind in order to bring the intuition more to the foreground. Dahui⁵² boldly declares, “Others give priority to Dhyāna rather than to intuition (*prajñā*) but I give priority to intuition rather than to Dhyāna.” He was one of the strong advocates of the kōan exercise in China in opposition to his great contemporary Hongzhi.⁵³ As I have already explained in my previous essay as well as in the First Series,⁵⁴ the kōan students of Zen are almost violently aggressive in their attitude toward the realization of the passivity phase of the religious experience.⁵⁵

No signs of passivity seem to be noticeable in their exercise, but what is aimed at here is intellectual passivity and not an emotional one which comes out in view so much in Christian mystics and also in the followers of the Pure Land school of

Buddhism. The method of the kōan exercise, on the other hand, is to blot out by sheer force of the will all the discursive traces of intellection whereby students of Zen prepare their consciousness to be the proper ground for intuitive knowledge to burst out. They march through a forest of ideas thickly crowding up into their minds, and when thoroughly exhausted in their struggles they give themselves up, the state of consciousness, psychologically viewed, unexpectedly prevails, after which they have so earnestly but rather blindly been seeking. This last giving-up is what I would term a state of passivity in our religious experience. Without this giving-up, whether intellectually or conatively or emotionally or in whatever way we may designate this psychological process, there is generally no experience of a final reality. Let me give here some quotations from a book known as *Zenkan Sakushin*,⁵⁶ which may be freely translated, “The Breaking Through the Frontier Gate of Zen,” and which is very much read by Zen students as a most energizing stimulant to their wearied nerves.

Have the two characters “birth and death” pasted on your forehead until you get an understanding into their meaning; if you spend your time among idlers talking and laughing, the lord of death will surely demand of you a strict account of your life when you have to appear before him. Don’t say then, “I have never been reminded of this!”

When you apply yourself to the study of Zen, what is necessary is to examine yourself from moment to moment and to keep the subject (*kōan*) always before your mental eye so that you can see by yourself when you have gained strength and when not, and also where your concentration is needed more and where not.

There are some who begin to doze as soon as they are on the cushion and allow all kinds of rambling thoughts to disturb them if they are at all wakeful; and when they are down from the cushion their tongues are at once set loose. If they try to master Zen in this fashion, they would never succeed even if they are alive unto the day of Maitreya. Therefore, you should, exerting all your energy, take up your subject (*kōan*) and endeavor to get settled with it, you should never relax yourself day and night. Then you are not merely sitting quietly or vacantly as if you were a corpse. If you find yourself in a maze of confusing thoughts and unable to extricate yourself in spite of your efforts, drop them lightly, and coming down from the seat, quickly run across the floor once, and then resume your position on the cushion. Have your eyes open, hold your hands clasped and keeping your backbone straight up, apply yourself as before to the kōan, when you will feel greatly refreshed. It will be like pouring one dipperful of cold water into a boiling cauldron. If you go on thus exercising yourself, you will surely reach the destination.⁵⁷

Another Zen master⁵⁸ advises thus:

Some masters there are these days who in spite of their eyes not being clearly opened teach people to remain satisfied with mere empty-mindedness;⁵⁹ then there are others who reach people to accept things blindly as they are and contemplate on them as such; there are still others who advise people not to pay any attention to anything at

all. These are all one-sided views of Zen, their course of exercise is altogether on the wrong track, it will never come to a definite termination. The main idea in the study of Zen is to concentrate your mind on one point; when this is done, everybody will get it; that is, when thus the proper time comes and conditions are fully matured, realization will come by itself all of a sudden like a flash of lightning.

Let your everyday worldly consciousness be directed towards Prajñā, and then you will avoid coming under the control of your past evil Karma at the moment of death even if you may not attain to realization while in this life. In your next birth, you will surely be in the midst of Prajñā itself and enjoy its full realization; this is certainly, you need not cherish any doubt about it.

Only let your mind have a good hold of the koan without interruption. If any disturbing thoughts assail you, do not necessarily try to suppress them too vigorously; rather try to keep your attention on the kōan itself. Whether walking or sitting, apply yourself surely and steadily on it, give no time to relaxation. When your application goes on thus constantly, a period of indifference [literally, tastelessness] will set in. This is good, do not let go, but keep on and the mental flower will abruptly come to full bloom; the light illuminating the ten quarters will manifest the land of the treasure-lord on the tip of a single hair; you will then be revolving the great wheel of the Dharma even when you are sitting in the midst of an atom.

This Zen exercise full of arduousness and strenuousness with which the task of self-inspection is carried on seems to be the very reverse of passivity. But we must remember that passivity never comes by itself, nor is it to be confounded with a mere apathetic, indolent state of mind, which is no less than vegetation. Passivity in its highest religious connotation means breaking up the hard crust of egotism or relativism and melting itself in the infinity of the Dharmadhātu. This melting is felt psychologically as a mood of receptivity, and, theologically interpreted, as the feeling of absolute dependence, which is what I have designated in this essay as passivity. With followers of Zen, this is “being wholly possessed by Prajñā,” or “realising Prajñā.” The Mahayana sutras are generally dedicated not only to the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas but to Prajñāpāramitā, which is remarkable. In all the Zen hymnals reference is always made to “Mahā-Prajñāpāramitā” as if it were a personality like the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas of the past, present, and future. Further, Prajñā is compared to a great perfect mirror in which is reflected a world of multiplicities just as they are, *yathābhūtam*. This is the perfect mirror of passivity, to use the terminology adopted here. What follows I hope will make this point clearer.⁶⁰

The Perfection of Passivity in Buddhist Life

When the religious experience just described is matured, i.e., when it accompanies moral perfection, Buddhists will finally acquire what is technically known as *anābhogacaryā*,⁶¹ and its wonderful achievements as most elaborately detailed in the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* where they are said to take place in the life of a Bodhisattva,

the ideal being of Mahayana Buddhism. We can say that the effortless life is the perfection of passivism.

According to the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra*, the effortless life is attained when a Bodhisattva passes from the seventh to the eighth stage of spiritual life by realizing what is known as the “acceptance of all things as unborn” (*anutpattikadharma-kṣānti*).⁶² To quote the Sutra:⁶³

The Bodhisattva Vajragarbha said, “O son of the Buddha, when the Bodhisattva, while at the seventh stage, has thoroughly finished examining what is meant by cleansing the paths with transcendental wisdom and skillful means (*prajñopāya*), has accumulated all the preparatory material (*sambhāra*), has well equipped himself with the vows, and is sustained by the power of the Tathagatas, procuring in himself the power produced from the stock of merit, attentively thinking of and in conformity with the powers, convictions, and unique characteristics of the Tathagatas, thoroughly purified, sincere in heart, and thoughtful, elevated in virtue, knowledge, and power, great in pity and compassion which leaves no sentient beings unnoticed, and in pursuit of the path of wisdom that is beyond measurement; and, further, when he enters, truly as it is, upon the knowledge that all things are, in their nature, from the first, unborn (*anutpanna*), unproduced (*ajāta*), devoid of individualizing marks (*alakṣaṇa*), have never been combined (*asambhūta*), are never dissolved (*avināśita*), nor extinguished (*aniṣṭhita*), nor changing (*apravṛtti*), nor ceasing (*anabhinivṛtti*), and are lacking in self-substance (*abhāvasvabhāva*); when he enters upon the knowledge that all things remain the same in the beginning, in the middle, and in the end, are of suchness, non-discriminative, and entering into the knowledge of the all-knowing one; [and finally] when he thus enters upon the knowledge of all things as they really are; he is then completely emancipated from such individualizing ideas as are created by the mind (*citta*) and its agent (*manovijñāna*); he is then as detached as the sky, and descends upon all objects as if upon an empty space; he is then said to have attained to the acceptance of all things as unborn (*anutpattikadharma-kṣānti*).

“O son of the Buddha, as soon as a Bodhisattva attains this acceptance, he enters upon the eighth stage called Immovable (*acalā*). This is the inner abode of Bodhisattvahood, which is difficult to comprehend, which goes beyond discrimination, separated from all forms, all ideas, and all attachments; which transcends calculation and limitation as it lies outside [the knowledge of] the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas and above all disturbances and ever in possession of tranquility. As a Bhikṣu furnished with supernatural faculties and freedom of mind and gradually entering into the Samādhi of Cessation, has all his mental disturbances quieted and is free from discrimination; so the Bodhisattva now abides in the stage of immovability, that is, detached from all works of effort (*ābhoga*), he has attained effortlessness, has put an end to strivings mental, verbal, and physical, and is beyond discrimination as he has put away all forms of vexation, he is now established in the Dharma itself which he enjoys as the fruit of his past work.

“It is like a man who, in a dream finding himself in a great river, attempts to go to the other side; he musters all his energy and strives hard with every possible means.

And because of this effort and contrivance, he wakes from the dream, and being thus awakened all his strivings are set at rest. In like manner the Bodhisattva seeing all beings drowning themselves in the four streams, and in his attempt to save them, exerts himself vigorously, unflinchingly; and because of his vigorous and unflinching exertion, he attains the stage of immovability. Once in this stage, all his strivings are dropped, he is relieved of all activity that issues from the notion of duality or from an attachment to appearance.

"O son of Buddha, as when one is born in the Brahman world, no tormenting passions present themselves in his mind; so when one is born in the Brahman world, no tormenting passions present themselves in his mind; so when the Bodhisattva comes to abide in the stage of immovability, his mind is entirely relieved of all effortful activities which grow out of a contriving consciousness. In the mind of this Bodhisattva there is indeed no conscious discrimination of a Bodhisattva, or a Buddha, or enlightenment, or Nirvana; how much less the thought of things worldly. O son of the Buddha, on account of his original vows the Bodhisattva sees all the Buddhas, the Blessed ones personally presenting themselves before him in order to confer upon him the wisdom of Tathagatahood whereby he is enabled to get into the stream of the Dharma. They would then declare: 'Well done, well done, O son of a good family, this is the Kṣānti (acceptance) of the first order which is in accordance with the teaching of the Buddhas.' But, O son of a good family, thou hast not yet acquired the ten powers, the fourfold fearlessness, and the eighteen special qualities possessed by all the Buddhas. Thou shouldst yet work for the acquirement of these qualities possessed by all the Buddhas. Thou shouldst yet work for the acquirement of these qualities, and never let go thy hold of this Kṣānti.

"O son of good family, though thou art established in serenity and emancipation, there are ignorant beings who have not yet attained serenity, but are being harassed by evil passions and aggrieved by varieties of speculation. On such ones thou shouldst show thy compassion. O son of a good family, mindful of thy original vows, thou shouldst benefit all beings and have them all turn towards inconceivable wisdom.

"O son of a good family, the ultimate essence of all things is eternally such as it is, whether or not Tathagatas have come to appear; they are not called Tathagatas because of their realization of this ultimate essence of things. All the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas too have indeed realized this essence of non-discrimination. Again, O son of a good family, thou shouldst look up to our body, knowledge, Buddha-land, halo of illumination, skillful means, and voice of purity, each of which is beyond measurement; and with these mayest thou too be completely equipped.

"Again, O son of a good family, thou hast now one light, it is the light that sees into the real nature of all things as unborn and beyond discrimination. But the light of truth possessed by the Tathagatas is as regards its infinite mobility, activity, and manifestation beyond all measurement, calculation, comparison, and proportion. Thou shouldst raise thy intention toward it in order to realize it.

"O son of a good family, observing how boundlessly the lands extend, how numberless beings are, and how infinitely divided things are, thou shouldst know them all truthfully as they are.

“In this manner, O son of Buddha, all Buddhas bestow upon the Bodhisattva who has come up to this stage of immovability infinitude of knowledge and make him turn toward knowledge of differentiation and work issuing therefrom, both of which are beyond measurement. O son of the Buddha, if the Buddhas did not awake in this Bodhisattva a desire for the knowledge of the all-knowing one, he would have passed into Parinirvana abandoning all the work that will benefit beings. As he was however given by the Buddhas infinitude of knowledge and work issuing therefrom, his knowledge and work that is carried on even for a space of one moment surpasses all the achievements that have been accomplished since his first awakening of the thought of enlightenment till his attainment of the seventh stage; the latter is not comparable even to one-hundredth part of the former, no indeed even to one immeasurably infinitesimal part of it; no comparison whatever is possible between the two. For what reason? Because, O son of the Buddha, the Bodhisattva who has now gained this eighth stage after starting first with his one body in his course of spiritual discipline, is now provided with infinite bodies, infinite voices, infinite knowledge, infinite births, and infinite pure lands, and has also brought infinite beings into maturity, made offerings to infinite Buddhas, comprehended infinite teachings of the Buddhas, is furnished with infinite supernatural powers, attend infinite assemblages and sessions; and, by means of infinite bodies, speeches, thoughts, and deeds, acquires perfect understanding of everything concerning the life of the Bodhisattva, because of his attainment of immovability.

“O son of the Buddha, it is like a man going into the great ocean in a boat; before he gets into the high sea he labors hard, but as soon as it is pulled out to sea, he can leave it to the wind, and no further efforts are required of him. When he is thus at sea, what he can accomplish in one day would easily surpass what is done even after one hundred years’ exertion in the shallows. In like manner, O son of the Buddha, when the Bodhisattva accumulating a great stock of meritorious deed and riding in the Mahayana boat gets into the ocean of the life of a Bodhisattva, he enters in one moment and with effortless knowledge into the realm of knowledge gained by the omniscient. As long as he was dependent upon his previous achievements which were characterized with purposefulness (*sābhogakarma*), he could not expect to accomplish it even after the elapsing of innumerable kalpas.”⁶⁴

When the assertion is made that what has been described in the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* somewhat diffusely is the Buddhist life of passivity, we may think it to be very different from what is ordinary, and especially in the Christian sense, understood to be passive or God-intoxicated, or wholly resigned to “thy will” or to Tariki, other-power. But the fact is that Buddhism is highly tinged with intellectualism as is seen in the so frequent use of the term “knowledge” (*jñāna* or *prajñā*), though it does not mean knowledge in its relative sense but in its intuitive, supraintellectual sense. Even in the Pure Land school of Buddhism where the sentiment aspect of the religious life is very much in evidence, the giving-up of the self to the unfathomable wisdom (*acintyajñāna*) of the Tathagata goes on hand in hand with the trust in the

all-embracing love of Amitābha. Indeed, the final aim of the Shin followers is to attain supreme enlightenment as much as any other Buddhists, though the former's ambition is to do it in the Land of Purity presided over personally by Amitābha Buddha, and in order to be permitted to his Land they put themselves unconditionally under his loving guardianship. As a matter of fact, the two sides of the religious experience, sentiment and intellect, are found commingled in the heart of the Shin devotee. The consciousness of sin is its sentimental aspect while the seeking after enlightenment is its intellectual aspect. While passivism is more strongly visible in the sentiment, it is not at all missing in the Buddhist intellect either, as when the intellect is compelled to abandon its logical reasonings in order to experience the supreme enlightenment attained by the Buddha, or the life of the Bodhisattva, which is purposeless, effortless, and above teleological strivings.

Emptiness and the Zen Life

"Emptiness" (*śūnyatā*) is the gospel of the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* and also the fountainhead of all the Mahayana philosophies and practical disciplines. It is indeed owing to this Emptiness as the ground of existence that this universe is at all possible with its logic, ethics, philosophy, and religion. Emptiness does not mean relativity, as is sometimes interpreted by Buddhist scholars, it goes beyond that, it is what makes relativity possible; Emptiness is an intuitive truth whereby we can describe existence as related and multifarious. And the Buddhist life of passivity grows out of this intuition, which is called *Prajñāpāramitā* in the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* and the *Pratyātmāryajñāna* in the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*. The intuition is enlightenment as the culmination of Buddhist discipline and as the beginning of the life of a Bodhisattva. Therefore, we read in the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra* that all things are established in "non-abiding," which is Emptiness, *apraṭiṣṭhiti-śūnyatā*, and in the *Vajracchedikā-sūtra* that *na kvacit praṭiṣṭhitam cittam utpādayitavyam*, "thoughts should be awakened without abiding anywhere." When a thing is established (*praṭiṣṭhita*), there is something fixed, definitely settled, and this determination is the beginning at once of order and confusion. If God is the ultimate ground of all things, he must be Emptiness itself.⁶⁵ When he is at all determined in either way good or bad, straight or crooked, pure or impure, he submits himself to the principle of relativity, that is, he ceases to be God but a god who is like ourselves mortal and suffers. "To be established nowhere," thus means "to be empty," "to be unattached," "to be perfectly passive," "to be altogether given up to other-power," etc.

This Buddhist or Zen life of Emptiness may be illustrated in different ways,⁶⁶ each of which has its own signification as it depicts a particular aspect of the life.

1. When Subhūti was sitting quietly in a cave, the gods praised him by showering celestial flowers. Said Subhūti, "Who are you that shower flowers from the sky?"

"We are the gods whose chief is Śakra-devendra."

“What are you praising?”

“We praise your discourse on Prajñāpāramitā.”

“I have never uttered a word in the discourse of Prajñāpāramitā, and there is nothing for you to praise.”

But the gods asserted, “You have not discoursed on anything, and we have not listened to anything; nothing discoursed, nothing heard indeed, and this is true Prajñāpāramitā.” So saying, they shook the earth again and showered more flowers.

To this, Xuedou (雪竇) attaches his poem:

The rain is over, the clouds are frozen, and day is about to break;
A few mountains, picture-like, make their appearance: how blue, how imposing!
Subhūti, knowing nothing, in the rock-cave quietly sits;
Lo, the heavenly flowers are pouring like rain, with the earth shaking!

This poem graphically depicts the inner life of Emptiness, from which one can see readily that Emptiness is not relativity, nor nothingness. In spite of, or rather because of, Subhūti’s “knowing nothing,” there is a shower of celestial flowers, there tower the mountains huge and rugged, and they are all like a painting, beautiful to look at and enjoyable by all who understand.

2. While Vimalakīrti was discoursing with Mañjuśrī and others, there was a heavenly maiden in the room who was intently listening to all that was going on among them. She now assumed her original form as a goddess and showered heavenly flowers over all the saintly figures assembled there. The flowers that fell on the Bodhisattvas did not stick to them, but those on the Śrāvakas adhered and could not be shaken off though they tried to do so. The heavenly maiden asked Śāriputra, one of the foremost Śrāvakas in the group and well-known for his dialectic ability,

“Why do you want to brush off the flowers?”

“They are not in accordance with the Dharma, hence my brushing,” replied Śāriputra.

“O Śāriputra,” said the maiden, “think not that the flowers are not in accordance with the Dharma. Why? Because they do not discriminate and it is yourself that does the discriminating. Those who lead the ascetic life after the teaching of the Buddha commit an unlawful deed by giving themselves up to discrimination. Such must abandon discrimination, whereby their life will be in accord with the Dharma. Look at those Bodhisattvas, no flowers can touch them, for they are above all thoughts of discrimination. It is a timid person that affords a chance for an evil spirit to take hold of him. So with the Śrāvakas, as they dread the cycle of birth and death, they fall a prey to the senses. Those who have gone beyond fears and worries, are not bound by the five desires. The flowers stick where there is yet no loosening of the knots, but they fall away when the loosening is complete.” (That is to say, when Emptiness is realized by us, nothing can take hold of us, neither the flower nor dirt has a point to which it can attach itself.)

The life of Emptiness, thus we can see, is that of nondiscrimination, where the sun is allowed to rise on the evil and on the good, and rain is sent on the just and on the unjust. Discrimination is meant for a world of particulars where our relative individual lives are passed, but when we wish to abide beyond it where real peace obtains, we have to shake off all the dust of relativity and discrimination, which has been clinging to us and tormented us so long. Emptiness ought not to frighten us as is repeatedly given warning in the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*.

When all is done and said,
In the end thus shall you find:
He must of all doth bathe in bliss
That hath a quiet mind.⁶⁷

Where to find this quiet mind is the great religious problem, and the most decided Mahayana Buddhist answer is “in Emptiness.”⁶⁸

Mahayana and Hinayana Buddhism, or the Bodhisattva-Ideal and the Śrāvaka- Ideal as Distinguished in the Opening Chapter of the *Gaṇḍavyūha*¹

1932

Following his work on a Sanskrit manuscript of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* with Izumi (written “Idzumi” at time of publication) Hōkei that resulted in two books published in 1929 and 1930, Suzuki and Izumi then proceeded to edit a Sanskrit text of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* that came out in four volumes published between 1934 and 1936. Corresponding to the final chapter of the *Huayan jing* known as the *Ru fajie pin* 入法界品 (J. *Nyū hokkai bon*), the *Gaṇḍavyūha* is a Mahāyāna text with a profile in East Asian Buddhism similar to that of the *Laṅkāvatāra*—an influential cataphatic discourse affirming *dharmadhātu* and *tathāgatagarbha* notions of sacrality and transcendence. The essay contrasts the *lokadhātu* and *dharmadhātu* dimensions of the perceived world, expands this into the famous Huayan teaching of interpenetration, affirming the Mahāyāna conception of the transcendental knowledge of bodhisattvas that allows them to see the exalted spiritual power of buddhas. Having a known Sanskrit text both confirmed its Indic origins and enabled Suzuki to affirm Sanskrit equivalents of a number of Chinese Buddhist terms. It is worth noting that his spelling of Sanskrit words has improved markedly in this piece, from which we may infer either that Izumi proofread it or Suzuki himself finally realized the importance of checking this to avoid embarrassment. Emblematic of this period, his defense of Mahāyāna as a superior form of Buddhism exhibits the same polemic tone here that dominates the 1907 *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*.

This essay was originally published in *The Eastern Buddhist* 6, no. 1 (1932).

• • •

1

When we come to the *Gaṇḍavyūha* after the *Laṅkāvatāra*, or *Vajracchedika*, or the *Parinirvāṇa*, or even after the *Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka*, or the *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, we find a complete change of the stage where the great religious drama of Mahayana

Buddhism is enacted. There is nothing cold here, nothing gray, nothing earth-colored, nothing humanly mean; for everything one touches in the *Gaṇḍavyūha* shines out in an unsurpassable manner. We are no more in this world of limitation, adumbration, and obduracy; we are miraculously lifted up among the heavenly galaxies. The ethereal world is luminosity itself. Here is no somberness of earthly Jetavana, no disreputableness of the dry-grass seat on which the Lion of the Śākya probably sat when preaching; here is no group of shabbily dressed mendicants listening to a discourse on the unreality of an individual ego-soul. When the Buddha enters into a certain kind of Samādhi, the pavilion where he is situated all of a sudden expands to the fullest limits of the universe; in other words, the universe itself is dissolved in the being of the Buddha. The universe is the Buddha, and the Buddha is the universe. And this is not a mere expanse of Emptiness, nor is it the shriveling-up of it into an atom; for the ground is paved with diamonds; the pillars, beams, railings, etc. are inlaid with all kinds of precious stones and gems sparkling brilliantly and each reflecting others glitteringly.

Not only is the universe of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* not on this side of existence, but the audience surrounding the Buddha is not a mortal one. The Bodhisattvas, the Śrāvakas, and even the worldly lords who are assembling here are all spiritual beings. Though the Śrāvakas and lords and their followers do not fully comprehend the signification of the miracles going on about them, none of them are those whose minds are still under the bondage of ignorance and folly. If they were, they could not even be present at this extraordinary scene.

How does all this come about?

The compilation of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* was made possible owing to a definite change that took place in the mind of the Buddha concerning life and the world. Thus in the study of the *Gaṇḍavyūha*, what is most essential to know is that the Buddha is no more living in the world that can be conceived in terms of space and time. His consciousness is not that of an ordinary mind that must be regulated according to the senses and logic. Nor is it a product of poetical imagination, which creates its own images and methods of dealing with particular objects. The Buddha of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* lives in a spiritual world.

In this world there is no time division such as the past, present, and future; for they have contracted themselves into a single moment of the present where life quivers in its true sense. The conception of time as an objective blank in which particular events as its contents succeed one after another has completely vanished. The Buddha in the *Gaṇḍa* thus knows no time continuity, the past and future are both rolled up in this present moment of illumination, and this present moment is not something standing still with all its contents, for it ceaselessly moves on. Thus the past is the present, so is the future, but this present in which the past and the future are merged never remains the present; in other words, it is eternally present. And at the center of this eternal present the Buddha has fixed his abode that is no abode.

As with time, so with space. Space in the *Gaṇḍavyūha* is not an extension divided by mountains and forests, rivers and oceans, lights and shades, the visible and the invisible. Extension is here indeed, as there is no contraction of space into one single block of existence, but what we have here is an infinite mutual fusion or penetration of all things, each with its individuality yet with something universal in it. A general fusion thus taking place is the practical annihilation of space that is recognizable only through change and division and impenetrability. To illustrate this state of existence, the *Gaṇḍavyūha* makes everything it depicts transparent and luminous, for luminosity is the only possible earthly representation that conveys the idea of universal interpenetration, the ruling topic of the Sūtra. A world of lights transcending distance, opacity, and ugliness of all sorts, is the world of the *Gaṇḍavyūha*.

With the annihilation of space and time, there evolves a realm of imagelessness or shadowless-ness (*anābhāsa*). As long as there are lights and shades, the principle of individuation always overwhelms us human mortals. In the *Gaṇḍavyūha* there is no shadowiness; it is true, there are rivers, flowers, trees, nets, banners, etc. in the land of purity in the description of which the compiler taxes his human imagination to its utmost limits, but no shadows are visible here anywhere. The clouds themselves are luminous bodies—so many of them overhanging in the Jetavana of the *Gaṇḍavyūha*—which are described in terms of Mahayana world-conception.

This universe of luminosity, the scene of interpenetration, is known as Dharmadhātu in contrast to Lokadhātu, which is this world of particulars. In the Dharmadhātu there are space and time and individual beings as in the Lokadhātu, but they show none of their earthly characteristics of separateness and obduracy as are perceivable in the latter. For the Dharmadhātu is not a universe spatially or temporarily constructed like the Lokadhātu, and yet it is not utter blankness or mere void that is identifiable with absolute nonentity. The Dharmadhātu is a real existence and not separated from the Lokadhātu, only it is not the same as the latter, it is realizable when the solid outlines of individuality melt away and the feeling of finiteness no more oppresses one. The *Gaṇḍavyūha* is thus also known as the “Entering into the Dharmadhātu.”

2

What are then some of the chief changes of thought that have taken place in Buddhism enabling it to evolve a universe to be known as Dharmadhātu? What are those feelings and ideas that have entered into the consciousness of the inhabitants of the Dharmadhātu? In short, what are the Mahayana qualifications of the Tathagata, Bodhisattva, and Śrāvaka? As far as the opening chapter of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* is concerned, the following points may be noted.

1. The one dominant feeling, we may almost assert, that runs through the text is an active sense of grand inscrutable mystery (*acintya*), going beyond the power of thinking and description. Everything one sees, hears, or observes in the Dharmadhātu is a mystery, because it is incomprehensible to ordinary sense or logical measurement. Jetavana of so many square miles abruptly expands to the ends of the universe—does this not surpass human conception? A Bodhisattva comes from a world lying even beyond the furthest end of the universe, that is, beyond an ocean of worlds as innumerable as particles of atoms constituting a Buddha-land—is this not a wonderful event? And let us remind you that the Bodhisattva is accompanied by his retinue as innumerable as the number of atoms constituting a Buddha-land, and again that these visitors are coming from all the ten quarters, accompanied not only by their innumerable retinues but surrounded by luminous clouds, shining banners, etc. Depict all this in your own minds exercising all the power of imagination that you can command—is it not really a most miraculous sight altogether transcending human thought? All that the poor writer of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* can say is “inconceivable” (*acintya*) and “indescribable” (*anabhilāpya*). The miracles performed are not of such local or partial nature as we encounter in most religious literature. Miracles so called are ordinarily a man’s walking on water, a stick changing into a tree, a blind man being enabled to see, and so on. Not only are all these miracles recorded in the history of religion quite insignificant in scale when compared with those of the *Gaṇḍavyūha*, but they are fundamentally different from the latter; for the latter are possible only when the whole scheme of the universe as we conceive it is altered from its very basis.

2. We are impressed now with the spiritual powers of the Buddha who can achieve all these wonders by merely entering into a certain Samādhi. What are these powers? They are defined thus: (1) The sustaining and inspiring power (*adhiṣṭhāna*), which is given to the Bodhisattva to achieve the end of his life; 2. The power of working miracles (*vikurvita*); 3. The power of ruling (*anubhāva*); 4. The power of the original vow (*pūrvapraṇidhāna*); 5. The power of goodness practiced in his former lives (*pūrvasukṛtakūśalamūla*); 6. The power of receiving all good friends (*kalyānamitraparigraha*); 7. The power of pure faith and knowledge (*śraddhāyajñānaviśuddhi*); 8. The power of attaining a highly illuminating faith (*udārādhimuktyavabhāsapratilambha*); 9. The power of purifying the thought of the Bodhisattva (*bodhisattvādhyāśāyapariśuddhi*); and 10. The power of earnestly walking toward all-knowledge and original vows (*adhyāśayasarvajñatāpraṇidhāna-prasthāna*).

3. The fact that it was due to the miraculous power of the Samādhi attained by the Buddha that caused the transformation of the entire city of Jetavana makes one inquire into the nature of the Samādhi. According to the *Gaṇḍavyūha*, the miracle was effected by the strength of a great compassionate heart (*mahākaruṇā*), which constitutes the very essence of the Samādhi; for compassion is its body (*śarīra*), its

face (*mukha*), its forehead (*pūrvaṅgama*),² and the means of expanding itself all over the universe. Without this great heart of love and compassion, the Buddha's Samādhi, however exalted it may be in every other way, will be of no avail in the enactment of the great spiritual drama so wonderfully described here. This is indeed what characteristically distinguishes the Mahayana from all that has preceded it in the history of Buddhism. Owing to its self-expanding and self-creating power, a great loving heart transforms this earthly world into one of splendor and mutual fusion, and this is where the Buddha is always abiding.

4. The *Gaṇḍavyūha* is in a sense the history of the inner religious consciousness of Samantabhadra the Bodhisattva, whose wisdom-eye (*jñānacakṣus*), life of devotion (*caryā*), and original vows (*praṇidhāna*) make up its contents. Thus all the Bodhisattvas taking part in the establishment of the Dharmadhātu are born (*abhiniriyāta*) of the life and vows of Samantabhadra. And Sudhana's chief object of pilgrimage, which is told in such details in the *Gaṇḍavyūha*, was nothing else than identifying himself with Samantabhadra the Bodhisattva. When after visiting more than fifty teachers of all sorts he came to Samantabhadra, he was thoroughly instructed by the Bodhisattva as regards his life of devotion, his knowledge, his vows, his miraculous powers, etc., and when Sudhana realized what all these Buddhist disciplines meant he found himself in complete identity not only with Samantabhadra but with all the Buddhas, his body filled the universe to its ends, and his life of devotion (*caryā*), his enlightenment (*sambodhi*), his transformation-bodies (*vikurvita*), his revolution of the Dharma-wheel, his eloquence, his voice, his faith, his abode, his love and compassion, and his emancipation and mastery over the world were exactly those of Samantabhadra and all the Buddhas.

What concerns us here most is the idea of vow (*praṇidhāna*), which is made by a Bodhisattva in the beginning of his career and which controls all his later life. His vows are concerned with enlightening, or emancipating, or saving all his fellow beings, which include not only sentient beings but the nonsentient. The reason he gives up everything that is ordinarily regarded as belonging to oneself is not to gain a word or a phrase of truth for himself—there is in fact no such thing in the great ocean of reality; what he wants to accomplish by his life of self-sacrifice is to lead all beings to final emancipation, to a state of happiness that is not of this world, to make the light of knowledge illuminate the whole universe, and to see all the Buddhas praised and adored by all beings. This is what is absorbingly interesting in the life of devotion practiced by Samantabhadra the Bodhisattva.

3

Reference was made to the sense of mystery that pervades the whole text of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* as one of its striking characteristics. I want now to fathom this and point out where it originates, that is, what is its philosophical background. For the

Gaṇḍavyūha has its own view of the world and the mind, and it is based on this philosophical view that so many miracles, mysteries, or inconceivabilities succeed one after another in a most wonderful manner—which to many may appear to be altogether too fantastic, too beyond the reach of common sense. But when we grasp the central fact of spiritual experience gone through by the Bodhisattvas as narrated in the Sutra, all the rest of the scenes depicted here suggest perfect naturalness, and there are no irrationalities. The main thing, therefore, for us to do if we desire to understand the *Gaṇḍavyūha*, will be to take hold of its ruling idea.

The ruling idea of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* is known as the doctrine of interpenetration. It is a thought somewhat similar to the Hegelian philosophy of concrete universals. Each individual reality, besides being itself, reflects in it something of the universal, and at the same time it is itself because of other individuals. A system of perfect relationship exists among individual existences and also between individuals and universals, between particular objects and general ideas. This perfect network of mutual relations has received the technical name of interpenetration in the hands of Mahayana philosophers.

When the Empress Zetian of Tang felt it difficult to grasp the meaning of interpenetration, Fazang, the great master of the Avatamsaka school of Buddhism, illustrated it in the following way. He had first a candle lighted, and then encircling it had mirrors on all sides. The central light reflected itself in every one of the mirrors, and every one of these reflected lights was reflected again in every mirror, so that there was a perfect interplay of lights, that is, of concrete universals. This is said to have enlightened the mind of the Empress. It is necessary to have this kind of philosophy in the understanding of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* or the *Avatamsaka*. The following extracts from the text before us will help us to have a glimpse into its abstruse teaching.

After describing the transformations that took place in Jetavana when the Buddha entered into a Samādhi known as Simhaviṣṭambhita, the *Gaṇḍavyūha* goes on to say: "All this is clue to the Buddha's miraculous (*acintya*) deeds of goodness, to his miraculous work of purity, to his miraculously mighty power; all this is because he has the miraculous power of transforming his one body and making it pervade the entire universe; it is because he has the miraculous power of making all the Buddhas, all the Buddha-lands with their splendors enter into his own body; it is because he has the miraculous power of manifesting all the images of the Dharmadhātu within one single particle of dust; it is because he has the miraculous power of revealing all the Buddhas of the past with their successive doings within a single pore of his skin; it is because he has the miraculous power of illuminating the entire universe with each one of the rays that emanate from his body; it is because he has the miraculous power of evolving clouds of transformation from a single pore of his skin and making them fill up all the Buddha-lands; it is because he has the miraculous power of revealing in a single pore of his skin the

whole history of all the worlds in the ten quarters from their first appearance until their final destruction. It is for these reasons that in this grove of Jetavana are revealed all the purities and splendors of the Buddha-lands.”

When all the Bodhisattvas with an inconceivable number of followers come from the ten quarters of the world and begin to get settled around the Buddha, the *Gaṇḍavyūha* explains for its readers who are these Bodhisattvas miraculously assembling here accompanied mostly by luminous clouds, and gives among others the following characterization of the Bodhisattvas:

All these Bodhisattvas from the ten quarters of the world together with their retinues are born of the life and vows of Samantabhadra the Bodhisattva. By means of their pure wisdom-eye they see all the Buddhas of the past, present, and future, and also hear the ocean of the Sutras and the revolving of the Dharma-wheel by all the Buddhas. They are all masters of the excellent Pāramitās; they approach and serve all the Tathagatas who are performing miracles every minute; they are also able to expand their own bodies to the ends of the universe; they bring forth by means of their body of light all the religious assemblies conducted by the Buddha; they reveal in each particle of dust all the worlds, singly and generally, with their different conditions and multitudes; and in these different worlds they choose the most opportune season to discipline all beings and to bring them to maturity; emitting a deep, full sound from every pore of the skin, which reverberates throughout the universe, they discourse on the teachings of all the Buddhas.

All these statements may sound too figurative, too fabulous, too fantastic to be seriously considered by the rationally minded, so called. From the realistic point of view, which upholds objective validity and sense measurement as the sole standard of truth, the *Gaṇḍavyūha* fares rather ill. But we must remember that there is another point of view, especially in matters spiritual, which pays no attention to the rationalistic interpretation of our inner experiences. The human body, ordinarily or from the sense point of view, occupies a limited area of space that can be measured, and continues to live also during a measurable period of time. And against this body there is the whole expanse of the universe including all the mountains and oceans on earth and also all the starry heavens. How can this body of ours be made to take in the entire objectivity? How can our insignificant, ignominious “hair-hole” or “pore of the skin” (*romakūpa*) be turned into a holy stage, where all the Tathagatas of the past, present, and future can congregate for their spiritual discourses? Obviously, this is an utter impossibility or the height of absurdity. But the strange fact is that when a door opens and a light shines from an unknown source into the dark chamber of consciousness, all the time- and space-limitations dissolve away, and we make a *Simhanāda* (lion-roar), “Before Abraham was I am,” or “I alone am the honored one above and below all the heavens.” The *Gaṇḍavyūha* is written always from this exalted point of view. If science surveys the objective world, and philosophy unravels intricacies of logic, Buddhism dives

into the very abyss of being, and tells us in the directest possible manner all it sees under the surface.

4

Having acquainted ourselves with the general atmosphere in which the *Gaṇḍavyūha* moves, let us now proceed to see what are the constituents of the audience, that is, what are the particular characteristics of Bodhisattvahood as distinguished from those of Śrāvakahood. In other words, the question is concerned with the differentia of Mahayana Buddhism. When we know how the Bodhisattva is qualified in the *Gaṇḍavyūha*, we know also how Bodhisattvahood differentiates itself from Śrāvakahood and what are the Mahayana thoughts as they are presented in this Sutra against those of the Hinayana. For the opening chapter of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* emphatically sets up the Bodhisattvas against the Śrāvakas as giving reasons why the latter are unable to participate like the Bodhisattvas in the development of the grand spiritual life.

The Bodhisattvas numbering five hundred are attending the assembly, which takes place under the supervision of the Buddha in Jetavana. The same number of the Śrāvakas are also found among the audience. Of the Śrāvakas such names are mentioned as Śāriputra, Maudgalyāyana, Mahākāśyapa, Revata, Subhūti, Aniruddha, Nandika, Kapphiṇa, Kātyāyana, Pūrṇa, Metrāyaṇīputra, etc., while Samantabhadra and Mañjuśrī stand out prominently as the two leaders of the five hundred Bodhisattvas. The Bodhisattvas are all qualified as “having issued from the life and vows of Samantabhadra”: (1) they are unattached in their conduct because they are able to expand themselves in all the Buddha-lands; (2) they manifest innumerable bodies because they can go over everywhere there are Buddhas; (3) they are in possession of an unimpeded unspoiled eyesight because they can perceive the miraculous transformations of all the Buddhas; (4) they are able to visit anywhere without bounds because they never neglect appearing in all places where the Buddhas attain to their enlightenment; (5) they are in possession of a limitless light because they can illumine the ocean of all the Buddha-truths with their light of knowledge; (6) they have an inexhaustible power of eloquence through eternity because their speech has no taint; (7) they abide in the highest wisdom, which knows no limits like space because their conduct is pure and free from taints; (8) they have no fixed abode because they reveal themselves personally in accordance with the thoughts and desires of all beings; (9) they are free from obscurities because they know that there are really no beings, no soul-substances in the world of beings; and finally (10) they are in possession of transcendental knowledge that is as vast as space because they illuminate all the Dharmadhātus with their net of light.

In another place where the Bodhisattvas visiting Jetavana from the ten quarters of the universe to contribute their shares in the grand demonstration of the

Buddha's spiritual powers are characterized, we find among other things the following statements: "All the Bodhisattvas know that all beings are like *māyā*, that all the Buddhas are like shadows, that all existence with its rise and fall is like a dream, that all forms of karma are like images in a mirror, that the rising of all things is like a *fata morgana*, that all the worlds are mere transformations; further, the Bodhisattvas are all endowed with the ten powers, knowledge, dignity, and faith of the Tathagata, which enable them to roar like a lion; they have deeply delved into the ocean of inexhaustible eloquence, they have acquired the knowledge of explaining the truths for all beings; they are complete masters of their conduct so that they move about in the world as freely as in space; they are in possession of all the miraculous powers belonging to a Bodhisattva; their strength and energy will crush the army of Māra; their knowledge-power penetrates into the past, present, and future; knowing that all things are like space, they practice nonresistance and are not attached to them; though they work indefatigably for others, they know that when things are observed from the point of view of all-knowledge, nobody knows whence they come; though they recognize an objective world, they know that its existence is something unobtainable; they enter into all the worlds by means of incorruptible knowledge; in all the worlds they reveal themselves with the utmost freedom; they are born in all the worlds, take all forms; they transform a small area into an extended tract of land, and the latter again into a small area; all the Buddhas are revealed in one single moment of their thought; the powers of all the Buddhas are added on to them; they survey the entire universe in one glance and are not at all confused; they are able to visit all the worlds in one moment."

Against this characterization of the Bodhisattvas, what have we for that of the five hundred Śrāvakas? According to the *Gaṇḍavyūha*, "They are enlightened in the self-nature of truth and reason, they have an insight into the limit of reality, they have entered into the essence of things, they are out of the ocean of becoming, they abide where the Buddha-merit is stored, they are released from the bondage of the Knots and Passions, they dwell in the house of non-attachment, they stay in the serenity of space, they have their desires, errors, and doubts wiped off by the Buddha, and they are rightly and faithfully devoted to the Buddha-ocean."

When Śrāvakahood is compared with Bodhisattvahood as they are here particularized, we at once perceive how cold, aloof, and philosophical the one is, in great contrast to the spiritual activities and miraculous movements of the other. The Bodhisattva is always kept busy doing something for others, sometimes spreading himself all over the universe, sometimes appearing in one or another path of existence, sometimes destroying the army of evil ones, sometimes paying reverence and making offerings to the Buddhas of the past, present, and future. And in these movements he is perfectly at home, he goes on everywhere with the utmost ease and spontaneity as nothing impedes his maneuvering as a world-savior. The Śrāvaka is on the other hand an intellectual recluse, his insight is

altogether philosophical and has no religious fervor accompanying it, he is satisfied with what he has attained by himself, and has no desire stirred within himself to let others share also in his spiritual or rather metaphysical realization. To him the Bodhisattva is much-adoing for nothing. To him the entire world of inconceivabilities is a closed book, and this is the very place where all the Bodhisattvas belong and find their reason of existence. How penetrating and perspicuous may be the intellect of the Śrāvaka, there is still a world altogether beyond his grasp.

This world, to use the *Gaṇḍavyūha* terminology, is where we find the Buddha's transformation (*vikurvita*), orderly arrangements (*vyūha*), superhuman virility (*vr̥ṣabha*), playful activities (*vikrīḍita*), miracles (*prātihārya*), sovereignty (*patey-ata*),³ wonderful performances (*caritavikurvita*), supreme power (*prabhāva*), sustaining power (*adhiṣṭhāna*), and land of purity (*kṣetrapariśuddhi*). And again here is where the Bodhisattvas have their realms, their assemblies, their entrances, their comings-together, their visits, their transformations, their miracles, their groups, their quarters, their fine array of lion-seats, their palatial residences, their resting abodes, their transportation in Samādhi, their survey of the worlds, their energetic concentrations, their heroisms, their offerings to the Tathagatas, their certifications, their maturities, their energies, their Dharmakāyas of purity, their knowledge-bodies of perfection, their vow-bodies in various manifestations, their material bodies in their perfected form, the fulfilment and purification of all their forms, the array of their boundless light-images, the spreading out of their great nets of lights, and the bringing forth of their transformation-clouds, the expansion of their bodies all over the ten quarters, the perfection of all their transformation-deeds, etc.

5

What are the causes and conditions that have come to differentiate Bodhisattvahood so much from Śrāvakahood?

The *Gaṇḍavyūha* does not forget to point out what causes are contributive to this remarkable differentiation, to tell what are the conditions that make the Śrāvakas altogether blind to the various manifestations and transformations going on in a most wonderful way at the assembly of the Bodhisattvas in Jetavana. The *Gaṇḍavyūha* gives the following reasons:

Because the stock of merit is not the same (1); because the Śrāvakas have not seen, and disciplined themselves in, the virtues of the Buddha (2); because they have not approved the notion that the universe is filled with Buddha-lands in all the ten quarters where there is a fine array of all Buddhas (3); because they have not given praise to the various wonderful manifestations put forward by the Buddhas (4); because they have not awakened the desire after supreme enlightenment attainable in the midst of transmigration (5); because they have not induced others to

cherish the desire after supreme enlightenment (6); because they have not been able to continue the Tathagata-family (7); because they have not taken all beings under their protection (8); because they have not advised others to practice the Pāramitās of the Bodhisattva (9); because while yet in the transmigration of birth and death they have not persuaded others to seek for the most exalted wisdom-eye (10).

Further, because the Śrāvakas have not disciplined themselves in all the stock of merit from which issues all knowledge (11); because they have not perfected all the stock of merit which makes the appearance of the Buddha possible (12); because they have not added to the enhancement of the Buddha-land by seeking for the knowledge of transformation (13); because they have not entered into the realm which is surveyed by the Bodhisattva-eye (14); because they have not sought the stock of merit which produces an incomparable insight going beyond this world (15); because they have not made any of the vows constituting Bodhisattvahood (16); because they have not confirmed themselves to all that is the product of the Tathagata's sustaining power (17); because they have not realized that all things are like *māyā* and the Bodhisattvas are like a dream (18); because they have not attained the most exhilarating excitements (*prativega-vivardhana*) of the Bodhisattva (19); in short, because they have not realized all these spiritual states belonging to the wisdom-eye of Samantabhadra to which the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas are strangers (20).

So, concludes the *Gaṇḍavyūha*, all these great Śrāvakas such as Śāriputra, etc., have no stock of merit, no wisdom-eye, no Samādhi, no emancipation, no power of transformation, no sovereignty, no energy, no mastery, no abode, no realm, which enable them to get into the assemblage of the Bodhisattvas and participate in the performance of the great spiritual drama that is going on in Jetavana. As they have sought their deliverance according to the vehicle and way of Śrāvakahood, what they have accomplished does not go beyond Śrāvakahood. They have indeed gained the knowledge whereby the truth is made manifest, they are abiding in the limit of reality (*bhūtakoti*), they are enjoying the serenity of the ultimate (*atyantaśānti*), but they have no great compassionate all-embracing heart for all beings, for they are too intently occupied with their own doings (*ātmakārya*) and have no mind to accumulate the Bodhisattva-knowledge and to discipline themselves in it. They have their own realization and emancipation, but they have no desire, make no vows to make others also find their resting abode in it. They do not thus understand what is really meant by the inconceivable power of the Tathagata.

To sum up, the Śrāvakas are yet under the covering of too great a Karma-hindrance, they are unable to cherish such great vows as are done by the Bodhisattvas for the spiritual welfare of all beings, their insight is not clear and penetrating enough to see into all the secrets of life, they have not yet opened what is designated as the wisdom-eye (*jñānacakṣus*) in the *Gaṇḍavyūha*, wherewith a Bodhisattva takes in at a glance all the wonders and inconceivabilities of the spiritual realm

to its deepest abyss. How superficial, compared to this, is the philosophical insight of the Śrāvakas!

6

The *Gaṇḍavyūha* gives us several parables to tell more graphically about the conditions of Śrāvakahood under which its followers are still laboring. Let me quote one or two.

Along the river Gangā there are millions of millions of hungry ghosts (*preta*) all naked and tormented with hunger and thirst; they feel as if their bodies were burning; and their lives are threatened every minute by birds and beasts of prey. Thirst impels them to seek for water, but they cannot find it anywhere even though they are right close to the river. Some see it, but there is no water but the dried-up bed. Why? Because their Karma-hindrance lies too heavily on them. In the same way, these great learned philosophical Śrāvakas, even though they are in the midst of the large assembly of the Bodhisattvas, are not capable of recognizing the grand miracles of the Tathagata. For they have relinquished all knowledge (*sarvajñatā*) owing to the ignorance-cataract covering their eyes; for they have never planted their stock of merit in the soil of all knowledge.

In the Himalaya mountains many kinds of medicinal herbs are found, and they are distinguished by an experienced doctor each according to its specific qualities. But all these are not recognized by the hunters, nor by the herdsmen, who may frequent these regions, because they have no eye for them. In the same way, the Bodhisattvas who have entered into a realm of transcendental knowledge and gained a spiritual power over form are able to see the Tathagatas and their grand display of miracles. But the Elders, the Śrāvakas, in the midst of these wonderful events, cannot see them, because they are satisfied only with their own deeds (*svakārya*), and not at all concerned with others' spiritual welfare.

To give another parable: Here is a man in a large congregation of people. He happens to fall asleep, and in a dream he is suddenly transported to the summit of Mount Sumeru, where Śakrendra has his magnificent palatial residence. There are a large number of mansions, pavilions, gardens, lakes, etc., each in its full splendor. There are also celestial beings incalculable in number, the grounds are strewn with heavenly flowers, the trees are decorated with beautiful robes, and the flowers are in full bloom. Most exquisite music is played among the trees whose branches and leaves emit of their own accord pleasing sounds, and these go on in harmonious concert with the melodious singing of the celestial damsels. The dancers innumerable and attired in resplendent garments are enjoying themselves on the terrace. The man is now no more a bystander to these scenes, for he is one of the participants, himself appareled in heavenly fashion and going around among the inhabitants of Sudarśana as if he belonged to them from the beginning.

These phenomena however have never come to be noticed by any other mortals who are congregated here, for what is perceived by the man is a vision only given to him. In a similar manner, the Bodhisattvas are able to see all the wonderful sights in the world taking place under the direction of the Buddha's power. For they have been accumulating their stock of merit for ever so many kalpas, making vows based on all knowledge, which know no bounds in time and space. For, again, they have studied all the virtues of the Buddhas, disciplining themselves in the way of Bodhisattvahood, and then perfecting themselves for the attainment of all knowledge. In short, they have fulfilled all the vows of Samantabhadra and lived his life of devotion, whereas the Śrāvakas have no pure insight belonging to the Bodhisattvas.

7

From these quotations and delineations, we have now, I hope, a general background of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* more or less clearly outlined, and from them also we gather the following ideas, which are really the contents of at least the opening chapter of the Sutra, while they also give us a further glimpse into the essence of the Mahayana teaching generally.

1. There is a world which is not of this world, though inseparable from it.
2. The world where we ordinarily move is characterized with limitations of all sorts. Each individual reality holds itself against others, which is indeed its self-nature (*svabhāva*). But in the world of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* known as Dharmadhātu, individual realities are enfolded in one great reality, and this great reality is found participated by each individual one. Not only this, but each individual existence contains in itself all other individual existences as such. Thus there is a universal interpenetration so called in the Dharmadhātu.
3. These supernatural phenomena cannot take place in a world where darkness and obduracy prevail, because then a penetration would be impossible. If a penetration should take place in these conditions it would mean the general breaking-up of all individual realities, which is a chaos.
4. Therefore, the Dharmadhātu is a world of lights not accompanied by any form of shade. The essential nature of light is to intermingle without interfering or obstructing or destroying one another. One single light reflects in itself all other lights generally and individually. Thus, light symbolizes spirituality.
5. This is not a philosophical interpretation of existence reached by cold logical reasoning, nor is it a symbolical representation of the imagination. It is a world of real spiritual experience.
6. Spiritual experience is like sense experience. It is direct and tells us directly all that it has experienced without resorting to imagination or ratiocination. The *Gaṇḍavyūha* is to be understood in this manner, that is, as a document recording one's actual spiritual life.

7. This realm of spirit belongs to the Bodhisattva and not to the Śrāvaka. The latter serenely abides in a world of intellectual intuition and monotony, supremely above the endlessly intermingling world of particulars and multiplicities. The Bodhisattva has a loving heart, and his is a life of devotion and self-sacrifice given up to a world of individualities.

8. A society of spiritual beings is approachable only by means of a great loving heart (*mahākaruṇā*), a great friendly spirit (*mahāmaitrī*), morality (*śīla*), great vows (*prañidhāṇa*), miraculous powers (*abhijñā*), purposelessness (*anabhisamkāra*), perfect disinterestedness (*anāyūha*), skillful means born of transcendental wisdom (*prajñopāya*), and transformations (*nirmāṇa*).⁴

9. As these attributes are lacking in Śrāvakahood, its devotees are not allowed to join the congregation of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas. Even when they are in it they are incapable of appreciating all that goes on in such assemblages. The Mahayana is more than mere Emptiness, a great social spirit is moving behind it.

10. Lastly, we must remember that there is a sustaining power (*adhiṣṭhāna*) behind all these spiritual phenomena that are going on in Jetavana, and also behind all those transformation-Bodhisattvas who have gathered around the Buddha. This power comes from the Buddha himself. He is the great center and source of illumination. He is the sun whose light reaches the darkest corners of the universe and yet leaves no shadow anywhere. The Buddha of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* is therefore called Mahāvairocana Buddha, the Buddha of Great Illumination.

8

In conclusion, let me quote the verse uttered by one of the Bodhisattvas in praise of the virtues of the Buddha, by which we can see in what relationship he stands to his devotees:

1. The great Muni, the best of the Śākya, is furnished with all the perfect virtues; and those who see him are purified in mind and turn toward the Mahayana.
2. That the Tathagata appears in the world is to benefit all beings; out of a great compassionate heart he revolves the wheel of the Dharma.
3. The Buddha has for ages gone through many a heartrending experience for the sake of sentient beings; and how can they requite him for what they owe him?
4. Rather suffer in the evil paths of existence all that there is in them for ever so many kalpas, than seek emancipation somewhere else by abandoning the Buddha.
5. Rather suffer all the pain that may befall all beings, than find comfort where there are no Buddhas to see.
6. Rather abide in the evil paths of existence if the Buddha's name can all the time be heard, than be born in the pleasant paths and never have the chance to hear him.
7. Rather be born in the hells however long one has to stay in each one of them, than be delivered therefrom by cutting oneself away from the Buddha.

8. Why? Because even though one may stay long in the evil paths, one's wisdom will ever be growing if only the Buddha is to be seen.

9. When the Buddha, the lord of the world, is to be seen somewhere, all pain will be eradicated; and one will enter into a realm of great wisdom, which belongs to the Tathagata.

10. When the Buddha, the peerless one, is to be seen somewhere, all the hindrances will be cleared away, and infinite bliss will be gained and the way of enlightenment perfected.

11. When the Buddha is seen, he will cut asunder all the doubts cherished by all beings and give them satisfaction each according to his aspirations, worldly and superworldly.⁵

Impressions of Chinese Buddhism

1935

In May–June of 1934, Suzuki spent six weeks in China and Korea, which led to a monograph in Japanese that includes ethnographic-like observations of what he saw and heard from scholars and practitioners. It is a rare attempt on his part to observe and describe how Buddhism is actually being practiced in his own time. He then produced an abridged English version in *The Eastern Buddhist*, excerpts of which are collected here. Note that 1934 also saw the publication of his critical edition, edited with Izumi Hokei, of the Sanskrit text of the *Gaṇḍavyūha sūtra*, volume three of his *Essays in Zen Buddhism*, a jointly edited text of the Dunhuang manuscript of Shenhui's *Yulu*, as well as articles in Japanese on Bodhidharma and Hakuin.

Sailing from Kobe on a trip sponsored in part by the Japanese government, he arrived in Shanghai on May 6. In Shanghai he met with the writer Lu Xun (鲁迅, 1881–1936) who had studied medicine in Japan. The trip also included time in Hangzhou, Ningbo, and visits to libraries and mountain Chan temples in Zhejiang such as Tiantong (天童) and Putuo (普陀), as well as a number of temples and sites in and around Suzhou, Nanjing, and Beijing. In Beijing he met the scholar Hu Shi (a.k.a. Hu Shih 胡適, 1891–1962), with whom his debates about Chan history became legendary. From Beijing they went to Dalian and then had three days in Korea (Seoul, Daegu, and Gyeongju) before returning to Kyoto on June 25. The Korean portion was not included in the English version.

Suzuki adds detailed bits of history to expand the meaning of what he sees, most explicitly in three areas: the cult of Budai (Hotei) and its relationship to belief in Maitreya and local folklore, the manifold faith in Guanyin (Kannon) and his relationship to Amitābha, and a discussion of *nianfo* (nenbutsu) practice and its relationship with the Chan tradition, especially as articulated by two figures: Suzuki's contemporary Yinguang (印光, 1861–1940) and the Tang period monk Cimin (慈愍, 680–748). Cimin's criticism of how Chan was practiced in his day, and Suzuki's positive appraisal of that discourse, is worth noting, particularly in regard to the ignorance of scripture touted by many Chan monks at that time,

which itself may be suggestive of Suzuki's own critique of Zen in both China and Japan in his own time. Perhaps the most intriguing part of this essay is his interview with Yinguang, a charismatic monk revered by his contemporaries who was devoted to Pure Land Buddhism, followed by Suzuki producing a list of comparisons regarding the viability of pursuing the Zen (Chan) path versus the Pure Land path. Yinguang had entered a period of isolated practice in 1930 that he briefly suspended to speak with Suzuki. In their conversation Yinguang explicitly rejected the abandonment of celibacy and vegetarianism prevalent among Japanese Buddhist clergy, exhibiting a level of monastic rigor for a monk devoted to Pure Land practices that surprised Suzuki.

This essay first appeared as *Shina Bukkyō inshōki* 支那佛教印象記 (Record of Impressions of Chinese Buddhism. Tokyo: Morie Shoten, 1934); in SDZ 26: 79–161. It was translated into Chinese in 1935 and partially again in 2009–2010.¹ Excerpts below are from Suzuki's own abridged translation that appeared in *The Eastern Buddhist* 6, no. 4 (1935).

. . .

In the following pages the author attempts to give an account of his impressions of Buddhism in China, where he spent several weeks of the early summer [of] last year (1934). These impressions, being [those] of a more or less superficial traveler whose knowledge of things Chinese is not at all thorough, especially in connection with the present state of things in China, must be far from being accurate and complete. A traveler's description of things and events he happens to observe in a strange land is always inevitably colored with his subjectivism and limited by his amount of knowledge, or ignorance. China and her Buddhism are well known to all the Japanese Buddhists as far as their historical book knowledge is concerned. But this kind of book knowledge and the present actualities are two altogether different matters—indeed, very frequently the former interferes with an adequate survey of the latter. With this thought in mind, the reader is asked to follow the observations of the writer whose pilgrimage in China this time covered only a very small portion of her extensive territory.

Incidentally, the facts may be mentioned that the writer was somewhat concerned in the beginning of his trip that an antagonistic attitude, though perhaps not actively, might be taken by the Chinese people toward him because of the political troubles between the two nations and that for this reason he might not see so many friends as he wished. But this was to a great extent unwarranted, for many fine opportunities were afforded to him while traveling through the neighboring country. For this he tenders hearty thanks to all his friends, Buddhist and otherwise.

The first question all the Japanese Buddhists are apt to ask of a recent traveler in China is this: "How does Buddhism fare in China these days?" This is quite a natural one, seeing that there are many things common to Japanese and Chinese Buddhism. In fact, the decline of Buddhist thought and practice in the one country is sure to affect the other. If the cultural unity of far-eastern civilization along the line

marked by Buddhism is to be firmly maintained in order to make it stand against the modern spirit of scientific and economic materialism, the Buddhists of the two great nations of the Far East are to be solidly aligned.

What was most disastrous to Chinese Buddhism in recent years was the truculent and most barbarous conduct of the Taiping rebellion, which "for fifteen years (1850-65) devastated sixteen provinces, destroyed six hundred cities," and, according to a historian, cost the lives of at least twenty million men and women. One Christian missionary adds that "the waters of the Yangzi carried seaward the ruins of thousands of temples and fragments of broken idols." From this one can imagine what devastation the "long-haired Christians" wrought out in these ancient districts of Wu and Yue where Buddhism had once been in a most flourishing condition, i.e., in the days of their Buddhist kings. The havoc is still remembered by the Buddhists, even after the lapse of over a half century, and still observable in the ruined pagodas and scattered tiles and bricks which we came across in our trip. There is no doubt that it will take many a year yet for Chinese Buddhism to recover fully from such disheartening consequences of the disaster. Especially when this is considered in connection with the modern trends of thought and culture which are somewhat against religious feeling generally, the Chinese Buddhists, I am sure, will have to put forward all the psychic energies in their possession to resuscitate the spiritual activities of the olden time. To do this, it goes without saying that an intellectual and affectional understanding and cooperation between the two great oriental nations, China and Japan, are imperative.

I. BUDAI²

What most strikes Japanese visitors to the historical Buddhist monasteries of southern China is that all their buildings are symmetrically arranged and enormously large. Compared with Japanese architecture, all the Chinese works are to be measured with a scale of another denomination. Look at the Great Wall, for instance; such a conception would never have entered into the Japanese head, much less its execution. For the Chinese architects, however, it was a natural thing to construct it—and indeed apart from its strategic effectiveness—and for the same reason it was natural for the Chinese mind to design those gigantic Halls in which Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, gods and Arhats, are enshrined such as we see at the Tiantong, the Lingyin, the Buzai, etc. To the Japanese who are used to their small, dainty houses, these enormous structures are really highly imposing. It is true that Japan too is not without great specimens of her stately architecture, such as are exemplified by the Honganji halls in Kyoto, but is it due to their sweeping roofs spreading out too low that they somehow do not impress with a sense of grand elevation? A quiet solidity is there, a deep meditative mood is felt, and this is perhaps where Japanese Buddhism stands strongest. But they fail to create the

sunny cheering atmosphere that is partially felt in China. Are her people characteristically happily disposed? Is their outlook of life more optimistic?

As the buildings are large and high, so are the figures enshrined. They are generally three or four times as large as life-size. They are gilded with gold or otherwise richly colored, their expressions are realistic and not at all idealistic, and the gods in fantastic and theatrical postures are threatening enough to drive evil spirits away from the monastery. These latter figures are not so familiar to the Japanese as the first ones. What corresponds to them in Japan will be a pair of the Vajra gods guarding the entrance gate to the Buddhist temple.

One of the figures that greets us first as we enter the Hall of the Guardian Gods, which stands in front of all other buildings, is Maitreya in one of his incarnated forms as Budai. This figure presents an interesting aspect of Chinese Buddhism in various ways to the foreign visitor. In the first place, he is not like the other Buddhist figures we encounter in the Hall. The four guardian gods are fantastic, the arhats are saintly, but Budai has ordinary human features familiar to us all. He assumes an easy posture with a protruding stomach, leans against a huge bag, broadly smiling and generally impressing us as the owner of a benevolent disposition and geniality of character. How did this secular figure come to occupy this significant position in the Hall of the Gods! His presence here does not seem to be in keeping with the entire environment. He is too near us to be enshrined with the warrior gods and other superworldly spirits. What has the "Laughing Buddha" to do with the protection of Buddhism? When did the legend start that he is an incarnation of Maitreya who is considered the "Buddha to come" when the world enters into another cycle? The following is what we know about his life on earth.

The record of his life appears first in the *Song Biographies of Eminent Buddhist Priests* (compiled in 982–998), and then in the *Transmission of the Lamp* (completed in 1064).³

NENBUTSU AND ZEN

Japanese Zen travelers in China deplore the fact that there is no more Zen in China as it used to prevail in Tang and Song when so many able Zen masters followed one after another and when Zen was such a powerful spiritual influence especially among the intelligentsia. It is true that Zen Buddhism as it is practiced in China at present has undergone phases of change since Song and Yuan, and it is unlikely at least in the near future that Zen can be restored to its ancient glory. Unless the modern trends of thought and feeling are made to swing in another direction, the Chinese Buddhists may not be awakened to a fuller appreciation of their past work. But inasmuch as Zen is the native product of the Chinese mind after its intimate contact with the Indian thought as represented by Buddhism, the time will surely come when Zen will begin to assert itself in a new form of expression.

There is the entire literature of Zen experience still well preserved in China. The practice of meditation goes on in the name of the Nenbutsu. Someday a great Buddhist may rise from among these earnest followers of the Nenbutsu and reinstate Zen to its proper seat of honor. We must know in the meantime how Zen came to be, as it were, replaced by the Nenbutsu and also how the latter is practiced at present in China.

It was indeed due to Zen that the Song philosophers were enabled to formulate what is known as Lixue (理學), or "system of philosophy." There are two periods in the history of Chinese thought when the Chinese mind reached its height of intellectual activity: the one is the ante-Qin and the other the Song. All the original ideas native to Chinese genius were perhaps exhausted in the former, while the Song thinkers showed what they could do with the ideas transplanted from abroad. In fact, really great philosophical minds are to be sought among the Buddhist scholars of Sui and Tang, when Buddhism was such a stimulation to the Chinese intellectuals that all the great systems of Buddhist thought were then formulated. But it was not until Song came to power that the Confucian philosophers began to work out their own methodology under the provocation of Zen mysticism; for mysticism in any form is always provoking, and this was the case with Confucianism in a most lively sense. The Laozian philosophy approaches mysticism and might have awakened the Confucians to the revaluation of their own thought. But the Laozian mysticism somehow lacked the power to stir up the disciples of Confucius to this effect, perhaps because Daoism was too world-flying and anarchistic and as a thought was not fertile and productive enough. It was different with Zen. Zen was comprehensive and all-embracing not only as a philosophy but also as a religion. As a philosophy it covered Confucianism as well as Laozianism; as a religion it penetrated deeply into the basis of our practical life including all its various aspects. And in this latter respect the Confucians had great concern and could not ignore the claim of Zen to the practical philosophy of life.

When the Indian form of Buddhist mysticism was acclimatized, it became Zen; Zen is the Chinese adoption of Buddhism. Thus adopted, Zen was legitimized into the Chinese family of thought, and in turn gave birth to the Song philosophy.

Zen in Song influenced not only the world of thought but the world of art. Those Zen pictures that are preserved in Japan (being lost in their native land), bespeak eloquently of the extent to which the spirit of Zen has entered into the minds of the artists. This will readily be recognized by those who study such monk-painters as Muqi, Liang Kai, and others.⁴ Their works, I am told, are in a sense a departure from the tradition of orthodox Chinese paintings.

Indeed it is this kind of Zen when the Japanese critics refer to the fate of Zen in Chinese Buddhism of modern times. The Zen they have in mind is that of Song and Tang, because they know it best and it is this Zen that is still thriving in a way in Japan. But it may not be quite reasonable to expect of Chinese religious thought

to remain stationary or rather stagnant all the time. Not only that, Zen as it was practiced in Song was prophetic of changes. While the development of the Kōan exercise was unavoidable or rather the outcome of the natural course of Zen consciousness, it was destined to undergo another turn of fate. This was to take place more readily in China where no strong sectarian spirit is asserted, that is, where there is no differentiation of sects and consequently there is no growth of partisan rivalry and antagonism. For this reason, Zen and Nenbutsu—the latter had been growing up steadily ever since the introduction of Buddhism in China—were to be merged instead of each marking its line of differentiation sharply and deeply against the other and defending it as it were at daggers drawn. Is it rather in consonance with Chinese psychology to keep things more or less in a chaotic state in which signs of inner differentiation are not allowed to develop too individualistically? As with the large family system, which is the characteristic feature of Chinese communal life, so with Buddhism minor differences are absorbed within the main body to which they all belong. Thus, instead of pursuing its own course, Zen in Yuan and Ming turned toward the Nenbutsu, the practice of which had then gathered great momentum among the multitudes. The Zen of Tang and Song disappeared, and what may be termed “Nenbutsu Zen” came up to take its place.

As I pointed out in my *Essays in Zen Buddhism*, series II, there is psychologically a common ground covered both by the Kōan exercise and the practice of Nenbutsu. It was not against the nature of Zen discipline as it went on in Song to adapt itself to the mentality of the Nenbutsu practitioner. Perhaps there was no need for Zen to take this step if it had an unobstructed path ahead of it. In point of fact, Zen appeals to a very limited number of people who are intellectually well trained⁵ and at the same time endowed with an amount of devotional piety. The impossibility of keeping up this exclusiveness on the part of Zen made it turn toward the Nenbutsu. Unless a Hakuin had been born in China about the time Shūkō (Zhuhong) of Unseiji (Yunqi Si) was flourishing, the tide could never have been any other way than actually took place. The growing prevalence of the Nenbutsu naturally influenced Zen, and Zen was ready to unite its force with the Nenbutsu, partly for self-preservation.

Syncretic movements have been going on for some time in China—of Zen with Buddhist philosophy, of Zen with Daoism and Confucianism, of Zen with Nenbutsu, etc. The success of the movements is not so manifest except with regard to Zen and Nenbutsu, which is practically demonstrated in present-day Buddhism.

Zen is iconoclastic and pays no respect to tradition and authority. This is because it is rebellious in spirit and fully realizes all the dangers attendant to intellectual systematization and conventional institutionalism. But for this very reason it is liable to ignore the limits naturally set for it and go all the length of liberationism. This historical tendency has been observed ever since its inception in early Tang. Cimin (慈愍, 680–748), who is one of the great Pure Land teachers of Tang,


severely attacks the followers of Zen on this particular score. We read in his writing on the Pure Land, the fragments of which have been recently discovered in Korea by Dr. Genmyō Ono:

To establish what is right we ought to put down first what is not right. Destruction must come before construction. . . . There are some Buddhists teaching "purity," which is absolute nothingness. Seeing that the world with all its multitudes is ultimately empty, they say that there is no reality, all is like horns of the hare or hair on the turtle; there are no goods which are to be practiced, no evils which are to be avoided; whatever forms one gets attached to in mind, including the Buddha and his sutras, are to be kept away; only let the inner mind abide in emptiness, in the emptiness of all things; and you are a Buddha yourself, you have realized Zen, you have cut off the bond of birth-and-death, you will suffer no rebirth, and what is the use of exerting yourself and seeking for the ancient Buddha? There is no need of reciting the sutras, no need of saying the Nenbutsu, which is not the way of deliverance. All the Paramitas, except devoting oneself to this kind of Zen practice, lead to birth-and-death; copying sutras, erecting statues, building shrines and pagodas, worshipping and paying reverence to holy figures, practicing filial piety, serving teachers and elders, and many other deeds—they all belong to the *saṃskṛta* and not to the *asaṃskṛta*. As long as there are attachments, attainments, desires, and discriminations, all the exercises lead one to the path of birth-and-death; and here is in them no final emancipation. This is what is claimed by followers of Zen. But the falsehood of this teaching is patent because the sutras teach otherwise, and are not the sutras the teaching of the Buddha? If so, we Buddhists have no right to run against his teaching. As facts stand, those Zen devotees devote a little time in the evening to the practice of Zen, and during the day they sleep or otherwise are riotous, paying very slight attention to the rules of life as bequeathed to us by the Buddha.

This is the way Cimin starts his discourse on the Pure Land doctrine. He then proceeds to dwell on the insurmountable difficulties which stand in the Zen way of attaining enlightenment. He regards on the other hand the teaching and practice of the Nenbutsu as the best means to realize all that is desired by followers of the Buddha. Of the 84,000 ways of attaining enlightenment, the Nenbutsu is the easiest, the most practical, the quickest and the most universal one; for thereby we can see the Buddha, escape the curse of birth-and-death, perfect the Dhyana discipline, attain emancipation and miraculous powers, realize the saintly life, and manifesting ourselves in the six paths of existence save all sentient beings from being drowned in the ocean of birth-and-death. Let us, therefore, devote ourselves to the practice of the Nenbutsu most sincerely and wholeheartedly and untiringly even for this one life, and, as the Buddha teaches, we shall be reborn in the Land of Bliss and Purity, where all our aspirations will be thoroughly fulfilled.

Cimin was thus a strong advocate of the Nenbutsu, and although he was vehemently against the followers of Zen as he understood it in his day, he was not

against Zen itself; he wanted to practice it along with the Nenbutsu in order to prevent Zen from going astray for the reason of its being too one-sided. His idea was to keep the threefold discipline of Buddhism in perfect balance so that the one would not be emphasized at the expense of the other two. This idea may be illustrated in the following diagram:



Zen as it was practiced in China since its early days tended to ignore the study of the sutras and their philosophy on the one hand and to despise on the other the various rules of morality and the religious observations traditionally set up for pious Buddhists. This antinomianistic tendency may be said to be inherent in Zen and will show it loudly when it is handled by unenlightened followers of Zen. The masters were, therefore, always giving warnings to their disciples not to misinterpret the true spirit of Zen. The undesirable effect became, however, already visible as early as in the days of Cimin. And no doubt this led him to become one of the first great syncretists of Zen and Nenbutsu in the history of Chinese Buddhism. Fazhao (法照) of Tang, Yanshou (延壽) of Five Dynasties, Yuanzhao (元照) of Song, Zhuhong (祿宏) and Zhixu (智旭) of Ming, and other syncretists may be all said to have followed the example of Cimin, and the Chinese Buddhism of modern times is the practical outcome of all these movements.

While visiting Suzhou, I had the good opportunity of interviewing Rev. Yinguang (印光) of Baoguo Si in the city of Suzhou.⁶ We talked about Zen and Nenbutsu. His view of Zen was quite definitive. According to it, the realization attained by the practice of Zen is not a final one, it does not go beyond mere intellectual understanding (解 *jie*). To attain Buddhahood means to have a *zheng* (證), and not a *jie*. *Chêng* is deeper and one's entire personality is involved; it is an experience in the inmost recesses of Buddha-consciousness; it is beyond our human understanding, which has its own conditions and limitations as long as we are beings belonging to the relative plane of existence. *Zheng* is possible only when these earthly conditions are dissolved. Zen is an experience we have while in this body, and, therefore, can never make us come face to face with the ultimate reality. We must, therefore, be born in the Land of Purity in order to attain Buddhahood, which is *zheng*. In the Land of Purity, conditions are such as to allow us to have this transcendental experience. All we have to do in this life, or all we can do while here, is to practice the Nenbutsu whereby it is made possible for us to effect a rebirth in Amida's realm. This is Amida's vow as told in the various sutras.

Zen is really meant for those only who are rich in endowments and can go through all the difficulties incident to the discipline of Zen. Zen is too exclusive and aristocratic for common mortals who are heavily laden with all sorts of karma-hindrances gathered up in their previous lives. Reciting the Nenbutsu with all the possible spiritual strength that is left to us in order to be born in the Pure Land is all that is required of us here, and it is not so difficult as Zen and just the thing for us all.

This kind of view is generally held by the followers of Jōdo (*jingtu*, land of purity), and Rev. Yinguang is one of the great advocates of this view now living in China. Each not being able to speak the other's language, I had to desist from a further talk with this interesting reverend Buddhist scholar-monk. He was leading a secluded life known as *biguan*, which means "frontier-gate closed,"⁷ and we were only allowed to speak to him through a narrow window such as we see in a cashier's office or a post office. It was due to his utmost kindness that he put himself from his practice of the Nenbutsu aside in order to see us for a while.

When I talked about the Shin school of the Pure Land teaching in Japan, the followers of which, claiming themselves to belong to a class of sentient beings considered "low and inferior," are in the habit of leading a married life and of eating meat, Rev. Yinguang at once responded, rejecting their claim as Buddhists. His idea perhaps was this: However "low and inferior" we may be, no Buddhist monks are to marry and eat meat. This is forbidden with utmost emphasis by the Buddha, and even so-called low and inferior beings who cannot take to Zen and therefore are to be Pure Land devotees, ought not to be so degraded as to contradict the Buddha's injunctions. To disobey the Buddha and yet to desire his help—this is the height of irrationality and indeed is offering a grave affront to the Buddha.

Here is a great spiritual dilemma: To be so "low and inferior" as not to be able even to follow the Buddha's injunctions, and yet to be earnestly desirous of being saved by the power of the Buddha-dharma. Will the Buddha be so hard-hearted, as it were, not to mind those inferior beings? Will he leave them rolling in the mire of birth-and-death until their karma is exhausted? But if they are really inferior their karma will never have the chance to reform itself, as they will be piling one evil karma on another all the time. But if the Buddha's mercy and compassion is infinite, it ought to reach those inferior beings incapable of being saved by their own efforts. The "other-power" ought to be made somehow to take in even those depraved ones. The Shin teaching is the response to this desperate cry on the part of the "unsavable," of the really "low and inferior." Will the Chinese devotees of the Pure Land school ever dare to listen to this kind of irrationality? A most elaborate system of Buddhist philosophy has developed in Japan about this spiritual irrationality. It may not be a mere waste of time for Chinese Buddhist scholars to study the Shin literature that has grown during these six hundred years around the doctrine of Amida's original vows.

The desire for immortality and the desire for the Pure Land are both derived from our innate longing for our own original birthplace. When we gain this birthplace, the kind of immortality we sought for while here may be found to be altogether different from what we may have then. When we are reborn in the land of Amida, the body we shall then assume may be altogether different from the one we are supposed to leave behind when the time comes. However this is, we all wish to be back in our native place. For this life in the relative plane of existence seems to be something not exactly belonging to our inner self. We feel always constrained in it, we long for deliverance and freedom. In this Buddhism and Christianity are one.

The question is whether this returning is effected by self-power alone, or by other-power alone, or by their combination. Monergism⁸ or synergism, theology may have much to discuss about, but as far as our practical life is concerned, each of us will settle it in his own way to his own satisfaction. I wonder what will be the future development of Chinese Buddhism, individually and as a whole, along this line of thought.

After reading some of the Jōdo-Zen literature, which was published or reprinted in Rev. Yinguang's monastery, Baoguo Si, and which he was kind enough to let us have, I add the following quotations from it:

1. The Zen followers, according to the Jōdo or Jingtū, are depending solely on their self-power (*zi li*) to attain the end of their life, that is, deliverance from birth-and-death. But all that they can really have is a kind of intellectual insight into the reason of one's existence or, as they express it, "to see the nature" (*jian xing*) of one's being. This "seeing" is, however, no easy task, and moreover if "the nature" is at all seen, the seeing must be penetrating enough so that the root of all evil karma is completely cut off. The "seeing" is, therefore, not enough, it must be a realization of the most thorough nature. If there is the least bit of evil karma left, or if there is the faintest shadow of obscurity in the intuition, this will hinder your deliverance from birth-and-death. Supreme enlightenment is something extremely hard to attain for most of us of these days.

2. Zhaozhou (趙州) was one of the greatest Zen masters of China, and yet he had to pass his time in Zen pilgrimage until he was eighty years because he was not quite sure of himself. Changqing (長慶), another great Zen master, is said to have worn out seven cushions under his seat before he attained his enlightenment. Yongquan (湧泉) still remained unsatisfied with himself even after forty years of study. Xuefeng (雪峰) visited Touzi three times and climbed up to Dongshan nine times to complete his training in Zen. Wuzu Jie (五祖戒) was reborn as Su Dongpo (蘇東坡)⁹ and Caotang Qing (草堂清) as Lugong (魯公)¹⁰ because the Zen attainment of both masters was not thorough enough. These examples in the annals of Zen are sufficient to prove the enormous amount of difficulties one has to over-

come in order to attain the highest degree of "seeing," or to realize the clearest possible view of the entire scheme of reality. This is simply because the Zen masters are depending entirely on their self-power, which excludes even the merciful mediation of a higher being such as the Buddha or Bodhisattva.

3. While going through this life of ignorance in which truth and error are confusingly mixed up, we confront all manners of situations rising at every moment of our living. It is like looking for the sun when the threatening clouds are sweeping across the sky. The thickly gathered vapor may disperse for a while allowing us to see the sunlight, but when the weather is in this unsettled condition, who can ever expect anything of the midsummer day? Changes may take place quite suddenly, and all that we have been enjoying a while ago may forever vanish. Unless one is a great expert in this branch of knowledge, nothing definite can be prognosticated. In a similar manner, when a man is struggling hard against all forms of mental confusion, emotional and intellectual, an evil spirit will find fine opportunities to exercise its influence over him, and his mind may go astray without his realizing it. When this takes place, there is no cure for him. He is forever lost. This is because he refuses to avail himself of another power.

4. It is a patent fact that Zen is not meant for everybody, and further that even when it is practiced by people most richly endowed and spiritually gifted, they may not always be able to attain final enlightenment (*zheng*), which will enable them to remove all the hindrances. What the Zen masters express themselves in words sound fine and enhancing and alluring too. But really they are no more than statements of metaphysical understanding, and the masters' inner life that they are actually living betrays all forms of karma-hindrances both intellectual and affectional. And because of this, they are still in the clutches of birth-and-death.

5. Those who are warmly clad and nourishingly fed may well say that they are not attached to things material. But are they really? The hungry ones who have not had a bowl of rice for some days may well declare that even if they see dishes filled with all kinds of tempting food spread right before them they would reject them as filth heaped, but this is no more than mere talk on their part, the declaration falls flat in the face of an eloquent fact. Followers of Zen too frequently commit this kind of fault.

6. On the other hand, the Jingtū is fortified with Faith (*xin*), Will (*yuan*), and Work (*xing*), and by virtue of these the devotees are reborn in the Land of Bliss and Purity. They do not have to expurgate themselves of all the karma-hindrances that are to be left within them. The Faith is to believe in the original vows of Amitābha who assures his devotees of their rebirth if they accept his vows. The Will is to desire for his Land where all the conditions are provided for the full attainment of enlightenment by those permitted there. The Work is to practice the Nenbutsu (*nianfo*), repeating "Nanwu emituo fo" with all the sincerity of heart in one's

possession. This can be done by all people however “inferior” or “ordinary” their natural endowments are; for each of them finds his suitable place in the Pure Land.

7. What is required of the Jingtū devotees is first of all to have absolute faith in Amitābha and rely on his power to take them under his saving arms. They have realized how inefficacious their self-power is for the achievement of a great deed known as “deliverance from birth-and-death.” When this faith is fully established, the power of the Buddha is added to theirs and sustains them throughout their lives and takes them into his realm even with all their karma-hindrances, which are successfully removed once in the Pure Land. Faith awakens the will or desire to be born there, for this rebirth is the condition that enables the Jingtū devotees to attain what they want. The desire naturally moves over to work or the practice of saying the Nenbutsu. The Nenbutsu is really the expression of faith, that is, faith if it is a genuine one must terminate in work. To think of the Buddha, which is the literal meaning of Nenbutsu, is in other words to see the Buddha. The thinking points to the seeing, and the seeing is the being born into the Buddha-field. From the first stage of faith up to the seeing of the Buddha, there is the constant working of the Buddha’s power over his devotees, and the latter are saved from going astray as in the case of Zen in their upward course of spiritual development.¹¹

Considering all in all, the difference between Jōdo (Jingtū) and Zen is that of the attitude one takes by reason of one’s psychology toward the fundamental teaching of Buddhism. The difference of “inferior root” (*xiagen*) and “superior root” (*shanggen*) so much talked about by followers of the Jōdo is not at all that of qualitative valuation, but merely that of psychological type. “Superiority” does not necessarily mean superiority of mind in every aspect of its activity, and “inferiority” its reverse. The “superior” indicates the intellectual or philosophical type of mind, while the “inferior” the affectional or devotional type. The chief characteristic that distinguishes the philosophically inclined people is their spirit of inquiry. For whatever subject they approach they assume an inquiring attitude, wanting to find out what and why and how they are, etc. This is a philosophical habit of mind. The devotional type on the other hand is more subjective and reflective in the sense that it is more conscious of its own shortcomings and weaknesses. It is not quite sure of itself. It does not know whether the instruments available for use are exact enough for the purpose. Instead of examining these instruments scientifically it feels the weight of its “karma-hindrance” so called and is strongly impelled toward the desire to be relieved of the burden.

With the Zen type of mind, such characters¹² as *ming*, “to make clear”; *jian*, “to see into”; *zhao*, “to illumine”; *wu*, “to awake to” or “to understand”; *che*, “to discern” or “to penetrate” are most frequently met with. They all show that the attitude of Zen toward its object is to have a kind of philosophical insight, to comprehend it intuitively. This inner perception is always aimed at by Zen. The devotional type is more concerned with its own weaknesses and sufferings. When it observes

on the one hand how imperfect and iniquitous this world is and on the other how helpless it is to cope with this situation—not only with itself but with the whole environment—it is deeply impressed with the enormity of its karma-hindrances. This feeling makes the Jōdo followers flee from their self-power, which is too feeble to achieve anything by itself, to the other-power, which is strong enough to lift them up from the mire of finitude and imperfection. Zen is in one sense “monergistic,” and Jōdo “synergistic.”¹³

PART THREE

Mature Years

The Logic of Affirmation-in-Negation

1940

Exceedingly well known in the world of philosophy is Suzuki's dictum, *sokuhi no ronri*, translated here as "the logic of affirmation-in-negation." Based in the hermeneutic of the *Prajñāpāramitā* sutra complex and its explication by Nāgārjuna, Suzuki borrows the particular phrasing favored in the Kumārajīva translations of that material where in the Chinese word *jifei* 即非, pronounced *soku-hi* in Japanese, where in *ji/soku* signifies an equivalence or affirmation and *fei/hi* signifies negation. The logic of *sokuhi* is used to express the peculiar Buddhist affirmation of a concept while simultaneously negating it, where both duality and preconception must be overcome for true affirmation. This kind of logic is essential to the Mahāyāna teachings to avoid the error of judging something on the basis of presumptive knowledge about it. Thus the buddha is not me and that is precisely why buddha is me. This can be taken either ontologically or epistemologically, and where Suzuki comes down on this question he himself does not state; in fact, there is very little here in his explanation of *how* or *why* Buddhist logic negates before it affirms other than statements to the effect that humans have a hard time accepting things the way they are, which suggests a heuristic approach.

The essay below is a composite of two separate pieces, neither of which were originally titled "Sokuhi no ronri" (即非の論理) but came to be known as such. The first is taken from "Zen keiken no kenkyū ni tsuite" (禪経験の研究について, "On Research into Zen Experience") found in *Nihon shogaku shinkō i'inkai kenkyū hōkoku Dai 8 hen* (Report of Research by the Committee for Promotion of Japanese Scholarship, vol. 8: Philosophy, 1940, p. 279ff.) and reprinted in 1941 in *Zen mondō to satori*; the second from a subsection of "Kongōkyō no Zen" (金剛經の禪, "Zen in the Diamond Sutra"), originally chapter five in *Nihonteki reisei* ("Japanese Spirituality," 1944, p. 259ff.) and later printed as a separate monograph. The second piece has the subsection title, "Hannya sokuhi no ronri" (般若即非の論理, "The Logic of Affirmation-Negation in Prajñā Wisdom"). Then, in 1959 both essays were reprinted within a volume called *Gendai chisei zenshū #29: Suzuki Daisetsu shū*, edited by

Akizuki Ryōmin, and in the second one (pp. 135–147) the word “Hannya” was dropped, leaving the now familiar name “Sokuhi no Ronri” for the first time. See SDZ at 13.497–517 and 5.263–245. The version here is a modification and expansion by Wayne Yokoyama of his translation appearing in *A Sourcebook in Japanese Philosophy*, J. Heisig, J. Maraldo, and T. Kasulis, eds. (2011), used with permission.

• • •

ON RESEARCH INTO ZEN EXPERIENCE

I do not know anything about logic, and although I admit it’s an odd thing for someone who knows nothing of it to speak of it—this is what Buddhism has to say about [logic]. There are sutras known as *Prajñā Wisdom Sūtras*.¹ The Sanskrit word *prajñā* (*paññā* in Pāli) was translated in China as *zhìhuì*, or “wisdom.” But given that the translation “wisdom” is somewhat lacking, I prefer to call it, “*prajñā* wisdom” (J. *hannya no chie*), even if it is a bit redundant. Using the form “*Prajñā* wisdom” is like saying “to drink a *cupful of a cup* of water,” but the Chinese word *zhìhuì* does not sufficiently convey all that is intended by the Sanskrit *prajñā*.

Contrasted in Sanskrit with the word *jñāna*, meaning something like “knowledge,” the word for “consciousness” is *vijñāna* wherein the prefix *vi-* is added to *jñāna*. The *vi-* has the meaning of “to divide,” that is, consciousness is formed by distinguishing one thing from another. It is in the clash between *prajñā* and *vijñāna* that Buddhist thought developed.

It shows up in a variety of forms in *Prajñā Wisdom Sūtras*, such as the following: “The ‘mind’ is not the mind, therefore it is the mind.” . . . The Chinese rendition of the Sanskrit original, *taccitam acittam yaccitam* (“mind is not mind, that is what mind is”) uses the copulative *soku* 卽 to express affirmation. The second half expresses, “that is what is called” by means of the single word *soku*. In this phrasing, negating (*hi* 非) is none other than affirming (*soku*), and affirming is none other than negating. This is where the so-called *soku-hi no ronri*, the logic of affirmation-negation, comes into existence. This is the logic of *prajñā* wisdom.

This logic of affirmation-negation takes what we today call affirmation (*soku*) and negation (*hi*) and places these two elements in a state of [contradictory] self-identity (*jikō dōitsu*), as expressed by *soku*. This is not meant to define the relationship of *soku-hi* [but in the logic of affirmation-negation] “that is that and this is this, and so this is that and that is this.” The way a person’s thought processes work when expressing ordinary things is to assume the two-ness of things. When we are told the two exist in *soku*, we tend to see the *soku* affirmation as being in opposition to their two-ness or negation. But that is not what Buddhism aspires to do, where the negating *hi*, itself is the affirming *soku*. Their two-ness is still there even as they exist in a relation of [mutual] negation, but that is *soku* affirmation. The

opposition that is *negation* is not linked somehow to the relationship that is affirmation. Negation is directly the affirmation without any mediation in between.

Because human language historically has been used in a restricted way, in order to express affirmation there had to also be some negation, and expressions of negation have to entail some form of [implicit] affirmation as well. In the so-called establishment of this world of ours, things proceeded in this fashion on the basis of this assumption.

THE LOGIC OF PRAJÑĀ WISDOM

I should like to discuss from a Zen viewpoint what may be regarded as the central concept of the *Diamond Sutra*. We begin with the words from the thirteenth chapter . . . , which amount to this:

What the Buddha calls *prajñā* wisdom, this in itself is not *prajñā* wisdom; therefore, it is called *prajñā* wisdom.

This logic, which is fundamental to the philosophy of *prajñā* wisdom, is also the logic of Zen and of Japanese spirituality. Set in a formula, we would have:

For A to be affirmed as A, A has to be non-A; therefore, it is A.

Here affirmation is negation and negation is affirmation. In the *Diamond Sutra* this passage is followed by other statements such as:

What the Tathāgata calls particles, these in themselves are not particles; therefore, they are particles.

The Buddha is said to have thirty-two identifying marks, but those thirty-two marks are not thirty-two marks; therefore, they are indeed the thirty-two marks.

In this pattern of thought all ideas have first to be negated before they are allowed to be affirmed. Someone may object that this is downright irrational. All I can do is try to state it in simpler words. When you see a mountain, you might say, "There's a mountain over there." Or when you see a river, you might say, "Look, there's a river." This is how we ordinarily speak. But in the philosophy of *prajñā* wisdom, a mountain is not a mountain, a river is not a river, and for that very reason a mountain is a mountain and a river is a river. How could this not look irrational to an ordinary mode of thought? The special trait of the logic of *prajñā* wisdom is that it takes all our words and ideas and treats them this way, passing them through a filter of negation before making any affirmations. This, it insists, is the authentic way of looking at things . . .

We take it for granted that we can look at things in an everyday, commonsense sort of way or we can look at them scientifically. *Prajñā* wisdom makes its presence felt in turning this idea on its head. Rather than "take in" some object or other, it

begins by “keeping it out.” It first says, “It is not” and only then comes around to saying, “It is.” What a waste of time, you might think. What conceivable reason can there be for taking such a roundabout route? From the start it is obvious that “the willows are green, the flowers are red,” so why not just say as much and save the extra step? To begin with the claim that “the willows are not green, the flowers are not red” is like looking for waves on dry land: it can only end up in confusion.

Perhaps. But remember: if there is any confusion, it is in our heads; it is something we have generated and was not there in the first place. If there are any waves whipped up on dry land, the blame falls entirely on us. So while it might seem odd to say that a mountain is not a mountain, is it not equally odd that we talk about being born and dying, or dying and being born, when from the start there is no such thing as birth or death? And when we say we want to go on living and do not want to die, are we not looking for waves on dry land?

The critic of such a logic might find it counterintuitive to carry on negating mountains or rivers or flowers or what have you. And when it comes to our own lives, it is hard to see birth and life from the standpoint of the “unborn” without ending up negating the “unborn.” When you look at life and death in the light of the “unborn,” it all sounds as irrational or useless as talk about mountains not being mountains or about the red flower not being red. Those with their two feet planted firmly in intellectual discrimination and driven by the demand for what is useful will never come to direct spiritual insight. The logic of *prajñā* wisdom is a logic of spirituality; to appropriate it you must have an experience that lifts you out of such a standpoint.

Zen adopts this logic but does not treat it in a logical manner. This is its uniqueness. When a person is faced with a life-and-death problem, Zen logic might say: “This life-and-death problem that you want to escape, just exactly where is it? This problem that has you all tied up in knots, can you locate it? And just who is the person who has you tied up? Who is it that has made it impossible for you to move?” This demand that turns questioners back on themselves for answers is what is unique about Zen logic.

In other words, first ordinary consciousness is negated, and then that negation is itself negated, bringing us back to our original affirmation. Again, this may seem a roundabout way of doing things, but our consciousness is such that unless we take this route, it is reluctant to accept things as they are. Viewed in the light of wisdom, that is, when we see things with the eyes of direct spiritual awakening, mountains are mountains and rivers are rivers from the very first and there is no need for any posturing. As experience reminds us again and again, however, negotiating a path from immediate feelings to such spiritual awakening is no easy matter.

Yet for all our difficulties at coming to insight, the spiritual life is our special gift as humans, one that sets us apart from the rest of creation. It is only in the human species, and not plants and animals, that we find the problem of “birth-and-death”

or struggle between the afflictions of desire and the liberation of “nirvāṇa.” Dogs and cats have nothing to say about what birth and death are, about what is good or evil, pleasing or unpleasing. They are born when they are born, die when it comes time to die, eat what they like, and when their stomachs are full, curl up and go to sleep. Only human beings wonder *why* they were born, *why* they must die. No other creature makes such a fuss about wanting to live and not die. Plants and animals do not want to die either, but when the time comes to wither and die, they do so quietly and without complaint. Not like humans who put up a fight. In this sense human beings are no match for plants and animals. But who among us aspires to be a dog or a cat! When we see a mountain, we can see first that the mountain is not a mountain, and then see the mountain. Human beings prefer this circuitous logic. In this uniquely human circuitousness lies the tragedy and comedy of human life. . . . Not even gods, should they exist in a realm beyond our own, would put themselves through this. The capacity to be circuitous, worried, and troubled is distinctively human. The wisdom to see this clearly opens up the world of the spiritual life.

The International Mission of Mahayana Buddhism

1943

In this call out to Buddhists in Japan written in April 1943, Suzuki urges them to take up the mission to spread Mahayana Buddhism to the world. This is no romantic expression of the uniqueness of Japanese Buddhist sensibility; Suzuki strongly criticizes the lack of spiritual appeal of the modern clergy as well as the deep political ties between Japanese Buddhist institutions and the state from ancient times. He also contrasts the pragmatic attractiveness of utilitarianism as it is usually advocated with something much more substantial to him: applying the Mahayana principle of what he calls the “logic of affirmation-negation of *prajñā* wisdom” (*han-nya sokuhi no ronri*). Although some see a disguised nationalism in his writings at this time, in this essay he explicitly rejects what he calls the “ethnic unconsciousness” trending in 1943 that served to define “Japaneseness” and instead advocates allegiance to an idealized “Mahayana Buddhism.” Suzuki’s vision of “true Japaneseness,” in evidence here contains an implicit criticism not only of the nationalism at the heart of Japan’s modern experiment but the nationalism at the heart of traditional forms of Japanese Buddhism. His explicit rejection of the Christian mission’s offer of a universal path for all peoples at the expense of their own religious traditions does not lead to the positing of a Japanese Buddhist replacement for that role. Japanese forms of Buddhism are full of inadequacies and merit severe criticism here, not the least of which are the failures of the Buddhist priesthood in Japan to provide authoritative leadership (he suggests putting the laity in charge). A philosophical form of “Mahayana Buddhism,” however, does hold the promise of an idealized world religion for him. At the very least, this piece illustrates that Suzuki’s proselytizing zeal for Mahayana does not spring from any identification with Japan and Japanese culture, but from the intellectual structure of Mahayana thought itself.

Originally titled “*Daijō bukkō no sekaiteki shimei: Wakaki hitobito ni yosu*” (大乘仏教の世界的使命：若き人々に寄す), published in *Ōtani Gakuho* 24, no. 3 (June 20, 1943): 1–14; in SDZ at 32: 420–435. Translation by Wayne Yokoyama, originally published in *The Eastern Buddhist*, new series, 39, no. 2 (2008). Used by permission.

• • •

Almost eighty years have passed since the Meiji Restoration [1868] to the present day [1943]. In the cultural spheres in Japan outside the Buddhist sector, quite intense developments have taken place. Our contact with the various Western countries has thus proved a profound stimulus for us. At the same time we were able to take appropriate measures in response. Comparing our culture at the beginning of the Meiji period [1868–1912] with that of the present day, this is a fact to which anyone would well attest.

Through scientific advances, the manufacture of machines, technological developments, the accumulation of capital, the increasing complexity of society, and epoch-making changes in the guiding principles of political thought, rapid advances have taken place in recent times in every aspect of our lives to a degree that has never before been seen in any other age in history. To those in the Western world it may well be that the fact of such remarkable progress may no longer disconcert them, but for those in the East, especially Japan, it was indeed earth-shattering. Or rather, the earth-shattering event of that time continues to be so even to the present day. The reason why this is so is attributable to the qualitative difference between Western culture and our Eastern one.

This ideological conflict between our distinctively different cultures is one that is amply evident even today in every facet of our lives. I would contend that such confrontation or compensation or antagonism or struggle and so on, as this phenomenon is to be called, will continue to take place for quite some time. However, accompanying such struggle and conflict there will surely occur a natural easing of the tension between Eastern and Western culture. Before that can happen, though, we must pass through a great many trials, especially with regard to philosophy and culture.

In terms of real life, it is always the case that the convenient replaces the inconvenient. Our Japanese garments, for instance, have been completely replaced by Western ones. However much we may doubt the suitability of the silk hat and frock coat for the Japanese man, they have since become *de rigueur* in the wardrobe of the prominent. Whether the electric trolley, wireless telegraph, airplane, or armored tank, if useful, regardless of its origins, all of them will be taken up in short order and used as easily as something in our own medicine cabinets. Utility, profitability, efficacy make up the new mantra that is now being heard everywhere. During the time of the Meiji Reformation, men would cover their topknots with a fan when passing under electric wires. Today, though, there is not a single Japanese person who would try with all their might to exorcise these “barbaric, defiled inventions.” It makes me think there is perhaps no force in the world as irresistible as utilitarianism.

When it comes to our thoughts, feelings, and preferences, though, utilitarianism may not always be so eloquent a spokesman. Although there may be times when the philosophy underlying utilitarianism seeps unconsciously into our thinking in these areas, when consciously considered, we resist utilitarian philosophy. The will

and way of thinking of our primitive ethos stand firm deep in our spiritual life and will not budge. This will and way of thinking try to gain control on the conscious level both in positive and negative ways. Thus even were we to fully adopt foreign utilitarian schemes, or were obliged to adopt them, when it comes to the philosophy or way of thinking that undergirds utilitarianism, we would find ourselves consciously rejecting it. Utilitarian schemes are not necessarily all generated from utilitarian philosophy alone; they can also contain elements of religion, morality, and cooperative social life, as seen in such slogans as universal brotherhood for all, impartiality in dealing with others, equal benefit for all, working for the public good, and be dependent on the people for your decision. Although utilitarianism is said to be utility- or effectiveness-oriented, it cannot be said to be motivated by mere self-benefit alone. For this reason, we cannot dismiss it out of hand using a philosophy based in our primitive ethnic sentiment, it will not do to dismiss it out of hand. The utilitarian philosophy itself latently contains a good deal of selfish individualism.

Utilitarian schemes have an element of internationality to them and, therefore, are not limited to things like ethnicity. Utilitarianism possesses a character that goes beyond national boundaries and is not limited regionally. It is in this dimension that we find its distinctive difference from Japanese culture. However, we must forego the discussion for the present time. In the following we will look briefly at the way in which Buddhist philosophy has responded to Western culture.

Utilitarianism, which makes up one facet of Western culture, is not aimed merely at profitability; it is also possessed of internationality and imbued with religiosity—these are facts that we should not lose sight of. The way of thinking informed by our primitive ethnic ethos, which is known by the name “Japanese-ness,” is challenging this utilitarianism, scientific thought and technology, which are internationally oriented. While on the surface of our “Japanese” minds we lay out all kinds of apparently logical arguments, beneath them all there operates the logic of affirmation-negation of *prajñā* wisdom. That is, the task for us to solve today is first how to negate our “Japanese-ness” and then return to affirm our true selves as Japanese. Our philosophical dilemma today lies in an inability to reconcile consciously and philosophically the fact that, geographically speaking, we are trying to make a leap out of the limited island nation called Japan and lead international, continental lives. During the Kamakura period we experienced that sudden intellectual leap—what I call the logic of negation, or the logic of affirmation-negation; today we find ourselves faced with the same situation. In the Kamakura period, however, the reality of this intellectual leap came about almost entirely unconsciously; today, by contrast, we are conscious of the challenge confronting us, and we must defuse this crisis consciously, that is, philosophically. We Japanese have come this far. Some people have urged us to retreat into the backwaters of our

ethnic unconsciousness, and as much as it may sound like a winning solution to some, in fact such a scheme is entirely shortsighted.

What actions did Buddhist philosophy and lifestyle take as a result of this intrusion of foreign culture into its environment? Well, the fact is, in the eighty years that have since passed they have done not a thing. As long as any life remains to Buddhism, even if its physical form were to die out, it would certainly sprout anew. However, since its teaching is spread by individuals, and those people are one part of that physical form, were it to disappear, it would be a long and difficult process to revive it. Then, during that period, undesirable elements would be allowed to flourish unchecked. Thus the defense, growth, and prosperity of the truth must be seen to in a conscious, well thought-out, and systematic manner. Japanese Buddhism today is indeed facing a serious crisis. If at this juncture we were to fail to take the time to work out a solution, we may well have to suffer the bitter experience of looking on as the very life force of Buddhism is extinguished. Subtle signs of this are to be seen everywhere we look.

The Buddhist religious organizations, living in the traditions of the feudal era, experienced a major shock from the political reformation of the Meiji Restoration. The ideology that had supported the religious organizations was badly shaken, let alone the damage to their material basis. Fortunately, there were a number of great priests and religious leaders who were able to restore the status of these institutions, but since then the thought and practice of Buddhists, the monks especially, have been like "the worm in the lion" [sapping the strength of its host], and this condition at present is widespread. Herein lies the root of all evil, its source exposed, and these poisonous vines grow more rampant with each passing day. Despite the fact that Japanese Buddhist religious organizations have become little more than extensions of the funeral industry, the monks are resigned to doing nothing about it. Eastern and Western culture and thought are bearing down on each other in a collision course, and though there are a great many ordained monks among these religious organizations, it makes me wonder whether there is a single one who is concerned with solving this very real problem confronting us or not.

The majority of these priests are incapable of doing anything other than promoting, defending, and serving what has come to be called "Japanese" Buddhism. The "Japanese-ness" they speak of is nothing but the empty shell of the past. In view of today's world situation, that empty shell is not something that they should be preoccupied themselves with. I have heard it said that the best defense is a good offense, and today what the term "Japanese-ness" should instead imply is the negation of the past behind and the conscious opening up of a new phase. We can no longer live simply clinging to the past. Today, we must first negate it. If out of this negation we do not nurture into being a new life force, then even clinging to the past will become impossible. In recent times I have heard people talking in terms of "progress through changing" and "developmental dissolution," but at whichever one we look

we can detect the logic of negation. It should not be necessary for me to point out that this is of course not negation in the ordinary sense of the term.

Kamakura Buddhism negated the Nara and Heian Buddhism that preceded it to develop a new, popular form of Japanese Buddhism. This opportunity was given to us Japanese people by the decline of the court nobility, the rise of the warrior class, the renewed contact with Chinese literature, and the spirit of defiance against the threat of Mongol invasion, among other things. Kamakura Buddhism, as a result of these stimuli, was able to shed itself of the abstract, aristocratic, amusement-oriented and island-country mentality that had characterized Buddhism up to then. In other words, Buddhism itself was able to waken to its original mission. During the long course of the intervening six or seven centuries, however, Buddhism has managed to put fetters on itself again. Today the opportunity presents itself to throw them off and advance yet another step forward. In response to the incursion of the distinctively different Western culture and thought, Buddhists as Buddhists must negate their way of thinking up to now, that is, purge themselves of the aspects of the past that deserve to be purged, and proceed to develop Buddhism in novel directions. What we call the Greater East Asia War, is, ideologically speaking, actually a struggle between Eastern and Western culture.¹ Buddhists must join in this struggle on their own initiative if they are to fulfill their original mission.

In terms of culture and thought, though we may speak of it as a struggle, conflict, or competition, this does not mean we should throw our opponent to the ground and render him immobile. This is especially the case when our opponent is not necessarily our inferior in intellectual, material, or historical terms, and so on; then not only is it actually impossible to eradicate our opponent, indeed doing so would not work to our benefit. Western culture is distinctly different from that of the East, and for that reason alone, we may assimilate it. In the same vein they need to assimilate our culture as well. On our side we need to do as much as we can to put our counterparts in that frame of mind. That role is truly one that Buddhism is charged with. The reason I say this is, it is Buddhist thought that we find at work at the axis of the Eastern way of thinking.

The systems that comprise Buddhist thought, however, must not be made dependent on things of the past. We must have sufficient understanding of the core of our opponents' philosophical systems as well as an appreciation of the most qualitatively distinctive features of our own systems. This appreciation will deepen to the same degree as our understanding of our opponents. That is, it is through knowing our opponents that we come to know ourselves. We do not arrive at an understanding of ourselves solely through ourselves. It is because there are those who are completely unlike ourselves that we come to recognize ourselves. One does not come to understand the Orient simply by holing up in the East. If we are

attached to our geographically and culturally limited past, is it even possible for us to understand ourselves? This attitude does nothing more than foster conservative, backward, and reactionary philosophies, which are entirely self-centered and exclusive. If we simply retreat into our shell like a turtle, the completion of any sort of philosophical development that is a move forward either externally or biologically would be unthinkable even in a dream.

Buddhists should first see the organizational institutionalism of their sects as heirlooms of the past and simply acknowledge their existence. Eventually and not too far from now, they will probably decay away naturally. The doors should not be closed to the historical, traditional, or academic research into Buddhism as fields of specialized study, but the methodology of that research is in need of revision. Research into Buddhist philosophy, logic, and intellectual history is also to be greatly encouraged, but these studies are in tedious detail as if it were a dead object. If Buddhism is to have a future, and if it is to have something to contribute to the advancement of the philosophy and culture of the world, it must be treated as a living thing. That is, Buddhism must bring its philosophical content to light as a fact of our religious experience through modern theoretical methods and modes of expression. Furthermore, we must proclaim within our country and beyond that which is eternal, true, and international within it, that which can be understood, practiced, and attained equally by ourselves and others. Once Buddhism is taken up in this fashion, then for the first time it will take on a life of its own. If it does not have a life of its own, not only is there no reason for it to exist, but also it will not develop to a point where it is capable of affecting Western culture and thought. Through the constant negation of what has preceded it, life itself can maintain its continuity and therefore immutability. What has died has died and must pass away. Living things always move forward in time, thereby expanding themselves. Life has to press forward, or else it will fall back, and here retreat means death.

This is not necessarily limited to the Japanese spirit; whatever living thing it may be, all of them obtain as many nutrients from their environment as possible. As long as an organism lives, it will not turn into the nutrients that it has taken in. For a living organism, nutrients are its sustenance. When they cease to be nutritive, even if an organism may strive with all its might to live, it has already begun the process of dying. Living things always get their sustenance from their environment by various means. When that power to acquire nutrition runs out and they have to consume themselves, they have been read a death sentence. To live in the past is like the young master of an old house that has been brought to ruins who sells the family heirlooms in order to eke out a meager day-to-day existence. What life is there in that, however—what power does it have to bridge the gap? Buddhists should never allow themselves to get into a similar situation. If Buddhism does not have any substantial life left in it, then we must let it pass away, but if there remains some life in it, then it must absorb all the nutrients available from its

environment. Moreover, since that environment is not in a state of rest for even an instant, Buddhism should never suspend taking sustenance from its environment.

Buddhism is a living organism, and there is nothing that moves Buddhism to realize the meaning of its existence to the extent that today's international milieu does. In other words, it is to the present age that Buddhism must boldly proclaim its vital existence. Buddhists have to reflect on the content of their religious experience as fact and must represent that experience effectively using the modern methods of thinking.

I think it was the mid-Meiji period when Dr. Inoue Enryō (1885–1919) authored his *Bukkyō katsuron* 仏教活論 (*On the Vitality of Buddhism*, 1887), demonstrating the reason that Buddhist philosophy is not inferior to Western philosophy. Professor Murakami Senshō (1851–1929) wrote his *Bukkyō tōitsuron* 佛教統一論 (*A Theory for the Integration of Buddhism*, 1901) wherein he tried to impart unity on Buddhist doctrines. Since then Buddhist scholars have appeared who have variously explored different aspects of Buddhism. There are those who are researching the Pāli and Sanskrit Buddhist literature, and others the Tibetan and Southern Buddhist traditions. As these scholars have been appearing one after another in ample numbers, we are witnessing a flourishing of so-called Buddhist studies. At the same time, among these studies we see no attempt to explain the contents of Buddhist thought as a fact of vital religious experience from a modern perspective. Nor do we see anyone who brings this thought up against Western culture and thought and attempts to relay to the world what is truly Eastern. We are surrounded by hordes of people who, just clinging to Japanese-ness, protect such a geographically limited thing as if it were their last outpost and thereby die with the past that they love. And that may all be fine and good. Would it not be wonderful, though, if there were but one person who was inspired by the vitality of living Buddhism who could transcend the limited notion of a Greater Asia and proclaim the fact of his religious experience to “the heavens above and all below them.”

In order to proclaim, minutely reveal, and sing out in praise of the Way, however, it is not enough to take recourse merely to tradition. A living religious experience must be expressed in living words, languages, and ideas. Pouring new wine into old wineskins simply will not do. Just as the cicada, butterfly, and snake leave behind their old skins, we too must divest ourselves of the old without a twinge of regret. Only people who have wrung dry the wellspring of life are so bound up with the old. Look at Dōgen (1200–1253) and Shinran (1173–1262). Did they not develop their own individual modes of expression and interpretation? Here dwells the living force of Zen; here, too, dwells the living force of Shinshū. The flourishing of the “Japanese spirit” during the Kamakura period clearly did not occur by coincidence. As aforementioned, we have to execute discerningly, with sufficient awareness, consciousness, thought and logic, what our ancestors did almost entirely unconsciously during the Kamakura period. The reason is that our ancestors, with regard to their

environment, did not have the intellectual resources to deal with the problem consciously and to analyze it discerningly. We who have been born now, six centuries later, and have experienced the culture of the Meiji period, are like the residents of the Garden of Eden after the apple was eaten. We are conscious of the kind of intellectual milieu we are in. We are no longer able to resolve to try to move out into the world with a worldview through refurbishing our simplistic, primitive, ethnic ethos by adding a traditionalistic, sectarian, insular, politicized Buddhism to it.

Geographically speaking, even Greater Asia is not suitable as a stage on which our spiritual awareness should appear. Culturally, it will not do to run and hide ourselves in the cave of traditional Oriental thought and attempt to become a cave-dwelling people who gaze out on the great sky from its mouth. Just as an electrical pulse can circle the world in a few seconds, the wave of our philosophy is able to go from one corner of the world to another, and once it starts to move there is nowhere it cannot go, as it makes its influence felt in other spheres, nor is it impossible for it to return from there. The world since the Meiji has been such that if a bell is struck in one corner, its reverberations are felt throughout. Today it is not ours to retreat and defend, but to go forth and take. That is the only path open to us. Thus what we must remember is that we must negate what ought to be negated, and thereby we can face historical reality for the first time. Thus I say, living Buddhism must be based on the living fact of religious experience and expressed in living words and languages. Once we can do that we find a way for Buddhism to contribute to the history of international culture and thought.

Buddhism's institutionalized religious organizations may have some historical or political meaning, but they do not go beyond having anything more than that. In the contact, exchange, and struggle between Eastern and Western culture and thought, which are the most realistic of our problems, we have to stare reality squarely in the face; the religious organizations count for nothing. Further, with regard to those working within those organizations, that is, the monks, they are a kind of tool, and in a sense they enjoy the social status they have by providing a kind of business service. Among them we can spy many who are rushing about trying to avoid losing that status. These people do not have any thought to guide the laity and lead them to enter the Buddhist path. In this regard, even if one suggested to these priests to develop the kind of dignity that the Zen master Bankei 盤珪 (1622–1693) expresses when he says, "I am the leader of the triple world. I do not have to ask the laity to act as my witness," they would be incapable of doing so. Instead, they chase after the laity, only afraid that they will be unable to keep up. These monks have no qualification to mount the stage where Eastern and Western culture are engaged in exchange and struggle. Well, who then will bear on their shoulders a living Buddhism, you ask. I think that responsibility will fall on the shoulders of young students whose names are as yet unknown.

In what way will they bear that living Buddhism? How should they prepare themselves spiritually for this task?

If there are living young Buddhists (not dead ones) who wish to proclaim to the world a living Buddhism and contribute to the development of the history of international philosophy, I imagine they would first think of the problem as follows.

First, Japanese Buddhism has never been Mahayana Buddhism in the true sense of the term. It has always been too bound up in the politics of its island country; this feature that once made it perfectly suited to its existence within that environment, today makes it impossible for Buddhists to rise above that limit. The Japanese Buddhist has never burned with the missionary zeal to go to other lands and die in the wilderness. In this regard, I feel Buddhists compare very unfavorably to Christians, particularly Catholics, with their spirit to struggle to spread their teachings. Even if one may be willing to sacrifice oneself within Japan, there is not even one Buddhist who is willing to make a martyr of himself to go outside the country for the path he believes in, who would be willing to leave Japan to go abroad to strange lands to dwell among foreigners, where no one in Japan would know whether he was dead or alive. This is only to be expected, given the character of Japanese Buddhism.

Since from here on out, Buddhism must articulate its *raison d'être* not just in Japan but internationally; the way for Japanese Buddhism to survive is through returning to the true nature of Mahayana Buddhism. The Buddhists of Japan misconceive Mahayana Buddhism as having neither precepts nor insight nor regulations nor knowledge. However, viewed in terms of its history or evolution, Mahayana Buddhism was never like that. I am sure that this is well known to those who are practicing Mahayana Buddhism in a "Japanese" way.

Mahayana Buddhism should not be sequestered away in Japan. It has an international mission. Philosophically, it is imperative that it leaves Japan, as it contains much within itself that will contribute to the improvement of international culture when it goes out into the world. While the various Japanese cultural assets that have been produced and preserved in a Japanese way are meaningful in the places where they have grown, developed, and are preserved, anyone with the slightest discernment would readily understand that these assets would require a great deal of adjustment if one were to give them internationality and make them meaningful across the globe. Among these, not only can Mahayana Buddhist philosophy alone be taken anywhere as is, it can also serve as a great alarm to the various other thought systems throughout the world.

Second, Mahayana Buddhism as it has been handed down to us, however, may be of little use. Mahayana thought has to be baptized in the waters of contemporary science and philosophy. In other words, living young Buddhists have to keep abreast of the leading ideas that are animating today's world. Without such understanding,

they would be unable to arrive at a correct grasp of Mahayana thought. Then, it would be impossible to make that thought valid internationally, to make it work at an international level. It is without doubt that performing research into the historical background of the origins of Mahayana thought in India, its development in China, and its preservation in Japan is important. However, that alone is not enough as a means of bringing Mahayana thought to move the world. Buddhists—young Buddhists conditioned by the world—have to keep themselves constantly informed as much as possible as to movements in world thought. Further, they must consider how to process that information in a Buddhist vein. Those who understand Buddhism with only traditional or historical methods have the unfortunate defect that they are unable to make that understanding meaningful internationally.

That alone is not sufficient. Knowing how to make Mahayana thought meaningful at an international level is not simply summed up by being able to understand Buddhism internationally. It means charging into the middle of the battle of international thought. It must not be just protecting one corner of the world with an insular mentality in a traditional way. That is nothing more than presenting the narrowness and insularity of that thought. If there are people who have attained the attitude that “I solemnly vow to deliver sentient beings from suffering, however boundless the sea of beings may be,” and “I solemnly vow to learn the approaches to the Dharma, however infinite in number they may be,” they must proclaim what they have understood in a way that can be understood by anyone over the largest possible area for the longest possible period of time. It will not do for us to hole up and keep it for ourselves, lest we be admonished for hiding our awakening to ourselves. Military conflict without an ideological background is merely a beastly struggle to the death, which for man is the most shameful thing.

That is, Mahayana Buddhists must not stop at realizing the international nature of what they believe in, but must go on to proclaim and argue internationally that internationality in an international logic. This requires that tradition and history be negated for the time being. We are being called on internationally to make a 180 degree turn. One could say that this opportunity arose by chance. Or one could say it arose from the actions of a certain group that broke out of control. Regardless of what the direct cause might be, today, in the year 1943, what is demanded of us is that we make a complete turnabout in our culture and thought. This call seems as though it would resonate in the depths of the heart of a Mahayana Buddhist. No, more than that, I believe that it is heard by everyone. However, we may not be ready to respond to it. During the Kamakura period, Shinran was moved by the spirit of the times beckoning to him from the very folds of the earth, and look how he went on to negate tradition.

Up until the time of Shinran the traditional view had been that sentient beings transferred the merit derived from good karma upward toward *bodhi*, the awakened state. Shinran, however, understood merit transference as coming from the

Tathāgata. This was a direct negation of the traditional view. That merit transference, which had been assumed to be an upward movement, could be read as a movement from top down was something that no one prior to Shinran had thought of. Once someone comes up with it the notion may seem rather unremarkable, but to first conceive it required a true leap, a leap across the gap. From the very first, Mahayana Buddhism has always had a doctrine of mutuality, but it was Shinran's genius to consciously dwell on this concept and articulate it in his writings. Since then Shinshū believers have developed a traditional doctrinal system and lived the lay lifestyle following Shinran's example (Shinshū has no priests in the usual sense of the term) that allows eating meat and getting married. Though they have researched his teachings and lived a lay life as he did, this is still not enough. They have to leap into Shinran's living religious experience itself. Then we can truly begin to talk. This might be the complete turnabout that is beckoning to Shinshū believers today.

. . .

Although just reading what I have said above may leave one feeling that there is something inconclusive in my argument, if my readers will consider the statements of those who are regarded as Buddhists and as thinkers in our country today, I believe they will be able to grasp what I am trying to say.

First of all, I would like you to observe the words and actions of today's Buddhists, especially those of the monk class. Does not the majority seem to be simply living on tradition? Moreover, what tradition refers to is nothing other than the feudal tradition. Let us look at the life that the "monks" lead in today's temples. In a sense, their lives are feudalism itself. However, in another sense, very "modern" aspects have been appended. As a result, their lifestyle has come to be quite complex. They may seem to be leading lay lives, but "temples" are not homes for the laity. From the perspective of their being monk-like, one must say there is a difference between their lifestyle and that of the laity. Well, then, what of their views, we ask. We find there is not one among them who would willingly lend an ear to what the laity has to say. From one perspective, these priests might know the Buddhist canon inside and out, but their grasp of it does not go beyond the box of traditional views. In order for those teachings to have currency in the real world, they must be taken out of the hands of the priests and placed in the hands of the laity. Indeed, when ideas are shorn off from practical application, they cease to have a life of their own. If we allow the priceless treasures contained in Buddhist philosophy to rust away unused, we will have done something unforgivable to our ancestors.

Next, let us take a good look at the way in which the world's modern thought, especially scientific thought, is influencing the various aspects of culture. It will no longer do for us to live in the cheap conceit that "we Japanese are spiritual, those Westerners are materialistic." There is nothing as immoral and materialistic as

claiming that one is spiritual or has a monopoly on morality. Although it is useless to criticize those whose eyes and ears are covered and do just as they are told, any Buddhist with the least powers of self-reflection and observation should be able to tell what is actually going on around them. While I would not say these people are being duped, clearly they are not using their eyes and ears to their full capacity.

Science does not just work in our everyday lives technologically. Science in fact also works within our inner lives via the concepts that comprise it. We must not forget that there is both a good side and a bad side to this. We can only obtain an eye to discern that good and bad through an essential grasp of Mahayana Buddhism. Some say that Buddhism and science are not in opposition. This is something that a person who does not understand Buddhism would say. Buddhism has a perspective from which to criticize science. We cannot put Buddhism and science in the same category and say that the object of both of their positions, both of their spirits, is the same. Buddhists must have a selective eye in these matters. With this eye they must appreciate matters from a higher dimension, whether it be philosophy or science. (However, I cannot address this point any further in the present essay.)

At any rate, in whatever direction Buddhists may turn nowadays, they are confronted by the need to consummate the fact of a complete turnabout. I hope that living young Buddhists will consider this matter deeply.

Excerpts from The Essence of Buddhism

1946

This title refers to the English-language text of two lectures Suzuki Daisetz delivered to the Emperor and Empress of Japan in April 1946, less than a year after the end of the war. This work not only stands out because of the auspiciousness of the occasion but also because together with another work published in 1944, *Nihonteki reisei*, they represent definitive statements of his religious outlook from this period when Suzuki was in his late seventies. An English translation of *Nihonteki reisei* appeared in 1972 under the title *Japanese Spirituality*.

The sweeping nature of these writings suggests summaries if not conclusions of his life and career as a spokesman for what I think he himself would acknowledge as “the Suzuki understanding” of Buddhist spirituality as embedded in over a millennium of Japanese cultural expression. *The Essence of Buddhism* in particular is a bold, detailed statement of how he understands this form of religious awakening to work. In this regard, to understand Suzuki we need to recognize not only what he discusses but also what he all but ignores. Perhaps the most significant lacuna is anything remotely like a social perspective; although there is plenty of what is normally regarded as “doctrine” here, there is almost no attempt to frame it in the particularities of the social and political contexts when and where it arose. One could attribute this to his own context of writing barely eight months after the end of the war, but in fact this lack of social context can be found in his Meiji-period writings as well. And the doctrinal presentation here is hardly comprehensive—instead Suzuki is writing what he considers the *main ideas*, the *tai'i* 大意 as he called his original lectures to the Emperor. What we have here is essentially what matters most in Suzuki Daisetz’s understanding of Buddhism.

And what matters most is often surprisingly *religious* in tone. If anything, *Essence of Buddhism* echoes a personal religious perspective that is often resistant to the rationality in philosophy and Buddhist doctrinal systems of thought, reminiscent of Kiyozawa Manshi.

This “end of the war and early postwar period” shows what appears to be a newfound respect for Pure Land Buddhism as embodying many of the ideals described in abstract

scriptures like *Huayan/Kegon Sutra* or the *Nirvana Sutra*, even if Pure Land tradition does not hold out the intellectual excitement that he finds in Zen literature. This is also seen in his work on so-called *myōkōnin*, the often illiterate or semiliterate saints that are part of the Shin Buddhist tradition, embodying the power of Shinran's perspective on what Buddhism is and how it should be lived.

There is much interweaving of Christian theology and mysticism here, and a newfound confidence in Suzuki's famous theory of the identity of affirmation and negation known as *sokuhi no ronri* (see chapter 16). Perhaps most enigmatic is why Suzuki felt the need in this monograph to use phrases like "truly appreciating God's way with us" to make his point about the nature of spirituality. The key to this appears to be his deepening appreciation of the *other-power* perspective on the salvific power of the dharma and the similarity he finds in Christian mysticism. One of the hallmarks of *Essence of Buddhism* is his assertion that the Pure Land (he always capitalizes the phrase) is the realm of nonduality, nondiscrimination, or in the language from the *Huayan jing* employed here, the interpenetration of objects (*shishi wuai* 事事無礙, Japanese *jiji muge*). In response to this, Suzuki expresses an unusual degree of devotionality in this essay; for example, "[Amida] stands in a very much closer relationship to me than a book before me, in fact even closer than my own parents; hence, his Enlightenment could not but affect me." I would argue that this perspective can be traced to a deeply emotional sense of awe he felt at discovering the religiosity of local Shin saints in the Edo and Meiji periods called *myōkōnin*. Thus he employs here stories from the nineteenth-century *myōkōnin* known as Shōmatsu to show what can only be described as a deeply personal bond with Amida Buddha. In phrases such as "the embracing arms of Amida"—which appears to be Suzuki's invention—he is rejoicing at finding Buddhist, if only Japanese Buddhist, analogues to expressions of "God as Love" as a universal.

Below is the entire text of the original version of "The Essence of Buddhism," a translation of his imperial lectures made by Suzuki working with Christmas Humphreys, first published by The Buddhist Society in London in 1946, one year before the Japanese text came out in 1947 under the title *Bukkyō no tai'i* 佛教の大意 (Kyoto: Hōzōkan); in SDZ 7: 1–79. Two other greatly expanded editions of *Essence* were published in London (The Buddhist Society) in 1947 and in Kyoto (Hōzōkan) in 1948, respectively, in which Lewis Bush and R. H. Blyth worked with Suzuki to produce a work more than double the length of the original. After much clamor for access to the original 1946 edition, it was reprinted in *What Is Zen?* (The Buddhist Society) in 1971, the text used here. Original translation materials from various manuscripts found at The Matsugaoka Bunko were compiled in 2012 but have not yet been published.

• • •

PART I

Before I speak about Buddhism, I should like to say something about religion in general. For Buddhism, like other religions, is often considered as having no direct communication with life itself, and many think that they can get along quite well without it. Some go further and say that [religion] is mere superstition, and that whether

heaven and hell exist is no concern of theirs. Some have gone further still and described religion as the opium of the masses, a means used by capitalists and bureaucrats to make the people blindly obey their will. At the least they claim that God is merely an object of selfish prayer. If this is what is meant by Buddhism, there is no understanding of the function which religion plays or should play in our daily life.

In the ordinary way, we do not recognize the fact that we are living in two worlds—a world of sense and intellect, and a world of spirit. We are apt to consider the former real and the latter unreal, imaginary, existing only in the minds of poets, visionaries, and the so-called spiritualists. But from the religious point of view this latter world is far more real than that of the sense-intellect, which, contrary to our commonsense notion, is a reconstruction, and not the one immediately revealed to the spirit. This explains the constant feeling that there is something in our conception of life which is unaccounted for, a feeling that torments us in various ways until the missing part is found. Quite apart from the problem of philosophy, our daily life is full of contradictions, and though some ignore them, others are deeply troubled. In the course of the troubled wandering, they struggle to find a way out and immediately notice the unreality of the life they are leading day by day. Having reached this stage, they begin to look for some other world on a different plane; meanwhile, all which they had previously regarded as true and real begins to lose its significance. Then they begin to realize that what they had previously thought to be real is not truly unreal either, but real only in connection with a greater reality behind it. The two worlds already described are found to be two phases of one world, and it is only by not understanding the fact of one world that they foolishly believed that there were two. For this relative world in which we know that we live, and the more real world that lies behind it, form a complete and undivided whole, and neither is more real than the other. Or, it may be better to say that the relative world gains its reality by being merged into the spiritual world, though this does not mean that relativities are thereby lost, and sink into the chaotic state of the undifferentiated. The cause of our unhappiness is found to be the fundamental error that there are two separate and uncoordinated worlds, when the truth is that the world is one.

Now how do we come to regard this one world as two separate worlds? The one is the world of distinction and discrimination, of the intellect and reasoning; the other is the world of nondistinction and nondiscrimination, of the spirit. We live in the world of distinction and discrimination, which is dominated by reason, and take it to be real. But in fact it is interpenetrated by the world of nondistinction and nondiscrimination, and only when the former is viewed in the light of the latter do we arrive at the true meaning of distinction and discrimination. It is not too much to say that religion arises from this understanding.

This conception of nondistinction¹ admittedly runs counter to our daily experience, which is based on innumerable distinctions and the ensuing processes of

thought. For this reason most of us will not subscribe to the idea of nondistinction, and yet this contradiction—being distinct yet not distinct—and its consequent unintelligibility is what makes up the religious life. It is for this reason that there are so many things in our religious experience that go counter to our rational experience. This unintelligibility is absolute so long as it is understood on the plane of mere rationality, but when it is reduced to the point where the merging of distinction and nondistinction takes place, all irrationalities will disappear.

This world of nondiscrimination is the spiritual world as the West understands it. In Buddhism, it is Nirvana, or Bodhi, or the attaining of Buddhahood, or being born into the Western Paradise. To the Japanese mind, some of these terms are associated with an after-death condition and may therefore appear negative. But this is only because we are still under the bondage of the analytic and discriminating mind, which loves to dichotomize even where this is impossible. To understand these terms properly, we have first to destroy the intellect, in the sense of completely transcending its power, and so reaching the foundation of all things. For in the world of analysis and discrimination the self is predominant, and so long as the self is not destroyed we cannot enter the world of nondistinction. This is why these terms are, from the lower point of view, always negative. Yet the spiritual world of nondistinction is positive and affirmative, for it is only when surveyed from the spiritual point of view that this analytical intellect acquires significance in our daily life of distinction and discrimination. We have always to keep in mind the fact that the things discriminated have value only when they are referred to the world of spirit.

Buddhists often speak of the “Great Death,” which means dying to the ordinary life, or putting an end to the analyzing intellect. Slay, they would say, with one stroke this meddling intellect, and throw it to the dogs. This is a strong phrase, but the idea is plain; it is to transcend the intellect. For the spiritual world of nondiscrimination will never open its doors until the world of the discriminating mind is destroyed to its foundations. Then only comes the birth of Prajñā, the illuminated, nondiscriminating mind. Vijñāna is enlightened, and is now Prajñā and moves in its own straight path. When Vijñāna, our normal consciousness, lacks the light of Prajñā, it loses its way. When Prajñā shines there is still distinction, but the distinctions are viewed in the light of nondistinction, and the self is dead. But we must not think that Prajñā exists in separation from Vijñāna, or vice versa. Separation means distinction, and where there is distinction in any form there is no Prajñā. And without Prajñā, Vijñāna loses its way.

Prajñā is therefore the knowledge of nondistinction or nonthinking, in the sense that all thought involves the distinction of this and that, for to think means to analyze. Acintya, nonthinking, means not to divide, that is, to pass beyond all intellection, and the whole of Buddhism revolves about this central idea of non-thought, or nonthinkingness.

But to repeat, we must not assume that the spirit of nondistinction has a separate existence of its own apart from the intellect, for if it were separate it would have no vital connection with our daily life, and there would be no nonthinking. There is, however, nonthinkingness just because distinction is interfused with nondistinction, and nondistinction with distinction, however paradoxical this may be. The spirit is always at the back of the intellect, but the intellect conveniently, though often to its own ruination, forgets that it only functions by virtue of the spirit of nondistinction shining through. To realize this fact, that thinking is nonthinking and nonthinking is thinking, is to attain enlightenment, to become Buddha, to enter the Western Paradise. It is the "second birth" of Hindu philosophy, the giving up of life in order to gain it of the New Testament.

The Emperor Hanazono (reigned 1308–1318), a most devout Buddhist, once invited Daitō, the National Teacher who founded the Daitokuji Temple at Kyoto, to a talk on Buddhism. When Daitō appeared before the Emperor and had seated himself, the Emperor remarked, "Is it not a matter of unthinkability that the Buddha-Dharma should face the royal Dharma on the same level?" Daitō replied, "Is it not a matter of unthinkability that the royal Dharma should face the Buddha-Dharma on the same level?" The Emperor was pleased at the reply.

This famous *mondō* is most suggestive. The Buddhist authority here represents the world of spirit, and the royal or civil authority the world of distinction. So long as we live in the dual world of distinction we must obey its laws. A tree is not a bamboo and a bamboo is not a tree; a mountain is high and rivers flow; the willow is green and the flower is red. In the same way, where social order obtains the Master is Master and the subject is subject. Daitō was a subject, and must therefore sit below the Emperor, and the Emperor's remark was made with this in mind. As long as we stay in the world of the intellect we cannot allow the intrusion of the nonthinking spirit. As long as the Emperor was living in a world of distinction and did not recognize the existence of a world above his own, Daitō must stand below the Emperor. Then Daitō, revealing the existence of a higher world, explained that as long as the Emperor looked at the Master from his own point of view he would be unable to see how the world of nondistinction could break through into the world of distinction, and there claim its place. But as soon as the Emperor was awakened to the truth that there is a world of nondistinction, thoroughly interfused with and actually in the world of distinction and discrimination, he understood how Daitō came to him and sat facing him on the same level. The Emperor's unthinkability was relative, for he looked at things with discriminative eyes. Daitō's viewpoint, on the other hand, was absolute, for he looked at things from a purely transcendental point of view where there was no room for intellection. Thus the two men, though using the same terms, were poles apart in thought. Inasmuch as the Emperor stayed on the plane of intellectual discrimination he could never rise

to the level of Daitō's understanding and would not be able to resolve the doubts which remained in his mind.

The Master's way of handling unthinkability was not the Emperor's, and the latter had to learn to handle the position for himself by ceasing to think, that is, by not resorting to ratiocination in spiritual affairs. Thereafter no doubt would remain in his mind about distinction and nondistinction. There were words in the realm of spiritual significance which were not in the Emperor's vocabulary as such. As the Master used them they were on the plane of distinction, but they came from the plane of nondistinction. Yet the remark made by the Master must have to some extent enlightened the Emperor, for he allowed the Master to remain seated on the same level as himself.

On another occasion when the Emperor had an interview with the Master he asked, "Who is he who remains companionless within the ten thousand things?" a reference to the Absolute, which defies analysis and has none facing it. Yet the very question showed that the Emperor had not emerged from the clouds of doubt, and that he needed further enlightenment. The Master did not directly answer the question, but standing on the same level as the Emperor, that is, in the world of discrimination, he just moved his fan and said, "I long enjoy being bathed in the Imperial breeze." In spring we bathe in the breeze and enjoy tranquility. The Master tried to express by the use of his fan the spring breeze of the Absolute, and a state of spiritual relaxation issuing therefrom, and ascribed it to the Imperial grace. Here the Absolute, which stands without companion, is the Emperor, is Daitō himself, is the present lecturer.

The fundamental purpose of Buddhism is to pass beyond the world of opposites, a world built up by intellectual distinction and emotional defilement, and to realize a spiritual world of nondistinction, which involves achieving an absolute point of view. Yet the Absolute is in no way distinct from the world of discrimination, for to think so would be to place it opposite the discriminative mind and so create a new duality. When we speak of an Absolute we are apt to think that, being the denial of the opposites, it must be placed in opposition to the discriminative mind. But to think so is in fact to lower the Absolute into the world of opposites and necessitates the conception of a greater Absolute which will contain both. The Absolute, in brief, is in the world of opposites and not apart from it. Nor can this contradiction be understood so long as we stay in the world of distinction. To go beyond this world will not help, nor to stay in it either. Hence the intellectual dilemma from which we all struggle to escape.

So the Master points out in silence that Buddhism is beyond the comprehension of the intellect. Discrimination and nondiscrimination are two yet one; otherwise there is no way in which to transcend the contradiction involved in the intellect. In one way the intellect is denied, yet without its help there is no way of

transcending it, and Buddhists claim that the paradox can only be solved by personal experience.

Prince Shōtoku (Prince Regent, 593–621), the founder of the Hōryūji Temple at Nara, wrote commentaries on three Mahayana Sutras, the *Saddharma Puṇḍarīka*, the *Vimalakīrti*, and the *Śrīmālā*, and in all of them emphasized the unthinkability of Buddhist experience. In the *Śrīmālā*, the *tathāgatagarbha* is described as being buried in innumerable defilements, yet it remains beyond their control. The Tathāgatagarbha is the spiritual world of nondiscrimination, and the defiling world is that of thought. That these two are separate yet one is beyond our power to understand completely, for perfect understanding amounts to Buddhahood. Yet all religious people finally come to this experience. It is the state of mind which in Christian experience is called divine revelation, something supernatural and not attainable by human reason alone. But most people, living as they do on the plane of the intellect, submit everything to intellectual domination and so reject as unworthy of consideration all that the intellect cannot understand. In their folly they treat Buddhism in the same way, but sooner or later they have to pick up what they had cast away and place it on the altar of the heart. For whether they realize it or not it was there all the time, though sadly unrecognized. When the bird sings we know it is a bird; when the bell is struck it rings. When the Buddha held out a golden flower, Mahākāśyapa smiled. No word was exchanged, for one who knows, knows! The Emperor Goyōzei (reigned 1586–1611) wrote a poem about it:

Smiling eyebrows are opened.
Is it cherry or peach blossom?
Who does not know?
Yet nobody knows!

From the viewpoint of nondistinction nobody knows. The flower is offered and somebody smiles. Intellectually no communication has passed, but something must have passed between the two minds beyond the plane of the intellect. Where there is understanding no comment is needed, but where there is no understanding the abyss cannot be crossed intellectually at all.

To understand this unthinkability, the mind must escape from the prison of the intellect and pass beyond the field of opposites, even as the Emperor Hanazono faced the Master Daitō and rose to the higher point of view. In the *Puṇḍarīka Sūtra* we frequently find such phrases as, “However much we try to measure Buddha-knowledge by means of thought we can never succeed.” In the chapter on Longevity we have, “In the immeasurably long past I obtained my Buddhahood, and I have been living here for an incalculably long period of time. I am indeed immortal.” According to history, Śākyamuni attained Enlightenment at a spot not far from his royal palace when he was twenty-nine. In spite of this fact he says in the Scripture that his Enlightenment took place hundreds of thousands of kalpas ago.

The two statements are obviously contradictory, and the contradiction is inevitable so long as we let ourselves be bound by the intellect. And when the intellectual contradiction is transferred to the emotional life we suffer all forms of disturbance. As we live most of our life on the emotional plane we are apt to forget that these disturbances are the outcome of the contradictions in the intellectual mind.

Contradictions and unthinkability are inevitable companions, and when functioning on the plane of distinction they lead to doubt and confusion. Only when they rise to the spiritual plane do they produce a sense of bliss and become the source of faith and fearlessness.

This contradiction was the subject of a discussion between the Master Daitō and the Emperor Godaigo (reigned 1318–1339), another student of Zen. The Master said, “We were parted many thousands of kalpas ago, yet we have never been separated, even for a moment. We are facing each other all day long yet we have never met.” This idea is expressed by Śākyamuni himself in the *Saddharma Puṇḍarīka*, as stated before. In spite of the historical fact that he attained Enlightenment near Buddha Gaya, he says that he was fully enlightened before the world was born. The historical fact of his Enlightenment is a record that we make with the intellect. Likewise the fact that the Master and the Emperor were facing each other is a fact based on the concept of time. But from the point of view that is only possible in the field of nondiscrimination, where no rational calculation is possible, historical facts have no significance. In other words, “You and I have been in each other’s presence through all eternity, and have never been separated even for a moment.” Or, expressed conversely, “I have been with you all day long, but have never entered your presence.” The Master is viewing things from his nondiscriminative point of view, which the Emperor was at first unable to understand. Nor are any of these things understandable when given to the judgment of our everyday experience. Buddhists learn to disregard these intellectual “facts,” and to express themselves in a way that is quite irrational, and we must change our point of view to accord with the Buddhist viewpoint, which comes from the nondiscriminative mind. The reason we are so annoyed in our daily life, and unable to escape from its annoyance, is due to our intellectual inability to go beyond the intellect. Here, then, is a need for a major operation, to sever the knots of the intellect. A mountain is not a mountain; a river is not a river. Yet a mountain is a mountain and a river is a river. Negation is affirmation and affirmation is negation. Nor is this a mere play on words. We must admit that all the vexations and anxieties of life are due to our failure to sink into our own center, and then to rise out of it on to the plane of nondistinction where the problems at once disappear. Buddhists strive not to be tied by words from the higher point of view. Yet words are needed to transcend words, and intellection is needed to rise above the intellect. Yet this rising must never be made in a dualistic or “escapist” sense, for no such escape is possible.

We are now in a position to say something about Karma. Human suffering is due to our being bound in Karma, for all of us, as soon as we are born, carry a heavy

burden of past Karma, which is therefore a part of our very existence. In Japan the term is connected with bad deeds, and evil people are spoken of as bearing the Karma of the past. But the original meaning of the term is "action," and human acts may be good, bad, or indifferent. In this sense, human beings are the only beings that have their own Karma. All others move in accordance with the laws of their own being, but humans alone design and calculate, and are conscious of themselves. We humans are the sole self-conscious animals, or, as Pascal says, "We are thinking reeds." Now to think means to be conscious, designing, planning beforehand, which implies that we are free to plan. It follows that Karma is only found in human beings, and in fact as soon as we enter the world our Karma attaches to us. Not only are we wrapped up in our Karma but we know it, and the fact that we are aware of our bondage is a privilege of humanity. This privilege implies freedom, and with freedom comes responsibility and struggle, the struggle itself implying freedom. Thus the value of human life lies in the fact of suffering, for where there is no suffering, no consciousness of Karmic bondage, there will be no power of attaining spiritual experience and thereby reaching the field of nondistinction. Unless we agree to suffer we cannot be free from suffering. Only by accepting our bondage can we be free.

As long as we are human we cannot escape from Karma, and yet we are always trying to escape. Hence a contradiction. Yet it is this very contradiction which raises man above all other forms of existence and provides the spiritual urge to break through the ordinary plane of consciousness. Karma oppresses us all the time, yet all the time we are trying to rise above it, and this very impulse to transcend our Karma is a power that issues from our spiritual nature. One may describe this urge as prayer, and prayer is of the essence of the religious life. It is an attempt to separate ourselves from things which are inseparably part of ourselves, and it follows that by prayer we add to our suffering. Hence the declaration by early Buddhists that all life is suffering, and many in consequence regarded Buddhism as mere pessimism. This erroneous belief inspired many of the early Buddhists to escape from the world, but others, regarding this attempt as negative, wished to be more positive. They dug deeper and deeper into the foundations of being and eventually tapped the source of life itself, thereby opening the door to the spirituality of human existence. And this is the spiritual awakening.

The intellect is dualistic, and divides things into opposites. This opposition is a source of suffering, which is Karma, but it also means freedom. To be free means to be able to choose between two or more courses open to us, yet as long as we stay on the plane of the intellect the choice or decision invariably leads to a further choice or decision. To be really free we must go beyond all intellection, which is separation, opposition, and mutual conditioning, and without this going beyond there will never be freedom from Karma. To be bound by Karma, yet to be free from it, here is a spiritual mystery. On the intellectual plane it must ever remain a mystery, and so long as the intellect tries to walk on its own feet it will be threat-

ened by this mystery, which stands forever against it. Yet in the end the mystery must be solved without being solved, for as soon as we reach the spiritual plane it may be allowed to remain a mystery, though in a different sense. To the intellect it is still a mystery insoluble, but to the spirit it is already solved and no more mystery, yet still a mystery in the highest sense of the word. To the intellect it is a mystery, in the sense that it defies the power of intellection. To the spirit it is not so in its intellectual sense, but still remains a mystery. For mystery is spiritual as well as intellectual. Unthinkability is an intellectual term in reference to the things of spirit, and as far as the spirit is concerned intellection is of no avail. A mountain is a mountain and yet not a mountain, and because it is not a mountain it is a mountain—such is the bold statement to be found in the *Prajñāpāramitā* sutras. But as our daily experience is so cut through and through with intellectuality we have to speak of mystery as such. Speech implies the plane of the intellect and this is why I speak of the distinction of nondistinction and the nondistinction of distinction.

To return to Karma, Karma implies causation, and to be free from Karma means to be free from causation. But ethics are built on the moral law of causation, even as the physical world is held together by the law of cause-effect. To be free from causation will thus mean a denial of the moral world as well as the physical world, which is tantamount to the denial of life itself, for we cannot conceive of life apart from the notion of causation. Does Buddhism want us to deny life, that is, to commit suicide? If not, what does “being free from karma and causation” mean? The following famous story of Baizhang will clarify the position of Zen in regard to its significance.

When Baizhang,² a Master of the Tang dynasty, had one day finished his preaching, an old man who used to attend his sermons regularly came to him and said, “In the days of Kāśyapa Buddha, innumerable kalpas ago, I lived here on this mountain, and one day a student asked me, ‘Does an enlightened man fall into causation or not?’ I answered, ‘No,’ and for this answer I have lived in the form of a wild fox ever since. Will you give me the proper answer, that I may be free from this fox-form?” And again he asked, “Does an enlightened man fall into cause-effect or not?” The Master answered, “He does not evade the law of cause-effect.” The fox-man was thereupon enlightened.

The meaning of the story is this, that the enlightened man allows the law to take its course, and is therefore no longer bound by it. When the appropriate conditions are manifest, causation arises. The sun shines on all, good and bad. The law operates for all, enlightened and unenlightened, for it is the law which governs alike the moral and physical world. The intellect requires ratiocination, and therefore cannot admit irrationality, and even on the spiritual plane it is the same. The spirit does not negate the intellect, it simply transcends it, in the sense that it has its own realm within the intellectual boundaries and yet is not bound by them. It therefore

makes use of the intellect, it expresses itself through the intellect, and yet it has its own way of interpreting it. It belongs to a world of distinction, and at the same time is above it. Its world is one of distinction and nondistinction, and for this reason Karma as causation is not to be contrasted with noncausation, for on the spiritual plane beyond the intellect no such distinction exists. Yet apart from distinction and causation there is no spiritual world of nondistinction, for which reason the enlightened man cannot escape Karma, does not evade causation, but submits himself to it willingly and cheerfully, and thereby transcends it. And he does this, not on the intellectual plane, as philosophers and scientists might do, but in a spiritual way, a way of distinction not distinguished, of discrimination not discriminated. Therefore his enlightenment takes place in the world of causation, and he is not bound by the law. If it took place in the spiritual world, severed from the intellectual and causal world, it would no longer be the spiritual world. When a bell is struck, it rings and we hear it, and this hearing is the same for ordinary beings as for enlightened men. When the old man asserted, therefore, that an enlightened man is not bound by causation, he committed the grave mistake of making the spiritual world stand apart from the intellectual world of distinction. Baizhang, knowing this, knew where the old man's fault lay. So he made it clear that there is no evasion of Karma for the enlightened or the unenlightened man. The enlightened man, in other words, falls into cause-effect just as much as the unenlightened, but his falling is merely the paying of an old debt.

This nonevasion of causation illustrates the logic of the *Prajñā* class of Mahayana sutras in which *Prajñā* is *Prajñā* because it is not *Prajñā*, and this logic of contradiction runs through all the Mahayana texts.³ To say that causation is not causation is to rise above it, not to destroy it or evade it, and when we rise above it by immersing ourselves in it we accept it with its full consequences. I am, for example, born, I may become ill, I shall grow old, and die. I cannot ignore this wheel of causation, but the fact that I am conscious of its revolutions and yet at the same time conscious that there is something that is never touched by the causal revolutions, enables me to "escape" from it. Thus we never fall into cause-effect, because we are already in it. To fall into it, or to be delivered from it, presupposes that there has been a state where there was no falling and no deliverance. When we find ourselves on the wheel, and move continuously with it, there is neither falling nor being delivered, for we have become the wheel itself.

In another Zen story it is said that someone asked the Master, "Summer comes, winter comes. How shall we escape from this?" The Master answered, "Why not go to the place where there is neither summer nor winter?" "Where can such a place be found?" asked the inquirer. The Master replied, "When winter comes, it is cold. When summer comes, it is hot." As Pascal says, even the Universe can be destroyed, and we are all subject to birth and death. One drop of poison will kill the most

virtuous man, but the poison is not conscious of its destructive power. Man alone is aware of the distinction between consciousness and nonconsciousness, and he alone is self-conscious. His consciousness has therefore a great significance, and enlightenment is no more than a recognition of this fact. Enlightenment is spiritual cognition becoming spiritually conscious of the facts of our everyday experience. And this form of consciousness is different from our consciousness of the world of sense. Cold may be felt by the ignorant as well as the enlightened. When a bird sings, all hear it, whether or not enlightened, but the consciousness experienced by the ignorant does not rise above the sensuous plane. To the spiritually enlightened the hearing of the bird and the feeling of the cold is on the spiritual plane that penetrates the world of sense, and the enlightened man interprets the facts of daily experience from the spiritual point of view. When the world is thus interpreted spiritually it is no more an object of the senses and the intellect. The world, with all its suffering, shortcomings, and dualities, is one with the spiritual world, and for those who are enlightened suffering is no more suffering. Causation in this sense no longer affects them. When Pascal speaks of the thinking reed, this thinking is no mere cogitation or contemplation, but a process of becoming spiritually conscious. The importance of contemplation was highly stressed by the early Buddhists, but the Mahāyāna insists on something more. All contemplation suggests a form of dualism, for where there is an object of contemplation there must be a mind that contemplates. Being spiritually conscious is therefore more than contemplation, though consciousness itself suggests a form of dualism. But spiritual consciousness implies that there is neither one to be conscious nor the fact of which the mind is conscious. To be conscious yet not conscious of anything at all is true spiritual consciousness. Here the object and the mind are one, and from this oneness arises the world of multiplicity. As long as we are bound up with these multiplicities we cannot escape their domination, but as soon as we rise in consciousness to the source of consciousness, where there is yet no separation, no distinction, no opposition between this and that, we are free, and all the multiplicities can hurt no more. But, as I have repeatedly said, this does not mean the denial of the sensuous world, which has always been a cardinal doctrine of Hīnayāna Buddhism.

It is for this reason that we say that we are far greater than the universe in which we live, for our greatness is not of space but of the spirit. And there is nothing spiritual in the universe apart from human spirituality. The greatness of the world comes from our own greatness, and all about us acquires its greatness only from ourselves. And we only realize our greatness when we become conscious of human suffering, and this consciousness is emancipation. According to legend, when the Buddha was born he cried, "Above heaven and below heaven I alone am the Honored (Fully Enlightened) One." This shows that he had realized in himself the

greatness that each one of us has within him, and this supreme affirmation is reached by going through with suffering, and contradictions, and Karma. For contradiction is pain and we feel this pain. By this feeling we rise above ourselves, and this rising is emancipation.

PART II

There are two pillars supporting the great edifice of Buddhism, the Daichi, or Mahāprajñā, the Great Wisdom, and the Daihi, or Mahākaruṇā, the Great Compassion. The Wisdom flows from the Compassion and the Compassion from the Wisdom, for the two are in fact one, though from the human point of view we have to speak of them as two. Regarding them as one, we may think of them as a person, for the two are not united mathematically but spiritually. As living principles, therefore, they may be thought of as uniting in an absolute Person. This Person is, of course, objectively a contradiction, but the distinction of nondistinction is revealed in such a Person, and it is just because he is a field of contradiction that he is full of life and can manifest in action.

The climax of Buddhist philosophy is reached in the Kegoṅ conception of *jiji-muge* (literally, each thing no hindrance). As I see it, this is the summit of oriental thought as developed by the finest Buddhist minds and represents Japan's contribution to world philosophy. Kegoṅ philosophy teaches a fourfold conception of the world: (1) The world viewed as individual existences. (2) The world viewed as the Absolute. (3) The world conceived as individuals retaining their individuality in the Absolute. (4) The world conceived as each revealed through each other, so that each individual has no hindrance from being merged in every other. Note that here the conception of the Absolute has been dropped. There is thus a pantheism without *theos*, or in Western terminology, all is God and there is no God.

When the world is so conceived it ceases to be a mere world of the senses and becomes the spiritual world that Buddhists call the Dharma-loka.⁴ If the notion of a physical world is retained, each individual will lose its ultimate significance, but in a spiritual world all that was lost is restored. Each individual is asserted to exist, and the physical world is restored, but this time as a spiritual world. In Christian terminology, it reflects the divine glory. The earth acquires heavenly splendor, and this world of misery becomes a land of purity, or the Pure Land.⁵ In this world of individual realities no one can ever be converted into another. A flower is a flower and a leaf a leaf. The mountains are towering high, and water flows downward. This world is a world of the intellect, where everything retains distinctively its individuality. At first we take this world as real, but after reflection we realize that it is not ultimate, because what we think to be individual never retains its individuality, being destined to redissolve into its elements. Buddhists have therefore sought for the underlying principle which does not change and have found it in

the conception of Śūnyatā. This Śūnyatā is what was referred to before as the Absolute, but the Absolute and Śūnyatā, the Void, are synonymous, as pertaining to nondistinction. This Void, or emptiness, however, as I have said repeatedly, is not to be taken as mere nothingness. Śūnyatā is absolute, not relative nothingness, and when it is understood in a dualistic sense nothingness becomes a somethingness, and all understanding of Buddhism is made impossible.

We have, however, to guard ourselves against making the Absolute dualistically transcend this dual world of individualities. Unless such polarization is avoided, the Kegon philosophy can never be understood, for the intellectual world of distinction gains its meaning only when it is related to the spiritual world of nondistinction. The world is, as it were, double-decked, intellectual and spiritual, and these are both distinct and nondistinct. Distinction is an awkward term, but it is the best way of expressing the idea repeated in the Prajñā sutras. Form is Void and the Void is Form.

This idea of the interpenetration of the Absolute and individuals, of one and all, totality and individuality, is generally explained by an analogy. Each wave is a part the ocean, but the ocean cannot exist apart from the waves. The waves are not the ocean, but we cannot speak of the ocean apart from the waves, nor of the waves apart from the ocean. Conceptually they are distinct, but in actuality the waves are the ocean and the ocean is the waves. The ocean of nondistinction expresses itself in the waves of distinction, and distinction is possible only in the ocean of nondistinction. We are apt to consider the waves apart from the ocean, and forget the ocean, or to take the ocean alone as reality and ignore the waves, and this logical confusion ends in a tragedy of misunderstanding. In a similar way, the doctrine of interpenetration upholds the individual's actuality, and at the same time acknowledges the realm of the Absolute.

The oriental mind, however, was not satisfied with this doctrine of interpenetration. It wanted to go one step further, and the result was to revert to this world of individuals alone, although it meant in a way reverting to the world of sense. Kegon therefore developed the notion of *jiji-muge*, wherein takes place the interpenetration in its perfect form. The principle may be formulated in four stages as follows. First, each individual embraces the all and enters into the all. Second, the all embraces each individual and enters into each individual. Third, each individual embraces itself, and enters into itself, and fourth, the all embraces itself and enters into itself.

To explain this conception, Kegon uses the analogy of ten mirrors, placed in the zenith, the nadir, and at the eight points of the compass. Each mirror reflects the other nine, individually and together. Each mirror, containing all these reflections individually and together, is also reflected in all the other nine mirrors, and each of these is reflected again in the original mirror. In this conception of interpenetration or reflection, it will be noted that there is no reference to the Absolute, or to

any transcending reality. The world of everyday is taken in its entirety, and the world of multiplicity is affirmed. This may be called a form of radical empiricism, but note that there is a fourth stage after the preceding three. This sense world is restored, though it is not the same as that which existed before.

Now there are two forms of intuition, intellectual and spiritual, and the latter is needed to understand the Kegon world conception of *jiji-muge*. But before we can realize this Kegon conception in its full significance, another is needed. So far we have confined ourselves to a spatial interpretation of the Dharma-loka, but loka also exists in terms of time. This loka is not static but dynamic, and there is a constant interplay between individual realities. Where great Wisdom is emphasized great Compassion is apt to be overlooked. The moving power in the world of *jiji-muge* is the great Compassionate Heart by which we expand into and become all other selves; that is to say, our own self is a self only to the extent that it disappears into all other selves. Thus does the Mahayana depict Dharma-loka, and this perfect state of interpenetration is strongly emphasized when the Buddhist doctrine of compassion is worked out into experience. In the sense world there is a need for regulation, and each has to fulfil his duty in his own place, but in the spiritual world no such sense of obligation obtains. There is no self-sacrifice, no giving of oneself to others, for what appears such would be, so far as the agent himself is concerned, like cutting the spring breeze in two in the shadow of the lightning. In such a state no trace is left, no distinctions remain, and one moves from one part of the whole to another without hindrance. As the Buddhist would say, "When I am hungry, I eat, and if I don't want to eat I refrain from eating." There is no artificial effort here, no moral restraint or striving, for the spirit is perfectly free when working on the plane of no moral choice, of no intellectual distinctions.

This condition is well illustrated by a Zen story. The Zen Master Muzhou,⁶ of the late Tang dynasty, had a disciple called Wang,⁷ who was a high government official. One day the disciple was late in arriving, and the Master asked him why. He replied, "I have been watching a polo match." The Master asked him, "Are the men tired?" The official answered, "Yes." The Master asked, "Are the horses tired?" and the official answered, "Yes." Then the Master asked, "Is this wooden post here tired?" and the official could not answer. That night he could not sleep, yet toward morning the answer dawned on him. He hurried back to the Master and said, "I understand." Again the Master asked, "Is this post tired?" and the official answered, "Yes!" The Master nodded and smiled. A Master of the Song dynasty, commenting on this story, pointed out that unless the post was tired too there could be no tiredness.

The Kegon doctrine of interpenetration must be intuitively understood if we are to understand this story and the Master's comment on it. For interpenetration is not an intellectual experience, but comes directly from the spirit, manifesting itself as a great Compassionate Heart. Pure Land Buddhists personify this manifestation and call it Amida; other Buddhist names are Avalokita and Kannon. Amida vowed that

he would not attain enlightenment until by his enlightenment all sentient beings were also enlightened, and as he had attained it in the infinite past it follows that we are enlightened already. When this is interpreted intellectually it is absurd, for Amida is here conceived as an individual reality, and as such is different from myself. How, then, could his enlightenment affect me? But when the spiritual world has been attained we know that his vow has already been realized in us, and we are enlightened individuals. My attainment of enlightenment assumes others' enlightenment, and hence the saying that when one individual attains enlightenment on earth a lotus flower unfolds in the Pure Land to provide a seat for him. The Pure Land is a spiritual world, and this is a physical world, but the two are interfused, and what takes place in one is reflected in the other. The spiritual world of nondistinction and the sense-world of distinction are found thus to be one.

As long as we remain in the realm of dualistic logic this world of *jiji-muge*, controlled by the great Compassion, will be unintelligible, and as a result we shall encounter all manner of suffering in our daily life. We Japanese have for the last ten years been groaning under the misguided principles of totalitarianism and individualism, which are alike inimical to *jiji-muge*, for both lack a true understanding of Compassion. Even modern science may be a misery to mankind unless this great Compassion is understood. Much of the friction existing between nations comes from a lack of understanding, and applying this great Compassion, while even democracy, of which we in Japan have lately heard so much, must, if it is to succeed, be founded on it. However much of legalism and the technical arrangements of economy and industry are used to make it work as smoothly as possible, so long as the great heart of Compassion is missing, there will always be some measure of unease, a lack of spiritual lubrication, as it were, among the people.

Buddhists have personified this great spirit of Compassion, and many Buddhist images are meant to represent as many aspects of it. Two of the most popular of these in Japan are Amida and Kannon, both being regarded as saviors of mankind. Amida is famed for his forty-eight "Original Vows," while Kannon manifests himself in thirty-three different forms, some of them female, or in whatever form he may be sought. Some of Amida's forty-eight Vows are out of relation with modern life, but the common theme is to save all sentient beings from the sufferings that ensue from intellectual discrimination, which is in turn the cause of passion, selfish desire, and karmic hindrances. When the self is asserted, and that which is above self neglected, i.e., when the world of individualism is emphasized at the cost of the higher self, the whole becomes involved in misery, the world from which Amida wants to save us by leading us to a realization of the spiritual life. When, on the other hand, the Absolute is over-emphasized, individualism is effaced, and the so-called sameness aspect throws us all into confusion. Some ask, is it not enough to stay in this world of individuals? Where is the need to move into a realm of nondistinction? The moral world is quite sufficient, and there is no need

to talk of religion or salvation. But those who talk in this way fail to realize that ethics alone can never give full satisfaction to the spirit. Most of us are not conscious of this spiritual life, for it is hidden under so many layers of intellection that it is hard to find. But in fact it is working all the time through the layers of intellection, and just as we are not ordinarily conscious of the existence of air, so we are apt to overlook the existence and reality of spirit in our ordinary experience. But when we meet with happenings incompatible with our selfish desires we are baffled and realize the feebleness of human aspiration. This is the time when spirit asserts itself and forces us to look beyond mere intellectuality. Even when suffering is not so keenly experienced, we find an aspiration deep in our minds that whispers to be heard. Some are sensitive enough to listen, but the karma of some is too heavy to be lifted easily. Even when we listen to this "still small voice" we may not realize at once what it means, though once we have learned to listen to it we shall sooner or later learn its full significance. This is in one way an allurements, yet in another way it is a threat, for we are forced by a power stronger than ourselves to choose between the self and the not-self. Those who live on the plane of discrimination and ethics may remain indifferent, but those who have never experienced a spiritual awakening will always be difficult to interest in a higher plane. For religion never grows from ethics and logic; it is the latter which emerges from religion. Even when religion and ethics are talking of the same thing they are moving in the world of spirit and the intellect respectively. Both may refrain from evil, but in the moral man there is a feeling of constraint, whereas the spiritual man moves naturally, showing no trace of conflict or the need of choice. Amida Buddha wakens us from this life of choosing and constraint, and this awakening to the presence of Amida is a self-awakening to the spiritual life and seeing into the world of *jiji-muge*. This is the beginning of the Buddhist or religious life, as distinct from the life of self-righteousness.

There is an old Chinese song which runs,

When the sun rises I work in the fields;
 When the sun sets I rest.
 I dig a well and I drink;
 I till the soil and I eat.
 What has the Imperial Power to do with me?

According to Chinese history, the period of Yao was an ideal age, for the people were not conscious of political restraint. Everything went on as smoothly as the growth of a plant. But from the Buddhist point of view this Arhat life is not enough, for we do not live unto ourselves, and we must think of others. The Bodhisattva, seeing misery around him, can never be content until these sufferers have reached the same plane as his own. We are always aspiring for Utopias, but it is in the nature of Utopias that they cannot be realized on this earth. In this sense Amida's

Vows are eternal. He knows that there are some who will never reach a full realization of the spirit, for it is the very nature of existence that it drags along a certain residue of discrimination. Yet it is because of this residue of distinction that spiritual activity never ceases. All the Bodhisattva's Vows are therefore purposeless, and in the same way the Buddhist life is purposeless. Some may call this purposeless life merely animal, but from the spiritual point of view the divine or higher life is also purposeless. There is truth in Voltaire's saying, that we need not trouble about salvation, for that is God's business, and if we are content with this statement there will be no spiritual disquietude. We need to see God face to face, that we may live in each other. There is need for an immediate communication, and this also in a way is *jiji-muge*. In Christianity self is nonassertive, and God stands above and beside the self. There is always a sharp distinction between the two, and the two are never merged. If there is merging it takes the form of merging the self in God, and God never merges Himself in the Self. There is no mutuality between the two. In this sense Christianity is thoroughly dualistic, whereas in Buddhism God stands on the same level as man. God becomes man and man becomes God. Christians may think that this reflects on the dignity of God, but Buddhism asserts not only the merging but the distinction retained, for merging does not efface distinction. God and man are distinct yet mutually merged. Thus Buddhist mysticism, if it is a form of mysticism, is not the same as Christianity in its experience of the mystic union. "Knock and it shall be opened unto you" has its equivalent in Buddhism, though with a difference. Says Kannon, "Seek and there will be a response," but the response does not come from above but from those fellow beings of the seeker who are in sympathy.

In the *Kannon Sutra* we find repeatedly the phrase, "To think of the power of Kannon," yet this thinking does not mean merely to call Kannon to memory, but to seek him deep in our own being. In fact Kannon is not living outside the seeker but within, and the seeker endeavors to reach Kannon in the depths of his own being.

But though we speak of seeking Kannon in the depths of our own being, this does not mean that he lives within us, for when the seeker digs deep enough he will find that he has got out of himself, and is now in Kannon. In other words, he has ceased to be himself, and when he finds Kannon, Kannon will not be in him but he in Kannon. This is the true meaning of thinking of Kannon, and he who thinks in this way is no longer living life in the intellect, but living it in Kannon and he in him. In other words, he is no longer living unto himself but with and in someone above him. From this point of view the life so lived is purposeless. If God has a secret purpose to accomplish he will be bound by that purpose, and his life to that extent constrained and limited. Yet this lack of purpose is not to be confused with license. As I have repeatedly said in this lecture, distinction is as much to be emphasized as nondistinction, for individuality is never ignored in Buddhism. In order to reach the spirit the intellect is for a while denied, but as soon as

the spirit has been reached the intellect works through it and finds thereafter its proper place and function. In this way life is purposeless and at the same time purposeful, which is distinction and nondistinction too.

It is in this sense that the old Chinese poem I quoted is to be understood. The spontaneous life of the poet, as nature made it, is genuine and complete, and altogether beautiful. In another Chinese poem we read,

My nap was so deep
I never heard the passing shower,
When I woke
I found the air in the room refreshed.

From this point of view the making of vows, the offering of prayers, the working for salvation are all to no purpose. In spite of them there is suffering for all sentient beings, and Gods and Bodhisattvas are found to be shedding tears of compassion for mankind. On the one hand purposelessness and on the other eternal striving; this problem will never be solved on the plane of intellectual distinction, but when it ceases to be a contradiction we see the dawn of the spiritual life. In the *Lotus Sutra*, Śākyamuni is said to have attained his Enlightenment in the infinite past, yet at the same time he declares this triple world to be his home, and all men to be his children. And in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* we read that Prajñā, Daichi, transcends the dualism of being and not-being. Yet the great heart of Compassion is moved. In the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra* the sick man says, "I am sick because all beings are sick." This self-contradiction is found along with and in self-identification, because from the spiritual point of view contradiction is identification and identification is contradiction. To experience this is the spiritual life. The one is many and the many is one; Prajñā is Karuṇā and Karuṇā, Prajñā. And to understand this is spiritual awakening. In Japanese Buddhism Zen represents the Prajñā phase of the Mahayana, and the Pure Land claims to represent the Karuṇā phase. Zen is apt to emphasize the Arhat ideal and Jōdo the Bodhisattva ideal. Zen is closely related to what is known as nature mysticism, while Pure Land moves among mankind, among ignorant, Karma-laden sentient beings. Zen developed in China, yet lives in Japan in the daily life of the people, while the Pure Land School developed in Japan from the teachings of Hōnen and Shinran, who may be regarded as one personality. Pure Land is supposed to appeal more to the masses, but from a certain point of view its teaching goes very deep, with its friendliness to all forms of life as compared with the greater aloofness of Zen.

Shōmatsu,⁸ a Shin devotee noted for his spirituality, once visited a Buddhist temple in the country, and as soon as he entered the main Hall where Amida was enshrined proceeded to stretch himself out before the Shrine and make himself comfortable. Asked by a friend why he was so lacking in respect for Amida, he said, "I am back in my parents' home, and you who make that kind of remark must

be only a stepchild," an attitude of mind that reminds one of a child asleep at its mother's breast. He seemed so happy in the embrace of the Great Compassionate One that he did not realize that he was still in the world of tribulation.

Again, when the same Shin devotee was returning home to Shikoku from Kyoto, he had to cross an arm of the sea. While in the sailing boat with his companions a storm arose, and so fierce was the sea that it seemed that the boat would sink. The others lost their all-important faith in the Nenbutsu and invoked the aid of Konpira, the god of the sea. Only Shōmatsu slept on until his companions waked him to ask him how he could sleep in the face of such calamity. "Are we still on earth (*sahāloka*)?" asked Shōmatsu, for it was a matter of indifference to him whether he was in this world or the next.

To express this attitude in terms of Zen, Dao is our everyday thought, and everyday thought here means to live on the plane of spirit, which is yet not separate from the intellectual life. To the mind of Shōmatsu the Pure Land was not somewhere beyond this world, but here. His life in this world was life in the Pure Land, where the sea is always calm and boats are steady. In the midst of turmoil, therefore, he had no cause to be afraid. When he was sleepy he slept. When he wanted to sit up he sat up. When the boat was tossed up and down he too was tossed up and down, for he identified himself with the turmoil and accepted whatever came as though unconcerned with consequences. Even in the rising waves he felt the loving arms of the great Compassionate One, and he slept in the boat even as he laid himself down before the image of Amida. This consciousness of the embracing arms of Amida meant that his everyday thought was never disturbed by outward circumstances.

On another occasion, when he had been working in the rice fields, and was tired, he came home to rest. When he felt a cool refreshing breeze he thought of the Amida in his shrine. He therefore took it out and set it beside him, saying, "You too shall enjoy the breeze." This may seem an extraordinary act, but in terms of pure feeling everything that needs one's care has life, just as a child makes a living being out of a doll. In the same way we read in a Chinese story of a son who on a stormy night lay on his father's tomb, covering it from the rain with his body. Yet in this world of pure feeling there is no consciousness of a process of personification. It is only the intellect which makes the distinction between animate and inanimate, sentient and nonsentient. From the spiritual point of view all is alive and the object of affectionate regard. Nor is this a case of symbolism, but a taking of actualities as actualities, for this is the life of *jiji-muge* and Buddhist experience.

In concluding this lecture I want to refer to our social life, for the whole universe is regulated by *jiji-muge*. In society each individual remains an individual, and his rights must never be violated. At the same time each must give up certain rights of his own for the welfare of the community. In exchange, the community looks after him, but never interferes with his freedom of thought. In this way the

whole life of a community should be based on the Buddhist doctrine of Great Compassion, and the application of this doctrine would, in my belief, solve most of the problems now demanding solution. When *jiji-muge* is politically translated there is a true democracy.

In Buddhism God is immanent in his being, while Christianity cherishes a transcendental God. But so long as we retain a one-sided way of thought, this transcendental God will never satisfy. We want God working immanently, but if he is only immanent we shall crave for a transcendental God as well. Christianity conceives God as transcendent, without neglecting his immanent existence, while Buddhism conceives God, first as immanent, yet without forgetting his transcendental nature as well. In Christianity God is transcendental immanence; in Buddhism God is conceived as immanently transcendental. According as emphasis is placed on one or the other, each works out in its own way, and I believe that because Buddhism emphasizes its immanent conception of God its devotees should study its transcendentalism, and that Christianity would do well to emphasize God's immanence. For there is no reason why the two should not work together in harmony.

A Zen Master was asked whether he would go to the Pure Land after his death, as a reward for his high moral life on earth. "At least I am sure," said the questioner, "that you will never go to hell." "On the contrary," said the Master, "I shall be the first to go to hell, for if I do not go to hell who will help people like you when they arrive?" For the first thing required of a Buddhist is to forget self and to work for others. This is the reason for all attempts at self-perfection, that one wants thereby to help others, but to be able to help others one must train oneself to that end, and this is the essence of the Great Compassion. Yet perfection in helpfulness is only reached when the helping has become unconscious. So long as one is conscious of helping others this very consciousness interferes with the flow of the Great Compassion, and only when Compassion flows while drinking tea and walking in the street will even drinking tea and walking in the street be the actions of the Great Buddha Heart of the All-Compassionate One.⁹

The Buddhist Conception of Reality

1974

This text was found among the papers of Suzuki kept at the Matsugaoka Bunko and published posthumously in *The Eastern Buddhist* in 1974. A note added by the journal's editors attached to the bottom of the first page of the article reads:

This was the basis for a public lecture given during the 2nd East-West Philosophers' Conference, held at the University of Hawaii in 1949. An accompanying note reads: "Delivered at Farrington Hall, University of Hawaii, July 27, 1949. Parts of the original lecture were left unread." We thank the Matsugaoka Library of Kamakura for permission to use it here. Slight editorial revisions have been made by the editors.

The essay itself is consistent with his writing in the first decade after the war in that he waxes philosophical and yet doing so in a way that allows him to keep himself at arm's length from philosophy proper. In this particular piece Suzuki offers a Buddhist answer to the question that he defines as "what is reality" in the beginning, but the concluding section is more about the experience of religious "seeing" in a very subjective sense. His approach seems to put him within the comfort zone of the tradition of "philosophy of religion" as defined by his friend Nishida Kitarō, whom he had lost only four years earlier. Indeed, at the end he launches into a discussion of "pure experience," the hallmark of the latter's *An Inquiry into the Good* and arguably the most well-known if not most representative concept in Nishida's thought. The fact that Nishida himself rethought this notion several times in his career leaves open the question of what exactly Suzuki understood this to mean, but at the very least it represents for Suzuki a kind of preintellectualized cognition that has transcendental significance even while it is based in worldly perception.

Originally published posthumously in *The Eastern Buddhist*, new series, 7, no. 2 (1974). Used by permission.

. . .

There is one question every earnest-minded man will ask as soon as he grows old, or rather, young enough to reason about things, and that is: "Why are we here?" or "What is the significance of life here?" The question may not always take this form; it will vary according to the surroundings and circumstances in which the questioner may happen to find himself.

Once up to the horizon of consciousness, this question is quite a stubborn one and will not stop disturbing one's peace of mind. It will insist on getting a satisfactory answer one way or another.

This inquiry after the significance or value of life is no idle one, and no verbal quibble will gratify the inquirer for he is ready to give his life for it. We frequently hear in Japan of young men committing suicide, despairing at their inability to solve the question. While this is a hasty and in a way cowardly deed, they are so upset that they do not know what they are doing; they are altogether beside themselves.

This questioning about the significance of life is tantamount to seeking after ultimate reality. Ultimate reality may sound to some people too philosophical, and they may regard it as of no concern to them. They may regard it outside their domain of interest, and the subject I am going to speak about tonight is liable to be put aside as belonging to the professional business of a class of people known as philosophers. The question of reality, however, is just as real, just as vital as the question of life itself. What is reality?

Reality is known by various names. To Christians it is God; to the Indians it is Brahman or Ātman; to the Chinese it is *ren* 仁, it is *dao* 道, Heaven or *tian* 天; to Buddhists it is Bodhi, it is Dharma, Buddha, Prajñā, Tathatā, etc. Buddhists perhaps have a richer vocabulary than other religions or philosophies for ultimate reality.

How do we approach reality and take hold of it?

A general approach to reality is the so-called objective method. This is an attempt to reach reality by means of logical reasoning, by appealing to the intellect, which is a very useful and frequently powerful instrument in dealing with our daily practical affairs. Being useful, efficient, and effective in innumerable ways, the intellect is generally regarded by us as the most precious thing we can employ and enjoy in this world. It is therefore natural for us that we should resort to it in our attempt to reach reality. This is what philosophers do. They are indeed most intellectual men.

But the question is: Is the intellect really the key to open the door of reality? It raises all kinds of questions belonging to the objective world and it is able to solve most of them, I believe. But there is one question which defies the intellect. It is the question of reality. Reality is that which lies underneath all things, not only of nature but of mind. (To say "underneath" is not exact. This will become clear as we proceed.)

It was due to the working of the intellect that the question of reality was raised. The intellect tries to establish a complete system of relations obtaining between ideas which we have formed in our contact with the world. In this trial we come to

postulate an ultimate reality whereby a harmonious unification of ideas becomes possible. But so far we have not succeeded in this, as is proved by the history of philosophy. One system of thought is formed by a great thinker, to which he has applied the best of his speculative powers. But his successors generally find it insufficient, defective one way or another. His logic shows flaws somewhere and is rejected as incomplete, though not entirely. Another great thinker arises and again tries his best, to the same effect.

According to my view, the intellect is not an efficient weapon to deal with the question of an ultimate reality. It is true that it has raised the question, but this does not mean that it is qualified to answer it. The asking of the question in fact demonstrates that there is an urge in every one of us for something final to which we earnestly desire to attach our human destiny.

This urge for the ultimate reality, while it is made conscious by means of the intellect, is really seated in a far deeper recess of mind. If the intellect is unable to give it full satisfaction, where should we look for it? Before we go on, let us examine the nature of the intellect.

The intellect looks outwardly, takes the so-called objective view of things. It is unable to look inwardly so as to grasp the thing in its innerliness. The intellect attempts to achieve a unitive view of the world by the so-called objective method. The objective method may work well when the inside view has been first taken hold of. For the unifying principle lies within and not outside. It is not something we arrive at, but it is where we start; it is not the outcome of postulation but what makes postulation possible.

According to the Vedas, there was Ātman or Brahman in the beginning; it was all alone, then it thought or willed: "I am one, I will be many." From this, a world of multiplicities arose.

In Christianity, God in the beginning was alone. He willed to create a world of manyness and commanded light to appear, saying, "Let there be light." A world of light and darkness thus came to existence.

When a thing is by itself and there is nothing beside it, it is the same as nothing. To be absolutely alone means to be a nothing. So there is reason when Christians say that God created the world out of nothing. If God created something out of something, we naturally would ask: What is that which made this something? When we go on like this there is no end, and finally we have to come to nothingness, which is the beginning of the world.

Here is the most puzzling question we humans can encounter: Why did God or Brahman or Atman (or it) not stay all alone quietly in his absolute sense, enjoying himself? Why did he move to divide himself and create this world of woes, miseries, anxieties, and sufferings of all kinds?

To create something out of nothing, which is a contradiction in itself, and this something—not a mass of joys but being inextricably mixed with pain in all its

possible forms—this is really something that goes altogether beyond the realm of intelligibility. It is the most baffling question for the intellect. How can the intellect reconcile the idea of nothing, or nonbeing, with that of being, two conflicting ideas that defy the intellect—something coming out of nothing? As long as we resort to the objective method, no answer will be forthcoming, however ingeniously we may manipulate the intellect.

Not only the intellect but the heart also refuses to be reconciled to the fact, apparently committing himself to this act of inhumanity or ungodliness. Why did he put us in this world of iniquities and cruelties?

As long as we look at this world from the outside, as long as we try to effect a synthesis of the conflicting ideas by intellectualization, as long as we stand as mere observers and critics, this question of something coming out of nothing will never be solved, will forever lie outside logical comprehensibility.

It is not really the intellect that remains unsatisfied but the heart that is troubled to the utmost. The intellect and the heart are good, inseparable companions. When one is worried the other shares it.

The only solution of the problem, as far as I can see, is to become *Ātman* itself and to will with it in its creation of this world. Instead of looking back to the beginning of the world while staying in it, we must leap back at once to the spot *Ātman* stood when the world was not yet created. That is, we must go back even to the point before the world came to exist. We must plunge ourselves right into the midst of nothingness. If one is a Christian, one must become God himself and feel the motive he had when he uttered that fatal cry, “Let there be light.”

This seems to be the only way to come to a definitive solution of the question. The intellect will naturally protest, saying: How is this possible? We are not God, we are creatures, the created, and it is the height of sacrilege to think of our becoming God himself. We are forever separated from him by his act of creation; the chasm is utterly beyond human power to cross. Besides, we are already created, the time of creation is past, it is gone forever. We can never go back to the time where there was yet no time. A timeless time is beyond our conception. To go out of time means annihilation. To use a Buddhist expression, we are what we are, swimming along the stream of *samsara* (birth-and-death), and how can we stay in the stream and at the same time be on the other shore of *Nirvāṇa*?

This protest on the part of the intellect is quite rational, for it is in the nature of the intellect to stay outside and not to enter inside. It is so made as to be an observer and not a mover. But it knows how to raise all kinds of self-baffling questions, and as long as it can do this there must some way for it to quit its attitude of objectivity. It must somehow devise the means to kill itself and to let something else take its place. This act of killing itself on the part of the intellect means a revolution in our life of relativity.

According to Buddhist philosophy, we can become God or Ātman or Brahman. No, not *become* it, for we *are* it. No becoming is required, only a recognition of it, a becoming conscious of the fact. Becoming means a certain movement or transformation from one state to another state—for example, a dog turning into a cat, or a tree transforming itself into a man. Man being man and God being God, this transformation is impossible. Buddhist philosophy does not require this of us. It only tells us to realize the fact, to become conscious of the fact that man is God. By this transformation man can understand what moved God in the beginning to create the world out of nothing.

God made man after his own image. Man can surely go back to this stage—the image he has been in possession of even before he came to this world. So it is not to become, but to be; not transformation, but simple recognition.

As long as we are outsiders, there is no way to get inside the thing, and if we do not get inside, our disharmony with life and the world at large will never come to an end. This is where we have to undertake a grand experiment with ourselves. When a Buddhist devotee was asked whether or not Amida could save us, he replied to the inquirer: “You are not saved yet!” This is an experiment, and you have to conduct it yourself. You cannot leave it to others.

When Erō (Huīláng 慧朗), of the late Tang era, came to Baso (Mazu 馬祖), Baso asked, “What do you seek here?” “I wish to attain Buddha-knowledge.” “Buddha has no knowledge; knowledge belongs to the world of devils.” Erō later went to Sekitō (Shitō 石頭)¹ and asked him, “What is Buddha?” Sekitō said, “You have no Buddha-nature.” “What about these wriggling, creeping creatures?” “They rather have the Buddha-nature.” “How is it that I have none?” “Because you do not recognize yourself.” This brought the monk to awakening. After this he shut himself up in his monastery and did not go out of it for thirty years. Whenever a monk came to him to ask for enlightenment, he said only this: “You have no Buddha-nature.”

Christ often admonished his disciples, “ye of little faith!” Faith is generally considered the opposite of intellection and often irrational, and for this reason philosophy has nothing to do with faith. But life itself is a great affirmation, and philosophy or no philosophy, we cannot go on without taking this fact into account when we want to arrive at some solution to the question that is the subject of this lecture. If so, philosophy too must have something of faith in it and be standing on it. An intellectual understanding of any sort must be after all an attempt to arrive at an integration of ideas, which is nothing but faith.

Underlying our intellection there is faith. When the intellect forgets itself, it cherishes a doubt as to the presence of faith, and this makes the intellect wander away further and further from its root. In fact all the intellectual efforts we make to solve the problem of reality are really directed toward the restoring of faith from which it started. The trouble with the intellect is that it does not realize for what it is working,

and imagining that it has its own end, it goes on proposing question after question. We can describe the process in another way. Faith negating itself is turned into doubt, and doubt, which is at the bottom of curiosity and questioning, starts up intellection. When intellection comes to an impasse—to which it will surely come one day if it works honestly—it sees itself reflected in the mirror of faith, which is its homecoming. The intellect thus finally arrives at the great affirmation.

Here is a good story that I believe I quoted somewhere else but which I wish to quote here again, for it is illustrative of the character of doubt above referred to. It also demonstrates how masters take up this question, giving it their own solution—a solution which rests after all with the doubter himself.

A monk came to Yakusan (Yueshan 藥山)² to have his doubt settled. Yakusan said, “Wait until I come to the Dharma Hall, where I will have your doubt settled.” In the evening the master appeared in the Dharma Hall as usual, and seeing the whole congregation assembled he announced, “Let the monk come out who wished to have his doubt settled today. Where is he?”

When the monk came forward and stood before the master, the latter came down from his chair and, holding him, made this announcement, “Here is a monk who cherishes a doubt!” So saying, the master pushed him away and went back to his room.

Later another master, called Gengaku (Xuanxiao 玄學), remarked on this incident: “Let me see, did Yakusan solve the doubt for the monk? If so, what would be the solution? If there were still no solution, I would say this again, ‘Wait until I come to the Dharma Hall, where the doubt will be solved!’”

If this is repeated in this way, where do we come to a final settlement? Yakusan says somewhere else, “It is not difficult to say a word for you, but all that is needed is that you come to an immediate apprehension. If you begin thinking about it, the fault may turn out to be mine. It is after all better for each of us to see to the matter by ourselves, so that nobody will be blamed for it.”

When the baby first separates itself from the mother-body, it utters a cry resounding all over the universe, from the Akaniṣṭha heaven down to the deepest parts of Naraka. But as it grows up, it becomes timid because of its intellectual development, so-called, until it finally separates itself entirely from God. When it comes to this pass, it loses its Buddha-nature, falteringly asking if it ever had it. Is not the intellect here forgetting itself and plunging right into the abyss of utter darkness and confusion?

The intellect divides, dissects, and murders; faith unifies, puts the broken pieces together, and resuscitates. But division or analysis is possible only when it has something at its back that unifies. Without unification, division is not possible. To divide must after all mean to unite and consolidate. We thus cannot go on just dividing and analyzing. After all our dividing and analyzing we must once more come back to the point where we started, for this is where we belong.

When a Zen Buddhist master of the Tang dynasty was asked how to attain the ultimate goal of Buddhist life, he said, "Have an interview with yourself who is even before your birth."

This is getting back to the source of the universe where even the intellect has not begun its dissecting business. This is when God has not yet given his fiat to have light. This is where the Vedantic Atman has not yet stirred itself "to will." It is up to the intellect, if it can, to retrace its steps and put itself back even where it has not yet started its work.

When I talk like this, we are apt to consider the matter chronologically in terms of time. This is also the case when it is declared that God created the world out of nothing. We consider this "objectively" in the physical sense and are mystified. The event of creation did not take place so many kalpas or eons ago, astronomically or biologically speaking. Creation is taking place every moment of our life. My talking is a work of creation, and your hearing is a work of creation. We are creators, each one of us, and we are also the created at the same time—created out of nothing and creating out of nothing.

The eye cannot see itself. The intellect cannot dissect itself. This is true as long as the matter is considered objectively, as long as we are outside observers. But after all the eye that sees God is the same eye that sees myself. To get this knack or trick, if we are to call it so, is to open the eye and see the flower in front of yourself, or to look out to the starry heaven. But it is not the eye that sees the flower or the stars, nor is it the flower or the stars that are seen. The eye is the flower and the stars, the flower and the stars are the eye.

Again, I stretch an arm and the intellect dissects this event or experience declaring: "I move the arm, and the arm is moved." But the truth is that there is no agent called "I" that moves the arm, nor is there the arm that is moved. The arm is "I" and "I" is the arm; the actor is the acted, and the acted is the actor. There is only pure act, that is, pure experience. This, however, when expressed in words, is, as the saying goes, "one thousand miles off."

In this connection I wish to say a few words about Buddhism being often regarded as pantheistic. For this is not correct. Buddhism is neither pantheism nor mysticism; it has a unique way of interpreting reality; it apprehends reality as it really is or as it actually asserts itself. When Buddhist philosophers state that the green bamboos swaying in the breeze are the Dharmakāya, or that the yellow foliage luxuriantly growing in my front garden is Prajñā or Buddha-nature (*buddhatā*), critics believe that this is a pantheistic statement. But Buddhists will say this: that if the yellow foliage is Prajñā, Prajñā is a nonsentient being; that if the green bamboo is Dharmakāya, Dharmakāya is no more than a plant. When I eat a bamboo shoot, am I eating Dharmakāya, that is, the Buddha himself? No. Dharmakāya is Dharmakāya and the bamboo is bamboo; they cannot be the same. What is meant is this: Dharmakāya or Prajñā, being "emptiness" itself and having no tangible

bodily existence, has to embody itself in a form and is manifested as a bamboo, as a mass of foliage, as a fish, as a man, as a Bodhisattva, as a mind, etc. But these manifestations themselves are not the Dharmakāya or Prajñā, which is something more than forms or ideas or modes of existence. Now when statements like the above are made most people are apt to be confused. They fix upon the bamboo and they cannot but think it is a real existence, an objective reality. Buddhists also, while not denying the bamboo's objectivity with a certain qualification, still insist that it is not the Dharmakāya itself.

The strangest thing is that the intellect raises questions and then separates itself from them and does not realize that those questions are the intellect itself. When it understands this act, that is to say, when the intellect apprehends its own way of moving out into questioning, the questioning will be the answering, the answer will be directly discovered in the question. As long as the intellect remains objective, it will never be free of the snare contrived by itself. But at the same time we must not forget that if not for the intellect devising all those innumerable questions out of itself we would never be called back to look within ourselves and find the answer snugly nestled there.

The animals and plants and inorganic objects are all endowed with Buddha-nature. They are acting it, they are living it, but they never come to a state of self-realization, for they have never awakened to an intellectual life. The intellect is what makes this human life worth living. It may also lead man astray in its attempts at intellectual interpretation. But when it is once awakened to its true nature, man attains enlightenment. And it is for this reason that the true enlightenment or illumination corresponding to the Sanskrit Bodhi has an intellectual connotation.

When a Buddhist teacher was asked as to that which even transcends Buddhahood, he answered, "The dog, the cat."

Another teacher told his disciples, "If you wish to know what Buddhism is, go ask the peasants working in the fields; if you wish to know about worldly affairs, go to those grand professors of religion."

These statements by Buddhist teachers are not meant to be ironical or sarcastic. They really point to the truth of Buddhism. The truth is where it is, and not where it is talked about or argued. Nevertheless, unless it is argued and discussed, it may never have the opportunity to be itself, to discover itself, to be back within itself. The main thing is to know how to make a judicious use of the intellect.

What the intellect aims at is a system of unification on the cosmic basis of all human experience. In the crying of a baby there is this unification, in the highest productions of art there is this unification. When Confucius said that at seventy, one follows what one's heart desires and yet does not go beyond the natural order, he reached this *citta-gocara*, that is, a state of spiritual unification.

To say that at the bottom of intellection there is belief or faith or affirmation means that it conceals within itself a fundamental unification in which we all have our being and from which we work out our daily life.

The main trouble with the intellect is that it gets away from itself, that is, it ignores the fact that it belongs to life and undertakes to work out its own system independent of the original system in which it properly finds its meaning. However much it may try to achieve this, it can never work it out, though it may sometimes imagine that it has.

Why this impossibility? Because its feet are firmly set on the great mother earth out of which it has grown up and away from which, with no supply of nourishment, it cannot thrive. The intellect belongs where its roots are.

Intellectualization ought to be made the means of logically, or if necessary, even “illogically” constructing a greater system of unification on the basis of self-realization.

Reality is all-inclusive, there is nothing that can be outside it. As it is all-inclusive, it is fullness of things and not a contentless abstraction, as the intellect is too frequently apt to make it. It is not an aggregation of individual objects, nor is it outside them. It is not something that is imposed upon the aggregates, stringing and holding them together from the outside. It is the principle of integration residing inside the aggregated masses and identical with them.

To take hold of reality, therefore, we must find a means other than sheer intellection, which is always looking outward and running away from itself. If we can make the intellect turn within itself and achieve what Buddhists call *parāvṛtti*, a kind of mental about-face, it may accomplish something. But this is going against the habit we ordinarily make the intellect assume. In other words, the intellect must awake to a more fundamental faculty lying dormant within it. Though it is going in the wrong direction, further and further away, one day it must become aware of its having gone in a way it ought not to have gone. Herein a complete revolution will take place, which is called *parāvṛtti*. The intellect must once and for all experience an impasse in the course of reasoning, and when it is sincere to itself, it is sure to meet this fate. When it thus faces a blind alley, when the wall stands absolutely unyielding to the pressure, it will for the first time realize its own nature. This means that it surrenders to something greater and stronger than itself. The surrender means salvation, for the wall now suddenly opens from the other side as if by a miracle. The Bodhisattva Maitreya snaps his fingers and the heaviest door yields and Sudhana sees at one glance all the treasures inside glowing in their glory. (The *Gaṇḍavyūha sūtra*, section on Maitreya.)

I said just now “a more fundamental faculty” when speaking of the working of the intellect, but I am afraid this is somewhat misleading. There is no special faculty destined to take hold of reality, rising from some special outside independent

source. To tell the truth, it is reality itself which now comes out in full view, shifting the stage and making the intellect see itself reflected on reality. Reversing the order, the intellect seeing itself is no other than reality becoming conscious of itself. This self-consciousness on the part of reality, intellectually interpreted, is where subject and object just begin their differentiation.

This may be designated “pure experience,” and the method leading to it may be called subjective experimentation in contrast to objective methodology. “Pure experience,” as I remember, is a term used by a noted American psychologist. I am using the term not in its psychological sense but in its metaphysical bearing. In this there is no experiencing “I,” nor is there any “experience reality.” Here is an experience in its purest form, in its most real aspect; here is no abstraction, no “emptiness,” no mere naming, no conceptualization, but an experience experiencing itself. Though there is here neither subject nor object nor their mutual coalescence or unification, there is a distinct experiencing provided with noetic quality. While it is not one of those individualized experiences that go under this name in our daily life, it is in a most eminent sense an experience.

When I see an object as confronting me, it is generally understood as a case of immediate apprehension. But “pure experience” is not this kind of immediate apprehension or intuition. This is to be distinctly understood, for in “pure experience” in the sense I wish to use it here, there is no subject seeing the object, that is, there is no apprehending or intuiting agent coming in contact with the apprehended or intuited, nor is there any event taking place which is called apprehension or intuition. To understand “pure experience” in this fashion as the compact between subject and object is the outcome of intellectualization. All these differentiated ideas come out of the experience itself, they lie deeply in it, they are it. We must first have the experience in its purest form and then the differentiation follows. The intellect, forgetting its own nature and limitations, persuades itself into thinking there is an “I” effecting union with a “not-I” and proclaims this “union” to be a mystic experience. When the intellect thus proposes an unnecessary interference or mediation, the whole thing turns topsy-turvy and an “I” with all its egocentric impulses comes to assert itself. As long as mysticism is understood as the union of “subject” and “object,” I cannot endorse the use of the term for the Buddhist experience. Though we cannot avoid resorting to words even where they are not at all adequate, we must try to make the nearest approach to the fact.

Masters of Buddhist philosophy therefore exhaust their stock of terminology trying to impart this knowledge to those who have not yet been initiated.³ In fact, not only do the masters exhaust the terminology but they also use a multitude of “skillful means” (*upāya-kauśalya*).

A monk approached a master and asked, “What was Bodhidharma’s idea in visiting this country (China)?” Bodhidharma came to China from India in the Six Dynasties Era, about 1500 years ago, and is generally accepted as the founder of the

Zen school of Buddhism in China. The question proposed here means: "What necessity was there for him to come to China from the west to teach Buddhism, or rather about the Buddha-nature, which is said to be possessed by everybody? There was no need at all for him to undertake such a hazardous trip from a faraway land to teach the Chinese—as if they were not already endowed with the Buddha-nature." This, however, is the superficial meaning of the question; its real purport is about being informed about the Buddha-nature itself, that is, "What is reality?"

The master, however, following up the literal meaning of the question, tells the monk, "Why not ask about your own idea (or mind)? For there is no use asking about another man's mind when the Buddha-nature concerns yourself. You ought to know your own Buddha-nature, your Self, the ultimate reality."

The disciple then obediently asked this: "What, then, is my own mind (or nature)? What is my inner Self? What is ultimate reality?" This is really the question that had been troubling the disciple. The master said: "You must see into the secret working."

"What is the secret working?" asked the disciple.

The master opened and closed his eyes. And this is said to have opened the inquisitive monk's mental eye to the secret working of "pure experience."

To add a superfluous comment: The secret working of reality is not confined to this master's opening and closing his eyes. Here is my hand, I make a fist by clasp-ing the fingers together, I open it, and now I show you the palm. Here is no secret, it is all open, no evidence of whatever nature is needed, those who have eyes are the witnesses. But if you say there is still a secret, an obscurity, a mysticism, you cannot blame me; all that is on your side.

Dīpaṃkara Buddha is the first Buddha, according to Buddhist legend, under whom Śākyamuni had his first teaching in Buddhism. Dīpaṃkara therefore may be considered the first form God assumed in order to teach human beings ultimate reality. Now there was a monk in the Five Dynasties Era,⁴ about one thousand years ago, who asked this, "What is the world like before the appearance of Dīpaṃkara, the first Buddha?" This may be understood in this sense: What is the world like even before the appearance of Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden? Or, what kind of a world is it before God created this world of multiplicities?

The master said, "The same as after the appearance of Dīpaṃkara Buddha."

"What is the world like after the appearance of Dīpaṃkara?"

"The same as before the appearance of the Buddha."

"What is the world like at this very moment with Dīpaṃkara among us?"

"Have a cup of tea, O monk."

This *mondō*—the "questioning and answering" between monk and master—is apparent and intelligible enough, I suppose; but if you say it is not, I am afraid that to make it intelligible and perhaps more rational would take much time and a great deal of intellectualization. Even after that, the matter might not be understood in

the way it should be. Indeed, unless there is a perfect and harmonious assimilation of all our ideas into the total body of thought in which all the opposites, such as subjective and objective, God and man, nature and mind, find their proper assignments, there cannot be a real understanding of the “absurdities” running through Buddhist philosophy.

Now the question will be how to have a self-realization of “pure experience” whereby we take hold of reality.

Realization means experimentation. Unless we experiment, we can never come to a realization. By mere talking about, or by mere looking at, we never reach anywhere. To reach somewhere we must use our own legs and tread every inch of the ground. Nothing is more self-evident than this. Nobody will quarrel with it.

Philosophy is all very well. We are born to argue, to discuss, but if we do not move on, it is like working a treadmill: we never make progress. If the purpose is just to work the treadmill, the means and the end are in harmony. But if it is accomplishing something more than that, we must try the means suited to the purpose, that is, we must experiment for the experience.

And for this experiment it is not at all necessary to sacrifice thousands of human lives, innocent human lives. If any sacrifice is needed, let it be our own life. By losing life, we find it—this is what is told by wise men of all races. If it is so, is not the experiment worth trying?

Let me quote another *mondō*:

Disciple: “As I do not yet see into the truth, I get involved in errors and falsehoods.”

Master: “As to the truth, do you see anything specifically to be so called and pointed out as such to others?”

Disciple: “No, it cannot be something to perceive as specifically definable.”

Master: “If so, where do you get what you call errors and falsehoods?”

Disciple: “I am really puzzled here and am asking you about that.”

Master: “If that is the case, stand in a field ten thousand miles wide where there is not an inch of grass growing.”

Disciple: “Where there is not an inch of grass growing—is any standing there at all possible?”

Master: “Do not argue, just go ahead.”

A field where not an inch of grass is growing symbolizes *śūnyatā*, the ultimate reality of Buddhist philosophy. *Śūnyatā* is literally “emptiness.” Being “empty” means that reality goes beyond definability, where it cannot be qualified as this or that. It is above the categories of universal as well as particular. But on that account it must not be regarded as contentless and void in its relative sense; it is, on the

contrary, fullness of things, containing all possibilities. Errors and falsehoods stand against right views, and they belong in the world of relativities. In *śūnyatā* no such contrasts exist; there are no such grasses growing in “the field.” But you cannot say this by just walking around the field, by just peeping through the outside walls; you must at least once be in it, “stand in it” as the Chinese original has it. The “going straight ahead” is a great experiment and experience.

The ultimate reality as conceived in Buddhist philosophy is “pure experience,” *śūnyatā*, a grand integration which is before subject and object are intellectually differentiated; it is the cosmic or divine Unconscious becoming conscious.

The following may help the reader understand what is really meant by the Buddhist idea of *śūnyatā* (emptiness) where there is not an inch of grass growing and yet where we pass this bustling life of ours day after day, year after year.

Tōzan (Dongshan 洞山) once gave this sermon: “O ye Brethren, in early fall and late summer you go about east and west; only by going straight ahead in the direction of the field where not an inch of grass is growing can you get anywhere.”

On another occasion he said: “As to the field where not an inch of grass is growing, how do you get there?”

When Sekisō (Shishuang 石霜) heard of this he remarked: “Just out of the gate, and you see the grass growing.”

Later Tōzen-sai (Dongchan Qi 東禪齋)⁵ commented on this: “Let me ask whether Sekisō understood what Tōzan meant or not. If you say he did, O Brethren, what about your going around here and there, attending to all kinds of things, day in day out? Is this sowing grass all along the road? Or is it in harmony with the ancient usage? If you say Sekisō fails to understand Tōzan, how did he manage to make such a remark? O, Brethren, do you understand what I mean?”

“Let me ask, where do you want to go now? When you have a clear understanding you will be singing the ‘Homeward Ditty.’ Don’t you see? Once, I made this response: ‘If so, I won’t leave.’”⁶

The Buddhist idea is always to start from the source where division of subject and object has not yet taken place—and this not by analysis, nor by postulation, nor by dialectics, but by the method which I call *prajñā*-intuition. This is not an ordinary kind of intuition, for *prajñā* works where there is yet no differentiation. Philosophers would not subscribe to this idea, for they would say that we are already in a world of subject and object and that to reach an order other than this is possible only by postulation. Whether or not they are right, let me introduce you to Tōsu (Touzi 投子),⁷ one of the great masters toward the end of the Tang dynasty.

Someone asked Tōsu: “I am told that Prince Nata returns his bones to his father and his flesh to his mother. After this, where is his Primary Body?”

In philosophical terms, it is asking about the ultimate reality. The Primary Body is reality. When Nata gives up everything that is regarded as constituting his body, his individuality, where is his self?

When an individual object is subjected to analysis, physically it is reduced to atoms, to electrons, but what are atoms, what are electrons? Even when they are reduced to mathematical formulas, this does not add an iota to our knowledge of reality. The question is merely pushed further and further back into a mysterious recess where no illumination comes forward.

When, on the other hand, speculative analysis is carried into the metaphysical field, the question grows more complicated; all kinds of hypotheses are proposed over which great controversies take place. When a world of multitudes, of individual objects, of relative existences, of particular phenomena, is reduced to one reality, which is called God, Brahman, Reason, the Absolute, *élan-vital*, *śūnyatā*, emptiness, “undifferentiated aesthetic continuum,” etc., what is it after all? We may give it all sorts of names, but mere naming does not give us much satisfaction. Philosophically, we may think that we have said the last word, but the heart does not seem to be quieted by it. The metaphysical questions we may raise one after another seem to issue from a deeper source than our rational nature. For this reason, what we call the “heart” must be in more direct and concrete contact with what we call reality than the intellect.

Prince Nata as “Primary Body” must be found out not by analysis of any kind but by directly taking hold of reality itself, that is, by immediately apprehending reality, whatever it may mean.

But if it is directly and immediately apprehended, how do we express it? How do we communicate it to others? How do we transmit it to our fellow beings? Objects of direct apprehension as a rule cannot be communicated in words, for words are symbols, ideas, abstractions, and cannot be realities themselves. Words are an efficient means of communication only when the addressee has the experience somehow corresponding to the contents of communication. Otherwise, words are empty, or cryptic, or mystical.

Masters of Buddhist philosophy know that fully well, and they have devised other means of communication such as gestures, ejaculations, meaningless utterances, impossible statements, illogicalities, irrelevant remarks.

What, then, is Nata’s “Primary Body”?

Tōsu, the master, thus asked, threw down the staff he carried in his hands.

Where do we now see Nata’s Primary Body?

Tōsu was asked another time, “Who is Vairocana Buddha?” (Vairocana Buddha is ultimate reality.)

Tōsu said, “You have already named him.”

The inquirer continued, “Who is the teacher of Vairocana Buddha?”

“Take hold of him before Vairocana Buddha was!”

This reminds us of Christ who “is even before Abraham was.”

When Tōsu was asked about his own “teacher,” he answered in the Laozian style, “When you face him, you cannot see his head. When you follow him you cannot see his form.”

This description of reality is more or less conventional. How about the following?

Someone asked Tōsu: "I understand that Buddha exclaimed as soon as he came out of the mother-body: 'Above the heavens and below the heavens, I alone am the honored one!' Pray tell me what this 'I' is."

Tōsu answered, "Why push this old fellow down? What fault did he commit?"

To paraphrase this in more or less familiar terms: Why do you take the old Buddha to task by demanding he explain what "I" or reality is? He just cried as all babies do when they come into this world of individualization. By doing this, he did not commit any fault. His cry comes out of the very depths of reality; there is in it no intellection, no dialectical analysis, no intermediating postulation.

When I was once talking with a young philosopher about a baby's first cry, he said it was an "uninterpreted sensation." Yes, that is the way the philosopher would "explain" reality; he always resorts to an "objective" method when dealing with the subject under consideration. But by this he can never come to an understanding of it. What he calls the objective method will never penetrate into the realm of "pure experience" where the dichotomy of subject and object has never yet taken place. Where there is no such happening there is no room for objectivity of any sort.

The baby cries and the philosopher explains or interprets, but the baby goes on crying regardless of the intellectual subtleties. To "understand" it, we must become the baby and cry with it. It is on the side of the philosopher's interpretation of the "uninterpreted sensation." "Above the heavens and below the heavens, I alone am the honored one!" Let the baby not be "interpreted"!

Babies are one of the favorite subjects of Buddhist masters as they were with Christ. Let us quote another case.

Sekishitsu Zendō (Shishi Shandao 石室善道), of the latter part of the Tang dynasty, would lift up his staff whenever a monk approached him and say, "All the Buddhas of the past, future, and present come forth from this." When someone asked him about the difference between the Buddha and the truth (*dao*) the master said: "The truth is like opening the palm, and the Buddha is like closing it up to a fist." The questioner of course failed to understand what all this implied and wished a further elucidation. The master, waving his hand, said, "No, no! If you go on like that you will never come to an understanding. All the teaching contained in the scriptures and canons is all very well, but if you endeavor to draw anything out of them [by means of an objective method], you will utterly fail. For you make the mind stand against its objects whereby there is bifurcation of the seer and the seen and this will lead you to further speculative complications and crazy casuistries. Don't have anything to do with the world of opposites, it comes to naught."

The ancient master says: "From the beginning there is absolute nothing"; [therefore do not fabricate a world of dualities out of that].

“See the baby coming out of the mother’s body? It does not say, ‘I understand the sutras!’ nor does it say, ‘I do not.’ It is never bothered with the existence or the nonexistence of the Buddha-nature, but as it grows it learns all sorts of things and will declare, ‘I know all that!’ This is after all something added to it later on; it is the working of the evil passions.

“Here, however, we have to be on our guard and not be so hasty as to conclude that babyhood is the truth. For this is not quite to the point.”

This last remark of Zendō is significant. While the baby has its life to live ignorant of all scriptures of Buddhism and of the subtleties of *śūnyatā* philosophy, we grownups have also our lives to live, however sophisticated and involved in dialectical reasonings we may be. We are no more babies, and it would be the height of stupidity to aspire for their undeveloped mentality. What is important is to remain ourselves in every way possible with all our faults, moral as well as intellectual, and yet be “wise” as babies.

The Buddhist conception of *śūnyatā* is in one way the easiest and most direct to grasp—just as easy and direct as feeling hot water hot or as tasting sugar sweet. But when this approach is rejected and an appeal is made to intellection, *śūnyatā* becomes the hottest issue for a “philosophers conference.” Masters of Buddhist philosophy, however, are fully aware of this interminable struggle for objective evidence and rationalistic treatment. They refuse to waste their time on this for they are not “philosophers” but men of fact, men of direct action, men of “experience.”

Note how they respond to inquirers:

Q. “How about the golden chain which is not yet loosened?”

A. “It is opened!”

Q. “When the golden cock has not yet crowed, what about it?”

A. “There is no sound whatever.”

Q. “After it has crowed, what about it?”

A. “Each of us knows time.”

Q. “When the sun and the moon are not yet shining, where are the Buddha and we sentient beings?”

A. “When you see me angry you say I am angry; when I am glad you say I am glad.”

Q. “When not one thought is awakened, what comes out of it?”

A. “This is truly a nonsensical remark!”

Q. “When not one thought is awakened, what comes out of it?”

A. “What can you do with it?” (That is, you cannot do anything with it.)

The “chain not loosened,” “the cock not crowing,” “no thought awakened”—all these refer to *śūnyatā*. And when the monk wants to have some kind of information about it, that is, from an objective point of view—for this is the only method so far

known to him—the master is disappointing. The master's standing is not that of the monk; they are talking about different things. The master knows this but the monk does not. When an object is approached from outside, this means that we see it among other objects, that we put it in relationship with them, and therefore when we refer to it the nets of relationship are always woven around it; we can never single it out from them. This means that it ceases to be itself. We may thus know many things about it, but as to its inner working we know absolutely nothing.

If we are satisfied with this ignorance, it is well with us. But human curiosity knows no ends. It is better to say that the spirit is never satiated until it finds the final abode where it belongs. Moved by this spiritual anguish the intellect asks about "the golden cock that has not yet crowed," about the "golden chain that is not yet loosened," or about "one thought unawakened." This is the intellectual attempt to probe into the innerliness of things, wishing to take hold of *śūnyatā* directly or absolutely instead of surveying it in its inextricable meshes of reference, instead of pushing it into the labyrinth of conceptual abstractions.

In other words, we want to immediately apprehend the undifferentiated. When the golden cock crows it is differentiated; by this, time is known. But what we are after is to hear the cock when it has not yet uttered a sound—for it is by this experience alone that the undifferentiated is immediately apprehended, and the only way to get acquainted with the undifferentiated is to be personally introduced to it—no, to *be* it. The undifferentiated is never within our apprehension as long as it is undifferentiated; it is apprehensible only as differentiation. So reverse what I have just said: "We must hear the uncrowing cock when it crows!"

To repeat: hear the cock when it does not crow, or hear the cock remaining dumb all the while it crows.

The master stands where the intellect finds contradictions, and he goes on riding over them as if nothing stood in his way, whereas the disciple or philosopher is balked at every step because his intellect makes him too timid against the threat of contradictions.

When the philosopher is told of "not one thought awakened," which is *śūnya*, he is puzzled and will ask, "What state of a thing could this be?" The doubt rises because he takes "no thought awakened" for some special state of consciousness to be distinguished from "all thoughts rising." When his thinking runs along this line, he cannot comprehend that "no thought awakened" is no other than our everyday consciousness. For this reason, one master brands this philosophical way of thinking as truly nonsensical, while another retorts: "What do you want to do with it?" or "What can you do with it?"

When the master is ill-tempered his monks realize it; when he is pleased, they perceive it. This is the way not only with the masters but with every one of us. Being human, we are all susceptible to joy, to irritation, to pleasure, to pain. As we all belong in a world of differentiation, we cannot be indifferent to conditions

prevailing there. Buddha as well as all we sentient beings have to submit to them. While conditioning ourselves thus to laws of differentiation we are all the time unconsciously conscious of that which is not differentiated, that which is where the sun and moon are not yet shining, that which is when light was not separated from darkness.

The Buddhist conception of reality or *śūnyatā* is something concrete, but not in the sense of individualization. This will be seen again in the following *mondō*:

Q. "I am told that rain universally falls over all beings. What is this one rain?"

A. "A pouring rainfall."

Q. "One particle of dust contains the universe. What is this one particle?"

A. "Already differentiated into several particles!"

Q. "The old year is gone and the new year is ushered in. Is there anything that does not belong to either of these two?"

A. "Yes, there is."

Q. "What is that which transcends the two?"

A. "An auspicious new era is ushered in and all things are assuming a fresh aspect."

See, these *mondō* are after all more or less on the intellectual plane while claiming to be above it; there is here a taint of ratiocination. Let the "philosopher" comment on the following:

A monk asked, "When the moon is not full, what would you say?"

Tōsu, the master, answered, "Swallow two or three of them."

Q. "What after the moon is full?"

A. "Vomit seven or eight of them."⁸

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Despite publications of Tibetan materials that display Suzuki's name as editor, there is no evidence that he had any knowledge of the Tibetan language. Although he often uses Sanskrit and Pāli words in his essays, Tibetan is almost entirely absent. In the case of the critical edition of the Tibetan text of the *Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra*, and the revised glossary of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, we can surmise that the Tibetan textual work, as well as the Sanskrit to a significant degree, was the result of Izumi Hōkei's cooperation on the project.

2. At that time, the Imperial University (founded in 1886, renamed Tokyo Imperial University in 1897) had two forms of admittance that produced two different ranks of students taking the same classes, with very different privileges and academic possibilities. When Kyoto Imperial University was founded in 1897, the same system was implemented. Students admitted as *honka* 本科 ("normative track") graduated in three years, had full library privileges including access to comfortable reading rooms in the library, and were allowed to enter the stacks to browse the books in their third year. Students admitted as *senka* 選科 ("selected track"), on the other hand, had a similar three-year course of study but it did not result in a graduation certificate; they were limited to taking courses in only one program, had limitations in their library privileges (which did not include access to the stacks), and they had to study in the hallways rather than the library reading rooms. The distinction was based on whether they had graduated from what were called middle schools or high schools prior to entering the university, but as many students did not have access to a high school, this resulted in many of the brightest students coming into the university in the secondary status of *senka*, although *senka* students were allowed to move up to *honka* status if they passed the equivalent of high school exit exams. Not only Suzuki but also Nishida and many of Japan's brightest came into the national universities in the *senka* track and wrote about how depressing it was to be treated as students of secondary importance.

3. There were two other English-language journals, *Light of Dharma* (San Francisco, 1901–1907), and *Mahayanist* (Kyoto, 1915–1916), that preceded *The Eastern Buddhist*, but although Suzuki contributed to both of them, they did not have the academic profile or staying power of *The Eastern Buddhist*, which is still in operation today, nearly one hundred years later.

4. The *kyōgaku* publications, many of them explicitly sectarian, of Japanese Buddhist scholars who otherwise work on Indian Buddhism are taken for granted in Japanese scholarship but are often unknown outside Japan because they are rarely, if ever, translated. For example, in the case of Shin scholarship, Nanjō wrote one of the first critical modern studies of *Tannishō*, and Akanuma and Yamabe Shūgaku contributed a detailed commentary on the *Kyōgyōshinshō* published in 1914–1916 that is still in print today, and this work is heavily indebted to Edo-period *shūgaku* scholarship of people like Jinrei. Takakusu Junjirō, chief editor of the Taishō canon and writings on Indian Buddhism, also founded Musashino University for the Hongwanji branch of Shin and published a book on Shinran. In the Zen tradition, Mizuno Kōgen, known for his Pāli dictionary, grammar, and many translations, also published two monographs on the *Shushōgi*, a controversial Meiji-period text defining the doctrines and practices of the Sōtō sect, one published by the Sōtō sect itself.

5. Kizu Muan, ed., *Shin'yaku Bukkyō seiten* (Nagoya: Shin'yaku Bukkyō Seiten Fukyūkai, 1925).

6. Given his indebtedness to their work, it is striking that many years later Suzuki rejected the Yamabe dissertation proposal based on a study of the same *Huayan jing*, thereby denying him a doctorate from Ōtani University.

7. The one exception is the so-called Tenshō Embassy when four teenage aspirants to the Catholic clergy, ages twelve to fifteen, were sent to Europe by a Christian daimyo to meet the Pope and spent time in Portuguese-controlled Goa en route under control of Jesuit clergy, for one month in 1582 and one year 1587–1588. Not only did the perceived value of their journey lie in bringing back knowledge of Spain, Portugal, and Italy, but also because they returned only after Hideyoshi had issued his expulsion order for Catholic priests, whatever they may have communicated about India had little or no impact in Japan. Tenjiku Tokubē 天竺徳兵衛, on the other hand, was a merchant interested in India who managed to get passage twice on different so-called red-seal ships doing trade with Southeast Asia, and the second trip took him to India. These trips took place in 1626 and 1630, just before the isolation policy went into effect. He wrote about what he observed in a book called *Tenjiku tōkai monogatari* 天竺渡海物語 that became so well-read in the international information-starved Edo period that a character based on him was written into later *jōruri* and kabuki plays.

8. It is unclear if there was knowledge in Japan of European scholarship on Sanskrit Buddhist materials. We know that Burnouf's 1852 French translation of the *Saddharmapundarika Sūtra* from Sanskrit influenced American Transcendentalists, but there is no record of it reaching Japan.

9. Lewis Lancaster, ed., in collaboration with Sung-bae Park, *The Korean Buddhist Canon: A Descriptive Catalogue* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

10. *Budda no fukuin*. On this particular publication, see J. Snodgrass, "Buddha no fukuin: The Deployment of Paul Carus's *Gospel of Buddha* in Meiji Japan." See the

description of Suzuki's publishing efforts before journeying to the United States and the journals in Japan focusing on overseas writing on Buddhism in volume 1 of this series, pp. xxvi–xxvii.

11. Although he does not mention it, I strongly suspect that he also heavily relied on the renderings into Classical Japanese of standard editions of texts found in the *Kokuyaku issaikyō* editions.

12. Published by Open Court Press, Chicago.

13. The *Studies* and *Laṅkāvatāra* translation were published by George Routledge and Sons, London. The first edition of the *Index* was published by *The Eastern Buddhist* in Kyoto in 1933; the revised and expanded *Index* was published by the Sanskrit Buddhist Text Publishing Society, Kyoto, in 1934.

14. The publisher of the Sanskrit edition of the *Gaṇḍavyūha* is an arm of *The Eastern Buddhist* called Sanskrit Buddhist Texts Publishing Society, also located in Kyoto. This came out between 1934 and 1936. After the war a revised edition was published in 1949 by a different company called The Society for the Publication of Sacred Books of the World, Tokyo.

15. It was Edmunds who first got Suzuki interested in Swedenborgianism, which overlapped with Beatrice's interest in Theosophy.

1. THE MĀDHYAMIKA SCHOOL IN CHINA

1. [Misspelled here and numerous times in this essay as “Kumārajīva.” MLB]

2. [Divākara (613–687), transliterated as 地婆訶羅 (a.k.a. Rizhao 日照, Jpn. Nisshō), was a high-born Buddhist monk from India who studied in the Nālandā monastic college and became a high-profile Indian cleric after his arrival in China. He was treated with respect by emperors Gaozong and Wu Zetian during what was arguably the high point of state support of Buddhism in Tang China. He is named as translator of eighteen texts or more, though some are duplicates. Some of these Wu Zetian herself wrote prefaces for, but given that he did not arrive in China until he was well into his sixties, his role was undoubtedly that of transmitter rather than translator and the fame associated with his name probably had more to do with his *attribution* as translator than his knowledge of Chinese. Today largely forgotten, he was regarded as having transmitted an updated version Mādhyamika doctrine, which in Chinese terms was called *xin sanlun* (新三論), to such luminaries as Fazang (法藏, 643–712) and Wonhyo (元曉, 617–686). See Ui Hakuju's *Bukkyō jiten* (833). There is one text attributed to him as translator, however, with Mādhyamika-style content embedded in an early Vajrayāna context, which is T#830, called *Dàshèng biànzào guāngmíng zàng wúzi fāmén jīng* 大乘遍照光明藏無字法門經, reconstructed as *Anakṣarakaraṇḍaka-vairocana-garbha-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra*. Note, too, that there are also two translations attributed to Divākara of materials that Suzuki would take up in earnest some years later, the *Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra* (T#295), and an emended version of the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* translated under the name *Dàshèng mìyán jīng* 大乘密嚴經 (T#681). MLB]

3. [Original text has Avatamsaka instead of Avatāmsaka. MLB]

4. [Jizang (吉藏, 549–623) was the person who first systematized Mādhyamika thought in China to the point that it got an identity as the Sanlun school. Suzuki likes to use his social name based on his temple of affiliation, Jiaxiang Dashi 嘉祥大師. Note that the

proper Wade-Giles spelling for this was Chia-hsiang Ta-shih but Suzuki repeatedly uses the form Chia-hsiang Tai-shih. MLB]

5. [The Chinese name for the sect/school is Sanlun Zong 三論宗, referring to three Indian śāstras on Mādhyamika thought that Jizang himself regarded as the core scriptural basis for the school. So by calling it the “Three Śāstra sect,” Suzuki is reconstructing *lun* as *śāstra*, which is accurate in this case, but in fact that has not been the standard way to interpret the name. Moreover, he is interpreting *zong* as “sect,” when in fact there was no sectarian institution under this moniker. MLB]

6. [The Dharmalakṣa sect corresponds to the Hossō school; Suzuki mistakenly uses Dharmalakṣa. MLB]

7. [Asaṅga is written Asanga. MLB]

8. [Yogācāra is written Yogacāra. MLB]

9. [The *Dasheng zhangzhen lun* 大乘掌珍論 by Bhāviveka, translated in two fascicles by Xuanzang (T#1578). There is no Sanskrit or Tibetan translation of this text, so the Sanskrit title has been reconstructed variously as *hastaratna*, *hastamaṇi*, *karatalaratna*, and this form, *tālaratna*, all of which is still found. MLB]

10. [*Erdi yizhang* 二諦義章. This appears to be another name for the *Erdi yi* 二諦義 treatise attributed to Jizang, T#1854, as stated at the beginning of the treatise (嘉祥藏大師所撰二諦義章三卷, T 45.77b27). Suzuki may have misread the statement in *Guang hongming ji* 廣弘明集 where mention is made of a prince of the Liao kingdom called 昭明太子 asking for a lecture to explain this text (see T#52.246c26–28). MLB]

11. [I have corrected Suzuki. He starts out spelling this “Samvṛti,” but midway through the essay he uses the form Saṃvṛti. I have changed all instances to Saṃvṛti. MLB]

12. The *Viśeṣacintābrahmapariṣcchā sūtra* was translated three times into Chinese at Taishō nos. 585–586–587 by Dharmarakṣa, Kumārajīva, and Bodhiruci, respectively. It features a discourse dominated by the theme of nonduality and frequently appears in Chinese *panjiao* schema in the same category as the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*. There is also a commentary on this sutra attributed to Vasubandhu that is extant in Chinese translation, *Sheng siwei fantiansuowen jinglun* 勝思惟梵天所問經論, at T#1532. MLB]

13. [This refers to the *Zhonglun* itself, T#1564, traditionally attributed to Piṅgala (賓伽羅) as an essay accurately describing Nāgārjuna’s thought. MLB]

14. [*Shùnzōnglùn yìrù dà bōrě bōluómì jīng chūpīn fāmén* 順中論義入大般若波羅蜜經初品法門, a.k.a. *Shunzhonglun* 順中論, T#1565. Nanjō #1246. MLB]

15. [*Bore deng lun shi* 般若燈論釋, T#1566. Nanjō 1185. Fenbie ming 分別明 is Bhāviveka. I have changed Suzuki’s “Prabhāmitra” to Prabhākaramitra. MLB]

16. [*Dasheng zhongguan shilun* 大乘中觀釋論, T#1567. I have changed Suzuki’s “Sthitamati” to Sthiramati. Nine fascicles in the Taishō edition rather than eight. Not found in Nanjō. MLB]

17. [*Shi er men lun* 十二門論, T#1568. Nanjō 1186. MLB]

18. [*Bai lun* 百論, T#1569. MLB]

19. [Suzuki is referring to the preface written by Sengzhao (僧肇) affixed to the *Bai Lun* translation of Kumārajīva. Sengzhao comments at the end that the original text consists of twenty chapters, each of which contained five verses, but both the verses and the latter ten chapters were left out of this translation because they were deemed to be of insufficient

value to a Chinese audience. The first of the ten chapters in the translation does begin with four verses, but verses do not appear in the other chapters. MLB]

2. THE BREADTH OF BUDDHISM

1. [*Tīrthaka* is a pejorative term in Buddhist Sanskrit for a member of a rival religious or philosophical tradition. Typically translated as *waidao* 外道, as seen by Suzuki's word choice of "victory over . . . *tīrthakas*," it may or may not have strong polemic implications, depending on the context. MLB]

2. [More commonly known as Lu Jiuyuan (1139–1192), Lu Xiangsan was a Neo-Confucian philosopher active in the Southern Song period who exhibits some influence from *cittamātra* thought. MLB]

3. [Zhu Xi (1126–1271), also from the Southern Song period, was one the most influential Neo-Confucian thinkers for China, Korea, and Japan. MLB]

4. [Wang Yangming (1472–1529), active in the Ming period, was another highly influential Neo-Confucian thinker, founder of a rival school of interpretation to the above two. MLB]

4. ARTICLES FROM LIGHT OF DHARMA

1. Dharma here does not mean law or doctrine as is commonly understood, but nature, objects, being, or that which exists. Kaya is body in the sense of system or organized form.

2. [諸惡莫作 諸善奉行 自淨其意 是諸佛教 (T 4.567b1–2). This verse was first put into Chinese in T#210, dated 224 CE and matches the Pali verse perfectly. T#210, translated by Zhi Qian and Dharmatrāta, is the earliest of four translations of textual materials that closely but not completely match the content of the *Dhammapada* and *Udānavarga*. Note that Suzuki provides a translation in the next paragraph of only the first half of the verse; the second half reads, "Purifying one's own mind, this is the teaching of the buddhas." MLB]

3. [白樂天, a.k.a. Bo Juyi 白居易 (772–846). MLB]

4. This consists of less than a dozen sheets of paper in ordinary Chinese print. An English translation of it was published some years ago in this magazine by Rev. Sonoda and the present writer.

5. These views are repeatedly expounded in all the Mahayana works such as the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka*, the *Gaṇḍhavyūha*, the *Laṅkāvatāra*, the *Karuṇā-puṇḍarīka*, etc., etc. Only the first of these sutras has been rendered into English and French. All the others are still left untouched in an obscure corner of the great European and Indian Sanskrit libraries. It is a pity that the interests of Oriental scholars in these documents have been so far only philosophical and historical. But the time will soon come when they are studied from a humanistic and religio-philosophical standpoint, and then they will yield very rich harvests, enough to feed all hungry souls in the world. [Diacritics added. MLB]

6. Those readers who desire to get more acquainted with Mahayana Buddhism are requested to peruse Rev. Soyen Shaku's "Sermons of a Buddhist Abbot," published by The Open Court Publishing Co., and the present writer's *Outlines of the Mahayana Buddhism*, Luzac & Company, London.

5. THE FIRST CONVOCATION OF BUDDHISM

1. [See A. Thakur, *Buddha and Buddhist Synods in India and Abroad* (1996). On more recent efforts using Chinese sources to understand Indian Vinaya discourse, see the work of Charles Willemen, Yamagiwa Nobuyuki, Shayne Clark, and others. MLB]

2. Swedenborg was considered a sort of “natural Buddhist” by a number of influential people in the 1880s and 1890s in the West and in Japan, including Shaku Sōyen. On Suzuki’s relationship with Swedenborgianism, see “Suzuki Daisetsu and Swedenborg: A Historical Background,” in *Modern Buddhism in Japan*, ed. M. Hayashi, E. Ōtani, and P. Swanson (Nagoya: Nanzan University Press, 2014).

3. [Hermann Oldenberg (1854–1920). MLB]

4. This refers to the Japanese edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka compiled in 1883, commonly known as the Kōkyō Shoin Edition. [Today this is known as the *Dai Nihon kōtei shukusatsu daizōkyō* 大日本校訂縮刷大藏經. The reconstructed Sanskrit titles of the eleven texts listed here are taken from *A Catalogue of The Chinese Translation of The Buddhist Tripiṭaka: The Sacred Canon of the Buddhists in China and Japan* by Bunyiu Nanjio (Oxford, 1883), which served as an annotated table of contents for this canon. Suzuki relies on it heavily. MLB]

5. [T#1462. *Shanjianlü piposha* 善見律毘婆沙. MLB]

6. [T#1421. *Mishasaibu hexi wufenlü* 彌沙塞部和醯五分律. MLB]

7. [T#1428. *Sifen lü* 四分律. MLB]

8. [T#1425. *Mohe sengqi lü* 摩訶僧祇律. MLB]

9. [T#1451. *Genben shuo yiqie youbu pinaiye zashi* 根本說一切有部毘奈耶雜事. Suzuki hereafter refers to this as “*Sarvāstivāda-vinaya*.” MLB]

10. [T#1463. *Pinimu jing* 毘尼母經. MLB]

11. [T#1509. *Dazhidu lun* 大智度論. MLB]

12. [T#2042. *Ayuwang zhuan* 阿育王傳. MLB]

13. [T#2026. *Zhuanji sanzang ji zazang zhuan* 撰集三藏及雜藏傳. MLB]

14. [T#2027. *Jiashe jie jing* 迦葉結經. MLB]

15. [T#2058. *Fu fazang yinyuan zhuan* 付法藏因緣傳. MLB]

16. This monk Subhadra should not be confounded with Buddha’s last convert, who happens to bear the same name.

17. The name of the imprudent Bhikṣu is Bhānanda in the Mahiśāsaka, the Dharmagupta, and the Vinaya-mātrkā; Mahallaka in the Mahāsāṃghika; Subhadra-Mahallaka in the Suddhāśāna-vibhāṣā-Vinaya.

18. Jieji. Literally, jie means to tie, to join, or to unite, and ji to gather, to collect, to compile, and the like. The term is apparently an equivalent of samgīti, but I have retained its Chinese sense by translating it “compilation.”

19. Except the Transmission of the Dharmapiṭaka, where no mention is made of this incident.

20. So in the Caturvarga-vinaya, but Boqi in the Pañcavarga-vinaya, and Boshê Fuduo as a disciple of Ānanda in the Life of Aśoka. It is very difficult to find the Sanskrit equivalents of those names when their meanings are not given, for there is a tendency among the so-called old translators to simplify long Sanskrit terms in such a manner as to make them appear like native Chinese names.

21. Here the accuser is not Mahākāśyapa, but Upāli.

22. Most of the Chinese books here referred to give all the reasons by which Ānanda justified himself for having committed those alleged misdemeanors, but from want of space, no mention here is made of them.

23. This naturally caused a vehement demonstration among the Saṃgha later.

24. Note how trifling all these accusations are.

25. The fault is viewed here from two points: (1) not giving any water, (2) not knowing the fact that Buddha is able to cleanse any kind of water.

26. That is, the Sarvāstivāda-vinaya and the Mahāsāṃghika-vinaya.

27. The number of the Bhikṣus who took part in the First Convocation is generally estimated at five hundred, but according to the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā Śāstra*, the Convocation consisted of one thousand Bhikṣus.

28. According to the Mahāsāṃghika, two Bhikṣus were missing when the members were counted by Kāśyapa, but one of them, Anuruddha, soon joined them.

29. The *Mahāprajñāpāramitā Śāstra* makes him a disciple of Śāriputra.

30. According to some, the Śrīvrikṣa (?) palace, but according to others the Śrīdeva palace.

31. So in the *Sarvāstivāda-vinaya*.

32. The *Sarvāstivāda-vinaya*, the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā Śāstra*, and the *Sutra on Kāśyapa's Compilation* relate, in addition, that four streams ran out of his transfigured body, each murmuring a gāthā that proclaimed the transiency of life and the lamentable departure of the Lord.

33. Not given by Beal.

34. Beal gives the Anāgata-Bhayāni and Munigāthā.

35. This and following four titles are so concisely given in the text that it is very difficult to make out what they are, and the translation and the reference to the Pāli Abhidharma works here presented are merely tentative.

36. The text is reticent about the author of the compilation of this Piṭaka.

37. According to other editions.

38. Those five titles of the books contained in the Abhidharmapiṭaka closely agree, though the translation is a little different, with those above referred to in the Vinaya in Five Divisions, but the terms being too concise, we cannot give anything more than a mere conjecture as to their correspondence to the Pāli works.

39. Was the Gāthā already existing side by side with the prose at the time of the First Convocation? Did Buddha himself put some most important tenets of his doctrine into a rhythmical form, that his disciples might learn them by heart? (Yes: See *S. B. E.*, XIII., p. 151. —Edmunds.)

40. Were some parts of the Abhidharma also versified?

41. Does this mean that Buddha preached on some traditional subjects, or that some Sūtras deal with traditions, or that the first sermons of Buddha, such as were delivered for the five Bhikṣus in Varanasi before the conversion of Ānanda, were heard by him afterward from Buddha's own mouth, or from those who were then present, in which case the term tradition would be used in the sense of hearsay? Judging from similar passages in some other works, the last sense seems to be most preferable.

42. This statement is most significant, for many Mahayana texts are said to have been taken from the Nāga Palace, where they were long preserved in secret. The Vinaya text of

the Sarvāstivāda is generally considered to belong to the Hinayana work, and this fact makes the above statement much more mysterious. Is the Nāga Palace an ideal creation of later Buddhists? or is it some yet unknown region in the Himalaya? [Buddha converted several yakkhas, nāgas, etc. —Edmunds.]

43. This is very strange, considering that those who were admitted to the assembly were all free from attachment, that is, they were all Arhats, but in spite of this were many other Bhikṣus also admitted as the audience, though not actually partaking in the work of the compilation of the Tripiṭaka? In the Mahayana work a statement is sometimes made to the effect that the followers of the Mahayana Buddhism had their own convocation somewhere in the neighborhood. Does the present text refer to this, or to the council of the Mahāsāṃghika school as it is mentioned in Xuanzang?

44. These subjects also appear in the Abhidharmapiṭaka, as we see below. Do the statements mean that those subjects as taught by Buddha were classified with the Sūtra pitaka, while a further exposition of the same by his disciples was included in the Abhidharma?

45. Saṃyukta in Sanskrit. Coincidence is a literal translation of it, which is commonly rendered miscellaneous, according to its derived meaning—so says the text. [Note that Suzuki also translates Saṃyukta in this essay as “Miscellaneous.” MLB]

46. Literally, those who carry the Vinaya, i.e., know it by heart.

47. It is very strange that Mahākāśyapa did not first ask Upāli about the four Principal Sins (Pārājika) instead of about such insignificant regulations as the Śikṣā rules. Why does the Sarvāstivāda school attach such importance to the latter, while other schools invariably give the first place to the Pārājika, as is naturally expected? Noticing, however, the inconsistent statement which is made immediately below, I am inclined to think that some spurious elements have crept later into the body of the original text.

48. The following quotation clearly shows how confusing the text is: “Upāli was asked to recite the third Śikṣā, and is stated to have told them about the first Pārājika instead.” As I remarked just above, the text must be considered to contain some later additions.

49. Literally, to live together.

50. Originally tables of contents, as may be seen in the Pāli texts. —A. J. E.

51. Observe that some of those subjects also appear in the Sūtrapitaka, while the identity of others cannot be determined, owing to the brevity of the statement.

52. According to some the Dharmapiṭaka is identified with the Sūtrapitaka, as in the present text; while, according to others, it is a general name given to the entire collection of the sacred writings. This disagreement among the records of different Buddhist schools apparently shows that at the earlier stage of development of Buddhist literature there was no definite name for the Pitaka compiled by the First Convocation, which had probably been known by the simple designation, *buddhavacana* (Words of Buddha). Therefore, we shall not run much risk in considering those terms which are now currently used by Buddhists themselves, as well as by Buddhist scholars (to wit, Vinayapiṭaka, Sūtrapitaka, Abhidharma, Tripiṭaka or Dvīpiṭaka), as the elaboration of later Buddhists.

53. The reader will observe that the number of the subjects contained in the “Āgama increasing by one” differs in different texts.

54. This statement is very valuable. The Mahāsāṃghika quarreled with the Theravāda about the contents of the Khuddaka Nikāya, where these books belong, and the very treatises which the Dīpavaṃsa says they omitted, are wanting here. —Edmunds.

55. It is noteworthy that according to the Mahāsāṃghika school the man who blamed Ānanda before the assembly was not Mahākāśyapa, but Upāli, the first of the Vinaya-dhara.

56. What does the statement here refer to, which says one thousand Bhikṣus staying outside were summoned in? Xuanzang mentions that the Mahāsāṃghika school, being excluded from the assembly of the Sthavira school, had their own compilation, meeting to the west of Mahākāśyapa's convocation. Does the present text refer to that?

57. Why not give names, so as to compare with Theravada list in Mahāvamsa? — Edmunds.

58. The Pāli commentaries say the same. — A. J. E.

59. This is very strange, because the text has before said that the First Convocation compiled the Vinaya and Sūtra only. I am inclined to think that these additional statements, as well as the succeeding detailed explanation of such terms as Sūtra, Abhidharma, Piṭaka, and Āgama, are later interpolations put down here by way of commentary, but which in the course of time have been mixed up with the text.

60. The Chinese characters for transliteration in the present text, so far as they have come under my notice, strongly suggest that the text is a translation of the Pāli original, though I have retained the Sanskrit terms for the sake of uniformity.

61. The present text belongs to the Mahāyāna literature, and it will be very interesting to contrast its accounts of the First Convocation with those of the preceding ones, which all belong to the Hīnayāna Buddhism.

62. A literal translation of Saṃyuktāgama.

63. Here, as well as further on, five hundred Arhats are mentioned. Is this the number of the Arhats assembled in the Convocation? If so, it is in direct contradiction to the above statement that there were a thousand.

64. One edition reads eight thousand, which is probably a misprint.

65. The *Pañcavarga-vinaya*, the *Caturvarga-vinaya*, and the *Vinaya-mātṛkā*.

66. According to the *Pañcavarga-vinaya*, agreeing with the Pāli.

67. The last passage is not clear, and we may consider it either as forming an independent statement or as an appendix to the sixth.

68. [The spelling of the following words reflect corrections by the editor: *vibhāṣā*, Mahāsāṃghika, fascicles, Piṭaka, Nirvāṇa, Nikāya, *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, Mahānirvāṇa, *Dīpavaṃsa*, *Mahāvamsa*, Prātimokṣa, Aṅguttara, *Śrāmaṇyaphala*, Bhikṣuṇī, *Vibhaṅga*, Tripiṭaka, Brahmarāja, Pippala, *Dharmacakrapravartana*, Kauṇḍinya, Bodhyaṅga, Vinaya-dhara, Kalandaka, Saṃghāvaśeṣa, Naiḥsargika, Karmavācā, Pratisaṃvid, Vipāśyanā, Dharmasaṃgraha, Ītīvṛttaka, dhara, buddhavadana, Saptaparna, Gṛdhrakūṭa. MLB]

6. PHILOSOPHY OF THE YOGĀCĀRA

1. See Yijing, Takakusu, p. 15. [Nanhai jigui neifa chuan 南海寄歸內法傳, T#2125. Suzuki translated the title as *Correspondence from the Southern Seas*. See Takakusu (1896). MLB]

2. [Nanjio Bunyiu, 1883. MLB]

3. [The final chapter in the *Huayan jing*, T#278, 279; translated as separate text at T#293. MLB]

4. [T#675, 676; partial translations at Nos. 677 and 678. MLB]

5. [T#1579. MLB]
6. [T#1592, 1593, 1594. This is the Xuanzang translation. Based on Nanjio, Suzuki uses *Mahāyānasamparigraha*. MLB]
7. [T#1606. Today reconstructed as **Mahāyānābhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā*. MLB]
8. [顯揚聖教論 *Xianyang shengjiao lun*, T#1602. Title variously reconstructed; translation here from Schmithausen 1987. MLB]
9. [T#1599. MLB]
10. [T#1585. MLB]
11. The *Mahāyānasamgraha*. [See n. 6. MLB]
12. This is one of the most essential doctrines of Yoga philosophy. [J'ai fait observer a M. T. Suzuki que la forme āliya (= ālaya) m'était inconnue; on verra ci-dessous p. comment il croit pouvoir la justifier —L. V.P.]
13. This is not exactly peculiar to the Yogācāra, but its classification may be considered to be original with them.
14. [眞如. MLB]
15. This work was never translated into Chinese. [One of the six sutras listed by Kuiji as authoritative for the Faxiang school. MLB]
16. In Vasubandhu's notes the prose part of the Sūtra explaining the gāthā is quoted. See also in the Sūtra the chap. treat of "Citta, Manas, and Vijñānāni."
17. Giles 4087, 1064. [習氣. MLB]
18. "Defiled" does not mean immoral or unlawful, but particular, individual, conditional, relative, etc. Defiled dharmas are particular existences, or individual objects, or phenomena. But dharma in its broadest sense sometimes even implies the sense of karma and is equivalent for act or deed.
19. The original Chinese for activity is 緣生 *yuan sheng* (Giles, 13737, 9865), condition-generation. It is the generating activity of the Āliya, which is manifested when its conditions are matured. The Āliya, as it stands by itself, is absolutely neutral and indifferent to action.
20. *Andhagajanyāya*.
21. [Although his use of "Ādhāna" earlier as "support" makes sense, here *ādhāna* appears to be a mistake for *amala* 阿摩羅, the pure, ninth level of consciousness advocated by Paramārtha. MLB]
22. Two hindrances (*āvaraṇa*) are recognized by the Mahāyānists, which lie in the way to final salvation: hindrance of desire and hindrance of intellect. The first is moral and comes from egoism, while the second is philosophical and the outcome of limited knowledge. The first hindrance is destroyed when our instinctively egoistic desires are subdued. The second is removed when we acquire all-knowledge (*sarvajñatva*), which belongs to Bodhisattvahood.
23. I am tempted in this connection to enter on a so far not yet quite explored field of Buddhism, which concerns itself with the question of Dharmakāya and Bhūtataṭhā. But this being impossible in a limited space I have to wait for another occasion.
24. [In this addendum, I have left the spelling in its original form so that the reader can see how Suzuki struggled to deal with the discrepancy between the modern pronunciations of the transliterated forms used in the sixth and seventh centuries in China and the known Sanskrit form of *ālaya*. MLB]
25. Giles [1892 edition], 1, 6942, 12832. [阿黎耶. Suzuki neglects to mention that the form 阿梨耶 is even more common in Chinese texts translated prior to Xuanzang. The

Cantonese pronunciation, considered close to that of the Tang period, of 黎 is lai and of 黎 is lei, so it is entirely likely that these earlier transliterations did indeed render the Indic form ālaya. MLB]

26. 1, 6699, 12832. [阿賴耶. MLB]

27. 12753, 8016, 9928. [無沒識. MLB]

28. 11601, 9928. [藏識. MLB]

29. 9806, 11601. [攝藏. MLB]

30. 9456, 9951. [不失. MLB]

31. [Suzuki mistakenly identifies the author as Baozang, but this is from Fazang's *Da-sheng qixinlun yiji*, T#1846, at 44.255c3–6. MLB]

32. [Spellings of the following words reflect corrections by the editor: *saṃvṛti*, Asaṅga, *Laṅkāvatāra*, *saṃvṛtisatya*. MLB]

7. EXCERPTS FROM OUTLINES OF MAHĀYĀNA BUDDHISM

1. His date is not known, but judging from the contents of his works, of which we have at present two or three among the Chinese Tripiṭaka, it seems that he lived later than Aśvaghōṣa, but prior to, or simultaneously with, Nāgārjuna. This little book occupies a very important position in the development of Mahāyānism in India. Next to Aśvaghōṣa's *Awakening of Faith*, the work must be carefully studied by scholars who want to grasp every phase of the history of Mahāyāna school as far as it can be learned through the Chinese documents. [The work to which Suzuki refers here is unclear, perhaps T#1567 or T#1613? MLB]

2. Be it remarked here that a Bodhisattva is not a particularly favored man in the sense of chosen people or elect. We are all in a way Bodhisattvas, that is, when we recognize the truth that we are equally in possession of the Samyaksaṃbodhi, Highest True Intelligence, and through which everybody without exception can attain final enlightenment.

3. [Abhidharmasamuccaya, T#1605. MLB] by Asaṅga. Nanjo, No. 1199.

4. [Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, T#1579. MLB] Nanjo, No. 1170. The work is supposed to have been dictated to Asaṅga by a mythical Bodhisattva.

5. [顯揚聖教論 *Āryadeśanā vikhyapāna? T#1602. MLB] by Asaṅga. Nanjo, 1177.

6. [Mahāyānasamgraha translated by Paramārtha. T#1593. MLB] by Asaṅga. Nanjo, 1183.

7. Perceiving an incarnation of the Dharmakāya in every spiritual leader regardless of his nationality and professed creed, Mahāyānists recognize a Buddha in Socrates, Mohammed, Jesus, Francis of Assisi, Confucius, Laozi, and many others.

8. Ancient Hindu Buddhists, with their fellow philosophers, believed in the existence of spiritually transfigured beings, who, not hampered by the limitations of space and time, can manifest themselves everywhere for the benefit of all sentient beings. We notice some mysterious figures in almost all Mahāyāna sūtras, who are very often described as shedding innumerable rays of light from the forehead and illuminating all the three thousand worlds simultaneously. This may merely be a poetic exaggeration. But this Saṃbhogakāya or Body of Bliss (see Aśvaghōṣa's *Awakening of Faith*, p. 101) is very difficult for us to comprehend as it is literally described. For a fuller treatment see the chapter on "Tri-kāya." [This refers to a latter chapter in *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism* not included in the current collection. MLB]

9. Though I am very much tempted to digress and to enter into a specific treatment concerning these two Hindu Mahāyāna doctrines, I reluctantly refrain from so doing, as it requires a somewhat lengthy treatment and does not entirely fall within the scope of the present work.

10. The Aśvaghōṣa's conception of the Ālaya, which varies with the view here presented, may be familiar to readers of the *Awakening of Faith*. This is one of the most abstruse problems in the philosophy of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and there are several divergent theories concerning its nature, attributes, activities, etc. In a work like this, it is impossible to give even a general statement of those controversies, however interesting they may be to students of the history of intellectual development in India.

The Ālayavijñāna, to use the phraseology of Sāṃkhya philosophy, is a composition so to speak, of the Soul, so to speak, of the Soul (*puruṣa*) and Primordial Matter (*prakṛti*). It is the Soul, so far as it is neutral and indifferent to all those phenomenal manifestations, that are going on within as well as without us. It is Primordial Matter, inasmuch as it is the reservoir of everything, whose lid being lifted by the hands of Ignorance, there instantly springs up this universe of limitation and relativity. Enlightenment or Nirvāṇa, therefore, consists in recognizing the error of Ignorance and not in clinging to the products of imagination.

11. For a more detailed explanation of the ideal philosophy, or the Yogācāra, see my article on the subject in *Le Muséon*, 1905.

12. "One mind" or "one heart" meaning the mental attitude which is in harmony with the monistic view of nature in its broadest sense. [Suzuki is alluding to the use of the term *yixin* 一心 in the *Awakening of Faith*. MLB]

13. These ten stages of spiritual development are somewhat minutely explained below. See Chapter XII [in *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*. MLB].

14. The ten moral precepts of the Buddha are: (1) Kill no living being; (2) Take nothing that is not given; (3) Keep matrimonial sanctity; (4) Do not lie; (5) Do not slander; (6) Do not insult; (7) Do not chatter; (8) Be not greedy; (9) Bear no malice; (10) Harbor no skepticism.

15. Mahāyānism recognizes two "entrances" through which a comprehensive knowledge of the universe is obtained. One is called the "entrance of sameness" (*samatā*) and the other the "entrance of diversity" (*nānātva*). The first entrance introduces us to the universality of things and suggests a pantheistic interpretation of existence. The second leads us to the particularity of things culminating in monotheism or polytheism, as it is viewed from different standpoints. The Buddhists declare that neither entrance alone can lead us to the sanctum sanctorum of existence, and in order to obtain a sound, well-balanced knowledge of things in general, we must go through both the entrances of universality and particularity.

16. The doctrine of Trikāya will be given further elucidation in the chapter bearing the same title. [This refers to a latter chapter in *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism* not included in the current collection. MLB]

17. [Spellings of the following words reflect corrections by the editor: *Abdhidharmasamuccaya*, *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra*, *Mahāyānasamgraha*, *Sambhogakāya*, *dāna*, *Asaṅga*, *Arciṣmatī*, *Dūraṅgamā*, *Nirvāṇa*, *Sāṃkhya*, *śikṣā*, *saṃsāra*, *Nirmāṇakāya*, and *Sambhogakāya*. Capitalization has been left unchanged. MLB]

8. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MAHĀYĀNA BUDDHISM

1. The term *dharmakāya* is very difficult to define. Neither “essence-body,” “law-body,” nor “being-system” exactly expresses its idea. “Dharma” is a very comprehensive term in Buddhist philosophy, and in this case it means all this: essence, being, law, and doctrine. In short, let us understand Dharmakāya here as the source, the ultimate reality, from which is derived the reason of existence, morality, and religion.
2. Translated into English by the present author from the Chinese translations, 1900. A new revised edition will be issued in the near future.
3. [Apparently a translation of *Zhonglun* 中論, the Chinese title used by Kumārajīva for his translation of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārika*. MLB]
4. [Spelling of the following words reflect corrections: Rissū, Mahāsāṃghika, Sthavira, Tripiṭaka, Puṇḍarika, Nirvāṇa, Īśvara, *tattva*, *samyaksambodhi*, *bodhicitta*, *pariṇāmanā*. MLB]

9. THE BUDDHA IN MAHĀYĀNA BUDDHISM

1. [Reginald S. Coplestone, *Buddhism Primitive and Present in Magadha and in Ceylon* (London: Longmans, Green, 1892). MLB]
2. [Ananda Coomaraswamy, *Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism* (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1916). MLB]
3. [The *Foyijiao jing* 佛遺教經 is an abbreviated name for T#389: *Fochui banniepan lüeshuo jiaojie jing* 佛垂般涅槃略說教誡經. A commentary on it by Vasubandhu also exists in Chinese translation, 遺教經論 (T#1529). MLB]
4. [Separate from spelling mistakes for many of the Sanskrit terms, this list appears to have a couple of mistakes. Normally the list begins with *tathāgata* and the term *buddha* is not included. The seventh item is also nonstandard in that it combines what is normally the sixth (*lokavid* 世間解) and seventh (*anuttara* 無上士) items into one term, producing the form “Peerless One in the knowledge of the world.” MLB]
5. Henry Clarke Warren, *Buddhism in Translations* (1922 ed.), 107.
6. The text exists both in Chinese and Tibetan translation. It is an important work describing different views held by the various schools of Buddhism concerning the Buddha's teaching, which arose in India during one or two centuries after the Nirvāṇa. The passage quoted here is an abridged one. [T#2031. MLB]
7. [Spelling of the following words and names reflect corrections: Coplestone, Coomaraswamy, Ānanda, Saṃgha, Parinirvāṇa, Śākya, *Samyaksambuddha*, *Vidyācaraṇasaṃpanna*, *Puruṣadamyasārathi*, *Śāstādevamanuṣyānām*, *Lokajyeṣṭha*, *Mahāvīyutpatti*, *Guṇasāgara*, *Tāyin*, *Nāyaka*, *Dharmasvāmin*, *Daśabala*, *Vaiśāradya[m]*, *Asaṅga*, *Śākyas*, *Vairocana*, *Saddharma-puṇḍarika*, *Gaṇḍavyūha*, *Mahāparinirvāṇa*, *Mahāparinibbāna*, *Śrīmālā*, *Mahāsāṃghika*, *Prajñāpāramitā*, *Nirmāṇakāya*, and *Saṃbhogakāya*. MLB]

10. NOTES ON THE AVATAMSAKA SUTRA

1. *The Eastern Buddhist*, vol. 1, p. 149.
2. *The Eastern Buddhist*, vol. 1, p. 152.

3. Xianshou Dashi, an honorific title for Fazang 法藏, third patriarch and author of a definitive twenty-fascicle commentary on the Huayan/Kegon sutra called *Huayanjing tanxuan ji / Kegonkyō tangen ki* (T#1733), regarded with the highest authority throughout East Asia.

4. [Spelling for the following words reflects corrections made by the editor: Avataṃsaka, Sāgara-mudrā, Dharmadhātu, Śakrendra, Samantabhadra, Avīci, Bodhisattvacaryā, *śīla*, *vīrya*, and *kṣānti*. MLB]

11. ENLIGHTENMENT AND IGNORANCE

1. The story of Enlightenment is told in the Dīgha-Nikāya, XIV, and also in the Introduction to the Jātaka Tales, in the Mahāvastu, and the Majjhima-Nikāya, XXVI and XXXVI, and again in the Saṃyutta-Nikāya, XII. In detail they vary more or less, but not materially. The Chinese translation of the *Sutra on the Cause and Effect in the Past and Present*, which seems to be a later version than the Pāli *Mahāpadāna*, gives a somewhat different story, but as far as my point of argument is concerned, the main issue remains practically the same. Aśvagoṣa's *Buddhacarita* is highly poetical. The *Lalitavistara* belongs to the Mahāyāna. In this article I have tried to take my material chiefly from *The Dialogues of the Buddha*, translated by Rhys Davids, *The Kindred Sayings*, translated by Mrs. Rhys Davids, Majjhima-Nikāya translated by Silācāra, and the same by Neumann, the Chinese Āgamas and others.

2. The six Buddhas of the past later increased into twenty-three or twenty-four in the *Buddhavaṃsa* and *Prajñā-Pāramitā* and even into forty-two in the *Lalitavistara*. This idea of having predecessors or forerunners seems to have been general among ancient peoples. In China Confucius claimed to have transmitted his doctrine from Yao and Shun, and Laozi from the Emperor Huang. In India, Jainism which has not only in the teaching but in the personality of the founder, so many similarities to Buddhism, mentions twenty-three predecessors, naturally more or less legendary. It is singular that the number of the Jaina forerunners corresponds to that of the Buddhist so closely.

3. [Suzuki does not identify the source of his translation. Is this PTS? MLB]

4. It is highly doubtful that the Buddha had a very distinct and definite scheme for the theory of Causation or Dependence or Origination, as the Paṭicca-samuppāda is variously translated. In the present Sutra, he does not go beyond Viññāṇa (consciousness or cognition), while in its accepted form now the Chain starts with Ignorance (*avijjā*). We have however no reason to consider this tenfold Chain of Causation the earliest and most authoritative of the doctrine of Paṭicca-samuppāda. In many respects this *Sutra* itself shows evidence of a later compilation. The point I wish to discuss here mainly concerns itself with the Buddha's intellectual efforts to explain the realities of life by the theory of causation. That the Buddha regarded Ignorance as the principle of birth-and-death and therefore of misery in this world, is a well-established fact in the history of Buddhism.

5. *Cakkhu* literally means an eye. It is often found in combination with such terms as *paññā* (wisdom or reason), *buddha*, or *samanta* (all-round), when it means a faculty beyond ordinary relative understanding. As was elsewhere noticed, it is significant that in Buddhism, both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, seeing (*passa*) is so emphasized, and especially in this case the mention of an "eye," which sees directly into things never before presented to one's mind, is quite noteworthy. It is this *cakkhu* or *paññā-cakkhu* in fact that, transcending

the conditionality of the Fourfold Noble Truth or the Chain of Origination, penetrates (*sacchikata*) into the very ground of consciousness, from which springs the opposition of subject and object.

6. [T. W. Rhys Davids, J. E. Carpenter, eds., PTS *Dīgha Nikāya* vol. 2 (1903), p. 35. MLB]

7. [Ibid., p. 37. MLB]

8. Here as well as in the next verse, “the Truth” stands for Dharma.

9. [Translation of *Mahāpadāna Suttanta* in the *Dīgha Nikāya* by T. W. Rhys Davids and C. A. F. Rhys Davids, in vol. 2 of *Dialogues of the Buddha* (1910), p. 30. MLB] We have, besides this, another verse supposed to have been uttered by the Buddha at the moment of Supreme Enlightenment; it is known as the Hymn of Victory. It was quoted in my previous article, “Zen Buddhism and the Doctrine of Enlightenment,” in *The Eastern Buddhist*, vol. 2, no. 6, 1923. The Hymn is unknown to the Mahāyāna literature. The *Lalitavistara* has only this:

Chinna vartmopasānta rajāḥ śuṣkā āsraṇā na punaḥ śravānti;
Chinne vartmani vartata duḥkhasyaīṣo ‘nta ucyate. [22.1 MLB]
煩惱悉已斷 諸漏皆空竭 更不得受生 是名盡苦際

10. [Ibid., 32. MLB]

11. [“It is I who am accomplished in this world, I am the supreme teacher.” This phrase occurs in numerous places in the Pāli canon, and is repeated later in this essay. MLB]

12. The *Mahāvīyūtpatti*, CXLII, gives a list of thirteen terms denoting the act of comprehending with more or less definite shades of meaning: *buddhi*, *matī*, *gati*, *matam*, *dṛṣṭam*, *abhisamitāvī*, *samyagavabodha*, *supratividdha*, *abhilakṣita*, *gatiṃgata*, *avabodha*, *pratyabhijñā*, and *menire*. [Suzuki does not mention that in contrast to the list of qualities he cites in his main text, which is in Pāli, the words in this list from the *Mahāvīyūtpatti* are in Sanskrit.]

13. Translated by Bhikkhu Silācāra [né John Frederick S. McKehnie. MLB]. The original Pāli runs as follows:

Sabbābhibhū sabbavidū ‘ham asmi,
Sabbesu dhammesu anūpalitto,
Sabbam abhiññāya kam uddiseyyam.
Na me ācariyo atthi, sadiso me na vijjati,
Sadevakasmiṃ lokasmiṃ atthi me paṭipuggalo.
Aham hi arahā loke, aham sathā anuttaro,
Eko ‘mhi sammāsambuddho, sitibhūto ‘smi nibbuto.

14. *The Buddhacarita*, Book XIV. [Verses 82 and 88 from the translation by E. B. Cowell, published in the Sacred Books of the East series, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1893), p. 157. MLB]

15. *Ñanañ ca pana me dassanaṃ udapādi akuppā me ceto-vimutti ayaṃ antimā jāti natthi dāni punabbhavo*.

16. “Thus knowing, thus seeing” (*evam jānato evam passato*), is one of the set phrases we encounter throughout Buddhist literature, Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. Whether or not its compilers were aware of the distinction between the coupling is of great signification. They must have been conscious of the inefficiency and insufficiency of the word “to know” in the description of the kind of knowledge one has at the moment of enlightenment. “To see” or “to see face

to face” signifies the immediateness and utmost perspicuity and certainty of such knowledge. As was mentioned elsewhere, Buddhism is rich in terminology of this order of cognition.

17. *Tassa evaṃ jānato evaṃ passato kāmāsavāpi cittaṃ vimuccati bhavā savāpi cittaṃ vimuccati avijjāsacāpi cittaṃ vimuccati, vimuttasmiṃ vimuttamit nāṇaṃ hoti. Khīna jāti vusitaṃ brahmacariyaṃ kataṃ karaniyaṃ nāparaṃ itthattāyāti prāṇāti.* [Mahali Sutta. Translated by T. W. Rhys Davids in *Dīgha Nikaya* 6. MLB]

18. *The Brahmajāla Sutta.* Translation by Rhys Davids. p. 43.

19. The idea of performing miracles systematically through the power acquired by self-concentration seems to have been greatly in vogue in India even from the earliest days of her civilization, and the Buddha was frequently approached by his followers to exhibit his powers to work wonders. In fact, his biographers later turned him into a regular miracle-performer, at least as far as we may judge by the ordinary standard of logic and science. But from the Prajñāpāramitā point of view, according to which “because what was preached by the Tathāgata as the possession of qualities, that was preached as no-possession of qualities by the Tathāgata, and therefore it is called the possession of qualities” (*yaiśa bhagavān lakṣaṇasampat tathāgatena bhāṣitā alakṣaṇasampad eśhā tathāgatena bhāṣitā; tenocyate lakṣaṇasampad iti*), the idea of performing wonders acquires quite a new signification spiritually. In the *Kevaddha Sutta*, three wonders are mentioned as having been understood and realized by the Buddha: the mystic wonder, the wonder of education, and the wonder of manifestation. The possessor of the mystic wonder can work the following logical and physical impossibilities: “From being one he becomes multiform, from being multiform he becomes one; from being visible he becomes invisible; he passes without hindrance to the further side of a wall or a battlement or a mountain, as if through air; he penetrates up and down through solid ground as if through water; he walks on water without dividing it, as if on solid ground; he travels cross legged through the sky like the birds on [the] wing; he touches and feels with the hand even the moon and sun, beings of mystic power and potency they be; he reaches even in the body up to the heaven of Brahmā.” Shall we understand this literally and intellectually? Cannot we interpret it in the spirit of the Prajñāpāramitā idealism? Why? *Taccittam yacittam acittam.* (Thought is called thought because it is no-thought.)

20. The questions are: Is the world eternal? Is the world not eternal? Is the world finite? Is the world infinite? *Potthapāda-Sutta.*

21. [Based on the T. W. Rhys Davids translation of the Potthapāda-Sutta in *Dialogues of the Buddha*, vol. 1 (1899), p. 254–255. Suzuki has modified the text by changing the original “question” in the singular to “questions” and adjusted the verbs accordingly. MLB]

22. See the *Saddharma-puṇḍarika Sutra*, chapter 4, and the *Vajrasamādhi Sutra*, chapter 4 (Chinese translation, 金剛三昧經).

23. 雜阿含經, 辰, 六十五丁.

24. *Buddhacarita*, translated by E. B. Cowell, pp. 131–132.

25. Lefmann’s edition, p. 289. [Berlin (1875, 1902). MLB]

26. *Ariyapariyesanā-sutta*, Majjhima-Nikāya, XXVI, p. 167.

27. [Spellings have been corrected for the following words: Saṃbodhi, viññāṇa, paṭicca, āloko, pañita, paṇḍita, passa, Nikāya, nāṇa, upādāna, abhisambodhana and abhisambodha, saṃyukta, iṅṣaṇa, Kaṭha, gahakāraka, sacchikata, taṇhā, upādāna, bhagavān, Apratiṣṭhita, pūrvapraṇidhāna and praṇidhāna, sahāloka, puṇḍarika, Ārāda, Sāṃkhya, Buddhacarita, Nairāñjana, Saṃyutta, passa, Ariyapariyesanā-sutta, vartmopasānta. MLB]

12. ZEN AND THE ASSERTION THAT MAHĀYĀNA
WAS NOT PREACHED BY THE BUDDHA

1. The phrase here is *jōjū fudan* 常住不斷.

13. PASSIVITY IN THE BUDDHIST LIFE

1. Horatius Bonar, 1808–1889.
2. *The Laṅkāvatāra*, the author's English translation, p. 115. Bodhi-sattvo mahasattva kakī rahogataḥ svapratātmabuddhyā, vicārayaty aparapraṇeyah.
3. *The Dhammapada*, 165. The translation is by A. J. Edmunds.

Attanā 'va kataṃ pāpam attanā saṃkilissati,
Attanā akataṃ pāpam attanā 'va visujjhati,
Suddhi asuddhi praccattaṃ nā 'ñño aññaṃ visodhaye.

4. Quoted from Warren's *Buddhism in Translations*, p. 255.
5. Loc. cit., p. 214.
6. Loc. cit., p. 245ff.
7. Warren, 248–249.
8. *The Dhammapada*, 117, translated by A. J. Edmunds.
9. Edited by Louis de La Vallée-Poussin, pp. 302ff. For a detailed exposition of the theory of Karma, see the *Abhidharmakośa* (translated by the same author), chapter IV; what follows is an abstract.

[The next 3 paragraphs are what Suzuki calls “an abstract” of a portion of chapter 17 of La Vallée-Poussin's translation of Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamamakārikās* that focuses on *cetanā* 思 and *cetayitvā* 從思生 (verses 2 and 3) and the term *avipraṇāśa* 不失 as used in verses 14 and 15. However, Nāgārjuna does not mention the *darśanamārga* and *bhāvanāmārga* in this chapter, so this comment at the end appears to have been derived from chapter six of Vasubandhu's *Abhudharmakośabhāṣyam*. MLB]

10. 思, in Chinese, meaning “intention.”
11. 從思生, *cetayitvā*.
12. “Indication,” *vijñapti*, 表 or 作.
13. 不失法, “not lost,” or “unlosable,” or “indestructible.”
14. *Darśanamārga*, 見道.
15. *Bhāvanāmārga* 修道.
16. *The Dhammapada*, 127. Translated by Albert J. Edmunds
17. [A significant portion of this section relating stories of Christian testimonials has been removed in the interest of brevity. MLB]
18. [Again, in the interests of brevity, this section has been reduced to the concluding paragraph. MLB]
19. Cf. pp. 46–47 fn., where St. Francis's simile of a corpse is quoted. [Source unclear; perhaps *Life and Religious Opinions and Experience of Madame de La Mothe Guyon* by Thomas C. Upham (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1847), which Suzuki quotes inaccurately in a section omitted here, citing only the title and Upham's name. MLB]
20. *The Mattōshō*, 末燈鈔.

21. 無義の義.

22. はからひなき.

23. 自然法爾.

24. 無礙の道.

25. *Anjin shōwa* 安心小話 (*Talks on Mental Peace*). [Ichiren'in Shūzon 一蓮院秀存 was a student of Jinrei from the Harima region; today he is considered a *myōkōnin*. MLB]

26. Done after the sense, for a literal translation of Rinzai requires a great deal of comments.

27. [Original sentence, "You are as old as you are" appears to be a scribal error of some sort, probably resulting from a misreading of his handwriting. The same line occurs three times in Ichiren'in 66 and Suzuki translates the other two instances as "You are saved as you are." MLB]

28. Deshan Xuanjian (德山宣鑒), who used to be a great scholar of the *Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā* before he was converted to Zen, appeared one evening in the pulpit and declared: "I shall not allow any questioning tonight; questioners will get thirty blows." A monk came forward, and when he was about to make bows, Te-shan gave him a blow. Said a monk, "When I am not even proposing a question, why should you strike me so?" The master asked, "Where is your native place?" "I come from Xinluo (Korea)." "You deserved," insisted the master, "thirty blows even before you got into the boat." *The Transmission of the Lamp*, vol. XV.

29. [*The Journal of John Woolson with an Introduction by John G. Whitter* (Boston: James Osgood and Co. [1871]), p. 280. MLB]

30. There are two kinds of ignorance in Zen: the one has wisdom and trust in it but the other is utter darkness.

Dongshan (洞山) came to see Huichao of Shushan (薯山慧超), and the latter asked, "You are already master of a monastery, and what do you want here?" "I am distressed with a doubt and do not know what to do, hence my coming here." The master called out, "O Liangjie (良价)!" which was Dongshan's name, and Liangjie replied at once, "Yes, Sir." "What is that?" demanded the master. Jie failed to answer, and Huichao gave this judgment, "Fine Buddha no doubt, and what a pity he has no flames!" (*The Transmission*, IX). As he has no flames, his "ignorance" is not illuminating. When he becomes conscious of the fact, there is enlightenment.

Huilang asked Shitou, "Who is the Buddha?" "You have no Buddha-nature." "How about these beings that go wriggling about?" "They rather have the Buddha-nature." "How is it that I am devoid of it?" "Because," said the master, "you do not acknowledge it yourself." This is said to have awakened Huilang to his own "ignorance," which now illuminates (Op. cit., XIV).

Yaoshan was sitting in meditation, and Shitou said, "What are you doing here?" "I am not doing anything." "If so, you are sitting idly." "Even an idle sitting is doing something," retorted Yaoshan. "If, as you say, you are not doing anything, what is it that is not doing anything?" Yao-shan said, "Even the wise know it not" (Loc. cit.). This "ignorance" is of quite a different sort, is it not?

Zhenlang (振朗) asked Shitou, "What is the idea of the First Patriarch's coming from the West?" "Ask the post over there." "I do not understand, sir." "I too fail to understand," was Shitou's reply, which, however, lighted up Lang's "ignorance," which in turn became illuminated (Loc. cit.).

31. *Ippen Shōnin goroku* 一遍上人語録 (*Sayings of Ippen*).

32. Condensed from VIII–XIII, of *Sayings of Shūson*, one of the modern teachers of Shin Buddhism, 1788–1860. Compiled by Gessho Sasaki, 1907. [Taken from Sasaki Gesshō, comp., *Shūson goroku* 秀存語録 (Tokyo: Kōkōdō Shuppanbu), 1907. Note that although presented as a quote, this is actually a summary of materials in this book. MLB]

33. That the Catholic monks avow absolute obedience to their superior is also an expression of passivism in our religious life. When a man can submit himself to a life of obedience, he feels a certain sense of relief from the oppressing burden of self-responsibility, which is akin to the religious feeling of peace and rest.

34. Kathleen Lyttleton's introduction of Molinos's *Spiritual Guide*, p. 25.

35. Some sections discussing expressions of mystical passivity toward God in the Christian tradition have been removed in the interest of brevity.

36. [尼入道の無智のともがら. A reference to women with minimal education who shave their heads and devote themselves to practice but remain living at home. MLB]

37. [A portion of this section has been removed in the interest of brevity. MLB]

38. *Sacred Books of the East*, XLIX, pp. 127–128.

39. [At this juncture Suzuki gives a nine-page summary of the Sadāpraruditā story in the *Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines*, found in chapters 30 and 31 in the Conze translation (1973). As he provides no gloss or analysis, this section has been omitted. MLB]

40. [The Christian material in this section has largely been removed in the interest of brevity. MLB]

41. 曇鸞.

42. 法然.

43. Prayer is divided, according to the author of *Des Grâces d'Oraison*, into two categories, ordinary and extraordinary or mystic. Ordinary prayer may be called natural against the mystic, which is supernatural, for the Catholic theologians retain the word mystic for what they designate as supernatural states of prayer, which are absolutely impossible to be realized by the human will alone. Psychologically, no doubt the “supernatural” is the continuation of the “natural,” but from the theological point of view, the Catholics would naturally desire to reserve a special room for the “supernatural.” Ordinary prayer is regarded to have four degrees: 1. vocal prayer, which is a recitation; 2. meditation where there is a chain of distinct reflections or arguments; 3. affective prayer in which affections are made predominant; and 4. the prayer of simplicity where intuition replaces reasoning and affections are not varied and are expressed in a few words. The Nenbutsu is, to use Catholic terminology, sometimes vocal prayer, sometimes prayer of simplicity, and sometimes even mystic prayer when the devotee is embraced in the original vow of Amida. The character of the Nenbutsu varies according to the individuality of the devotee and also to his mental attitude at the same time.

44. *Dhyāna* is generally translated as meditation, but it is really the practice of mental concentration in which the reasoning process of the intellect is cut short and consciousness is kept clean of all other ideas except the one that is given as the subject of meditation.

45. 坐禪 *zuochan*. For explanation see the *First Series of Zen Essays*, pp. 304–305, footnote.

46. 禪那 *channa*.

47. The author of these “Directions” is not known, but they are generally regarded as coming originally from the “Regulations of the Meditation Hall” compiled by Baizhang (720–814), the founder of the Zen monastery in China. The original “Regulations” were lost

with the downfall of the Tang dynasty; they were compiled again by Zongze 宗頤, 1103, in the Song. The work now known as *Baizhang qinggui* (百丈清規) is a modern compilation in the year 1265 under the auspices of the Emperor Taizu of Yuan. The present “Directions” are found in these works. The reference to Yuanzong of Fayun in them shows that they contain some insertions of Zongze himself because Yuanzong was his own master. [Note: The current view is that this later compilation was initiated under Emperor Shundi in 1335, not 1265 (the Yuan dynasty did not begin until 1279). I have added the characters for the name Zongze to correct Suzuki’s rendering of the name as Zongyi (Tsung-I). MLB]

48. [In the interests of brevity, I have omitted the next three-page description of how meditation is to be done in terms of sitting, breathing, and mental relaxation, as there is no direct relevance to the topic of passivity. MLB]

49. 圓學經, fas. II.

50. 法華經, fas. V, of the Kumārajīva version. [= *The Lotus Sutra*. MLB]

51. [Taken from the “Pure Regulations” of Baizhang preserved in the *Chanyuan qinggui* 禪苑清規 of Zongze, *Zokuzōkyō* #1245, explained in a Suzuki note from a section of text omitted here. MLB]

52. 大慧 1089–1163.

53. 宏智 1091–1157.

54. [The phrase “my previous Essay” must refer to a long analysis (226 pages) of *kōan* practice in the same volume where this piece on passivity appears, *Essays in Zen Buddhism* (Second Series). But his mention of something he wrote in “the First Series,” a clear referent to *Essays in Zen Buddhism* (First Series) is far less clear, and *kōan* practice is not discussed in any detail in any of the essays in that volume. MLB]

55. For example, Tōrei, one of the chief disciples of Hakuin, writes in his edition (1762) of the *Changuan cejin*: “The lion refuses to eat the meat left by the eagle, and the tiger will not feed upon dead animals,” referring to the Zen Yogin’s proud spirit, which would not subscribe to the mawkish femininity of the “other-power” teaching.

56. 禪關策進. *Changuan cejin*, compiled by Zhuhung 株宏, 1531–1615.

57. This is the admonition given by Fayen of Wuzu Shan (五祖山法演) to one of his disciples about to start on his Zen pilgrimage.

58. From a letter of Zonggao Daihui 宗杲大慧.

59. It may not be inopportune to call the reader’s special attention to this repudiation by Dahui of “mere emptiness.” Zen has been frequently criticized, not only by the outsiders but by some Buddhists, for teaching the doctrine of blank nothingness or a state of absolute passivity, which effaces all the traces of voluntarism in every possible form. That this is the “spirit of inquiry” was discussed in connection with the “Kōan Exercise.” When this spirit is absent, a wrong form of passivity may be cherished by Yogins of Zen.

60. See also the appendices to this essay in which translations are given from a Zen master and a Jodo teacher. [The aforementioned appendices are not included in this excerpt but can be found in the full version of the article in *Essays in Zen Buddhism* (Second Series). Note that this entire last paragraph is a new addition not found in the original 1930 essay. MLB]

61. For the explanation of this important idea, see my *Zen Essays*, I, p. 66 fn., p. 82; *Lañkāvatāra Studies*, p. 43, p. 378; *English Lañkāvatāra Sūtra*, p. 78; etc.

62. This is one of the Mahayana terms quite frequently misinterpreted by Buddhist scholars of the West. The point is that they fail to grasp the central conception of the

Mahayana according to which all things (*sarvadharma*) are unborn (*anutpanna*), unattainable (*anupalabdha*), and therefore empty (*śūnya*).

63. Edited by Rahder, p. 63 et seq.

64. Rather freely done, for a literal translation would be to most readers quite unintelligible. The text goes on still further into details of the life of the Bodhisattva at the eighth stage of immovability. But the above may be sufficient to show what the spirituality of the Bodhisattva is like when he realizes a life of effortless activities.

65. To quote further from the *Theologia Germanica* (p. 184): "For God is One and must be One, and God is All and must be All. And now what is, and is not One, is not God; and what is, and is not All and above All, is also not God, for God is One and above One, and All and above All. . . . And a man cannot find all satisfaction in God, unless all things are One to him, and One is All, and something and nothing are alike. But where it should be thus, there would be true satisfaction, and not else." This is fine, indeed, but why stop short with God? If God is "One and above One, All and above All," is this not Emptiness? God himself must be lodged in it. When we stop at God and refuse to go further, God himself loses his abode, he cannot stay even where he is placed. He is either to go with All or altogether part company with All, he cannot be "All and above All" as the theologians would like to have him, for he thus murders him. To save God from this perplexity, he must be placed in Emptiness where he can be "All and above All." If he is placed anywhere else, he is no more himself, and the "true satisfaction" so fervently sought after by the Christians will no longer be obtainable. Inasmuch as Buddhist scholars fail to penetrate into the true significance of Śūnyatā and are contented with interpreting it as relativity or mere nothingness, they can never expect to understand the Mahayana. Again, it is only possible in Emptiness to see "something and nothing alike." "Something" here is Buddhist *astī* and "nothing" *nāstī*, and true Prajñā obtains only when the dualism of being and nonbeing is transcended. There is no doubt that in these respects Buddhist philosophy and experience go deeper.

66. [Original mentions "three ways" but the third has been dropped from this excerpt. MLB]

67. Lord Vaux Thomas, 1510–1556.

68. [Spelling corrections were made to the following words: *Bhāvanāmārga*, *attasaraṇa*, *Samyutta*, *skandha*, *bhāvanā*, *Anātman*, *Tōrei*, *saṃbhāra*. MLB]

14. MAHAYANA AND HINAYANA BUDDHISM

1. The *Gaṇḍavyūha* or *Avatamsaka*, comprehensively known as 華嚴經 (*Huayan jing*) in Chinese, represents a great school of Mahayana thought. Traditionally, the Sutra is believed to have been delivered by the Buddha while he was in deep meditation after the Enlightenment. In this Sutra the Buddha gives no personal discourses on any subject except giving the sanction, "Sādhu! Sādhu!" to the statements made by the attending Bodhisattvas such as Mañjuśrī or Samantabhadra, or emitting rays of supernatural light from the various parts of his body as required by the occasion. The Sanskrit *Gaṇḍavyūha* exclusively treats the pilgrimage of Sudhana under the direction of the Bodhisattva Mañjuśrī. The young pilgrim-aspirant for Supreme Enlightenment visits one teacher after another, amounting to more than fifty in number. The object is to find out what constitutes the life of devotion as practiced by a Bodhisattva.

2. [Untraceable. Perhaps the word here should be *pūrvamgama*, meaning “zealously,” “foremost,” or “primary.” MLB]
3. [Changed to *adhi-pateyata* in later editions. MLB]
4. From Maitreya’s instructions given to Sudhana.
5. [Corrections have been made to the spelling of the following words: *Vajracchedika*, *anubhāva*, *sukṛta*, *Avataṃsaka*, *Śiṃhanāda*, *Kātyāyana*, *prātihārya*, *praṇidhāṇa*. MLB]

15. IMPRESSIONS OF CHINESE BUDDHISM

1. [First in 1935 in *Haichaoyin* 海潮音 and again in partial translations in 2009 and 2010 in the journal *Hongfa* 弘法. See “D. T. Suzuki and the Modernization of Chinese Buddhism” by Jingjing Li (unpublished). MLB]
2. Or Budei 布袋.
3. *Song Gaoseng zhuan*, fas. XXI; and *Chuandeng lu*, fas. XXVII. There is another story of Budai Heshang much fuller in contents because of its later compilation. It appears in the supplementary section (Case XIX, fas. 5) of the Kyoto Manji edition of the Chinese Tripitaka. The date of its compilation is not exactly known but must be later than 1282 A.D., of Yuan. The author is Tanè (曇噩), former abbot of Guoqing monastery at Tiantai. It evidently went through several editions. The Ming edition by Guangru (廣如) contains still more additional material in the form of an “epilogue.” From this we can readily gather that the cult of Budai has been steadily gaining its popularity in China. One may ask why Hanshan and Shide failed to appeal so strongly to the masses as Budai, although the first two have succeeded in capturing the imagination of the Zen artists. One reason at least is that Budai, as I have explained in the text, has more elements in his traditional personality embodying the social ideals of the Chinese people. [Suzuki then adds a lengthy translation of the relevant sections from the abovementioned two texts, and a discussion of the fusion of the mythic image of this medieval monk and the Maitreya cult in China, which has been elided here. MLB]
4. [Muqi Fachang (牧谿法常, d. 1269?), also Muxi, Japanese Mokkei. Liang Kai (梁楷, 1140–1210), Japanese Ryō Kai. MLB]
5. This does not mean to be scholarly, or philosophically minded. In fact, I am unable to find a good English word to express what I have in mind. It is a certain kind of intuition that Zen requires, and this intuition is gained when all the intellectual efforts are exhausted, that is, when all the attempts to understand life dualistically come to a halt and are unable to open up a new path leading to a new interpretation of life. The psychological study of intuition has not yet been quite thoroughly carried out, especially from the Buddhist point of view.
6. [See the new book on Yinguang: *Making Saints in Modern China* by David Ownby, Vincent Goossaert, and Ji Zhe (Oxford, 2017). MLB]
7. [*biguan* 閉關. MLB]
8. Not necessarily in its theological sense here but rather in its literal sense—“single-work” as equivalent to “self-power.” In the purely theological sense monergism corresponds to the Shin Buddhist idea of “other-power” alone.
9. [Also known as Su Shi 蘇軾 (1036–1101). MLB]
10. [Also known as Yan Lugong 顏魯公 or Yan Zhenqing 顏真卿 (709–785). MLB]

11. 1–7 are abstracts from Rev. Yinguang’s “Sayings” called *Yinguang Jiayan Lu*.

12. 明. 見. 照. 悟. 徹.

13. [Following this paragraph, Suzuki quotes a meditation on *nianfo* practice and the Pure Land by Yinguang from the *Yinguang fa shi jia yan lu*. Spelling of the following words in this essay have been corrected by the editor: *saṃskṛta*, *asaṃskṛta*. MLB]

16. THE LOGIC OF AFFIRMATION-IN-NEGATION

1. [This seems to be a general allusion to the *Prajñāpāramitā* sutra corpus. MLB]

17. THE INTERNATIONAL MISSION OF MAHAYANA BUDDHISM

1. [In the original 2008 publication in the *The Eastern Buddhist* there is an editorial note on page 83 regarding the journal’s decision to follow an interpretation advanced by Satō Taira that this line about seeing the Greater East Asian War as a culture war is a mistaken reading of an allusion to the cultural conflict between East and West. Satō’s view is that the phrase *tōa bunka no kōsō* 東亜文化の抗争 in the original Japanese publication reflects a misreading of Suzuki’s handwriting wherein the character 西 was misread as 亜. The original manuscript being lost, this interpretation was based solely on context. The current editor does not agree with the need for this change, but insofar as the essay here reproduces the EBS text faithfully, their reading has been kept intact. Note that there are other places later in the essay where the same East-West cultural struggle is similarly alluded to, and these might also reflect similar editorial “corrections.” MLB]

18. EXCERPTS FROM THE ESSENCE OF BUDDHISM

1. The Japanese for distinction is *shabetsu*, and its opposite is *mushabetsu*. *Shabetsu* literally means “cutting and separating,” implying a world of differentiation, where the principle of individuation rules. According to Buddhist philosophy this world of multitudes gains its reality by being sustained by another world of *mushabetsu*, nondifferentiation. The latter is not a separate existence, but is merged in the world of daily experience, and because of this merging the world in which we live is neither one nor two. Buddhism expresses this idea by saying that the One is the Many and the Many is One, or distinction is nondistinction and vice versa.

2. [Baizhang Huaihai (720–814), Hyakujō Ekai in Japanese pronunciation. MLB]

3. [This phrase, “the logic of contradiction,” appears to be Suzuki’s translation of Nishida’s term, *mujunteki jiko dōitsu*. In the revised editions of this text, instead he favors his own phrasing, *sokuhi no ronri*, that he translates as “the logic of self-identity.” I am indebted to Wayne Yokoyama for this observation. MLB]

4. [The term “Dharma-loka,” appears to be Suzuki’s reconstruction of *fajie* 法界 (Japanese *hokkai*); today this is reconstructed as *dharmadhātu*. MLB]

5. The Chinese term for the individual here is *shi*, which ordinarily means event or happening, and early Chinese translators of the Mahāyāna texts have been troubled to find an appropriate term for the Sanskrit word *vastu*. [Here *shi* is 事. MLB]

6. [Muzhou Daoming 睦州道明 Bokushū Dōmyō, 780–877. Also written Daozong 道蹤. Japanese pronunciation may also be Bokujū. MLB]

7. [Wang Changshi 王常侍. MLB]

8. [Shōmatsu 庄松 (1800–1872) was known as a *myōkōnin*. The name is also read Shōma. In an 1889 woodblock printing of a short pamphlet, *Sanuki Myōkōnin Shōmatsu ari no mama ki*, 讃岐妙好人庄松ありのまの記, both pronunciations are found in the *furigana*. MLB]

9. [Spelling of the following words has been corrected by the editor: Vijñāna, Prajñā, Daitō, Daitokuji, mondō, *Saddharma Puṇḍarīka*, *Vimalakīrti*, *Śrīmālā*, Tathāgatagarbha, Mahākāśyapa, Śākyamuni, *Prajñāpāramitā*, Śūnyatā, Mahākaruṇā, Kannon, Hōnen, Bokuju. MLB]

19. THE BUDDHIST CONCEPTION OF REALITY

1. [Huילang (d. 781); Mazu Daoyi (709–788); Shitou Xiqian (710–790). MLB]

2. [A reference to Weiyān (惟儼 745–828), who lived on Yueshan (also, Yaoshan) mountain in Hunan. MLB]

3. It is after all a kind of knowledge, although we have to insist that this prajñā-knowledge is of [a] different order.

4. [907–960, between the Tang and Song periods. MLB]

5. [Dongshan Shouchu (910–990); Shishuang Chuyuan (986–1039), Dongchan Qi (d.u.). MLB]

6. “We have revised Dr. Suzuki’s translation of this sentence in order to make its meaning clearer. Eds.” [This note was inserted by the editors of *The Eastern Buddhist*. MLB]

7. [Probably refers to Touzi Yiqing/Tōsu Gisei (投子義青 1032–1083) from the Song, not Tang, period. MLB]

8. [The spelling of the following words have been corrected: Ātman, Nirvāṇa, Yaoshan, Akaniṣṭha, *parāvṛtti*, Dīpaṃkara, Laozian, 善道, *dao*. MLB]

GLOSSARY

A lai ye shi	阿賴耶識
Abijigoku	阿鼻地獄
Akanuma Chizen	赤沼智善
Amida	阿弥陀
Anhui	安慧
Anjin	安心
Anshin Shōwa	安心小話
Babu zhongdao	八不中道
Bai Juyi	白居易
Baizhang	百丈
Baso	馬祖
<i>biguan</i>	閉關
<i>Biyan lu</i>	碧巖錄
Bokuju Dōmyō	睦州道明
<i>Bongaku shinryō</i>	梵學津梁
Bosatsugyō	菩薩行
Budai	布袋
<i>bunka kunshō</i>	文化勲章
Butsu	佛
<i>Butsu Yuikyōgyō</i>	佛遺教經

Caotang Qing	草堂清
Chan	禪
Changqing	長慶
<i>chie</i>	智慧
Chôgoshôbu	調御大夫
Cimin	慈愍
Dabei/daihi	大悲
Daijô Zen	大乘禪
<i>dao</i>	道
<i>daoli</i>	道力
Daoqian	道潛
Daosheng	道生
<i>Dasheng xuanlun</i>	大乘玄論
Dazhi / daichi	大智
Divākara	地婆訶羅
Dongchan qi / Tôzen-sai	東禪齊(齋)
Dongshan Shouchu / Tôzan Shusho	洞山守初
<i>Erdi yizhang</i>	二諦義章
Erô	慧朗
<i>Fahua jing</i>	法華經
<i>Faju jing</i>	法句經
<i>fangbian</i>	方便
<i>fashen</i>	法身
Fazang	法藏
Fazhao	法照
Fenbie ming	分別明
<i>fugengyô</i>	普賢行
<i>fuse</i>	布施
Genkaku	玄学
Genju Daishi	賢首大師
Goyôzei	後陽成
<i>Guang hongming ji</i>	廣弘明集
Guangru	廣如
Guanyin	觀音
<i>hachijusshukô</i>	八十種好
<i>hakarai naki</i>	はからひなき

<i>hasshōdō</i>	八正道
<i>hō</i>	法
Hōnen Shōnin	法然上人
Hōō	法王
<i>hōshin/hosshin</i>	法身
<i>hōshin</i>	報身
Hōrin	法輪
<i>Huayan jing</i>	華嚴經
Huilang	慧朗
Huisi	慧思
<i>Ibushūrinron</i>	異部宗輪論
Imadate Tosui	今立吐醉
Inoue Enryō	井上円了
Ippen Shōnin	一遍上人
<i>issai'chi</i>	一切智
Izumi (aka Idzumi) Hōkei	泉芳璟
<i>ji</i>	事
Jiaxiang Dashi	嘉祥大師
<i>jie</i>	解
<i>jieji</i>	結集
<i>jiji-muge</i>	事事無礙
<i>jikai</i>	持戒
<i>jinen hōni</i>	自然法爾
Jinling	金陵
Jintenshi	人天師
<i>jiriki</i>	自力
Jiumoluoshi	鳩摩羅什
Jiun	慈雲
Jizang	吉藏
<i>jūriki</i>	十力
<i>jyakujōsha</i>	寂靜者
Kasahara Kenju	笠原研寿
Kizu Muan	木津無庵
Kong Fuzi	孔夫子
<i>kōshōgaku</i>	考証学
<i>kudokukai</i>	功德海

<i>kyōgaku</i>	教学
Kyūseishu	救世主
Laozi	老子
<i>li</i>	理
<i>lixue</i>	理學
Linji Yixuan	臨濟義玄
Longshu Pusa	龍樹菩薩
Lugong	魯公
Lu Jiuyuan	陸九淵
Lu Xiangshan	陸象山
<i>Mattōshō</i>	末燈鈔
Mazu Daoyi	馬祖道一
<i>muge no michi</i>	無礙の道
<i>mugi no gi</i>	無義の義
<i>muku</i>	無垢
Murakami Senshō	村上專精
<i>mushabetsu</i>	無差別
Muzhou Daoming	睦州道明
<i>myōgyōsoku</i>	明行足
Namu Amida Butsu	南無阿弥陀仏
Nanjō Bun'yū	南條文雄
<i>Nehangyō</i>	涅槃經
<i>nianfo</i>	念佛
Nichiren	日蓮
<i>niepan</i>	涅槃
<i>Niepan jing</i>	涅槃經
<i>nin'niku</i>	忍辱
<i>nyōrai</i>	如來
<i>ōjin</i>	應身
<i>puti</i>	菩提
Rakan	羅漢
<i>ren</i>	仁
<i>sabetsu / shabetsu</i>	差別
<i>sangaku</i>	三學
<i>sanjin</i>	三身
<i>sanjūni sō</i>	三十二相

<i>Sanlun xuanyi</i>	三論玄義
<i>satori</i>	悟り
Seken'ge Mujōshi	世間解無上士
<i>senkasei</i>	選科生
Seson	世尊
<i>shengwen</i>	聲聞
<i>shimu'i</i>	四無畏
Shinran Shōnin	親鸞聖人
Shiqin	世親
Shishi Shandao / Sekishitsu Zendō	石室善道
<i>shishōtai</i>	四聖諦
Shishuang Chuyuan / Sekisō Soen	石霜楚圓
Shitou Xiqian / Sekitō Kisen	石頭希遷
<i>shōjin</i>	精進
Shōma	昇庄
<i>shūgaku</i>	宗学
<i>sō</i>	僧
Song Gaoseng zhuan	宋高僧傳
Su Shi	蘇軾
Su Dongpo	蘇東坡
Tan'e	曇暉
<i>tarikī</i>	他力
Tenjiku Tokubē	天竺 德兵衛
Three Śāstra sect	三論宗
<i>tian</i>	天
Tiantai	天台
Tominaga Nakamoto	富永仲基
Touzi Yiqing / Tōsu Gisei	投子義青
Wang Yangming	王陽明
Weituotian	韋駄天
Weiyān	惟儼
Wen'yi	文益
Wonhyo	元曉
Wuzhuo	無著
Wuzu Jie	五祖戒
Xuanxiao	玄學

Xuanzang	玄奘
Xuedou	雪竇
Xuefeng	雪峰
Yamabe Shūgaku	山邊習學
Yan Lugong	顏魯公
Yan Zhenqing	顏真卿
Yanshou	延壽
Yaoshan (Yueshan) / Yakusan	藥山
Yijing	義淨
Yinguang	印光
Yongquan	湧泉
<i>yuanjue sheng</i>	緣覺乘
Yuanzhao	元照
Yunfeng	雲峰
<i>zangshi</i>	藏識
<i>zenzei</i>	善逝
Zetian	則天
Zhaozhou	趙州
<i>zheng</i>	證
<i>zhihui</i>	智慧
Zhixu	智旭
Zhizhe Dashi	智者大師
Zhuhong	株宏
Zhu Xi	朱熹

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Akizuki Ryōmin 秋月龍珉, comp. *Gendai chisei zenshū dai 29-kan, Suzuki Daisetsu shū* 現代知性全集 第29卷 鈴木大拙集. Tokyo: Nihon Shobō, 1959.
- Carus, Paul. *The Gospel of Buddha According to Old Records*. Chicago: Open Court, 1894.
- Conze, Edward. *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies*. Oxford: Cassirer, 1967.
- Edmunds, Albert J., trans. *Hymns of the Faith (Dhammapada) Being an Ancient Anthology Preserved in the Short Collection of the Sacred Scriptures of the Buddhists: Translated from the Pāli*. Chicago: Open Court; London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1902.
- Inoue Enryō 井上円了. *Bukkyō katsuron 仏教活論 (On the Vitality of Buddhism)*, 1887.
- Izumi Hōkei 泉芳環. “Bonbun Bukkyōten gaikan” 梵文仏教典概観 (An Outline of the Sanskrit Buddhist Canon). *Shūkyō kenkyū* 宗教研究 No. 42, #507 (1928): 73–108.
- . *Bonbun Muryōjukyō no kenkyū* 梵文無量壽經の研究 (Research on the Sanskrit Larger Sutra of Immeasurable Life). Kyoto: Kenshin Gakuen Shuppanbu, 1939.
- , trans. *Kāridāsa no utaeru Indo no shizen* カーリダーサの歌へる印度の自然 (Nature in India as Sung by Kālidāsa). Kyoto: Indo Gakkai, 1924.
- . *Nyūmon Sansukuritto* (Gendai gogaku sōsho) 入門サンスクリット[現代語学叢書] (A Sanskrit Primer). Tokyo: Mikasa Shobō, 1944.
- . *Shinyaku Konkōmyōkyō: Bon-kan taishō* 新譯金光明經:梵漢對照. (New Translation of *Suvarṇaprabhāsa sūtra*, Sanskrit-Chinese Comparison). Tokyo: Daiyūkaku, 1933.
- Jiun (a.k.a. Onkō) 慈雲 (飲光). *Bongaku shinryō* 梵学津梁, in vol. 9 of Hase Hōshū 長谷宝秀, ed. *Jiun Sonja zenshū* 慈雲尊者全集. Osaka: Kōkiji, 1922–1926.
- Kizu Muan 木津無庵. *Shin'yaku Bukkyō seiten* 新譯佛教聖典 (New Translation of Sacred Texts of Buddhism). Nagoya: Shin'yaku Bukkyō Seiten Fukyūkai, 1925.
- Kōkyō Shoin 弘教書院, ed. *Dainihon kōtei Daizōkyō* 大日本校訂大藏經. Tokyo: Kōkyō Shoin, 1881–1885.
- Lancaster, Lewis R., ed., in collaboration with Sung-bae Park. *The Korean Buddhist Canon: A Descriptive Catalogue*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979.

- Lian Qingji (Lien Ching-Jyi) 連清吉. *Edo jidai ni okeru Shinchō kōshōgaku no juyō ni kansuru kenkyū* 江戸時代における清朝考証学の受容に関する研究. PhD diss., Kyūshū University, 1995.
- Murakami Senshō 村上専精. *Bukkyō tōitsuron* 佛教統一論 (A Theory for the Integration of Buddhism), 1901.
- Nanjio Bunyiu (a.k.a. Nanjō Bun'yū) 南條文雄. *A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka: The Sacred Canon of the Buddhists in China and Japan, Compiled by Order of the Secretary of State for India*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1883.
- . *Nanjō Bun'yū chosaku senshū* 南條文雄著作選集, edited by Sasaki Kyōgo, Nagasaki Hōjun, and Kimura Senshō. 10 vols. Niigata-ken Santō-gun: Ushio Shoten, 2001–2003.
- . *Tannishō kōwa* 歎異抄講話. Tokyo: Kōkōdō Shuppanbu, 1907.
- Nanjō Bun'yū and Izumi Hōkei. *Hōyaku Bonbun Nyūryōgakyō* 邦譯梵文入楞伽經 (Sanskrit Edition of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra in Japanese Translation). Kyoto: Nanjō Sensei Koki Kinen Shūkugakai, 1927.
- . *Bon-Kan taishō shin'yaku Hokekyō* 梵漢對照新譯法華經 (Sanskrit-Chinese Comparison of the Lotus Sutra in New Japanese Translation). Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1913. First published in *Mujintō*, 1903–1912, reprinted many times.
- Schmithausen, Lambert. 1987. *Ālayavijñāna: On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy*. Studia Philologica Buddhica Monograph Series 4. Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies.
- Snodgrass, Judith. “Budda no fukuin: The Deployment of Paul Carus’s *Gospel of Buddha* in Meiji Japan.” *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 25, no. 3/4 (1998): 319–344.
- Suzuki Daisetz (Teitaro) 鈴木大拙, trans. Aṣvaghosha’s *Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna Translated for the First Time from the Chinese Version*. Chicago: Open Court, 1900.
- . “The Avatamsaka Sutra (Epitomised).” *The Eastern Buddhist* 1, nos. 1–4 (1921).
- , trans. *Budda no fukuin* 佛陀の福音. Tokyo: Satō Shigenobu, 1895. Rev. ed., Tokyo: Morie Shoten, 1901. Translation of P. Carus, *The Gospel of Buddha*.
- . *Essence of Buddhism*. Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1948.
- , trans. *The Hekigan Roku (Pi-yen Lu)*. Edited with an introduction by Stefan Grace under the direction of Fumihiko Sueki. *The Annual Report of Researches of The Matsugaoaka Bunko* 26, Separate Volume (2012).
- , ed. *An Index to the Lankavatara Sutra* (Nanjio edition). 2nd rev. and enl. ed. Kyoto: Sanskrit Buddhist Texts Publishing Society, 1934.
- . “An Introduction to the Study of the Lankavatara Sutra.” *The Eastern Buddhist* 5, no. 1 (1929): 1–79.
- . *Japanese Spirituality*. Translated by Norman Waddell. Tokyo: Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, 1972.
- . *Kongōkyō no Zen: Zen e no michi* 金剛經の禪・禪への道 (Zen of the Diamond Sutra; the Path to Zen). Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1960.
- , trans. *The Lankavatara Sutra*. Translation from Sanskrit. London: George Routledge and Sons 1932.
- . “The Lankavatara Sutra, as a Mahayana Text in Especial Relation to the Teaching of Zen Buddhism.” *The Eastern Buddhist* 4, nos. 3–4 (1928): 199–298.

- . *On Indian Mahayana Buddhism*. New York: Harper and Row, 1968.
- . *Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism*. London: Luzac, 1907; translation by Sasaki Shizuka 佐々木閑, *Daijō Bukkyō gairon* 大乘仏教概論. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2004, 2016.
- . *Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra: One of the Most Important Texts of Mahayana Buddhism, in Which Almost All Its Principal Tenets Are Presented, Including the Teaching of Zen*. London: George Routledge and Sons, 1930.
- . *Shina Bukkyō inshōki* 支那佛教印象記. Tokyo: Morie Shoten, 1934.
- , ed. *The Tibetan Tripitaka: Peking edition*. 168 vols. Tokyo; Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute, 1955–1961.
- . “Zen keiken no kenkyū ni tsuite” (On Research into Zen Experience), in *Nihon shogaku shinkō i'inkai kenkyū hōkoku* 日本諸学振興委員会研究報告, 263–279. Tokyo: Monbushō Kyōgakusho, ed., 1939 or 1940; reprinted in *Zen mondō to satori*.
- . *Zen mondō to satori* 禅問答と悟り. Tokyo: Kondō Shoten, 1941.
- . *Zuihitsu Zen* 随筆 禪 (“Zen Essays”). Tokyo: Daiyūkaku, 1927.
- Suzuki Daisetz, and Hokei Idzumi, eds. *The Gandavyuha Sutra*. 3 vols. Kyoto: Sanskrit Buddhist Texts Publishing Society, 1934–1936. Rev. ed., *The Gaṇḍavyūha sūtra*: Tokyo: Society for the Publication of Sacred Books of the World, 1949.
- Takakusu Junjirō. *A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practised in India and the Malay Archipelago (A.D. 671–695) by I-Tsing*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896.
- Tominaga Nakamoto 富永仲基. *Shutsujō kōgo* 出定後語 (1745). Reprinted in Yoshikawa Entarō 吉川延太郎, *Chūkai Shutsujō kōgo* 註解出定後語. Osaka: Kyōgaku Shobō (1943); reprinted Tokyo: Ōzorasha, (1996).

INDEX

Abhidharma, 40, 243nn35,40, 244n52; compilation of, 35, 37, 39; contents of, 35, 36, 41, 243n38, 244n44; recitation of, 38, 41. *See also* Tripiṭaka
Abhidharmakośa (Vasubandhu), 253n9
Abhidharmasamuccaya (Miscellanea on Mahāyāna Metaphysics; Asaṅga), 59, 247n3
Abhidharmasamyuktasaṅgīti-śāstra, 46, 246n7
 Abhidharma studies, xiv
 Absolute, 203, 210, 211, 213
 absolute nothingness. *See* *śūnyatā*
Accounts of the Transmission of the Dharmapiṭaka (*Fu fazang yinyuan zhuan*), 29, 30, 34, 242n19
acintya (nonthinking, inconceivable), 153, 155, 201–3
acintyajñāna, 146
 Adbhūta, 35
 Ādhāna, 49, 52, 246n21. *See also* *ālayavijñāna*
 Adhikaraṇasamatha, 38
adhiṣṭhāna, 163
 affirmation-in-negation, xx, 181, 205. *See also* “Logic of Affirmation-in-Negation, The”; *sokuhi no ronri*
 Āgama Increasing by One (Āṅguttara Nikāya), 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 244n53
 Āgamas, xv, 9, 36, 38, 40, 41, 101, 103, 116, 250n1
 Ajñāta Kauṇḍinya, 37, 41
 Akanuma Chizen, xiii, xv, 88, 238n4
 Akizuki Ryōmin, *Gendai chisei zenshū* #29: *Suzuki Daisetsu shū*, 181–82

Ālāra Kālāma, 108, 109
ālaya (Aliya): Chinese rendering of, 44, 246–47n25; Dharmakāya stage of, 56; equated with *citta*, 53; explanation of, 50–51; infection of, 52–53; interpretations of, 56–57; in Mahāyāna, 46, 47; relationship to *manas*, 49, 50, 53–54, 56; as storage of seeds, 52; Suzuki’s spelling of, 44, 45, 56, 57, 246n24; two forms of activity of, 51. *See also* *ālayavijñāna*
ālayavijñāna: also called Ādhāna, 49, 52, 246n21; Asaṅga’s view of, 49, 53; Āśvaghoṣa’s concept of, 54–55, 248n10; Chinese rendering of, 56–57, 57; as feature of Mahāyāna, 46–47; and karma, 123; in Mahāyāna and Hinayāna, 50; and Manovijñāna, 62; replaced by Vajracitta, 52; in Sāṃkhya philosophy, 248n10; in Suzuki’s *Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism*, 61; Suzuki’s unusual interpretation of, 45; as *tathāgatagarbha*, 54–55, 126; as the ultimate reality, 48–49; Yogācāra concept of, 46, 48, 61, 62. *See also* *vijñāna*
amala, 246n21
 Amida (Amitābha): all-embracing love of, 130, 147; as the Compassionate Heart, 212–13; faith in, 132, 134; land of, 174; and Mahāyāna concept of bodhisattva, 26, 86; original vows of, 131, 132–33, 136, 139, 172, 175, 213, 214–15, 255n43; recitation of the name of, 131, 134, 135, 136, 139–40; relationship to Guanyin,

Amida (Amitābha) (*continued*)

165; as savior, 223; Shōmatsu and, 216, 217;
Suzuki's devotion toward, 199. See also
nenbutsu

anābhāsa, 152

anābhogacaryā, 143. See also *effortless life*

Anāgata-Bhayāni, 243n34

Ānanda: asked Buddha about transfiguration, 85;

Buddha's instructions to, 39, 80, 86; compila-
tion of the Dharmapiṭaka and Sūtrapiṭaka,
35, 37, 39, 40–41; excluded then admitted to
First Convocation, 30–32, 36, 39, 41; misde-
meanors of, 31, 32–34, 35, 39, 243nn22–25,
245n55; pursuit of arhatship, 31, 32, 39; recita-
tion of Buddha's words, 41

anātman (non-ego), 68–69, 137. See also non-
ātman

anatta, 128. See also *anatman*; non-atman

ancestor worship, 12–13

Anesaki Masaharu, 111

An Faqin, 29

Anguttara Sūtra, 40

animitta (unconditionality), 38. See also condi-
tionality

anjin, 139

An Shigao, 29

Anuruddha, 34, 41, 243n28

anutpattikadharmakṣānti (acceptance of all
things as unborn), 118, 144, 256n62

Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi, 25, 98

apraṇihita (freedom from desire), 38

Apratiṣṭhita, 105

apraṭiṣṭhitanirvāṇa (Nirvāṇa that has no
abode), 47

Ārāda, 108

āraṇya, 38

arhatship, 39, 55, 60, 101, 122; arhat ideal versus
bodhisattva ideal, 66, 75, 214, 216

ariya-sacca, 98, 99

Arnold, Sir Edwin, 17

Āryadeva, 12, 46, 58

Asaṅga: *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, 59, 247n3;
on *ālayavijñāna*, 49, 50, 51, 53; distinction
between Hīnayānism and Mahāyānism, 61;
Madhyāntānugama-śāstra, 9, 240n14; and
the Mahāyāna conception of the Buddha, 85;
Mahāyānasamgraha-śāstra, 46, 48, 246n6;
on *parikalpita-lakṣaṇa*, 47; on practicing the
six *pāramitās*, 62; texts by, 45, 147n3, 247n4;
and the Yogācāra school, 4, 46, 61

āsava (defilements), 95

asceticism, 63, 109, 125, 128, 148

Āśoka missionaries, 67

Āstika, 6, 7

Āsvaghoṣa, 14, 15–16, 70, 108, 247n1; *Buddhacar-
ita*, 250n1; conception of the *ālayavijñāna*,
54–55, 248n10. See also *Awakening of Faith*

*Āsvaghoṣa's Discourse on the Awakening of Faith
in the Mahāyāna* (1900), xix; publication
of, 14; translator's preface, 14–16. See also
Awakening of Faith

atakkāvacara (not to be grasped by mere logic),
95

ātmakārya, 160

ātman (ego-entity), xxiii, 18, 37, 62, 221, 222,
223, 225; with eight virtues, 51. See also ego;
non-ātman

atyantaśānti, 160

Avadāna, 35

Avalokita, 212. See also Amida

āvāraṇa (hindrance), 246n22

Avatamsaka school, 3, 155

Avatamsaka-sūtra, xvi, 9, 89, 155, 257n1; “The
Avatamsaka Sutra (Epitomised),” xv, 88;
publications on, xix; role of Buddha and bo-
dhisattvas in, 88–89. See also *Gaṇḍavyūha-
sūtra*; *Huayan jing*; “Notes on the Avatam-
saka Sutra”

Avatāras, 13

Avīci, 90

avijjā, 95. See also *ignorance*

aviprañāsa, 122, 253n9

Awakening of Faith (*Dasheng qixin lun*;

Āsvaghoṣa), xvi, 247n1; Āsvaghoṣa on such-
ness, 70; concept of *ālayavijñāna*, 54, 248n10;
Fazang as commentator, 56; influence on
Suzuki's understanding of Yogācāra, 45;
Suzuki's preface to, 14–16; as Suzuki's title
for *Dasheng qixin lun*, 14; translated into
English by Suzuki, xix, 44; use of Chinese
term *alaya*, 44

babies, 233, 234

babu zhongdao (Middle Path in the eight nega-
tions), 4–5. See also *Middle Path*

Bai Letian (Bo Juyi), 25, 241n3 (chap. 4)

Baizhang, 207–8, 259n2; “Regulations of the
Meditation Hall,” 140–41, 255n47

bāla (ignorant), 135. See also *ignorance*
Bankei, 193

Baoguo Si (Suzhou), 172, 174

Baso (Mazu Daoyi), 223, 260n1

- Beikoku bukkyō*, 17
being and nonbeing, 10, 222; and the Middle Path, 6–7, 8
Benāres (Vārāṇasī), 37, 38, 40, 97, 243n41
Bhānanda, 242n17
bhāvanāmārga, 253nn9,15
Bhāviveka (Fenbie ming), 240n15; *Dasheng zhangzhen lun* (*Mahāyānatālaratna-śāstra*), 5, 240n9
bhikṣu: imprudent, 29–30, 242n17; rules concerning, 35, 38
bhūtakoti, 160
Bhūtatahatā (Suchness), 8, 48, 55, 246n23. *See also* suchness
biguan (seclusion), 173
birth and death, 55, 63, 184–85, 222; deliverance from, 171, 173, 174, 175, 176. *See also* rebirth
Biyan lu (*Hekigan roku*), xxiii
Blyth, R. H., 199
bodhi (enlightenment, awakening, wisdom, intelligence), 19, 21–22, 39, 63, 71. *See also* *saṃbodhi*
Bodhibala (Daoli), 40
bodhicitta (wisdom heart), 25, 72
Bodhidharma, 116, 165, 228
Bodhiruci, translation of
 Viśeṣacintābrahmapariprcchā sūtra, 240n12
bodhisattvacaryā (virtues of a Bodhisattva), 90, 139
bodhisattvahood: all-knowledge of, 246n22; concept in Mahāyāna Buddhism, 9, 21–22, 25–26, 60, 74–75, 93; contrasted with arhatship, 66, 75, 214, 216; contrasted with śrāvakahood, 9, 63, 157–59; stages of, 47, 62, 144–46, 248n13, 257n64; Suzuki's creative writing on, xx. *See also* bodhisattvas
bodhisattvas: doctrinal struggle with śrāvakas, 59; in the *Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra*, 151, 153, 156, 157–60, 162, 163; as incarnations of the *dharmakāya*, 59; interpretation of the ten moral precepts, 63; Japanese ancestor-gods as, 13; lives of, 139, 257n1; role in *Avatamsaka-sūtra*, 88–89; stock of merit, 74, 120, 144, 158, 159–60, 162; transcendental knowledge of, 150, 160, 247n2; vows of, 154, 156, 160, 163, 215. *See also* bodhisattvahood
Bodhisattvayāna, 75
bodhi-tree, 114–16
Bodhyaṅgas, 37, 38
Boehme, Jakob, 70
Bo Juyi (Bai Letian), 25, 241n3 (chap. 4)
Bonar, Horatius, 253n1
Book of Buddha's Last Sermon, 25, 241n4 (chap. 4)
Boshe (Boshe Fuduo/Boqi), 31, 242n20
Brahma(n), 94, 121, 145. *See also* Ātman (God)
Brahmajāla sūtra, 35, 40
Brahmans, 103–4
“Breadth of Buddhism, The” (1900), 11–13; publication of, 11
Budai (Hotei), 165, 167–68, 258n3
Buddha: appellations of, 83–84, 249n4 (chap. 9); as conqueror of ignorance, 110; death of, 80, 82–83; deification of, 85–86; and Dharma as one, 82, 86, 87; disciples of, 113–14; double body theory of, 87; Enlightenment of, 92, 93–97, 100, 109–10, 115, 125–26, 204–5, 216, 251n9; entrance into Nirvāṇa, 29, 30, 33, 34, 40, 94, 109–10; in the *Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra*, 151, 153, 163; gold-colored robe of, 33; of Great Illumination, 163; Hīnayāna conception of, 79–80, 86; on his six predecessors, 93; identifying marks of, 84, 183; as love and wisdom, 25; and Mahāyāna teachings, 112–13; manifested as Gautama, 64; and the Middle Path, 6; and the misdeemeanors of Ānanda, 33; personality of, 79, 81–82, 111, 114; radiant with light, 88, 89; relationship with sentient beings, 134–35; rules for the Saṃgha, 42; sayings of, 24; secret parts of, 33; sermons of, xvi, 111, 114, 115, 243n41; statement “I alone am the honored one,” 115, 156, 209, 233; stock of merit, 120, 124, 125; superhuman powers of, 85, 86; teachings of, 8–9, 15, 112–14; and the threefold treasure, 68, 80, 87. *See also* Buddhahood; “Buddha in Mahāyāna Buddhism, The”; Buddha-knowledge; Buddha-nature; Śākyamuni; Tathāgata
Buddhabhadra, 28
Buddha Gaya, 205
Buddhahood: attainment of, 90, 133; and Buddhatā, 127; in Mahāyāna, 60, 82–83, 204; *trikāya* theory, 87; Yinguang's view of, 172
“Buddha in Mahayana Buddhism, The” (1921), 79–87; publication of, 79
Buddhajīva, 28
Buddha-knowledge, 204, 223
Buddha-nature (Buddhatā), 86, 223, 224, 225, 229, 254n30. *See also* Buddhatā
buddhas: Mahāyāna concept of, 247n7; predecessors to Gautama, 93, 250n2
Buddhatā, 126–28; in Pure Land, 131
buddhavacana (words of the Buddha), 40, 111, 115, 244n52

Buddhavaṃsa, 250n2

Buddha-wisdom, 133–34

Buddhayaśas, 28

Buddhism: classification of schools and sects, 66; compatibility with science, 11, 13; conception of God, 218; definition of, 113–14, 115; essential features of, 18, 24–25; future of, 190–92, 193–95, 196–97; history of development, 21, 26; influence on Christianity, 13; influence on Confucianism, 12; and intellect, 11–12, 141, 146–47, 203–4; international, 193, 194; introduction to China and Japan, 12, 25; Kamakura period, 190, 192, 195; misunderstood as pessimism, 24, 206; relationship to what the Buddha preached, 114, 115; of Siam, Ceylon, and Burma, 13; tolerance of other religions, 12–13, 21. *See also* “Breadth of Buddhism, The”; Chinese Buddhism; Hinayāna Buddhism; Mahāyāna Buddhism; Pure Land Buddhism; Zen Buddhism

Buddhist canon: *Bongaku shinryō*, xvii; Chinese-language, xv, xvii–xviii, xix; *Dainihon kōtei daizōkyō*, xviii, xix, 242n4; *Kokuyaku issaikyō* editions, 239n11; Korean, xviii; Pāli scriptures, 113; *rufubon*, xix; Taishō, xviii, xix, 44, 238n4. *See also* Tripiṭaka

“Buddhist Conception of Reality, The” (1974), 220–36; lecture at University of Hawai‘i, xxi, xxiii, 219; publication of, xxiii, 219

Buddhist discipline, 67, 91, 147, 172

Buddhist lifestyle, 115, 189, 196

Buddhist philosophy, 123, 137, 170, 172, 173, 223; early philosophers, 64, 70; and the future of Buddhism, 189, 191, 194, 196; Kegon, 210; Masters of Buddhist philosophy, 228, 232, 234–35; and ultimate reality, 230–31; and Western culture, 188–89; and Western philosophy, 192

Buddhist priesthood, 186, 193, 196

Buddhist Society of London, xx

Buddhist Studies: in Japan, xvii, xvii–xviii, 111; *kyōgaku*, xiv, xvi, 238n4; as philology and textual exegesis, xi, xiv–xv; Suzuki as a problem for, xvi, xxiv; Suzuki’s approach to, xviii, xxii–xxiv, 192; Suzuki’s contribution to, xiv, xx, xxiv; today, xxiii, xxiv; in the West, xiv, xvii, 238n8

Buddhist temples, 165, 167–68, 204

“Buddhist View of War, A” (1904), 22–24; publication of, 18

Bukkyō no tai’i, 199. *See also* *Essence of Buddhism, The*

Burnouf, Eugène, 238n8

Bush, Lewis, 199

cakkhu (insight), 93–94, 250–51n5

Calderón, Pedro, 126

Caotang Qing, 174

Carus, Paul: publication of *The Gospel of Buddha*, xviii; reader of *Light of Dharma*, 17; Open Court Publishing Company, xii, 27; Suzuki’s employment with, xii, xviii, 11, 58

Catholicism, 13, 194, 238n7, 255nn33,43

Caturvarga-vinaya (*Sifen lü*), 28, 31, 32, 34, 35, 242n20; on the incident of Purana, 41–42

causation, 10, 52, 98, 101, 207–8; chain of, 99, 106–7, 250n4, 251n5; doctrine of, 95, 104, 250n4. *See also* twelffold chain of dependent origination

cetanā, 122, 253n9

cetayitvā, 253nn9,11

Ceylon, 13, 29, 66, 67

Chan Buddhism, xxiii, 14, 165–66, 172; *nenbutsu* in, 165, 169, 170; temples, 165. *See also* Zen Buddhism

Changqing, 174

Changuan cejin, 256nn55–56

charity (*dāna*), 62, 90, 138

China and Korea, Suzuki’s travel to, 165, 166

Chinese and Japanese immigrants in the United States, 17

Chinese Buddhism, 169–70; of the 1930s, 166–67; architecture of, 167–68; introduction, 12, 25; Mādhyamika philosophy, 4, 5, 7; of the Tang, 171–72, 239n2. *See also* “Impressions of Chinese Buddhism”; Yinguang

Chinese mind, 4, 167, 168, 169

Chinese syncretism, 170, 172

Chinese translations of Indic texts, xv, xvi, xviii, xix, 3, 9–10, 14, 35, 41, 249n2 (chap. 8)

Christianity: concept of divine glory, 210; concept of God, 19, 215, 218, 221; creation, 221–22; discourse rationalizing discrimination against immigrants, 17; divine revelation, 204; in *Essence of Buddhism* (1946), 199; faith in, 223; influence by Buddhism, 13, 14; Johanism and Paulinism, 82; mission work, 186, 194; mysticism in, 118, 137, 199, 215, 255n43; quietists, 129; Suzuki’s comparisons with Buddhism, 18, 19, 20, 25, 67, 72–73, 82, 84, 105–7, 130–31, 133, 135, 174, 202, 229, 232, 257n65; symbolism in, 106; theology, 25, 65, 199

Cimin: criticism of Chan, 165–66; discourse on Pure Land, 170–71

- citta*: equated with *ālaya*, 53; gloss for, 45, 49; and *manas*, 49, 50, 53–54, 56. See also *ālaya*
- cittamātra* thought, 241n2 (chap. 2)
- Claremont Graduate School, xiv
- cognition (*viññāṇa*), 93, 98, 105, 219, 250n4 (chap. 11), 252n16; Buddha's theory of, 103. See also consciousness
- Coincidence/Miscellaneous (Saṃyukta) Agama, 37, 40, 41, 244n45
- Columbia University, xiv
- comparative religion, xi, xiv, xxiii, 14, 26. See also Christianity
- compassion (*karuṇā*), 19, 125, 128–29, 153–54, 163, 210, 212–13, 216
- conditionality, 7, 10, 48, 251n5; unconditional-ity, 38
- condition-generation (*yuan sheng*), 246n19
- conditions for conversion, 38
- Confucianism, 4, 6, 12, 169
- Confucius, 226, 250n2
- consciousness, 106, 235. See also *citta*; cognition; *manas*
- contemplation, 101, 108, 110, 209
- contradiction, logic of, 208, 259n3. See also *sokuhi no ronri*
- Conze, Edward, xxiv; *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies* (1967), xxiv
- craving (*taṇhā*), 93, 94, 95, 97, 99, 108
- creation, 225; in Christianity, 221–22, 225
- cult of Budai (Hotei), 165, 167–68, 258n3
- Dahui, 141, 256n59
- “Daijō hibusetsu to Zen” (Zen and the Assertion that Mahāyāna Was Not Preached by the Buddha; 1926), 112–17; publication of, 111–12; translation of, 111, 112
- Daijō Zen* (Mahāyāna Zen), 112
- Dainihon kōtei daizōkyō* (Taishō canon), xviii, xix, 44, 238n4, 242n4
- Daitō, 202–3, 204, 205
- Daitokuji, 202
- dāna* (charity), 62, 90, 138
- Daoism, 6, 12, 169
- Daoli (Bodhibala), 40
- Daosheng, 4
- darśanamārga*, 253nn9,14
- daśabala* (ten powers), 85
- Daśabhūmika-sūtra*, 118, 143–46
- Dasheng bianzhao guangming zang wuzi famen jing*, 239n2
- Dasheng qixin lun* (Daijō kishinron). See *Awakening of Faith*
- Daśottara sūtra*, 35, 36
- Deeds of Saṃantabhadra, 90
- defilements (*āśava*), 95
- democracy, 213, 218
- dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*), 92. See also twelvefold chain of dependent origination
- Des Grâces d'Oraison*, 255n43
- Deshan Xuanjian, 254n28
- desire (*kleśa*), 26, 51, 246n22
- Deva, *Śataśāstra*, 10
- “Development of Mahāyāna Buddhism, The” (1909), 66–76; publication of, 66; reduction-ist view and theological approach, 65
- Dhammapāda*, xxi, 24, 27, 35, 119–20, 241n2 (chap. 4)
- Dharma: Buddha's reluctance to teach, 94; in *dharmakāya*, 249n1 (chap. 8); in Hinayāna Buddhism, 80, 81; in Mahāyāna, 68, 82; and the personality of the preacher, 79, 82–83; symbolized by wheel, 81; three Dharma-cakras, 9. See also dharmas; *triratna*
- Dharmacakra-pravartana-sūtra* (Revolution of the Law-wheel, 37, 41
- Dharmacaksu, 30
- dharmadhātu*, 48, 89, 143, 150, 154, 155, 162; contrast with *lokadhātu*, 152; as Dharma-loka, 210, 212, 259n4
- Dharmagupta school, 28, 29, 31, 32, 242n17. See also *Caturvarga-vinaya* (*Sifen lü*)
- dharmakāya*: *avatāras* of, 13; and Bhūtataṭhā, 246n23; Buddha as, 86; Buddhist philosophers on, 225–26; definition of the term, 241n1 (chap. 4), 249n1 (chap. 8); doctrine of, 19–20; as essential feature of Buddhism, 18; infinitude of, 22; in Mahāyāna, 21, 26, 47, 59, 63, 64, 71–74, 87; oneness and, 19–20; relationship to *ālaya*, 56; and suchness, 70; and the ten spiritual stages of bodhisattva-hood, 62; theological approach to, xvi, 17–18, 65; and war, 23–24
- dharmalakṣaṇa*, 46
- Dharmalakṣaṇa sect (Hossō school), 4, 46, 240n6. See also Yogācāra school
- Dharma-loka, 210, 212, 259n4
- Dharmapadas, 35, 36, 38
- Dharmapala, Anagarika, xx, 5, 17
- Dharmapiṭaka, 30, 39, 40–41, 244n52. See also *Transmission of the Dharmapiṭaka*
- Dharmarakṣa, 240n12
- dharmas, 51, 52; defiled, 50–51, 246n18
- Dharmasamgraha, 38

- Dharmaskandha, 38
 Dharmatā, 126–27. *See also* Buddhātā
 Dharmatrāta, 241n2 (chap. 4)
dhyāna (meditation), 62, 67, 90, 138, 141; in
 Mahāyāna, 68; in Zen, 140–41
Dhyāna of Boundary, 38
Dhyāna sect, 13. *See also* Zen Buddhism
Diamond Sutra. *See Vajracchedika-*
prajñāpāramitā sūtra
 differentiation, 146, 228, 231, 235–36, 259n1 (chap.
 18)
 Digha-Nikāya, 93, 102, 250n1; *Mahāli Sutta*, 102–3
 Dipamkara Buddha, 229
 Dipavamsa, 244n54
 discipline, three forms of, 67, 172
 discrimination and nondiscrimination, 96,
 148–49, 200, 201, 203–5. *See also* distinction
 and nondistinction
 distinction and nondistinction, 200–204, 207,
 208, 210, 211, 213, 215, 259n1 (chap. 18)
 Divākara, 3, 239n2
 doctrine, primacy of, 11
 doctrine of former deeds, 51
 Dōgen, 192
 Dongshan (Tōzan), 231, 254n30, 260n5
 dualism, 19, 20, 63, 100, 105, 108; of being and
 nonbeing, 216, 257n65; of the intellect, 206–7;
 of knower and known, 98, 108
Dvādaśanikāya-śāstra (*Shi er men lun*), 10, 46
Dvipiṭaka, 244n52
- Eastern and Western cultures, 187, 189, 190, 192,
 193, 196, 259n1 (chap. 17)
Eastern Buddhist, *The*: academic profile and
 staying power, 238n3; articles by Suzuki, xix,
 79, 88, 92, 118, 150, 165, 166, 186, 259n1 (chap.
 17); audience of, 88; “The Avatamsaka Sutra
 (Epitomised),” xv, 88; establishment of, xiii,
 xiv, 18; publication of first edition of *Index*
 to the Lankavatara, xix, 239n13; publication
 of *Zen and Its Influence on Japanese Culture*,
 xiii; Suzuki’s posthumous publications, 219
 Eastern Buddhist Society, xxi, 239n14
 Eckhart, Meister (Eckhart von Hochheim), 70, 97
 Edgerton, Franklin, xxi
 Edmunds, Albert J., xxi–xxii, 17, 27, 239n15,
 245n57
 effortless life, 143–47, 257n64
 ego (*ātman*), 51, 100; annihilation of, 19–20;
 egoism, 18–19, 21, 23, 246n22; ego-soul, 19, 61,
 69, 70, 71, 151; ignorance and, 104, 107–8; and
 non-ego, 63. *See also* non-ātman
- eighteen Dhātus, 37
 Eighteenth Vow, of Amida, 131
 Eightfold Noble Path, 37, 38, 84, 117, 120
 eight indulgences, 42
 Eight No’s, 7–8
 Eitel, Ernest J., *Three Lectures on Buddhism*, 69
ekacitta (one thought), 62, 96
Ekottara Āgama (aka *Sūtra*), 35, 36, 50
 emancipation, 102, 103, 108, 120, 127, 140, 145,
 160; and arhatship, 101; of the Buddha,
 110; and consciousness, 209–10; through
 nenbutsu, 171; universal, 63, 154. *See also*
 Enlightenment
 Emperor of Japan, lectures for, xiii–xiv, 198, 199
 emptiness, 147–49; in *Theologia Germanica*,
 257n65. *See also* *śūnyatā*
 Engakuji, xii, xxi
 English-language publications, xiii, xiv, xv, xvi,
 xx, 3, 17, 112, 198, 238n3; Nanjō’s catalogue,
 xvii–xviii. *See also* *Eastern Buddhist*
 Enlightenment: definitions of, 209; and the dis-
 pelling of ignorance, 99–100, 101, 103, 104–7,
 108, 110; in the general system of Buddhism,
 101; role of the will in, 97–98; as sense of
 return, 105–7; texts on, 250n1; words relating
 to, 96, 251n12. *See also* Buddha: Enlighten-
 ment of
 “Enlightenment and Ignorance” (1924), 92–110;
 emphasis on will, 92, 97–100, 104, 105–8;
 publication of, 92
 environment, 26, 124, 191–92
Erdi yi (attrib. Jizang), 240n10
Erdi yizhang (Views on the Two Satyas), 5,
 240n10
Essays in Zen Buddhism (1933), xiii, 118, 165, 170.
 See also “Passivity in the Buddhist Life”
Essence of Buddhism, The (*Bukkyō no tai’i*; 1946):
 carelessness with Indic terms, xxi; lack of
 social perspective, 198; lectures to emperor
 and empress, xiii–xiv, 198, 199; as postwar
 overview study, xx; as reflection of Suzuki’s
 religious outlook in his late seventies, 198,
 199; text of original lectures, 199–218; ver-
 sions of, xiv, 199
 ethics, 21, 25, 65, 207, 214
 evidential learning methodology, xvii
 Explanation of Aphorisms, 35
Exposition of the Holy Doctrine, 59, 247n5
- Fahua Sanmei, 107
 faith, 21, 22–23, 223, 227
 Faxian, 28, 29

- Faxiang, school of, 246n15
- Fayan of Wuzu Shan, 142–43, 256n57
- Fazang: on *ālayavijñāna*, 56; *Dasheng qixin lun yiji*, 247n31; *Huayanjing tanxuan ji*, 250n3 (chap. 10); illustration of interpenetration, 155; Mādhyamika school information imparted to, 3, 239n2. *See also* Genju Daishi (Xianshou Dashi)
- Fazhao, 172
- female devotees, 136, 255n36
- Fenbie Ming, *Prajñāpāśāstravyākhyā*, 9, 240n15
- feudalism, 196
- “First Convocation of Buddhism, The” (1904), 28–43; preface and editorial help by Edmunds, 27; publication of, 27. *See also* First Convocation of the Buddhist Order
- First Convocation of the Buddhist Order: accounts of, 35–41; attendees, 244n43, 245n56; Chinese sources on, 27, 28–29, 41, 42–43; compilation of the Pīṭakas, 39, 41, 244n52; compilation of the *sūtras* and Vinaya, 37–38; exclusion of Ānanda, 30–32, 33; Gavāmpati incident, 34–35; in Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna texts, 245n61; number of *bhikṣus*/arhats participating, 34, 243n27, 245n63; place and time of, 42–43; summoned by Mahākāśyapa, 29–30; texts compiled, 40, 245n59
- First Council. *See* First Convocation of the Buddhist Order
- five aggregates (five *skandhas*), 37, 50, 121–22
- five *bhikṣus*, 37, 40
- five desires, 148
- five dreadful sins, 41
- five Indriyas, 37, 38
- five misdemeanors, 41
- five Powers (Bala), 37, 38
- five *skandhas* (aggregates), 37, 50, 121–22
- five sorts of malice, 41
- Fochui banniepan lüeshuo jiaojie jing* (Last Sermon of the Buddha), 81, 249n3 (chap. 9)
- Formation and Destruction of the World*, 35
- four Abhayas, 38
- four kinds of Right Effort, 37, 38
- four manners of exercise, 136
- Four Noble Truths, 37, 40, 81, 84, 106, 116, 120, 251n5
- four Pratisaṃvids, 38
- four Śramaṇaphala, 38
- four subjects of recollection, 37
- four supernatural powers, 33, 37, 38
- Free Spirit, 130
- Gakushūin, xiii
- Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra*: bodhisattvahood distinguished from śrāvakahood in, 157–62, 163; Buddha of, 163; critical edition with Izumi, xix, xxi, xxii, 150, 165, 237n1, 239n14; *dharmadhātu* in, 152, 162; English translation, 241n5; as history of the religious consciousness of Saṃmaṇ tabhadra, 154; interpenetration in, 155; luminosity in, 150–51, 152, 162; as Mahāyāna text, 86, 150; “Mahayana and Hinayana Buddhism . . . in the Opening Chapter” (1932), 150–64; miracles in, 153; origin and contents, 257n1; Sanskrit of, xxi; section on Maitreya, 227; sense of mystery in, 154–55; spiritual experience in, 162; Sudhana’s pilgrimage, 154, 257n1; Suzuki’s study of, xi, 239n2; time and space in, 151–52; translation attributed to Divākara, 239n2; verse in praise of virtues of the Buddha, 163–64; as Yogācāra text, 46. *See also* *Avatamsaka-sūtra*; *Huayan jing*
- Gaozong, 239n2
- gāthās* (verses), 10, 38, 39; compilation of, at the Convocation, 37, 243n39
- Gavāmpati incident, 34–35, 243n32
- Gengaku (Xuanxiao), 224, 226
- Genju Daishi (Xianshou Dashi), 89, 250n3 (chap. 10). *See also* Fazang; Kegon school
- God: Ātman as, xxiii, 221, 222, 223, 225; in Buddhism and Christianity, 218, 221; Christian concept of, 19, 218, 222; as Love, 199
- Godaigo, Emperor, 205
- golden rule, 20
- Gospel of Buddha* (1894), xviii
- Goyōzei, Emperor, 204
- Gr̥dhrakūṭa, 43
- Great Compassion (Daihi/Mahākaruṇā), 210, 212–13, 217, 218. *See also* compassion
- Great Death, 201
- Greater Asia, 192, 193
- Greater East Asia War, 190, 259n1 (chap. 17)
- Great Wisdom (Daichi/Mahāprajñā), 210, 212. *See also* *prajñā*
- Guang hongming ji*, 240n10
- Guangru, 258n3
- Guanyin (Kannon), 165, 212, 213, 215
- Guoqing monastery (Tiantai), 258n3
- habit-energy (*xi qi*), 50–51, 54
- Hakuin, 165, 170, 256n55
- Hanazono, Emperor, 202–3, 204
- Hanshan, 258n3
- Hegelian philosophy of concrete universals, 155

- hells, 90, 122
 Hideyoshi, 238n7
 Hinayāna Buddhism: canon of, 15, 111, 112–13; in Ceylon, 67; commonalities with Mahāyāna, 64; concept of Nirvāṇa in, 55; contrasted with Mahāyāna Buddhism, 59–61, 63, 67, 71, 82; denial of the sensuous world, 209; doctrinal struggle with Mahāyāna, 59; and the ethical side of Buddhism, 67, 68; and the Gavampati incident, 34; karma-conception of, 125; Suzuki's references to, 18, 65; teachings of, 6, 9. *See also* Theravāda Buddhism
 Hindu Buddhist thinkers, 58–59, 61, 64, 247n8, 248n9. *See also* Mahāyāna Buddhism
 Hōnen Shōnin, 139, 216; "One Sheet Document," 136
 Honganji (Kyoto), 167
 Hongren, 136
 Hongzhi, 141
 Hōryūji temple, 204
 Hossō school (Dharmalakṣaṇa sect), 4, 46, 240n6
 Hotei (Budai), 165, 167–68, 258n3
 Hottō, 134
 Hr̥daya, 53
 Hu Shi, 165
 Huayan jing (Kegon-kyō/Avataṃsaka-sūtra), xv, xix, xx, 199, 245n3, 257n1; and the Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra, 150; Yamabe's work on, xv, 238n6. *See also* Avataṃsaka-sūtra; Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra
 Huayan (Kegon) school, 14, 88–91, 150, 210–12
 Huber, Édouard, 45
 Huichao of Shushan, 254n30
 Huilang (Erō), 223, 254n30, 260n1
 Huineng, 136
 Huisi, 107
 Humphreys, Christmas, xiii, 199
 hungry ghosts (*preta*), 161
 Hymn of Victory, 251n9
 Ichiren'in, 132, 133, 254n25
 ignorance: absolute, 49; *ālaya* as the source of, 47, 52, 56; in Buddhism compared with Christianity, 135; and the chain of causation, 92, 99, 250n4; and cognition, 98; and ego, 104, 107–8; and Enlightenment, 75, 92, 98, 99–100, 101, 103, 104–7, 110; exalted in religious experience, 135, 137; mystical, 134; and passivity, 137; release from, 79, 83, 86, 95, 97, 102; as sin, 33, 126; subjective, 18–20, 54, 55, 61, 62; in Zen, 254n30. *See also* "Enlightenment and Ignorance"
 illusion, 48, 61
 Imadate Tosui, xix
 Imakita Kōsen, xii, xxi
 immortality, 19, 20, 98, 132, 174–75
 "Impressions of Chinese Buddhism" (1935), 166–77; publication history of, 166; travel in China and Korea, 165. *See also* Cimin; Yinguang
 Index to the Lankavatara Sutra (1933), xix, xxii, 239n13
 India, Japanese travel to, xvii, 238n7
 Indian Buddhism, xvi, 65, 238n4. *See also* Hindu Buddhists
 Indic-language texts, xvii–xviii, xx, 3; Pāli, 113; Sanskrit, xxi–xxii
 Indic terminology: capitalized in Suzuki's early works, 66; correction of, xxv; Edmunds's help with, 27; missing diacritics, 18; mistakes in, xxv, 92, 249n4 (chap. 9); rendering of *ālaya*, 44; Suzuki's use of, xvi, xx–xxi; Xuanzang's renderings, 44
 individual existence, 19–20, 26, 123, 126–28, 162, 210
 individualism, 127, 129, 188, 213
 Indologists, xv, xvi, 238n4. *See also* Akanuma Chizen; Izumi Hōkei; Nanjō Bun'yū
 Inoue Enryō, 11; *Bukkyō katsuron* (On the Vitality of Buddhism), 192
 intellect: approach to reality, 220–22, 223–24, 227–28, 232; death of, 201, 222; Buddhism and, 136–37; dissecting by, 224–25; dualism of, 206–7; and enlightenment, 226; faced with contradictions, 235; and faith, 223–24, 227; as hindrance to salvation, 55–56, 246n22; and nondiscrimination, 202–5; objectivity of, 221–22, 226, 233–34; spirituality and, 207–8, 209, 214, 215–16
 intermutuality. *See* interpenetration
 "International Mission of Mahayana Buddhism, The" (1943), 187–97; Buddhism as world religion, 186; critique of Japanese Buddhism, 186; publication of, 186, 259n1 (chap. 17)
 interpenetration, 88, 89–90, 155, 162, 199, 211–12. *See also* *jiji-muge*
 Ippen Shōnin, 134
 "Is Buddhism Nihilistic" (1907), 24–26
 Íśvara, 51, 69
 Itivṛttika, 35
 Izumi Hōkei, xix, xxi, xxii, 150, 165, 237n1

- Jainism, 250n2
- Japanese Buddhism, 65, 192, 194; crisis of, 188–90
- Japanese immigrants in the United States, 17
- Japanese Ministry of Education, xxi
- Japaneseness, 186, 188, 189, 192
- Japanese spirituality, 183, 191, 196–97
- Japanese Spirituality (Nihonteki reisei)*, xx, 181, 198
- Jātaka Tales, 35, 120
- Jātaka theory, 13, 93
- Jetavana, 151, 152, 153, 155–56; assembly of the bodhisattvas, 157, 159, 160, 163
- Jiaxiang Dashi (Jizang), 4, 239n4; *Dasheng xuanlun*, 4; *Erdi yi*, 240n10; *Sanlun xuanyi*, 4, 6; three Dharmacakras, 9; view of Middle Path in the eight negations, 5, 8; view of variant Buddhist teachings, 8–9
- jieji* (compile), 242n18
- jiji-muge* (“each thing no hindrance”), 199, 210, 211–13, 214, 215, 217–18. *See also* interpenetration
- Jingtu, 175–76. *See also* Jōdo
- Jinrei, 238n4, 254n25
- jiriki* (self-power), 92, 140. *See also* self-power and other-power
- Jiun, xvii
- Jizang. *See* Jiaxiang Dashi
- jñāna* (knowledge), 182. *See also* *prajñā*; *vijñāna*
- Jñānaprabha, 8
- Jōdo (Jingtu), 13, 139, 173, 174, 175–76, 177. *See also* Pure Land Buddhism
- Journal of the Buddhist Text Society* (Calcutta), 3
- Joyemon of Mino province, 133
- Kalandaka Village, 38
- Kamakura period, 188, 190, 192, 195
- Kaneko Daiei, xxii, 112; *Jōdo no kannen* (The Concept of the Pure Land), 112
- Kannon, 165, 212, 213, 215
- Kannon sūtra*, 215
- Kant, Immanuel, 61
- Kapila, 17, 21
- karma: accumulated, 59; and Buddhātā, 128–29; and causation, 207–8; contrasted with *pariṇāmanā*, 65; doctrine of, 120–23; in Hinayāna compared with Mahāyāna, 74, 125; and human suffering, 205–6; infecting of the Āliya, 52, 53; with or without “intimation,” 122; in Mahāyāna Buddhism, 72–75, 124–26, 128; and passivity, 120; and the realization of Nirvāṇa, 123; two sorts of, 122; “unlosable” part of, 122–23, 124
- karma-hindrane, 160, 161, 173, 175, 176–77
- karuṇā* (compassion), 19, 125, 128–29, 153–54, 163, 210, 212–13, 216
- Karuṇā-pundarika sūtra*, 241n5
- Kasahara Kenju, xvii
- Kāśyapa, 29, 116, 207, 243n28. *See also* Mahākāśyapa
- Kathā Vatthu*, 35
- Kaṭha-Upaniṣad* (Kathopanishad), 19, 96
- Kāthina ceremonies, 35, 36
- Kegon (Huayan) school, 14, 88–91, 150, 210–12
- Kegon-kyō*. *See* *Avatamsaka-sūtra*; *Huayan jing*
- Kevaddha Sutta*, 252n19
- Khuddaka Nikāya, 35, 40, 244n54
- Kitagawa Momoo, xiii
- Kivkara, 29
- Kiyozawa Manshi, 198
- Kizu Muan, xv
- kleśa* (desire), 26, 51, 246n22
- kōan* practice, 118, 141–42, 256nn54,59; and *nenbutsu*, 170
- “Kongōkyō no Zen” (Zen in the Diamond Sutra; 1944), 181. *See also* “Logic of Affirmation-in-Negation, The”
- Konpira (god of the sea), 217
- Korea, 12, 66, 165, 171, 254n28; Korean canon, xviii
- kṣānti* (acceptance/meekness), 62, 90, 138–39, 145
- Kṣatrya Cave, 43
- Kuiji, 246n15
- Kumārājiva: disciples of, 4; introduction of Mādhyamika school to China, 3; rendering of *ālaya*, 56; translation of Pingala’s *Mādhyamika-śāstra*, 9; translation of the *Mahāyāna-Sutrālaṃkāra*, 45; translation of *Viśeṣacintābrahmapariprcchā-sūtra*, 240n12; translations by, 10, 29, 240n19, 249n3
- kyōgaku*, xiv, xvi, 238n4
- Kyōgyōshinshō*, 238n4
- Kyoto School, xvi
- Kyoto University, xiii
- Lalitavistara*, 96, 109, 250nn1–2, 251n9
- Lancaster, Lewis, catalog of Korean canon, xviii
- Land of Purity (Pure Land), 131, 132, 134, 147, 172, 174, 199, 210
- Lane, Beatrice, xii, xiii, xiv, xxi, 239n15
- Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, xvi, 150, 216, 239n2, 241n5; *pratyātmāryajñāna* in, 147; revised glossary with Izumi Hōkei’s cooperation, 237n1; Sanskrit copy brought back by Nanjō, 44; Suzuki’s study of, xi, xiii, xix, xxii, 92;

Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra (continued)

- translation by Izumi and Nanjō, xxii; as
Yogācāra text, 44, 46
Lankavatara Sutra, *The* (1932), xiii, xix
Laozi, 12, 169, 232, 250n2
Last Sermon of the Buddha (Foyijiao jing), 81,
249n3 (chap. 9)
La Vallée-Poussin, Louis de, xx, 44,
58; translation of Nāgārjuna's
*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*s, 253n9
leather, use of, 35
Levi, Silvain, translation of the *Mahāyāna*
Sūtrālaṃkāra, 44, 45
Liang Kai (Ryō Kai), 169, 258n4
Liang Wudi, 116
Life of King Aśoka (*Ayuwang zhuan*), 29, 30, 31,
32, 33, 34, 242n20
Light of Dharma (journal), 17–18, 238n3. *See also*
“Buddhist View of War, A”; “Is Buddhism
Nihilistic”; “Mahayana Buddhism”; “What Is
Buddhism”
Lixue (“system of philosophy”), 169
logic, 182. *See also sokuhi no ronri*
“Logic of Affirmation-in-Negation, The” (1940):
logic of *prajñā* wisdom, 183–85; publication
history of, 181–82; research into Zen experi-
ence, 182–83
lokadhātu, 150, 152
Lokāyatika, 51
Longer Agama Sūtra, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41
Lotus Sutra, 216
Lu Xiangsan (Lu Jiuyuan), 12, 241n2 (chap. 2)
Lu Xun, 165

Mādhyamika-śāstra (attrib. Piṅgala), 7, 9, 46,
240n13
Mādhyamika school: contrasted with Yogācāra,
46, 47; and the division of Mahāyāna, 59;
doctrine of the Eight No's, 7–8; doctrine of
the Middle Path, 6–7; doctrine of the two
forms of truth, 5–6; founder of, 46; history
of, 3; interpretation of Buddha's teachings,
8–9; Jñānprabha as adherent of, 8; negativ-
istic views, 4–5, 8; principal texts, 46; and
the Sanlun school, 239n4; texts by Jiaxiang
Dashu, 4; *xin sanlun*, 239n2; Yijing on, 45. *See also* Three Śāstra sect
“Mādhyamika School in China, The” (1898):
Dvādaśānikāya-śāstra, 10; history, 3–4; pub-
lication of, 3; three *śāstras*, 9; outlines of the
doctrine, 4–9; *Sata-śāstra*, 10; use of Chinese
translations of Indic texts, 3

- Madhyāntānugama-śāstra*, 9, 240n14
Madhyāntavibhāga-śāstra, 46
Mahākaraṇā, 25. *See also karaṇā*
Mahākāśyapa (Kāśyapa), 204; and the assembly
for compiling the Piṭakas, 29–30, 34, 35–38,
39–41, 243n28, 244n47, 245n56; and the
Gavaṃpati incident, 34–35; and the incident
of Purāṇa, 41–42; and the misdemeanors
of Ānanda, 31–32, 34, 245n55; reprimand of
Ānanda and his exclusion from Convoca-
tion, 31–32; on the Threefold Treasure, 87. *See also* Kāśyapa
Mahāli Sutta, 102–3
Mahallaka, 242n17
Mahāmaudgalyāyana, 30
Mahānidāna-sūtra, 35, 36
Mahāpadāna suttanta, 93, 250n1
Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, 41, 86–87, 150
Mahāprajñā, 25. *See also prajñā*
Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra, 29, 32
Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra (*Dazhidu lun*), 28,
29, 30, 34, 40–41, 243n32
Mahāsāṃghika school, 29, 66, 87, 242n17,
244n54, 245n55; convocation of, 244n43,
245n56; on Vijñāna, 50; Vinaya text of,
39–40. *See also Mahāsāṃghika-vinaya*
Mahāsāṃghika-vinaya (*Mohe sengqi li*), 28, 31,
34, 39–40, 243nn28,36
Mahāvairocana Buddha (Buddha of Great Il-
luminatation), 163
Mahāvāṃsa, 245n57
Mahāvvyutpatti, 251n12
Mahāyāna-Abhidharma, 49, 246n15
“Mahayana and Hinayana Buddhism . . . as
Distinguishing in the Opening Chapter of the
Gaṇḍavyūha” (1932), xix, 150–54; publication
of, 150
Mahāyāna Buddhism: account of Enlighten-
ment, 96, 126; account of First Convoca-
tion, 244n43, 245n61; bodhisattvahood
in, 9, 21–22, 25–26, 60, 66, 74–75, 93, 150;
commonalities with Hinayāna, 25, 64,
75–76; conception of the Buddha, 79, 81, 82,
85–86, 112–13; concept of Nirvāṇa, 55–56,
60; contrasted with Hinayāna Buddhism,
25, 59, 63, 67, 71, 82; controversy over
whether expounded by Buddha, xvi, 112–13;
development of, 21, 58–59, 68, 112; divided
into Yogācāra and Madhyaika schools, 59;
denunciation of other sects, 68; emptiness in,
149; features of, 21–22, 25–26, 46–47, 48–49,
59–63, 162–63; international mission of,

- 194–95; karma in, 72–75, 124–26, 128; lack of understanding of, 15, 26; as mysticism, 70–71; name of, 66–67, 75; philosophy of nonbeing, 6; as religious, 71; schools of, 8, 45–46, 59, 68; as speculative, 67, 68, 75; Suzuki's proselytizing of, 186; Suzuki's publications on, xx; texts of, xvi, xxii, 15, 111, 115, 241n5, 245n61; viewed as nihilistic, 69–70; worldview of, 47, 246n22, 248n15. *See also* Buddhism; Mādhyamika school; "Mahayana and Hinayana Buddhism . . . as Distinguished in the Opening Chapter of the Gaṇḍavyūha"; "Mahayana Buddhism"; Pure Land Buddhism; Yogācāra school; Zen Buddhism
- "Mahayana Buddhism" (1902), 20–22
- Mahāyāna-mādhyamaka-śāstra-vyākhyā* (Sthiramati), 9
- Mahāyānasamgraha-śāstra* (Comprehensive Treatise on Mahayanism; Asaṅga), 46, 48, 61, 246n6; Vasubandhu's commentary, 48, 55
- Mahāyāna Sūtrālamkāra*, Levi translation, 44, 45
- Mahayanist* (journal), 238n3
- Mahīśāka-nikāya-pañcavarga-vinaya* (Misha-saibu hexi wufenlǔ), 28
- Mahīśāsaka school, 29, 31, 50, 242n17. *See also* *Pañcavarga-vinaya*
- Maitreya, 165, 227, 258n4; cult of, 258n3; incarnated as Budai, 168. *See also* Budai
- Majjhima-Nikāya, 109, 250n1
- manas* (consciousness), 45, 49, 53–54, 246n16
- Mañjuśrī, 148, 157, 257n1
- Manovijñāna (ego-consciousness), 53–54, 61, 62
- Manual of Zen Buddhism*, xiii
- Māra, 99
- materialism, 23, 47, 167, 196
- Mātṛkā, 38
- Matsugaoka Bunko, xiv, xxiii, 199, 219
- Maya, 19
- Mazu Daoyi (Baso), 223, 260n1
- meaning of life, 220. *See also* reality
- medicaments, 35, 36
- meditation, 90–91, 104; *samādhi*, 47, 53, 144. *See also* *dhyāna*
- Meiji Restoration, 187, 189
- merit, 10, 73, 161; of bodhisattvas, 74, 120, 144, 158, 159–60, 162; of the Buddha, 120, 124, 125; transfer of, 65, 74, 195–96
- Middle Path: in the eight negations (*babū zhongdao*), 4–5; in Mādhyamika doctrine, 6–7, 9; and the two kinds of truth, 5, 6
- Middling Agama, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41
- Milindapañha*, 120
- minor precepts, 39
- miracles, 85, 86; in the *Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra*, 153; through self-concentration, 102, 252n19
- Miscellaneous Agama (Samyutta Nikāya), 35, 36, 39
- Miscellaneous Piṭaka, 35, 36, 39
- Mizuno Kōgen, 238n4
- mokṣa (deliverance), 6, 40
- Molinos, 135
- monachism, 19, 21
- mondō*, 202–3, 204, 228–29, 230, 234–35, 236
- monergism, 174, 177, 258n8
- monk-painters, 169
- monks. *See* Buddhist priesthood
- moral conduct, 98, 101
- moral responsibility, 75, 123, 124
- Moteng, *Sūtra of Forty-Two Sections*, 56
- Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* (Nāgārjuna), 122, 249n3, 253n9
- Mūlasarvāstivāda-nikāya-vinaya-saṃyuktavastu* (*Genben shuo yiqie youbu pinaiye zashi*), 28
- Müller, Max, xvii
- Munigāthā, 243n34
- Muqi Fachang (Mokkei), 169
- Murakami Senshō, 111; *Bukkyō toitsuron* (A Theory for the Integration of Buddhism), 192
- Musashino University, 238n4
- mutuality, 196, 215
- Muzhou Daoming, 212, 259n6
- myōkōnin*, xx, 199, 254n25, 260n8 (chap. 18). *See also* Shōmatsu
- mysticism, 23, 70–71, 130, 134; Buddhism and, 215, 225, 228, 229; Christian, 118, 137, 199, 215, 255n43; Daoist, 169; mystic prayer, 255n43; nature, 216
- Nāga Palace, 37, 243n42, 244n42
- Nāgārjuna: *Book of the Mean*, 70, 249n3; disciples of, 12; double body theory of the Buddha, 87; *Dvādaśanikāya-śāstra* (*Shi er men lun*), 10, 46; as founder of Mādhyamika school, 46; on karma, 122, 128; and the Mahāyāna conception of the Buddha, 85; *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*, 122, 253n9; philosophy, 4, 15, 240n13; times of, 58, 59, 247n1; treatise on the Prajñāpāramitā, 87; works of, 29. *See also* Mādhyamika school
- name-and-form (*nāmarūpa*), 93
- nānāta (entrance of diversity), 248n15
- Nanjō Bun'yū, xiii, xv, xviii, xxi, xxii, 238n4; *Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripitaka*, xvii–xviii, 3, 44, 242n4

- Nāstika, 6, 7
 Nata, Prince, 231–32
 National Medal of Culture, xiv, xxiv
 nationalism, 186
 negation, 69–70, 72. *See also sokuhi no ronri*
 negativism, 107–10, 206. *See also nihilism*
nenbutsu: in Chinese Pure Land Buddhism, 171, 172–73, 175–76, 259n13; faith in, 217; Hōnen Shōnin on, 136; Nenbutsu Zen, 170; practice of, xii, 172–73; and prayer, 139–40, 255n43; relationship to Chan, 165, 169, 170; Shinran on, 133, 136. *See also Amida*
 Neo-Confucianism, 241nn2–4 (chap. 2)
 Neumann, Karl Eugen, 250n1
nianfo. *See nenbutsu*
 Nichiren sect, 68
 Nidānas, 35, 99
 nihilism, 24, 25, 26, 69, 109. *See also* “Is Buddhism Nihilistic?”
Nihonteki reisei (Japanese Spirituality, 1944), xx, 181; English translation of 1972, 198; as reflection of Suzuki’s religious outlook in his seventies, 198
 Nirmāṇakāya, 64, 87
 Nirvāṇa: and the *ālayavijñāna*, 248n10; attainment of, 122; Buddha’s entrance into, 29, 30, 33, 34, 40, 94, 109–10; Buddha’s understanding of, 109–10; Eitel on, 69; as extinction of vitality, 24; four forms of, 55; Mahāyāna concept of, 55–56, 60; and the principle of karma, 123; that has no abode, 47; Yogācāra conception of, 47, 55. *See also* Parinirvāṇa
Nirvana Sutra, 83
 Nishida Kitarō, xii, 219, 237n2; *An Inquiry into the Good*, 219; *mujunteki jiko dōitsu*, 259n3
 Nishi Honganji, 17. *See also Light of Dharma* (journal)
 non-abiding, 147. *See also śūnyatā*
 non-atman (*anātman*/non-ego), 21, 60, 128; doctrine of, 18–19, 24, 63, 68–70, 101, 137
 nonbeing, Mahāyāna philosophy of, 6, 8. *See also* being and nonbeing; *śūnyatā*
 nondiscrimination. *See* discrimination and non-discrimination
 Nonomura Naotarō, *Jōdokyō no hihan* (Critique of the Pure Land Teaching), 112
 Northern and Southern Buddhism, 66
 “Notes on the Avatamsaka Sutra” (1921), xix; introductory essay accompanying third installment, 88–91; publication of, 88
 noumena and phenomena, 5, 10, 60, 90
 obedience, 255n33
 objectivity. *See* intellect: objectivity of
 Olcott, Henry, 17
 Oldenburg, Hermann, 28
 Omar Khayyam, 20
 “one thought” (*ekacitta*), 62, 96
On Indian Mahayana Buddhism (1968), xxiv
 Ono, Dr. Genmyō, 171
 Open Court Publishing Company, xii, 27
 oriental mind, 211. *See also* Chinese mind
 original vows (*pūrvapraṇidhāna*), 106, 153, 154; of Amida, 131, 132–33, 136, 139, 172, 175, 213, 214–15, 255n43
 origination: law of, 95, 97, 98, 99, 250n4; theory of, 92, 104. *See also* causation; twelvefold chain of dependent origination
 Ōtani University, xiii, xxi, xxii, 112, 238n6
 other-power: (*tariki*), 118, 131, 133, 139, 146, 173, 199. *See also* self-power and other-power
Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism (1907), xxiii, 241n6; concept of *dharmakāya*, 65; as defense of Mahāyāna, 150; excerpts from chapter 2, 58–64; idiosyncratic approach, xi, xx, 45; misspellings of Sanskrit words, xxi; publication of, xii, 58; reception of, 58; theological approach in, 17, 58
 pain (*duḥka*), 103, 106, 123
 Pāli, xxi, 15, 27, 58, 67, 92; texts in, 26, 35, 40, 67, 86, 102, 113, 192, 245n60; verse in, 24, 241n1 (chap. 4); words used by Suzuki, 237n1
Pañcavarga-vinaya (Vinaya in Five Divisions), 31, 32, 33, 34, 242n20, 243n38, 245n66; account of First Convocation, 35–36; on the incident of Purāṇa, 42
 Pañña, 104
 pantheism, xxiv, 19, 21, 90, 210, 225, 248n15
 Pārājika (Principal Precepts), 35, 36, 38, 39, 244nn47–48
 Paramārtha, 246n21, 247n6; translation of *Dasheng qixin lun*, 14, 56
Paramārthasatya (supreme truth), 5–6, 47, 48
pāramitās (perfections): six, 47, 62, 90, 117, 122, 138; ten, 11
paratantra-lakṣana, 47–48, 61
parāvṛtti, 227
 Pārāyana, 35
parikalpita-lakṣana, 47, 61
pariṇāmanā, 65, 72–75
 Parinirvāṇa, 30, 83, 87, 146. *See also* Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra; Nirvāṇa

- Parinīṣpanna lakṣaṇa*, 5, 47, 48, 61
- Parivāra, 40
- Pascal, Blaise, 206, 208–9
- passivity: absolute, 130, 131; and activity, 130, 140; in Buddhist life, 143–46; and emptiness, 137; and ignorance, 137; and *kōan* practice, 118, 141–43; and the Mahāyāna interpretation of karma, 128; as non-ego, 137; as other-power, 118, 129, 139; psychology of, 129; and religious experience, 119; in Shin Buddhism, 131–32, 132–33; and the six *pāramitās*, 138; in Zen, 119, 140, 143. *See also* “Passivity in the Buddhist Life”
- “Passivity in the Buddhist Life” (1930): conception of self, 123–24; doctrine of karma, 119–23; emptiness and Zen life, 147–49; function of the *kōan*, 141–43; Mahāyāna Buddhism on the theory of karma, 124–26; passivity and patience, 138–39; perfection of passivism, 143–47; prayer and *nenbutsu*, 139–40; preliminary note, 119; psychology of passivity, 129–38; publication of, 118; sin in Buddhism, 126–29; *zazen*, 140–41
- Path (*mārga*), 39, 40–41
- pañicca-samuppāda*. *See* *pratītya-samutpāda*.
- Paul (apostle), 20
- peace, 18, 22, 23; and goodwill, 76
- Pelliot Collection, xiii
- Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines*, 255n39
- Petrucchi, 135
- philosophy, 220–21, 223, 233, 235, 236; of religion, 219. *See also* Buddhist philosophy
- “Philosophy of the Yogācāra” (1904), 44–45; additional note, 56–57; *ālaya* and *ālayavijñāna*, 48–49, 50–55; *citta* and *manas*, 49; conception of Nirvāṇa, 55–56; epistemology, 47–48; Mādhyamika and Yogācāra, 45–46; misrepresentation of Yogācāra, 50; publication of, 45; relationship of *ālaya* and *manas*, 53–54; ten features of excellence, 46–47; why not explicitly taught, 50. *See also* Yogācāra school
- Piṅgala, *Mādhyamika-śāstra*, 7, 9, 46, 240n13
- Pippala Cave, 36
- Pippala Rock, 43
- Piṭakas, compilation of, 29–30, 35, 244n52. *See also* Tripiṭaka
- Pośadha, 35, 38
- Poṭṭhapāda-Sutta*, 103, 252nn20–21
- Prabhākaramitra, translation of Fenbie Ming’s *Prajñāpāramitāśāstravyākhyā*, 9
- Prabhūtaratna, 116
- prajñā* (wisdom): and affirmation-in-negation, 183–84, 186, 188; and compassion, 210, 212, 216; contrasted with *jñāna*, 182; as *dharmakāya*, 225–26; and *dhyāna*, 141; in the *Diamond Sutra*, 183; and the dualism of being and nonbeing, 216; *ekacittkeṣaṇa-samyukta-prajñā*, 96; and Kegon doctrine of interpenetration, 90–91; in Mahāyāna, 47, 67; as the nondiscriminating mind, 201; and passivity, 118, 143; *prajñā*-intuition, 231; in six *pāramitās*, 62, 138; translation of, 182; and two forms of truth, 6; and *vijñāna*, 201; in Zen, 143. *See also* *Prajñāpāramitā*; *Prajñāpāramitā* sūtra corpus
- Prajñāpāramitā*, 143, 147, 148, 252n19; Nagarjuna’s treatise on, 87
- Prajñāpāramitā* sūtra corpus, 4, 46, 149, 182, 207, 208, 211, 250n2, 259n1 (chap. 16); emptiness in, 147; and *sokuhi*, xvi, 181
- Prajñāruci*, translation of Asaṅga’s *Mādhyāntānugama-śāstra*, 9
- Prakrit, xvii, xxi, 57
- prākṛti*, 51, 55, 248n10
- pranidhāna* (vows), 154, 163. *See also* original vows
- Prātimokṣa of Bhikṣu and Bhikṣuṇī, 35, 40
- pratītya-samutpāda* / *pañicca-samuppāda* (dependent origination), 92, 95, 97, 98, 99, 250n4
- pratīvega-vivardhana*, 160
- Pratyātmāryajñāna, 147
- pratyekabuddhas*, 9, 39, 59, 75
- prayer, 206, 255n43; *nenbutsu* as, 140, 255n43
- primary body, 231, 232
- prodigal son, 105
- prolongation of life, 33
- Protestantism, 139
- Puṇḍarika sect, 68
- Purāṇa, 41–42
- “pure experience,” 228–29, 230, 231, 233
- Pure Land Buddhism: as Buddhism of bodhisattvas, 66; in China, 170–73; comparison with Zen, 166, 174–77; development of, 216; ignorance in, 136; as the *karuṇā* phase of Mahāyāna, 216; Land of Purity in, 124; other-power in, 118, 131, 177; religious life in, 146–47; Suzuki’s mother’s association with, xii; Suzuki’s postwar appreciation of, xvi, 198–99; of Yinguang, 166. *See also* Amida; Jōdo; Land of Purity (Pure Land); Shin Buddhism; Yinguang

- purity, five sorts of, 39
puruṣa (soul), 248n10
 Putuo temple (Zhejiang), 165
- Qixinlun*. See *Awakening of Faith*
Questions of the Śakra-deva, 35
- Rājagṛha, 32, 35, 41, 42
rāṅgaku, xvii
 reality, 127, 155, 162, 171, 175, 193, 200, 211, 213;
 limit of, 158, 160; secret working of, 229. See
 also "Buddhist Conception of Reality, The";
 ultimate reality
 rebirth, 101; in the Pure Land, 131, 133, 136, 175
Record of the Collection of the Tripiṭaka, 30
Record of the Compilation of the Three Piṭakas
 and the Miscellaneous Piṭaka (Zhuanji san-
 zang ji zazang zhuan), 29
Record of the Compilation of the Tripiṭaka and
 the Saṃyuktapiṭaka, 34
Record of the Transmission of the Dharmapiṭaka,
 30, 34, 242n19
 regulations of the Karmavācā, 38
 reincarnation, 53. See also rebirth
 relics (*śārīra*), 30
 religion, 199–200; comparative, xi, xiv, xxiii, 14,
 26; and ethics, 214; institutionalized, 193;
 passivity and, 133; religious experience, 135,
 137, 146–47; religious systems, 26, 67; and
 superstition, 13, 200
 residing season, 35, 38
 Rhys Davids, C. A. F., 17, 250n1
 Rhys Davids, T. W., xx, 17, 80, 250n1
 Rinzai (Linji, d. 867), 133, 254n26
 Rinzai Zen, xii, 133
 Rizhao (Nisshō/Divākara), 3, 239n2
 robes, 35
 rope and snake analogy, 47–48, 61–62
Ru fajie pin (Nyū hokkai bon), 150
- Sadāprarudita, Bodhisattva, 138, 139, 255n39
saddharma-puṇḍarīka-samādhi (Fahua Sanmei),
 107
Saddharma-puṇḍarīka-sūtra, 9, 86, 150, 204, 205,
 238n8, 241n5
sāgara-mudrā-samādhi, 89
 St. Francis, 253n19
 Śakra-devendra, 147
 Śakrendra, 89, 161
 Śākyamuni, 81, 86, 116, 136, 139; Buddhist revela-
 tion to, 20–21; deification of, 84, 85, 127;
 taught by Dīpaṃkara Buddha, 229. See also
 Buddha
 salvation, xxiv, 26, 48, 215, 216, 227; by act of the
 will, 106; by faith, 21, 82; Great Vehicle of, 64,
 68; hindrances to, 246n22; individual, 60,
 126; and passivity, 119; in Shin Buddhism, 133,
 135, 136; universal, 50, 56, 60, 125
samādhi, 47, 53; *saddharma-puṇḍarīka-samādhi*,
 107; *sāgara-mudrā-samādhi*, 89; Samādhi of
 Cessation, 144; Sīṃhaviṃśambhita, 155
 Samantabhadra, 154, 156, 157, 257n1; Deeds of
 Samantabhadra, 90; vows of, 162; wisdom-
 eye of, 160
satatā (entrance of sameness), 248n15
śamatha (tranquilization), 38
Samayabhedo-paracana-cakra, 87, 249n6
 Saṃbhogakāya (Body of Bliss), 64, 87, 247n8
saṃbodhi, 93, 98; *saṃyaksambodhi* (most perfect
 wisdom), 71, 98, 247n2. See also Buddha:
 Enlightenment of
Samdhinirmocana-sūtra, 46, 47, 49
 Saṃgha: in Hinayāna Buddhism, 68, 80, 81; role
 in scripture creation, 111; women's admit-
 tance to, 33, 34. See also *triratna*
 Saṃghabhadra, 28
Samgīti-sūtra, 35, 36
 Sāṃkhya philosophy, 15, 17, 48, 51, 54, 108–9,
 248n10
saṃsāra (birth and death), 63, 222. See also birth
 and death
saṃvṛtisatya (conditional truth), 5–6, 47; Su-
 zuki's spelling of, 240n11
saṃyaksambodhi (most perfect wisdom), 71, 98,
 247n2
Saṃyukta sūtra, 40. See also Coincidence Agama
Saṃyukta-piṭaka, 30, 34
Saṃyutta-nikāya, 120, 250n1
 Saṃgha. See Saṃgha
 Sanlun Zong (Three Śāstra sect), 4, 5, 7, 8–9,
 239n4, 240n5
 Sanskrit, xxi–xxii, 3, 27. See also Indic terminology
 Sanskrit Buddhist Texts Publishing Society,
 239n14
 Saptaparnā Cave, 43
 Śāriputra, 30, 148, 157
sarvajñatva (all-knowledge), 246n22
 Sarvāstivāda school, 28, 30, 244n47; Vinaya text
 of, 30, 36–39. See also *Sarvāstivāda-vinaya*
Sarvāstivāda-vinaya, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36–39,
 243n26, 31–32, 243–44n42
 Sasaki Gesshō, xiii

- Sasaki Shizuka, xxi
Sata-śāstra (*Bai lun*), 10, 46, 240–41n19
 Satō Taira, 259n1 (chap. 17)
Satyasiddhi-śāstra, followers of, 6
 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 45, 54, 107
 science, 196–97
 Scythians, 17, 21
 seeing and insight, 250–51n5
 Sekishitsu Zendō (Shishi Shandao), 233–34
 Sekisō (Shishuang), 231, 260n5
 self: conception of, 123–24; reality beyond, 126–28. *See also* individual existence
 self-nature (*svabhāva*), 162
 self-power and other-power, 92, 127, 129, 131–32, 134, 140, 174–75, 258n8. *See also* *tariki*
 Sengzhao, 240–41n19
senkasei (selected track students), xii, 237n2
shabetsu/mushabetsu, 259n1 (chap. 18). *See also* distinction and nondistinction
 Shaku Kōzen, xxi–xxii
 Shaku Sōen, xii, xviii, 17, 242n2; “Sermons of a Buddhist Abbot,” 241n6
 Shenhui, *Yulu*, 165
 Shenxiu, 136
 Shide, 258n3
 Shin Buddhism (Shinshū): and the flourishing of the Japanese spirit, 192; harmonized with Zen, 134; passivity of, 139, 147; scholarship on, 238n4; Suzuki’s mother’s association with, xii; and Suzuki’s late publications, xvi, xx, xxiii, 199; teachers of, 133, 135; view of merit transfer, 195–96; view of self-power and other-power, 127, 129, 131, 258n8; Yinguang’s view of, 173. *See also* Amida; Pure Land Buddhism; self-power and other-power; Shinran
Shina Bukkyō inshōki (Record of Impressions of Chinese Buddhism, 1934), 166. *See also* “Impressions of Chinese Buddhism”
 Shingon sect, xxi
 Shinran, xxiii, 131, 133–34, 192, 195–96, 199, 216; *Kyōgyōshinshō*, ix, xx, xxiii, 238n4; *Tannishō*, xix, 133, 136, 238n4
 Shintoism, 12–13
Shin’yaku Bukkyō seiten (New Translation of Buddhist Scriptures), xv
shishi wuai (interpenetration of objects), 199. *See also* interpenetration; *jiji-muge*
 Shitōu Xiqian (Sekitō), 223, 254n30, 260n1
 Shōmatsu, 199, 216–17, 260n8 (chap. 18)
 Shōtoku, Prince, 204
shūgaku methodology, xv, 238n4
 Shūkō (Zhuhong) of Unseiji, 170, 172
Shūshogi, 238n4
 Siddhartha, 84. *See also* Buddha; Śākyamuni
 Śikṣānanda, translation of *Dasheng qixin lun*, 14
śikṣās (rules of propriety), 38, 244nn47–48; ten *śikṣās*, 63, 248n14
śīla (moral precepts), 62, 67, 90–91, 98
 Śīlabhadra, 8
 sin: in Buddhism, 126–29; cleansing of, 127, 129; five dreadful sins, 41; principal sins, 35, 39; in Shin Buddhism, 132
 six Āyatanas, 37
 six *pāramitās* (perfections), 47, 62, 90, 117, 122, 138
 six *vijñānas* (senses), 49, 53, 54
 Skandhaka, 40
skandhas (aggregates), 36, 37, 49, 50, 57, 121–22
 skillful means (*upāya-kauśalya*), 26, 60, 228
smṛti (recollections), 38
 Society for the Publication of Sacred Books of the World, 239n14
sokuhi no ronri (logic of affirmation-in-negation), xvi, 66, 125, 181, 182–84, 186, 188, 189–90, 259n3; in *The Essence of Buddhism* (1946), 199. *See also* “Logic of Affirmation-in-Negation, The”
Song Biographies of Eminent Buddhist Priests (*Song Gaoseng zhuan*), 168, 258n3
 Song philosophy, 169
 Sonoda, Rev., 241n4 (chap. 4)
sonomama (*yathābhūtam*), 134
 Sōtō sect, 238n4
 soul, 53, 54, 98, 103, 108, 248n10; *citta* as, 45, 49; ego-soul, 19, 61, 69, 70, 71, 151; soul-life, 21, 95, 98
Sourcebook in Japanese Philosophy (ed. Heisig, Maraldo, and Kasulis, 2011), 182
 speaking engagements, xiv; lectures for the emperor (1946), xiii–xiv, 198, 199; University of Hawai‘i (1949), xxi, xxiii, 219; World Congress of Faiths (1936), xiii
 speculative Buddhism, 67, 68, 75
 spiritual freedom, 101, 103, 108–9
 spirituality, 200–201, 206–7; Buddhist, 198; and human greatness, 209–10; and intellect, 207–8, 209, 214, 215–16; Japanese, 183, 191, 196–97; light as, 162; logic of, 183, 184–85
 spiritual leaders, 247n7
 spiritual unification, 226–27
Śrāmaṇyaphala-sūtra, 36, 40

- śrāvakas*, 37, 55, 148; contrasted with bodhisattvas, 157–62; doctrinal struggles with bodhisattva class, 59; in the *Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra*, 151, 157–62, 163; Hinayāna and, 9; interpretation of the ten moral precepts, 63
- Śrāvakayāna, 75
- Śrīmālā-sūtra, 9, 87, 204
- Sthavira school, 66, 245n56
- Sthiramati, 247n1; *Introduction to Mahāyānism*, 59; *Mahāyāna-madhyamaka-śāstra-vyākhyā*, 9, 240n16
- Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* (1930), xix, 138, 239n13
- Subhadra, 29, 242nn16–17
- Subhūti, 139, 147–48, 157
- subjectivism, 7, 22, 23, 166, 176, 228; subjective ignorance, 18–20, 54, 55, 61, 62
- suchness: in Aśvaghoṣa's *Awakening of the Faith*, 54, 70; Bhūtataṭhātā, 8, 48, 55, 246n23; in Mahāyāna, 63, 70–71; *tathābhāva*, 98
- Sudarśana, 161
- Sudarśana-vinaya*, 40
- Sudarśana-vinaya-vibhāṣā* (*Shanjianlū piposha*), 28, 29, 31, 34, 242n17
- Sudhana, 227, 154, 257n1, 258n4
- Su Dongpo (Su Shi), 174
- Sukhāvati (Jōdo) sects, 13. *See also* Jōdo
- Sukhāvativyūha*, 150
- Sumeru, Mount, 161
- sūnya* (no thought awakened), 235; *sūnya*-ness of existence, 5
- sūnyādin*, 69. *See also* nihilism
- sūnyatā* (emptiness): as the Absolute, 211; Buddhist masters on, 234–35; as Buddhist reality, 236; and conditionality, 10; interpretation and misunderstandings of, 8, 138, 234, 257n65; Mādhyamika school conception of, 4, 5, 7, 46; *mondō* about, 230–31; passivity and, 137, 139; in the *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*, 147; as subject for compilation at first convocation, 38; in Zen, 147–49
- supernatural, 85, 144, 146, 162, 255n43; four supernatural powers, 33, 37, 38
- superstition, 11, 12, 13, 21
- Sūtra of Perfect Enlightenment*, 141
- Sūtra of the Lotus of the Good Law* (Lotus Sutra), 141
- Sūtra on Kāśyapa's Compilation* (*Jiashe jie jing*), 29, 32, 33, 34
- Sūtra on the Cause and Effect in the Past and Present*, 250n1
- Sūtrapiṭaka, 35, 36, 244nn44, 51–52
- sūtras, compilation of, at the First Convocation, 37–38
- Suvarṇaprabhāśottama*, xix
- Suvarṇaprabhāsa-sūtra*, xxii
- Suzuki, Daisetsu Teitarō: approach to Buddhism, xiii, xv–xvi, xviii–xix, xxii; archive, xiv; career of, xiii–xiv, xviii; death of, xiii; devotion to Zen and Pure Land, xvi, xxiii, 198–99; diaries of, xix, xxii; education of, xii, 237n2; employment with Carus, xii; English-language study, xii; family background, xii; as interpreter for Shaku Sōen, xii, xviii; knowledge of Sanskrit and Indic languages, xx–xxii, 27; medal for contribution to Buddhist Studies, xiv, xxiv; posthumous publications, xxiii, xxiv, 219; publications, xix–xx; religious understanding of Buddhism, 198; return to Kamakura, xiii, xiv; as spokesman for Buddhism to the West, xi–xii, xx; on translation, 16; trip to China and Korea in 1934, 165, 166; Zen training, xii
- Suzuki family, xii, 165
- Suzuki Foundation (Suzuki Gakujutsu Shinkōkai), xi
- svabhāva* (self-nature/self-substance), 124, 126, 127, 162
- Swedengborgianism, 27, 239n15, 242n2; Swedenborg Society, xiii
- Taiping rebellion, 167
- Takakusu Junjirō, 45, 238n4
- Tan'è, 258n3
- taṇhā* (craving), 93, 94, 95, 97, 99, 108
- Tanluan, 139
- Tannishō* (Shinran), xix, 133, 136, 238n4
- tariki* (other-power), 118, 131, 133, 139, 146, 173, 199. *See also* self-power and other-power
- Tathāgata, 85, 87, 95, 101–2, 146, 152, 158, 163, 164, 195, 252n19; *ālaya* preached by, 50; as appellation for the Buddha, 84, 249n4 (chap. 9); Tathāgatahood, 144, 145, 156, 159–60, 161; vow of, 131. *See also* Buddha
- tathāgatagarbha*, xx, 54–55, 126, 150, 204
- tattva* (suchness), 70. *See also* suchness
- Tenjiku Tokubē, xvii; *Tenjiku tōkai monogatari*, 238n7
- Tenshō Embassy, 238n7
- Theologia Germanica*, 257n65
- Theravāda Buddhism, xx, xxi, 65, 111, 244n54, 245n57. *See also* Hinayāna Buddhism

- Three Bonds, 102
 three evil passions, 33
 threefold Buddhist discipline, 67, 172
 threefold heart, 136
 three Mahāyānaśāstras, 47
 Three Śāstra sect (Sanlun Zong), 4, 9, 239n4,
 240n5; and the *Mādhyamika-śāstra*, 7;
 Suzuki's translation of *lun* and *zong*, 240n5;
 view of variant Buddhist teachings, 8–9. *See*
 also *Mādhyamika* school
 Three Vedas, 103–4
 “thus knowing, thus seeing,” 101, 251–52n16
 Tiantai sect, 13, 14, 107; assaults on Zen, 136–37
 Tiantong temple (Zhejiang), 165
 Tibetan Buddhism, 66
 Tibetan canon, xi, 237n1
 Tibetan language, 237n1
 time-conception, 99, 105, 151, 205, 222
tīrthakas (*waidao*), 12, 29, 47, 241n1 (chap. 2)
 Tokyo Imperial University (University of Tokyo),
 xii, xxi, 111, 237n2
 Tominaga Nakamoto, xvii, 111
 Tōrei, *Changuan cejin* edition, 256n55
 Tōsu (Touzi), 231, 232–33, 236
 totalitarianism, 213
 Tōzan (Dongshan), 231, 254n30, 260n5
 Transcendentalists, 238n8
 transformation, 7, 10, 37, 52, 223; body of, 64, 154;
 in *Jetavana*, 153, 155, 157, 158, 159–60, 163
 transmigration, 26, 55, 63, 87, 133, 159–60. *See*
 also birth and death; rebirth
Transmission of the Dharmapīṭaka, 29, 30, 34,
 242n19
Transmission of the Lamp, 168
 Trikāya, doctrine of, 64, 81, 87, 248n16
 Tripiṭaka: compilation of, 36, 244n43; definition
 of, 40; Japanese edition of Chinese, 242n4,
 258n3; Pāli *Tipiṭaka*, 67; use of term, 244n52.
 See also Pitakas, compilation of
triratna (threefold treasure), 30, 68, 80, 87
 twelvefold chain of dependent origination, 51, 95,
 99, 115, 116–17, 120
 two forms of truth, 5–6, 47

Udānavarga, 241n2 (chap. 4)
 Uddaka, 109
 ultimate reality, 44, 47, 126, 142, 172, 220–21, 229;
 ālayavijñāna as, 45, 48, 49; *dharmakāya* as,
 249n1 (chap. 8); *śūnyatā* as, 230–31; Vairo-
 cana Buddha as, 232
 “uninterpreted sensation,” 233

 United States, Japanese immigrants in, 17
 universal love, 20, 60
 universal salvation, 50, 56, 60, 125
 University of Chicago, xviii
 University of Hawai'i, xiv; “Buddhist Conception
 of Reality” lecture, xxi, xxiii, 219
 University of Tokyo (Tokyo Imperial University),
 xii, xxi, 111, 237n2
upādāna (grasping), 95
 Upaka, 97
 Upāli: and the censure of Ānanda, 32, 35, 242n21;
 and the compilation of the *Vinaya*, 38, 39,
 244n48; as *Vinaya-dhara*, 38, 39, 40, 41,
 245n55
 Upaniṣad philosophy, 15
upāsakas and *upāsikās*, preachings for, 35, 36, 38
upāya, 6, 26, 60, 228
 utilitarianism, 186, 187–88

 Vaipulya-Mahāyānism, 6, 35
 Vairocana Buddha, 86, 90, 232
Vairocana-sūtra, commentaries, 57
vaiśāradyam, four sorts of, 85
 Vaiśeṣika, 51
Vajracchedika-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra (*Diamond*
 Sutra), xv, xvi, 139, 147, 150, 183, 254n28
 Vajracitta, 52
 Vajragarbha, Bodhisattva, 144
Vajrasamādhi-sūtra, 105
 Vajrayāna, 239n2
 Vārāṇasī (Benāres), 37, 38, 40, 97, 243n41
vastu, 259n5
 Vasubandhu, 46, 50, 61;
 Abhūdharmaśāstra, 253n9; commen-
 taries of, 10, 48, 55, 240n12, 246n16, 249n3
 (chap. 9); *Sheng siwei fantiansuowen jinglun*,
 240n12; *Vijñānamātra-śāstra*, 48
 Vasumitra, 87
 Vedas, 103–4, 221; Veda-worshippers, 21
vijñāna (consciousness), 50, 182, 201. *See also*
 ālayavijñāna
vijñānamātra, 62
Vijñānamātra-śāstra (Vasubandhu), 5, 48
Vijñānamātra sect, 46. *See also* Dharmalakṣaṇa
 sect
Vijñānavāda sect, 3, 4. *See also* Dharmalakṣaṇa
 sect; Yogācāra school
Vijñaptimātrasiddhi-śāstra, 46
 Vimalakīrti, 148
Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra, 9, 147, 204, 216, 240n12
Vinaya in Five Divisions. *See* *Pañcavarga-vinaya*

- Vinaya in Four Divisions*. See *Caturvarga-vinaya* (*Sifen lü*)
- Vinaya-mātrkā-sūtra* (*Pinimu jing*), 28, 29, 32, 34, 36, 242n17; and the incident of Purana, 42
- Vinayapiṭaka, 36, 40, 244n52; compilation of, 35, 36, 38, 39
- Vinaya sect (Risshū), 66
- Vinaya texts, 28, 29–30, 39; of the Mahāsāṃghika school, 39–40; of the Sarvāstivāda school, 36–38; in Sinhalese Buddhism, 67; translations, 27. See also Upāli; Vinayapiṭaka
- vinñāna* (cognition), 93, 250n4
- vipaśyanā* (insight), 38
- vīrya* (energy), 62, 90, 138–39
- Viśeṣacintā-brahmaparipṛcchā-sūtra*, 9, 240n12
- Visuddhimagga*, 120, 137
- Voltaire, 215
- Vulture Peak, congregation at, 107, 116
- wandering season, 35, 38
- Wang Changshi, 212
- Wang Yangming, 12, 241n4 (chap. 2)
- war. See “Buddhist View of War, A”; Greater East Asia War
- Warren, Henry Clarke, 86
- Watts, Alan, xiii; preface to *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, 58
- Weitsang, translation of *Mahāyāna-madhyamaka-śāstra-vyākhyā*, 9
- Weiyuan (Yueshan/Yaoshan/Yakusan), 224, 254n30, 260n2
- “What Is Buddhism” (1902), 18–20
- What Is Zen?* (1971), 199
- will, 95, 105–8, 110; and self-power, 92, 131; split in two, 99–100; will power, 92, 97, 99, 102, 103. See also “Enlightenment and Ignorance”
- wisdom-eye (*jñānacakṣus*), 154, 156, 160
- women: devotees, 136, 255n36; misdemeanors involving, 33; in the Saṃgha, 33, 34
- Wonhyo, 239n2
- Woolman, John, 133
- World Congress of Faiths (1936), xiii
- world religion, 186
- World’s Parliament of Religions (1893), xii, xviii
- Wu Zetian (empress), 155, 239n2
- Wuzu Jie, 174
- xin sanlun*, 239n2. See also Sanlun Zong
- Xuanzang, 4, 29, 56, 244n43, 245n56; rendering of Indic words, 44, 56, 246n6; translation of *ālayavijñāna*, 57
- Xuedou, 148
- Xuefeng, 174
- Yahweh, 17
- Yakusan (Yaoshan/Yueshan), 224, 254n30, 260n2
- Yamabe Shūgaku, xiii, xv, 88, 238nn4,6
- Yan Lugong (Yan Zhenqing), 174
- yāna*, defined, 75
- Yanshou, 172
- Yao (legendary Chinese emperor), 214
- Yaoshan (Yueshan/Yakusan), 224, 254n30, 260n2
- Yijing, 28; *Record of Buddhism as Practiced in India Sent Home from the Southern Seas*, 45, 245n11
- Yinguang, 165–66, 172–73, 174; on *nianfo* practice, 259n13; sayings of, 174–76; *Yinguang Jiayan Lu*, 259n11, 259n13
- yixin* (one mind/one heart), 248n12
- Yogācāra school: concept of *ālayavijñāna*, 54, 61, 62; concept of Nirvāṇa, 47, 55; concept of “perfumed,” 52–53; contrasted with the Mādhyamika school, 45–46; creation of, 59; essential teachings of, 47; expounders of, 8, 46; influence of Sāṃkhya philosophy, 48, 54; introduced to China by Xuanzang, 4; scholars of, xiii; Suzuki’s views on, xvi, xx, 45; and the ten essential features of Buddhism, 61; texts and documents, 44–45, 46; three forces, 53; three kinds of knowledge, 47–48, 61–62; treatment of two forms of truth, 5; Yijing on, 45–46. See also Asaṅga; Dharmalakṣaṇa sect; “Philosophy of the Yogācāra”; Vasubandhu
- Yogācārābhūmi-śāstra* (Spiritual Stages of Yogācāra), 46, 59, 247n4
- Yokoyama, Wayne, 182, 259n3
- Yongquan, 174
- Yuanzhao, 172
- Yuanzong of Fayun, 256n46
- zazen*, 140, 141
- Zen and Its Influence on Japanese Culture* (1938), xiii
- “Zen and the Assertion that Mahayana Was Not Preached by the Buddha” (“Daijō hibusetsu to Zen”; 1926), 112–17; publication of, 111–12; translation of, 111, 112
- Zen Buddhism: appeal of, 170, 258n5; art, 169; attitude toward scholarship, 136–37; and the Buddha’s awakening, 114, 115, 116; in China,

- 168–69, 216; comparison with Pure Land, 166, 171, 172–73, 174–77, 216; of Deshan Xuanjian, 254n28; emptiness in, 147; founding of, 228–29; on freedom from causation, 207; harmonized with Shin, 134; and intellect, 140; and the issue of whether Mahāyāna was preached by the Buddha, 112, 113, 115, 116–17; logic of, 183–84; meditation in, 140–41, 255–56n46; mentioned, 66; as nature mysticism, 216; and passivity, 119, 256n59; philosophical insight in, 176; as representative of Mahāyāna, xvi; Rinzai Zen, xii, 133; and self-power, 140, 174–75; sense of return, 107; Suzuki's writings on, xvi, xxiii, 112, 166. *See also* Chan Buddhism; *kōan* practice; *mondō*; Zen stories
- Zenkan sakushin* (Breaking through the Frontier Gates of Zen), 142–43
- “Zen keiken no kenkyū ni tsuite” (On Research into Zen Experience, 1940), 181. *See also* “Logic of Affirmation-in-Negation, The”
- Zen stories, 207–9, 212. *See also mondō*
- Zhaizong, Emperor, 256n46
- Zhaozhou, 174
- zheng* (final enlightenment), 172, 175
- Zhenlang, 254n30
- Zhi Qian, 241n2 (chap. 4)
- Zhixu, 172
- Zhiyi (Zhizhe Dashi), 107
- Zhonglun*, 240n13. *See also Mādhyamika-śāstra*
- Zhu Fonian, 28
- Zhuhong (Shūkō) of Yunqi Si, 170, 172
- Zhu Xi, 12, 241n3 (chap. 2)
- Zonggao Daihui, 256n58
- Zongze, 255–56n46, 256n51
- Zuihitsu Zen* (Zen Essays, 1927), 112

Founded in 1893,
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
publishes bold, progressive books and journals
on topics in the arts, humanities, social sciences,
and natural sciences—with a focus on social
justice issues—that inspire thought and action
among readers worldwide.

The UC PRESS FOUNDATION
raises funds to uphold the press's vital role
as an independent, nonprofit publisher, and
receives philanthropic support from a wide
range of individuals and institutions—and from
committed readers like you. To learn more, visit
ucpress.edu/supportus.